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Airbus trepidation... convince me otherwise!

  • Thread starter Thread starter aa73
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The 737 was certainly predictable, but your goal in the Airbus is to be so far ahead of it, that you anticipate it's response and can correct if necessary. The old joke is the new pilot says "Why is it doing that?" and the old pilot says "I don't know, but it's doing it again!" Do not try to bridge the gap between the Boeing and the Airbus, but learn how to prevent "it from doing that". That involves learning how the computers interact with each other, the flight controls and the pilots.

Just watch the airplane while it's on autopilot and think about how some engineers distilled everything you've learned about the art of flying into a computer program. Turning everything off is tempting, but counterproductive to learning and building confidence. Make it do what you want the way it should be done.

That's why there's been several accidents. I guess those pilots just tried to do "pilot s**t", having never LEARNED the engineers' interpretation of how an aircraft should be flown.

Habshiem 1988
Bangalore 1990
Bucharest 1991
Strasbourg 1992
Tolouse 1994
Nagoya 1994
Warsaw 1993
Abu Dhabi 1997
Bacolod (Philippines) 1998
Abidjan 2000
Atlantic Ocean (off Brazil) 2009

Source: Airdisaster.com - only the accidents that cited warning systems associated with flight controls, autoflight/autothrottle/computer failures, crew misunderstanding of FMS/autoflight/autothrottle features.

Seems like a lot to me.
 
I've never flown another aircraft that required so much study. We all should study, but after type #7, I rely on previous systems a lot- and we all tend to coast a bit. In the bus, the best advice I got was treat class and study like I'm brand new to airlines. Clean slate, humble, and focused. The people who struggle are those that don't and try to make it a Boeing. As stated, it is a different mindset- monitor with eyes and not with hands- but they're right - now that I'm back with Boeing, I was probably not receiving as much info as I thought from the yoke and levers-
From the content of this thread, you'll be way ahead of those who struggle. Computers aren't going anywhere- you have to understand this Manual, or you're going to be dangerous relying on old habits
I didn't fly it long enough to contribute much- but that was the advice given to me and I felt the extra work did much to alleviate my own concerns-
I wish Boeing would get rid of the yoke
 
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Airbus did NOT design the pilot out of the loop; Airbus did NOT design the airplane
to "override" the pilot; Airbus did NOT design the computer to "take over" the airplane
and Airbus did NOT design a flying video game!!!

The pilot is an integral part of the Airbus cockpit and, at all times, is "in the loop!" There is, however,
one caveat. There are numerous flight mode annunciations (FMAs) in the cockpit of an Airbus
airplane. If the pilot does not know, observe or understand the FMAs, he is asking for trouble.
It is imperative to know the FMAs, and as a former LCA with 80+ A320 Captain/First Officer
IOEs competed, I can confirm that a failure to know/understand the meaning of the FMAs can
only lead to bewilderment on the Airbus - but I could say the same thing about a Boeing - having
completed 60+ IOEs on the B737-300 and 50+ IOEs on the B777. You anti-Airbus guys better
be careful how you pick your fights, because I turn everything around and cite numerous
instances where Boeing pilots were as equally confused/uncertain about what was happening
in the cockpit. I got on the B737 in 1988, the A320 in 1994 and B777 in 1999, all relatively
"early on," (all as Captain and, eventually, as an LCA) in these airplanes lives at UAL and I saw
numerous instances where pilots new to glass*****did not understand what was happening - what the
airplane "was doing to them!" If you don't*****understand the FMAs - and some are rather subtle - there's
going to be a problem. I saw B737-300*****pilots hand fly every leg because they didn't understand the
autopilot and its various mode, didn't*****understand the FMAs*****and, I think, didn't want to embarrass
themselves by admitting it. (As a B737-300 LCA, I was asked, once, to Line Check a B737-300
Captain who had busted a PC. No Standards Captains/Flight Managers were available; I was and the
only Captain who needed the Check was within a day or two of running out of grace time for his check.
I asked the Captain why he needed the check and he was very forthright.*****He said, "I've been a "round dial"
pilot all my life, but I just can't make any sense of all the automation. I can hand fly the airplane and be
perfectly safe. And that's how I want to do it - until I retire in about three months." I gave him credit for
having such an honest attitude; he flew a flawless leg ORD-BNA and I signed him off!!!! And, I assume
he retired on time - and lived happily ever after!! *****:-)) :-)) *****)

On the Airbus, the FMAs, like Boeing, are presented across the top of the PFD. On the Airbus, there
are five (5) columns of FMAs. Column 1: is Autothrottle Operation; Column 2: is Autopilot/Flight
Director (AP/FD) Vertical Modes; Column 3: is AP/FD Lateral Modes; Column 4: is Approach Capabilities
DH or MDA and Column 5: is Autopilot, Flight Director, Autothrust (AP, FD A/THR) Status. There are
also three (3) rows of FMAs: Row 1: is Engaged or Captured Modes; Row 2 is: Armed Modes and Row 3:
is Special Messages. And, a white box highlights each new annunciation for 10 seconds.

