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Airbus trepidation... convince me otherwise!

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aa73

Well-known member
Joined
Oct 12, 2004
Posts
2,075
OK Folks this question has been a long time coming. I know I'm gonna hear a lot of good and bad from both camps... that's fine.

With the A319 only 1.5 years away from arriving here at AA, I'm trying to erase a long running hesitation in someday flying this bird. For years I strongly disliked the Airbus cockpit philosophy and was rather glad that AA chose to stay true to Boeing.

I've had the opportunity to j/s on United and USAir Airbus cockpits and I must say..... I'm still hesitant.

There is no doubt in my mind that this is one of the most comfy cockpits I have ever sat in. The ergonomics are spectacular. Everything flows nicely.

But... I still question: Are the pilots REALLY in control? I had a lot of difficulty watching the engine instruments register changes without the throttles moving. I never quite knew what the engines were doing. Why are the throttles locked at Climb Thrust with the engines back at idle? This stuff really conflicts with my "Boeing-warped" mind.

I also had a tough time comparing aircraft pitch/roll commands without seeing a corresponding stick movement. Why, because the other stick doesn't move. How does the other pilot know what the flying pilot is doing?

Lastly: I understand that the stick commands a RATE, not simply a control surface movement. So if you bang in left stick and center it, the aircraft will continue rolling left until you bang in right stick. VERY disconcerting to me: I expect that, if you bang in left stick and center it, the aircraft would stop rolling, not increase it.

As I understand it, the 777, while still FBW, maintained the Boeing philosophy of keeping it a pilot's airplane.

As you can see, I have serious issues with this philosophy, not to mention the fact that this "pilot out of the loop" philosophy may have contributed to the lack of SA exhibited with Air France 447. I want to feel comfortable with the Airbus as this aircraft may very well be my first CA upgrade at AA. Please give me the pros and cons and help convince me that this aircraft will not "go computer psycho" without anything I can do about it.

Posted on APC as well.

Thanks for any responses.
73
 
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Fly it see for yourself. There have been many threads on this subject. I never want a yoke in front of me again.
 
See my types to the left. The Airbus office is by far the most comfortable, quiet, ergonomic one you'll ever work in. Warm in the winter, cool in the summer. We're not paid to be Chuck Yeager anymore. Sully did just fine achieving hero status in the bus.

You'll love it.
 
Can you disconnect everything (FDs, A/T, A/P) and fly it up to cruise? Can you disconnect the auto trim and fly it like a "real" airplane? As I said on APC, I;m a big hands-on flyer, like to disconnect everything to keep my skills sharp - I'm by no means a "lazy pilot" nor do I want to become one (keeps the flying aspect fun.) Not a fan of auto trim as it sounds right now - where do all the flying skills go?
 
Once you learn the systems for yourself and know facts instead of hearsay I think you'll be pleasantly surprised.
The Sidestick and it's lack of feedback will take about 15 minutes to master and the same with the autothrust and don't forget you can disconnect the autothrust and have regular thrust levers just like any other a/c.
Once online you'll never want to be without the tray table again.
Boeing make a fine product also, I'd be happy with either and that's the point, there is nothing to fear about the Bus transition.
 
Thanks overseas, exactly what I want to hear: that it's a safe aircraft that won't "go psycho" on the pilots without anything they can do. Because that's what it sounds like to my "Airbus-uneducated" mind.
 
Yes you can disconnect everything and fly to altitude (dependant on your airline SOP). You will however still have autotrim (unless you're degraded to direct law). Again once you're use to it you'll just happily watch the autotrim do it's job.
 
But... I still question: Are the pilots REALLY in control? I had a lot of difficulty watching the engine instruments register changes without the throttles moving. I never quite knew what the engines were doing. Why are the throttles locked at Climb Thrust with the engines back at idle?

Think of it this way: in the climb detent, the "thrust levers" (might as well get used to the terminology) are marking maximum available thrust for the autothrust system. The autothrust system then can command any thrust setting from idle to climb (with all due consideration as to what the pilot wants it to do). With an engine out, you set the good engine to the next detent, MCT, so the autothrust can use it all.

You're being thrown by the fact that the Airbus doesn't feed back control cues to the side sticks and the thrust levers. But it gives you all the feedback you need right in front of you on the six big panels. Even in a Boeing, the control feedback is approximate at best. You still need to look to see what's really going on. You get over it in an hour, tops. You won't miss it as much as you think.

