Airbus trepidation... convince me otherwise!

[Jetjockey]

The only pilots who complain about the Bus are the ones who never flew it.

 

[IBNAV8R]

Sully may have been the hero (with a lot of skill but even more luck) in a single instance. But, there have been more than a few aw-s**ts when the airplane didn't react as commanded.

Commuting, I was ALWAYS happy to see the bus. Flying, I'd prefer to be the "pilot in command" rather than an operator requesting something from "Hal".

 

[SBD]

The tray is great! I came from a CRJ to the Bus so I understand your concern about the thrust levers. Overall I think it's a great plane. The MCDU/FMGC is something to get use to. As far as the thrust levers not moving, it's all about your scan to me. Look at the gauges and your PF. You'll also hear the engines spooling up for whatever you told the aircraft to do. Just like any other aircraft, kick off the A/P and you hand fly it. The different laws happen when the crap hits the fan. They'll teach you what to do and what you can control after. Only have been on it for about 3 months.

 

[Bringupthebird]

The 737 was certainly predictable, but your goal in the Airbus is to be so far ahead of it, that you anticipate it's response and can correct if necessary. The old joke is the new pilot says "Why is it doing that?" and the old pilot says "I don't know, but it's doing it again!" Do not try to bridge the gap between the Boeing and the Airbus, but learn how to prevent "it from doing that". That involves learning how the computers interact with each other, the flight controls and the pilots.

Just watch the airplane while it's on autopilot and think about how some engineers distilled everything you've learned about the art of flying into a computer program. Turning everything off is tempting, but counterproductive to learning and building confidence. Make it do what you want the way it should be done.

 

[scoreboardII]

Sully did just fine achieving hero status in the bus.

.

Which if he had full manual control of the motors he would have flown back around and landed it on the runway.

 

[B6Busdriver]

Which if he had full manual control of the motors he would have flown back around and landed it on the runway.

So now you think we should get rid of FADECs too?

 

[IBNAV8R]

The 737 was certainly predictable, but your goal in the Airbus is to be so far ahead of it, that you anticipate it's response and can correct if necessary. The old joke is the new pilot says "Why is it doing that?" and the old pilot says "I don't know, but it's doing it again!" Do not try to bridge the gap between the Boeing and the Airbus, but learn how to prevent "it from doing that". That involves learning how the computers interact with each other, the flight controls and the pilots.

Just watch the airplane while it's on autopilot and think about how some engineers distilled everything you've learned about the art of flying into a computer program. Turning everything off is tempting, but counterproductive to learning and building confidence. Make it do what you want the way it should be done.

That's why there's been several accidents. I guess those pilots just tried to do "pilot s**t", having never LEARNED the engineers' interpretation of how an aircraft should be flown.

Habshiem 1988
Bangalore 1990
Bucharest 1991
Strasbourg 1992
Tolouse 1994
Nagoya 1994
Warsaw 1993
Abu Dhabi 1997
Bacolod (Philippines) 1998
Abidjan 2000
Atlantic Ocean (off Brazil) 2009

Source: Airdisaster.com - only the accidents that cited warning systems associated with flight controls, autoflight/autothrottle/computer failures, crew misunderstanding of FMS/autoflight/autothrottle features.

Seems like a lot to me.

 

[waveflyer]

I've never flown another aircraft that required so much study. We all should study, but after type #7, I rely on previous systems a lot- and we all tend to coast a bit. In the bus, the best advice I got was treat class and study like I'm brand new to airlines. Clean slate, humble, and focused. The people who struggle are those that don't and try to make it a Boeing. As stated, it is a different mindset- monitor with eyes and not with hands- but they're right - now that I'm back with Boeing, I was probably not receiving as much info as I thought from the yoke and levers-
From the content of this thread, you'll be way ahead of those who struggle. Computers aren't going anywhere- you have to understand this Manual, or you're going to be dangerous relying on old habits
I didn't fly it long enough to contribute much- but that was the advice given to me and I felt the extra work did much to alleviate my own concerns-
I wish Boeing would get rid of the yoke

 

[aa73]

When you transition to it could you speed up the taxi. Thanks.

Fabulous! :laugh:

Thanks for all the replies, you have all eased my fears and made me look forward to it.