Additional, the FMAs and the ECAM (Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring) system use the following
color codes: RED = Requires immediate action; AMBER = Requires awareness but not immediate action;
GREEN = NORMAL long-term operation; WHITE = TITLES or REMARKS; BLUE = ACTIONS to be carried out
(Mnemonic is BLUE EQUALS YOU - something you did or need to do; MAGENTA = Special Messages, i.e.,
T.O. Inhibit or LDG Inhibit!

To explain the Airbus A320 Habsheim (A320 into the woods) accident, again:

The accident airplane was in NORMAL flight control law. NORMAl law is "normal;" there's no flight control law
"better" than NORMAL - no super-normal, no mega-normal, etc. In NORMAL law, you have three (3) axis control
and the following flight envelope protections: - load factor limitation; - pitch attitude protection; - high angle of
attack protection; - high speed protection, and - bank angle protection.

NORMAL law has both a Ground and a Flight mode. I'll skip the Ground mode discussion, but the Flight mode
is active from lift-off until Flare mode engages during landing at 50 feet RA.

NORMAL law - Pitch: The Normal flight mode is load factor demand law with automatic (pitch) trim and full
flight envelope protection that maintains a 1g load with the sidestick at neutral and the wings level. When using
the sidestick, the elevator and stabilizer trim achieve a load factor proportional to sidestick deflection. Pitch trim
is automatic with or without the autopilot engaged. (And the elevator trim wheel DOES move as the stab trims - my
comment!)

Automatic pitch trim is inhibited under the following conditions:

- Radio altitude (RA) is below 50 ft (100 ft with autopilot engaged)
- Load factor less than 0.5g
- High speed/Mach protection is active
- 33 deg bank exceeded
- Load factor greater than +1.25g (nose up trim inhibited)
- During manual trim (obviously!)

Load Factor Limitation:
- Flaps Retracted: +2.5g to -1.0g
-Flaps Extended: +2.0g to 0.0g

Pitch Attitude Protection:
The airplane's pitch attitude is protected, as follows:
- 30 deg nose up with Flaps (position) 0 to (position) 3,
**********progeressively reduced to 25 deg at low speed;
- 25 deg nose up with Flaps Full (progessively reduced to
**********20 deg at low speed;
- 15 deg nose down

The flight director bars are removed when pitch exceeds 25 deg up
or 13 deg down.

High Angle of Attack Protection: (In this discussion, I will substitute the symbol "@"
in place of the Greek letter for "alpha," which my keyboard doesn't have - or I can't find.

The alpha protection provided by Normal Law comprises three (3) angle of attack
functions. They are: (1) alpha protection (@ prot) alpha floor (@ floor) and alpha maximum
(@ max). The associated V speeds, V@ prot. V@ floor and V@ max vary with airplane weight
and configuration.

In pitch normal law, the elevator control changes from normal mode to a protection mode when the
angle of attack is greater than @ prot. When this occurs, the autopilot disconnects, the speed brakes
retract and the angle of attack is proportional to sidestick deflection. In the @ prot range, from @ prot*****
to @ max, the side stick demands an angle of attack directly; however, @ max cannot be exceeded even
if the sidestick is pulled and held fully back against the mechanical stop. If the sidestick is released,
the angle of attack returns to and maintains @ prot. This function, which provides protection against
stall and windshear has priority overcall other protections. On take-off, @ prot is equal to @ max for
5 seconds. If angle of attack protection is active, the sidestick must be pushed forward to return to the
normal mode.

The @ floor protection, which occurs at a predetermined angle of attack between @ prot and @ max, engages
the autothrottle system. TO/GA thrust is provided regardless of throttle position. The @ floor function *****is NOT
available in the landing configuration below 100 ft RA! (Any guesses why??????????)

NOTE: Alpha Floor is ONLY available in NORMAL (flight control) Law.

I provide the above explanations/descriptions so that you can't accuse me of editing out important information
about the Airbus' Normal flight control laws. *****:-))

CAUTION: Alpha Floor protection is only available in NORMAL Law.

