Midwest Captain Writes About BUF Colgan Crash

[flying zephyr]

I am not defending Scott, and I am not saying that pilot error is the main cause of the accident, but let's be realistic. If you don't think that they will list the primary cause of the accident as "pilot error" think again. The FAA and the NTSB are under tremendous pressure think "SWA" FAA oversight. They can't put the majority of the blame on the manufacturer, that would ground the fleet, they can't put the majority of the blame on the airline, that could ground the airline until training is accomplished, also the FAA would have to take blame for approving the manuals. They can't blame ATC for not saying severe icing or the government will get sued. I wish that it could be different, but pilot error is the "least risk blame location". I am sure that the pilots were quite capable, but there will be blame placed on them because it is the "easy out". God bless those who parished and thier families. Would it have been a different outcome with more experienced pilots, does it matter, we'll never know. I do agree that there is no substitute for experience, but that doesn't mean that I haven't seen some really lazy 15,000 hour pilots too. I have jump seated on Colgan many times, good people, I wish them all well. Good luck and God's speed to them all.

 

[flying zephyr]

You can call his letter poorly timed, but did anyone see Capt. Sullenberger's testimony on Capitol Hill today. Also, whoever thought that MKE doesn't see much ice on aircraft hasn't flown there between NOV and MARCH. I only flew there for almost nine years and from the Beech and the Dornier with thier boots to the 717. I saw more ice than I would care to even think about. It gives me the chills and makes me want to call and buy the engineers some frosty beverages. The Beech especially with all that stuff hanging off of it could carry ice like a tank with minimal performance loss.

 

[Fubijaakr]

Right. While three guys were trying to change a lightbulb, they ran out of fuel.

Wrong again. Try reading the report.

 

[ePilot22]

Every single one of you has lowered the bar for the next generation, so Scott Kaley and all can STFU! You all flew regional planes before the majors. You all sold the regional jet down the drain to the regional carriers. You all sit high and mighty like this industry was perfect when you came aboard, but somehow the guy behind you f'd it all up. Well look again! Unless you were hired by United and they paid for your commercial certificate and training in a 737 the you accepted lower pay, you accepted worse work rules, you surrendered to management. Management outsources to regional because you gave them the ability to. Now all you want to is cry fowl when your lack of foresight backfires.

Scott Kaley wants to point the finger at management, but the problem is us, the pilots. This thread proves it. You all gave it away, then complain when it gone. This didn't happen yesterday, it didn't happen because of pilot factories, it didn't happen because of PFT, in fact all of this happened because of you! PFT, pilot factories, regional jet, low pay, poor work rules are a direct result of every pilot. Take some f' responsibility for your actions. Senior vs. Junior, new hire, CA vs. FO, Regional vs. major. $hit what a f' joke. Unity? HA! We put ourselves here, this is OUR mess. Enjoy it! I know I will for the next 35 years cause I'll be sure to take what I've learned from all of you and screw the next guy junior to me. (and of course I won't forget to blame him!)

Thanks.






eP.

 

[QOL_is_great:)]

should I be concerned???

According to this guy I guess I should be concerned? You be the judge. He's why.
Starting today and over the next 18 days I have six airline flights scheduled to move me for work. Of those six; one is on mainline Delta, one on ASA, two on Pinnacle, one on Republic and one on Chautauqua.
Sh*t happens and can happen at any time. Hell, it could happen on the drive to the airport. This guy had a valid point if he was trying to mention work condition and pay for ALL pilots. He sure took the wrong track to voice his views. Geez!!!!!

 

[CopilotDoug]

There are a plethora of "mainline" airline accidents that could have been avoided by a 250 hr commercial pilot. Case in point: forgetting to set takeoff flaps.

This is something that grinds my gears: Armchair QB'ing past events and following up with "Even Mr. Johnny-No-Timer could have done THAT!"

Looks like the crap I see over on that airliners website.

It's amazing how these pilot error problems aren't really all that tough once we've had an hour or two in a comfy chair to read over the NTSB report with our coffee.

You make yourself look like the 250Hr wonder pilot you speak of.