I also had a tough time comparing aircraft pitch/roll commands without seeing a corresponding stick movement. Why, because the other stick doesn't move. How does the other pilot know what the flying pilot is doing?
See above. And with the autopilot engaged, the side sticks are locked and neither of them move. You won't miss that either.

Lastly: I understand that the stick commands a RATE, not simply a control surface movement. So if you bang in left stick and center it, the aircraft will continue rolling left until you bang in right stick.
Nope. The side sticks command a roll rate, not a turn rate. So when you center the stick, it stops rolling and maintains whatever bank angle you're on. Well, up to 33 degrees of roll; beyond 33 degrees, it will roll back to 33 degrees once you center the stick. If you "bang in right stick", it will reverse the commanded roll rate and start rolling wings level, as you'd expect:

VERY disconcerting to me: I expect that, if you bang in left stick and center it, the aircraft would stop rolling, not increase it.
And so it does. Just like a real airplane. :)
 
The only pilots who complain about the Bus are the ones who never flew it.
 
Sully may have been the hero (with a lot of skill but even more luck) in a single instance. But, there have been more than a few aw-s**ts when the airplane didn't react as commanded.

Commuting, I was ALWAYS happy to see the bus. Flying, I'd prefer to be the "pilot in command" rather than an operator requesting something from "Hal".
 
The tray is great! I came from a CRJ to the Bus so I understand your concern about the thrust levers. Overall I think it's a great plane. The MCDU/FMGC is something to get use to. As far as the thrust levers not moving, it's all about your scan to me. Look at the gauges and your PF. You'll also hear the engines spooling up for whatever you told the aircraft to do. Just like any other aircraft, kick off the A/P and you hand fly it. The different laws happen when the crap hits the fan. They'll teach you what to do and what you can control after. Only have been on it for about 3 months.
 
The 737 was certainly predictable, but your goal in the Airbus is to be so far ahead of it, that you anticipate it's response and can correct if necessary. The old joke is the new pilot says "Why is it doing that?" and the old pilot says "I don't know, but it's doing it again!" Do not try to bridge the gap between the Boeing and the Airbus, but learn how to prevent "it from doing that". That involves learning how the computers interact with each other, the flight controls and the pilots.

Just watch the airplane while it's on autopilot and think about how some engineers distilled everything you've learned about the art of flying into a computer program. Turning everything off is tempting, but counterproductive to learning and building confidence. Make it do what you want the way it should be done.
 
The 737 was certainly predictable, but your goal in the Airbus is to be so far ahead of it, that you anticipate it's response and can correct if necessary. The old joke is the new pilot says "Why is it doing that?" and the old pilot says "I don't know, but it's doing it again!" Do not try to bridge the gap between the Boeing and the Airbus, but learn how to prevent "it from doing that". That involves learning how the computers interact with each other, the flight controls and the pilots.

Just watch the airplane while it's on autopilot and think about how some engineers distilled everything you've learned about the art of flying into a computer program. Turning everything off is tempting, but counterproductive to learning and building confidence. Make it do what you want the way it should be done.

That's why there's been several accidents. I guess those pilots just tried to do "pilot s**t", having never LEARNED the engineers' interpretation of how an aircraft should be flown.

Habshiem 1988
Bangalore 1990
Bucharest 1991
Strasbourg 1992
Tolouse 1994
Nagoya 1994
Warsaw 1993
Abu Dhabi 1997
Bacolod (Philippines) 1998
Abidjan 2000
Atlantic Ocean (off Brazil) 2009

Source: Airdisaster.com - only the accidents that cited warning systems associated with flight controls, autoflight/autothrottle/computer failures, crew misunderstanding of FMS/autoflight/autothrottle features.

Seems like a lot to me.
 
I've never flown another aircraft that required so much study. We all should study, but after type #7, I rely on previous systems a lot- and we all tend to coast a bit. In the bus, the best advice I got was treat class and study like I'm brand new to airlines. Clean slate, humble, and focused. The people who struggle are those that don't and try to make it a Boeing. As stated, it is a different mindset- monitor with eyes and not with hands- but they're right - now that I'm back with Boeing, I was probably not receiving as much info as I thought from the yoke and levers-
From the content of this thread, you'll be way ahead of those who struggle. Computers aren't going anywhere- you have to understand this Manual, or you're going to be dangerous relying on old habits
I didn't fly it long enough to contribute much- but that was the advice given to me and I felt the extra work did much to alleviate my own concerns-
I wish Boeing would get rid of the yoke
 
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Airbus did NOT design the pilot out of the loop; Airbus did NOT design the airplane
to "override" the pilot; Airbus did NOT design the computer to "take over" the airplane
and Airbus did NOT design a flying video game!!!