A Low Energy Warnibg is triggered during deceleration before Alpha Floor ir reached. (The delays between Low
Energy Warning and Alpha Floor activation depends on deceleration rate.) "SPEED, SPEED, SPEED"
is repeated every 5 seconds to indicate airplane energy is lower than a threshold under which to recover a positive
flight path angle though pitch control; THRUST must be INCREASED! The low energy warning is computed by the
FACs (Flight Augmentation Computers), based on airplane configuration Flaps [position] (2, 3 or Full), airspeed
deceleration rate and flight path angle.

The Low Energy Warning is inhibited:
- When TO/GA is selected
- Below 100 ft RA and above 2,000 ft RA
- When Alpha Floor or a GPWS alert is triggered
- In ALTERNATE or DIRECT law
- If both RAs are failed
- At Flaps 1 or UP

- - -*****

The Captain of the Habsheim accident airplane: 1) did not receive Company or (French) FAA approval
to conduct the maneuver; 2) did not brief the F/O; 3) it was a revenue flight; passengers were on board;
4) had the airplane in the landing configuration; 5) was below 100 ft RA, thus Alpha Floor was disabled),
6) Low Energy Warning was also disabled.

I'm assuming that either the autothrottles were not engaged or the Mode Control Panel speed had been
manually dialed down to a normal Vapp speed. In any event, the engines were at relatively low thrust and
I'm sure the Captain was thinking, during*****the approach/low altitude fly-by, that "any second now the throttles
will go to TO/GA," I'll just pull gently back on the sidestick and the airplane will perform a nice go-around
maneuver. That did not happen as both Alpha Floor and the Low Energy Warning had been (inadvertently/
unknowingly) disabled. I think the Captain pushed the throttles up; but it was too late. The flight path angle
never became positive.
 
Not to sound like a nerd, but if you take a joystick and Microsoft Flight Simulator, controlling the Airbus behaves pretty much the same way. You are commanding rate of pitch and roll rather than bank. I am not partial to the plane's philosophy but I do think it's the best for pilot comfort and it makes a long FT/DT trip go by much more painless.
 
However, in the Captain's favor was Alpha Max was not disabled. Thus, the airplane went into the woods wings
level at*****a flying angle of attack under control. The airplane did not stall; the airplane did not fall off on one wing
and the airplane did not impact the ground in an usual attitude - which, almost certainly, would have resulted in
more than three fatalities.

To this day, 23 years later, the Captain still blames Airbus and the engine manufacturer, claiming the engines failed to spool
up. Yup, and Buddy McBroom still blames the fuel gauges!!!!!

What's the moral of the story? 1) Airbus builds a fantastic airplane - but you have to read and understand the
AFM. If you're going to go fly an airplane that has CATIIIb autoland capability, I'd strongly suggest that you at least
read the Manual before your first attempt at flying one!!!!!!!

Questions for discussion: 1)*****How many members of*****RETUP know*****whether speed is "on the throttle" or
speed is "on the elevator?" If you don't know or you*****say, "WHAT?" or "HUH?" - *****you're in trouble - Airbus and Boeing!
2) Why do the throttles sometimes go to IDLE and airplane goes above the path on a VNAV PATH descent?

Thanks for your time, guys. And, rather than knock Airbus, I'd recommend a little humility. And, I should also add that
the Airbus uses "dissimilar redundancy" in the engineering design of its cockpit. The Captain's side of the cockpit
uses the equivalent of a Windows computer running on Intel chips and the F/O's side uses an Apple computer
running on the old Motorola or IBM chips. Also different and independent design teams wrote the flight control laws and the ELAC
(elevator and aileron computer) programs and the SEC (spoiler/elevator) computer laws. This was done to prevent a design error from "carrying
over" to the other side of the cockpit.

The Airbus and Boeing airplanes are both outstanding, but comparing them is a fruitless exercise. Which is "better?" a Ford or a Chevy?
Which is "better?" a 707 or a DC-8? Which is "better?" an asphalt road or a concrete road?

And I'll get on my soapbox for a minute here: When I was an A320 LCA, not only did I get ENOTES from pilots I'd never met and from
out-of-domicile places (LAX, SFO and SEA) asking me to do their IOES, but I only had one IOE failure - a A320 Captain with a severe
attitude problem. He blamed everything on the airplane. Unbelievably, he was former Navy F-8 pilot. Knowing how to fly was not
his problem; accepting his own refusal to learn/know the FMAs was. He went back to TK and whether he ate his humble pie or not, I don't
know as I went to the B777 right afterwards. And I had numerous pilots sign the matting of my retiring photo: "Thanks for the great IOE!"
Not too many pilots get that!!!! Off my soapbox.
 