 

[CopilotDoug]

I understand the defensiveness here, but please retake Reading 101 - Comprehension and reread what Scott wrote:

I quote


the definition of might:
may 1 - Past tense might (mīt)

1. To be allowed or permitted to: May I take a swim? Yes, you may.
2. Used to indicate a certain measure of likelihood or possibility: It may rain this afternoon.

he did not say the pilots were to blame. settle down. his point is against management, not saying colgan's pilots were to blame, using less experienced operators (again reading comprehension). Sully said the same thing today to Congress.

Why, Citation? If the time was taken to read and comprehend that sentence, alot of the knee-jerk pukes would have to keep their mouth shut. What's the fun in that?

 

[Mike man]

Fubijaakr and Propsync

Just kiss already...spare up the lovers quarrel.

 

[Bringupthebird]

When Midex negotiated their contract, they bought something with scope. Now they have buyers remorse.

Comparing US1549 and the Q400 accident is silly and any 25-year 15,000 hour pilot should know better. The outcome of 1549 was as much a result of enough circumstances lining up correctly as the Q400 was a result of enough negative factors lining up.

The least we should learn from both is not to make one guy the hero and the other guy the goat.

 

[climbhappy]

If Kaley would have lived in durham, NC, I would have hated to be a duke lacrosse player with him on the jury.

 

[dooork]

the ntsb determines the cause, not someone writing a letter to the editor. most people get that. some on here evidently do not.

baba booey

"most people get that" Are you freaking kidding me? The media tells the sheep what to think...has nothing to do with the truth or the NTSB.

 

[dooork]

Every single one of you has lowered the bar for the next generation, so Scott Kaley and all can STFU! You all flew regional planes before the majors. You all sold the regional jet down the drain to the regional carriers. You all sit high and mighty like this industry was perfect when you came aboard, but somehow the guy behind you f'd it all up. Well look again! Unless you were hired by United and they paid for your commercial certificate and training in a 737 the you accepted lower pay, you accepted worse work rules, you surrendered to management. Management outsources to regional because you gave them the ability to. Now all you want to is cry fowl when your lack of foresight backfires.

Scott Kaley wants to point the finger at management, but the problem is us, the pilots. This thread proves it. You all gave it away, then complain when it gone. This didn't happen yesterday, it didn't happen because of pilot factories, it didn't happen because of PFT, in fact all of this happened because of you! PFT, pilot factories, regional jet, low pay, poor work rules are a direct result of every pilot. Take some f' responsibility for your actions. Senior vs. Junior, new hire, CA vs. FO, Regional vs. major. $hit what a f' joke. Unity? HA! We put ourselves here, this is OUR mess. Enjoy it! I know I will for the next 35 years cause I'll be sure to take what I've learned from all of you and screw the next guy junior to me. (and of course I won't forget to blame him!)

Thanks.


Very nice! Well said.

 

[MCDU]

From pprune. This sounds very realistic. Time will tell.

M

Autopilot level-off from a descent in an aircraft without autothrottles is a bit of a trap. Although I don’t know of any similar accidents, there’s beginning to emerge a story of a catalogue of similar frightening incidents on the Q400 where pilots have become preoccupied with resetting (or setting up ) the FMS and not noticing, whilst heads down, the body angle changing rapidly to nose-up (once below about 180kts the Q400 reputedly does this slowdown rather fast, iced up or not). The normal speeds for intermediate level-offs are 200 to 210 knots. It’s believed that Colgan 3407 slowed to as little as 134kts. Some of the anecdotes have both pilots heads down trying to resolve an FMS button-punching glitch and/or looking back at the special “wing inspection” lights illuminating the Q400 wingtips - to see if the ice is actually being dislodged.

Does the Q400 simply level off and start bleeding airspeed without any indications at all? Is setting this trap something that should be happening during high pilot workload on approach?

Should the autopilot instead be set to a descent rate and the altitude alerter set to clue the flight crew to do the level off manually - instead of the autopilot just capturing the altitude and slowing whilst awaiting the pilots setting of an appropriate thrust? At least then there would be an expected alerting chime or suchlike.