The pilot is an integral part of the Airbus cockpit and, at all times, is "in the loop!" There is, however,
one caveat. There are numerous flight mode annunciations (FMAs) in the cockpit of an Airbus
airplane. If the pilot does not know, observe or understand the FMAs, he is asking for trouble.
It is imperative to know the FMAs, and as a former LCA with 80+ A320 Captain/First Officer
IOEs competed, I can confirm that a failure to know/understand the meaning of the FMAs can
only lead to bewilderment on the Airbus - but I could say the same thing about a Boeing - having
completed 60+ IOEs on the B737-300 and 50+ IOEs on the B777. You anti-Airbus guys better
be careful how you pick your fights, because I turn everything around and cite numerous
instances where Boeing pilots were as equally confused/uncertain about what was happening
in the cockpit. I got on the B737 in 1988, the A320 in 1994 and B777 in 1999, all relatively
"early on," (all as Captain and, eventually, as an LCA) in these airplanes lives at UAL and I saw
numerous instances where pilots new to glass*****did not understand what was happening - what the
airplane "was doing to them!" If you don't*****understand the FMAs - and some are rather subtle - there's
going to be a problem. I saw B737-300*****pilots hand fly every leg because they didn't understand the
autopilot and its various mode, didn't*****understand the FMAs*****and, I think, didn't want to embarrass
themselves by admitting it. (As a B737-300 LCA, I was asked, once, to Line Check a B737-300
Captain who had busted a PC. No Standards Captains/Flight Managers were available; I was and the
only Captain who needed the Check was within a day or two of running out of grace time for his check.
I asked the Captain why he needed the check and he was very forthright.*****He said, "I've been a "round dial"
pilot all my life, but I just can't make any sense of all the automation. I can hand fly the airplane and be
perfectly safe. And that's how I want to do it - until I retire in about three months." I gave him credit for
having such an honest attitude; he flew a flawless leg ORD-BNA and I signed him off!!!! And, I assume
he retired on time - and lived happily ever after!! *****:)) :)) *****)

On the Airbus, the FMAs, like Boeing, are presented across the top of the PFD. On the Airbus, there
are five (5) columns of FMAs. Column 1: is Autothrottle Operation; Column 2: is Autopilot/Flight
Director (AP/FD) Vertical Modes; Column 3: is AP/FD Lateral Modes; Column 4: is Approach Capabilities
DH or MDA and Column 5: is Autopilot, Flight Director, Autothrust (AP, FD A/THR) Status. There are
also three (3) rows of FMAs: Row 1: is Engaged or Captured Modes; Row 2 is: Armed Modes and Row 3:
is Special Messages. And, a white box highlights each new annunciation for 10 seconds.

Additional, the FMAs and the ECAM (Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring) system use the following
color codes: RED = Requires immediate action; AMBER = Requires awareness but not immediate action;
GREEN = NORMAL long-term operation; WHITE = TITLES or REMARKS; BLUE = ACTIONS to be carried out
(Mnemonic is BLUE EQUALS YOU - something you did or need to do; MAGENTA = Special Messages, i.e.,
T.O. Inhibit or LDG Inhibit!

To explain the Airbus A320 Habsheim (A320 into the woods) accident, again:

The accident airplane was in NORMAL flight control law. NORMAl law is "normal;" there's no flight control law
"better" than NORMAL - no super-normal, no mega-normal, etc. In NORMAL law, you have three (3) axis control
and the following flight envelope protections: - load factor limitation; - pitch attitude protection; - high angle of
attack protection; - high speed protection, and - bank angle protection.

NORMAL law has both a Ground and a Flight mode. I'll skip the Ground mode discussion, but the Flight mode
is active from lift-off until Flare mode engages during landing at 50 feet RA.

NORMAL law - Pitch: The Normal flight mode is load factor demand law with automatic (pitch) trim and full
flight envelope protection that maintains a 1g load with the sidestick at neutral and the wings level. When using
the sidestick, the elevator and stabilizer trim achieve a load factor proportional to sidestick deflection. Pitch trim
is automatic with or without the autopilot engaged. (And the elevator trim wheel DOES move as the stab trims - my
comment!)