For full disclosure I did not write preceding posts. It was sent to me by a friend. I believe it is authored by a UAL check pilot. I have spent 7 years on the plane and it was a very insightful and educational piece. Hope you enjoy it, and the plane as much as I (did) as I am now on the 75/76:(
 
It seems to me that the people always complaining about Airbus are the ones that have no experience with it. They see the video of the plane going into the trees and think it was computer error, but the pilot was something like 200 feet lower than planned. The jet just wouldn't allow him to stall it into the ground as he was trying to pull up. The bus is a different animal for sure, but I enjoyed my time on it. And yes you can turn off all the automation and fly it like any other airplane. That being said, the tricky things are crosswind landings and the FMS is a little different than other planes. I like the autothrust system and not having to trim all the time. And I really like the ECAM a lot. In an abnormal you just do what it says on the screen. I wish the 757/767 had some of the features of the bus. I miss the table too.
 
MACDU... that's pretty spot on... i'm on the 330 and i dig it... one of the biggest things told to me with this plane is to understand the FMA... cross check it... and with regards to the MCDU i was told "garbage in, garbage out"...
my biggest struggle was learning the MCDU, flying the plane was great with the sidestick... but it all comes together and is great to fly... especially on those long flts...
 
aa73,

If you want to see what the other pilot is doing with his sidestick, just look at your ADI. There is a small black square that is a cursor for the sidestick. When a sidestick is displaced, the cursor will show it on the display.

Everyone gets wrapped up about the way the Airbus "thinks" and flys. The reality is it isn't any different from any other glass airplane. The big one that gets everyone is the term "Managed". Managed is just the French way of saying that the airplane is flying FMS information. That could be an FMS speed profile, FMS VNAV profile, or an FMS RNAV profile.

Don't want to fly FMS speeds. Pull the speed knob. Now the plane maintains whatever speed you select with the knob on the panel. Still don't like it... Move the thrust levers to match the carrots indicating current power, then mash the disconnect buttons. Viola... you have direct control of engine thrust via the thrust levers and you can fly it like any other airplane.

Same process works for VNAV stuff as well. Don't like the way the FMS is doing it. Pull the knob and descend in Vspeed. Don't like Vspeed... flip the toggle and come down a path mode. Want to be real lazy... pull the knob and get Flight Idle Open Descent. The engines will roll back to idle and the airplane will pitch to hold airspeed. It won't honor FMS restrictions, but it will capture back up at the altitude selected in the window. Automation screwing you? Go to a different level of automation that you understand. It is that simple.

The bus is simply the most comfortable, most boring airplane I've ever flown. Because of the autotrim, hand flying is just as boring as watching the autopilot fly. Without the autopilot on... take your hand off the stick, wipe 50 knots off of it, and sit and watch as the airplane holds altitude perfectly while bleeding airspeed. You can even do that trick in a 30 degree bank. Set the bank, take your hand off, slow the airplane down 50 knots... and the airplane will hold altitude, bank, and settle perfectly on speed while you do nothing but watch. That being said... you will find the bus is extremely nimble to fly. Rolls very crisply and when moving the thrust by hand, the engines actually spool pretty quick.

I will give you... system logic is FUBAR'ed! The 1st time you read the checklist for a RADAR ALT 2 fault... you will be amazed, dumbfounded, and contemplate bidding a new piece of equipment. 1st time I saw it... the Captain says... well pull out the checklist for it. I thought he was kidding. He wasn't!
 
aa73,

If you want to see what the other pilot is doing with his sidestick, just look at your ADI. There is a small black square that is a cursor for the sidestick. When a sidestick is displaced, the cursor will show it on the display.

This doesn't happen in the Airbus I fly, not in flight at least. J32driver does make a good point though that the absence of thrust lever and side stick movement is a non-issue. I think it has only been made an issue by non-airbus pilots that don't understand what they have observed from the jumpseat.
 
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The only thing you should be afraid of is the new "negotiated" pay scales on the A319 at AA. Especially the new B-scale FOs (probably regional pay level). :eek::bawling: :angryfire:mad:

HOLD THE LINE GUYS!!!!!!!!!!!!

The Airbus pilots I speak to love the airplane. I know a few pilots at Delta who claim they have no interest leaving the Airbus fleet (from A319 to the A330 later).
 

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