So did the "low time on type" Colgan Flt 3407 pilot respond to a sudden stick-shaker [and rapidly following stick-pusher] by raising the nose, cleaning up the gear and flap and attempting a go-round from a dangerously low speed (instead of taking the correct stall recovery action of adding power and lowering the nose?). At first glance, that possibility exists. Surprise can be quite a mind-numbing wake-up call. It’s called Instant Overload. It results from fatigue or loss of Situational Awareness (SA)

But why and how would he achieve 31 degrees nose up before the aircraft stalled and started spinning? Did he mean to? The logical response is “no, of course he didn’t”.

The simple answer is that that extreme nose-up pitch-up tendency would be the autopilot’s legacy to him after it kicked itself out due to reaching full nose-up auto-trim in pitch (in its attempt to maintain the set capture altitude against the added drag of ice, gear and flap - likely with something near idle power inadvertently LEFT set).

Once the autopilot kicked out and the panicky pilot added max power, the full noseup trim would be conducive to the aircraft looping the loop of its own accord. The pilot would be flummoxed by this setup and, after a confused pause, fighting hard against powerful nose-up trim forces to lower the nose. Adding max power at low IAS itself produces a powerful nose-up trim change. Add that to the already full nose-up trim state and they didn’t have a chance…… of avoiding a deadly stall/spin outcome.

I couldn’t imagine a nastier surprise. Fancy building in such a death-trap as an autopilot without autothrottle and an FMS that needs lots of head-down two-pilot trouble-shooting and reprogramming? His available solutions were:

a. Not to add full power, but just enough to keep it flying and, as per my flight school's SOP technique (see below)

b. Roll sufficiently (about 50 degrees bank) so that the fully back-trimmed airplane only pitched mostly into the turn - giving him a chance to wind the trim nose forward whilst minimizing the speed loss..

I had a similar situation (but not unexpected) tonight after a night take-off. The EFATO drill for a practice (or real) engine failure after take-off is for the front-seat student to raise the nose, simulate putting the throttle to “stop”, call Mayday on intercom and then he releases the stick after having run the pitch trim to full nose up (for his optimal survival seat-vector), places both hands on his left knee and calls “abandoning now” (simulating an ejection). The rear-seat instructor then takes over, banks into the circuit direction (turns “crosswind” essentially), to help the nose drop from around 25 to 30 degrees nose-up - all whilst running the elevator trim nose-down towards neutral and adding near to max power. It’s a silly drill (it’s like practising dying) but meant to be very realistic for the trainee - and it’s a requirement for him to do it prior to his NF3 night solo sortie. You wouldn’t want it to happen suddenly without warning however. It’d be a quite difficult recovery (particularly at night or in IMC).

Prima facie, and in light of all the similar anecdotes now emerging about turboprops with this cheap option (i.e.no autothrottles and a heads down FMS keypad), this would have been the scenario surrounding Flt 3407’s fate. For that Colgan pilot it would have all happened very fast. It’s a nasty setup just begging for a tech remedy.

Automation can be a half-baked bitch.

 

[eightdriver]

Thats how every Dash-8 and other regional truboprop is set up.... Autopilot, but no autothrottles. And yes they do have a warning to prevent this, its called situational awareness! Something that only comes with experience and cannot be taught at the pilot factory...

Although Scott's timing was a little off, he does make a valid point and I'm glad that both him and Sully are making this information public...8

 

[climbhappy]

the inference is that safety is directly related to aircraft size... there is no correlation. you cannot make that argument.

safety is only related to training and cool under pressure. there is no age, no weight, no height and no airline size requirement.

case in point: US Air DC-9 crash on final in a thunderstorm in 1989 in CLT.

one cannot conduct a study from sully's perfect ditch which btw wouldn't have possible the day beofre the colgan crash with wind shear and winds gusting to 40 and 50.

while being vectored over the atlantic off jersey shore at 2000 in a 73, i looked at the whitecaps and said to my FO, "he was mighty fortunate that day to have mother nature deal with god's hand a calm,clear day in the northeast in the winter up north.