 

[macdu]

Airbus did NOT design the pilot out of the loop; Airbus did NOT design the airplane
to "override" the pilot; Airbus did NOT design the computer to "take over" the airplane
and Airbus did NOT design a flying video game!!!

The pilot is an integral part of the Airbus cockpit and, at all times, is "in the loop!" There is, however,
one caveat. There are numerous flight mode annunciations (FMAs) in the cockpit of an Airbus
airplane. If the pilot does not know, observe or understand the FMAs, he is asking for trouble.
It is imperative to know the FMAs, and as a former LCA with 80+ A320 Captain/First Officer
IOEs competed, I can confirm that a failure to know/understand the meaning of the FMAs can
only lead to bewilderment on the Airbus - but I could say the same thing about a Boeing - having
completed 60+ IOEs on the B737-300 and 50+ IOEs on the B777. You anti-Airbus guys better
be careful how you pick your fights, because I turn everything around and cite numerous
instances where Boeing pilots were as equally confused/uncertain about what was happening
in the cockpit. I got on the B737 in 1988, the A320 in 1994 and B777 in 1999, all relatively
"early on," (all as Captain and, eventually, as an LCA) in these airplanes lives at UAL and I saw
numerous instances where pilots new to glass*****did not understand what was happening - what the
airplane "was doing to them!" If you don't*****understand the FMAs - and some are rather subtle - there's
going to be a problem. I saw B737-300*****pilots hand fly every leg because they didn't understand the
autopilot and its various mode, didn't*****understand the FMAs*****and, I think, didn't want to embarrass
themselves by admitting it. (As a B737-300 LCA, I was asked, once, to Line Check a B737-300
Captain who had busted a PC. No Standards Captains/Flight Managers were available; I was and the
only Captain who needed the Check was within a day or two of running out of grace time for his check.
I asked the Captain why he needed the check and he was very forthright.*****He said, "I've been a "round dial"
pilot all my life, but I just can't make any sense of all the automation. I can hand fly the airplane and be
perfectly safe. And that's how I want to do it - until I retire in about three months." I gave him credit for
having such an honest attitude; he flew a flawless leg ORD-BNA and I signed him off!!!! And, I assume
he retired on time - and lived happily ever after!! *****) ) *****)

On the Airbus, the FMAs, like Boeing, are presented across the top of the PFD. On the Airbus, there
are five (5) columns of FMAs. Column 1: is Autothrottle Operation; Column 2: is Autopilot/Flight
Director (AP/FD) Vertical Modes; Column 3: is AP/FD Lateral Modes; Column 4: is Approach Capabilities
DH or MDA and Column 5: is Autopilot, Flight Director, Autothrust (AP, FD A/THR) Status. There are
also three (3) rows of FMAs: Row 1: is Engaged or Captured Modes; Row 2 is: Armed Modes and Row 3:
is Special Messages. And, a white box highlights each new annunciation for 10 seconds.

Additional, the FMAs and the ECAM (Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring) system use the following
color codes: RED = Requires immediate action; AMBER = Requires awareness but not immediate action;
GREEN = NORMAL long-term operation; WHITE = TITLES or REMARKS; BLUE = ACTIONS to be carried out
(Mnemonic is BLUE EQUALS YOU - something you did or need to do; MAGENTA = Special Messages, i.e.,
T.O. Inhibit or LDG Inhibit!

To explain the Airbus A320 Habsheim (A320 into the woods) accident, again:

The accident airplane was in NORMAL flight control law. NORMAl law is "normal;" there's no flight control law
"better" than NORMAL - no super-normal, no mega-normal, etc. In NORMAL law, you have three (3) axis control
and the following flight envelope protections: - load factor limitation; - pitch attitude protection; - high angle of
attack protection; - high speed protection, and - bank angle protection.

NORMAL law has both a Ground and a Flight mode. I'll skip the Ground mode discussion, but the Flight mode
is active from lift-off until Flare mode engages during landing at 50 feet RA.

NORMAL law - Pitch: The Normal flight mode is load factor demand law with automatic (pitch) trim and full
flight envelope protection that maintains a 1g load with the sidestick at neutral and the wings level. When using
the sidestick, the elevator and stabilizer trim achieve a load factor proportional to sidestick deflection. Pitch trim
is automatic with or without the autopilot engaged. (And the elevator trim wheel DOES move as the stab trims - my
comment!)