Automatic pitch trim is inhibited under the following conditions:

- Radio altitude (RA) is below 50 ft (100 ft with autopilot engaged)
- Load factor less than 0.5g
- High speed/Mach protection is active
- 33 deg bank exceeded
- Load factor greater than +1.25g (nose up trim inhibited)
- During manual trim (obviously!)

Load Factor Limitation:
- Flaps Retracted: +2.5g to -1.0g
-Flaps Extended: +2.0g to 0.0g

Pitch Attitude Protection:
The airplane's pitch attitude is protected, as follows:
- 30 deg nose up with Flaps (position) 0 to (position) 3,
**********progeressively reduced to 25 deg at low speed;
- 25 deg nose up with Flaps Full (progessively reduced to
**********20 deg at low speed;
- 15 deg nose down

The flight director bars are removed when pitch exceeds 25 deg up
or 13 deg down.

High Angle of Attack Protection: (In this discussion, I will substitute the symbol "@"
in place of the Greek letter for "alpha," which my keyboard doesn't have - or I can't find.

The alpha protection provided by Normal Law comprises three (3) angle of attack
functions. They are: (1) alpha protection (@ prot) alpha floor (@ floor) and alpha maximum
(@ max). The associated V speeds, V@ prot. V@ floor and V@ max vary with airplane weight
and configuration.

In pitch normal law, the elevator control changes from normal mode to a protection mode when the
angle of attack is greater than @ prot. When this occurs, the autopilot disconnects, the speed brakes
retract and the angle of attack is proportional to sidestick deflection. In the @ prot range, from @ prot*****
to @ max, the side stick demands an angle of attack directly; however, @ max cannot be exceeded even
if the sidestick is pulled and held fully back against the mechanical stop. If the sidestick is released,
the angle of attack returns to and maintains @ prot. This function, which provides protection against
stall and windshear has priority overcall other protections. On take-off, @ prot is equal to @ max for
5 seconds. If angle of attack protection is active, the sidestick must be pushed forward to return to the
normal mode.

The @ floor protection, which occurs at a predetermined angle of attack between @ prot and @ max, engages
the autothrottle system. TO/GA thrust is provided regardless of throttle position. The @ floor function *****is NOT
available in the landing configuration below 100 ft RA! (Any guesses why??????????)

NOTE: Alpha Floor is ONLY available in NORMAL (flight control) Law.

I provide the above explanations/descriptions so that you can't accuse me of editing out important information
about the Airbus' Normal flight control laws. *****:))

CAUTION: Alpha Floor protection is only available in NORMAL Law.

A Low Energy Warnibg is triggered during deceleration before Alpha Floor ir reached. (The delays between Low
Energy Warning and Alpha Floor activation depends on deceleration rate.) "SPEED, SPEED, SPEED"
is repeated every 5 seconds to indicate airplane energy is lower than a threshold under which to recover a positive
flight path angle though pitch control; THRUST must be INCREASED! The low energy warning is computed by the
FACs (Flight Augmentation Computers), based on airplane configuration Flaps [position] (2, 3 or Full), airspeed
deceleration rate and flight path angle.

The Low Energy Warning is inhibited:
- When TO/GA is selected
- Below 100 ft RA and above 2,000 ft RA
- When Alpha Floor or a GPWS alert is triggered
- In ALTERNATE or DIRECT law
- If both RAs are failed
- At Flaps 1 or UP

- - -*****

The Captain of the Habsheim accident airplane: 1) did not receive Company or (French) FAA approval
to conduct the maneuver; 2) did not brief the F/O; 3) it was a revenue flight; passengers were on board;
4) had the airplane in the landing configuration; 5) was below 100 ft RA, thus Alpha Floor was disabled),
6) Low Energy Warning was also disabled.

I'm assuming that either the autothrottles were not engaged or the Mode Control Panel speed had been
manually dialed down to a normal Vapp speed. In any event, the engines were at relatively low thrust and
I'm sure the Captain was thinking, during*****the approach/low altitude fly-by, that "any second now the throttles
will go to TO/GA," I'll just pull gently back on the sidestick and the airplane will perform a nice go-around
maneuver. That did not happen as both Alpha Floor and the Low Energy Warning had been (inadvertently/
unknowingly) disabled. I think the Captain pushed the throttles up; but it was too late. The flight path angle
never became positive.
 

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