Come on, guys.......Look at the "facts" those things that prove everything (supposedly).
No one cross referenced the FDR with the CVR. If the parking brake is set, conversations not relevant with the flight at hand are acceptable. And should not be published! End of story.
At 18:13:10 "eighty knots"/"checked".
6 seconds later (sound similar to flap handle movement) Captain realized they had briefed 20 degrees and they had selected only 8.
4 more seconds "#" (expletive) Captains hot mike. (The EICAS warning finally illuminates, "config flaps" and the Captain responds with profanity). The flaps are no longer at 8 and they aren't at 20 degrees yet so the system has a tizzy.
1 second later the F/O calls (V one) Don't slam him, V1 and VR are normally the same speed.
2 seconds later (sound of Master Waring) Ding, Ding, Ding, (it takes a few seconds for the computer to find the appropriate chime).
1 second later "oh #" Captains response to the flashing red Master Warning.
1 second later "config flaps" (it takes even longer for the computer to find the right tape recording).
1 second later (sound of Master Warning) Captain has initiated the Abort, throttles at idle setting but the fuel control computer is protecting the engines from sudden changes, but the config warning system is faster so now we get "config spoilers".
So now they are committed.
Did they screw up? Yes.
First, you don't reconfigure after initiating a takeoff and especially after 80 knots. But if you do, you should anticipate a config warning as the aircraft transitions between T/O flap settings. A better way to handle the situation would have been to continue the T/O with the knowledge that (depending on what company does your takeoff data) the difference between flaps 8 and flaps 20 is about 12 knots. Stay on the runway until you get the extra 12 or you hit the departure end fixed distance markers and rotate. This may have been fascinating to the crew as they removed the cushions from their buns but no one would know except them.
Second, you NEVER abort after V1 (okay, maybe in Salinas, KS) but NOT in Charlie West, EVER.
So the crew, mostly the Captain, screwed up. Should we hang them?
Maybe. But first let's look at the "facts".
Captain and F/O were well qualified. Captain had 9500 TT and 4600 in the CRJ. F/O had 3000 TT and nearly 2000 in the CRJ.
Both pilots had flown 4 hours in the previous 24 hours, 12 in the previous 7 days, and in the last 30, the Captain flew 39 hours, the F/O flew 103 (WOW!).
But the NTSB did not consider Fatigue to be a factor. In the Colgan/Buffalo accident, they debated whether Fatigue was a factor. Remember that the NTSB only looks back 72 hours!
Facts: a well rested man, under stress, may be "tired" in 72 hours of "heavy" work load, but should not be "fatigued". Fatigue is "chronic tiredness" and develops over a longer period of time. Also a "fatigued" person CANNOT recover in less than 72 hours, regardless of how much they sleep.
TT for the Captain in 12 months? 855 hours. The F/O? 928. These are "hard" hours, not "paid" hours. Were they "Fatigued"? A recent study of regional pilots indicated that 96 percent were fatigued. Don't care if they commuted, lived in base, lived at the airport.
Flight time/Duty time has to be rewritten NOW. Ride the brakes for maintenance? 1 hour flight time. Repo from maintenance to gate? 1 hour flight time or actual time served. One T/O/ landing? 1 hour minimum credit.
6 T/O/landings max per day. Fewer hours than the FAA has now. The regionals have no protection from the union contracts that the majors have.
Don't get it? Look at 16:12:53 in the transcript. "we're cleared to go right?" Too many days on, too many T/O's, not enough time off and you are stupid.