Automatic pitch trim is inhibited under the following conditions:

- Radio altitude (RA) is below 50 ft (100 ft with autopilot engaged)
- Load factor less than 0.5g
- High speed/Mach protection is active
- 33 deg bank exceeded
- Load factor greater than +1.25g (nose up trim inhibited)
- During manual trim (obviously!)

Load Factor Limitation:
- Flaps Retracted: +2.5g to -1.0g
-Flaps Extended: +2.0g to 0.0g

Pitch Attitude Protection:
The airplane's pitch attitude is protected, as follows:
- 30 deg nose up with Flaps (position) 0 to (position) 3,
**********progeressively reduced to 25 deg at low speed;
- 25 deg nose up with Flaps Full (progessively reduced to
**********20 deg at low speed;
- 15 deg nose down

The flight director bars are removed when pitch exceeds 25 deg up
or 13 deg down.

High Angle of Attack Protection: (In this discussion, I will substitute the symbol "@"
in place of the Greek letter for "alpha," which my keyboard doesn't have - or I can't find.

The alpha protection provided by Normal Law comprises three (3) angle of attack
functions. They are: (1) alpha protection (@ prot) alpha floor (@ floor) and alpha maximum
(@ max). The associated V speeds, V@ prot. V@ floor and V@ max vary with airplane weight
and configuration.

In pitch normal law, the elevator control changes from normal mode to a protection mode when the
angle of attack is greater than @ prot. When this occurs, the autopilot disconnects, the speed brakes
retract and the angle of attack is proportional to sidestick deflection. In the @ prot range, from @ prot*****
to @ max, the side stick demands an angle of attack directly; however, @ max cannot be exceeded even
if the sidestick is pulled and held fully back against the mechanical stop. If the sidestick is released,
the angle of attack returns to and maintains @ prot. This function, which provides protection against
stall and windshear has priority overcall other protections. On take-off, @ prot is equal to @ max for
5 seconds. If angle of attack protection is active, the sidestick must be pushed forward to return to the
normal mode.

The @ floor protection, which occurs at a predetermined angle of attack between @ prot and @ max, engages
the autothrottle system. TO/GA thrust is provided regardless of throttle position. The @ floor function *****is NOT
available in the landing configuration below 100 ft RA! (Any guesses why??????????)

NOTE: Alpha Floor is ONLY available in NORMAL (flight control) Law.

I provide the above explanations/descriptions so that you can't accuse me of editing out important information
about the Airbus' Normal flight control laws. *****)

CAUTION: Alpha Floor protection is only available in NORMAL Law.

A Low Energy Warnibg is triggered during deceleration before Alpha Floor ir reached. (The delays between Low
Energy Warning and Alpha Floor activation depends on deceleration rate.) "SPEED, SPEED, SPEED"
is repeated every 5 seconds to indicate airplane energy is lower than a threshold under which to recover a positive
flight path angle though pitch control; THRUST must be INCREASED! The low energy warning is computed by the
FACs (Flight Augmentation Computers), based on airplane configuration Flaps [position] (2, 3 or Full), airspeed
deceleration rate and flight path angle.

The Low Energy Warning is inhibited:
- When TO/GA is selected
- Below 100 ft RA and above 2,000 ft RA
- When Alpha Floor or a GPWS alert is triggered
- In ALTERNATE or DIRECT law
- If both RAs are failed
- At Flaps 1 or UP

- - -*****

The Captain of the Habsheim accident airplane: 1) did not receive Company or (French) FAA approval
to conduct the maneuver; 2) did not brief the F/O; 3) it was a revenue flight; passengers were on board;
4) had the airplane in the landing configuration; 5) was below 100 ft RA, thus Alpha Floor was disabled),
6) Low Energy Warning was also disabled.

I'm assuming that either the autothrottles were not engaged or the Mode Control Panel speed had been
manually dialed down to a normal Vapp speed. In any event, the engines were at relatively low thrust and
I'm sure the Captain was thinking, during*****the approach/low altitude fly-by, that "any second now the throttles
will go to TO/GA," I'll just pull gently back on the sidestick and the airplane will perform a nice go-around
maneuver. That did not happen as both Alpha Floor and the Low Energy Warning had been (inadvertently/
unknowingly) disabled. I think the Captain pushed the throttles up; but it was too late. The flight path angle
never became positive.