crw overrun transcript

[Data]

Does anyone know why they got the config flap message?

They realized they were at flaps 8 and t/o data was for flaps 20, just prior to V1 the captain saw this and threw the flaps to 20. While they were in transit they got the Config Flap message/caution.

 

[SpauldingSmails]

That's a shame. CA called for Twenty initially, and the FO kept reading back Eight... so close to catching it.

 

[regionaltard]

Yikes.

 

[Stifler's Mom]

Just make every departure flaps 20 on the CRJ and this never would have happened.

 

[Abernathy]

Just make every departure flaps 20 on the CRJ and this never would have happened.

That shouldn't be necessary, though. I will say that some of our checking priorities in flight are a bit misplaced. For instance, I think it's useless to physically point to the newly set altitude (when calling it out is just as good), but at the same time you're not required to point to the flap indicator while verifying they are correctly set. The latter is much more likely to kill you.

 

[DiverDriver]

Sterile cockpit! Keep your mind in the game. And this is why speeds are read as "one twenty seven, ...etc." Anyone notice that the FO read off the flaps as "eight" followed immediately by "twenty seven" for the V1 of 127? Quite possible the CA missed the eight statement and only heard twenty. Most certainly heard what he wanted to hear and didn't verify what he called for by looking at the screen.

A damn shame for the crew and thank God for the person(s) who developed EMAS and thank God for the people at KCRW who made the installation happen. Had they careened down that hill it would have been another LEX.

 

[DrunkIrishman]

The only thing I found disturbing was that after the airplane came to a stop, the guy in the left seat seemed to stop being concerned about his passengers and crew and worry more about himself. It took his Chief Pilot to make him ask if the gear had collapsed!

As for the initial mistake...it has happened before (flap issues on t/o) and it will happen again.

 

[Popeye0537]

Same person writes your checks, The Capt was horrible, The FO disregarded the Capt. on the go missed. FO didn't even open cockpit door till fire dept. showed up and all pax were off. Took 1 minute to tell tower they went off runway and even longer to say nil (what would have happened if someone would have landed behind them). I was at the gate waiting for the CVG flight and this crew could not have done things worse. But hey big guy thanks for trying to act like S5 and CHQ are a different company (maybe on some paper lost long ago). Here's to hoping the republic brand fails with the new direction.

If someone landed behind them, then they would have violated approach mins also. It was Eagle who was behind them and I know for a fact that anyone who shot the approach after them violated the approach mins. It was a LOC only approach and at the time of the accident the crew misread the mins and shot it down to ILS mins, just like the Eagle flight behind them. The captain said "this doesn't look right, lets get outa here", the FO stated" I got it in sight." They continued and were blinded by the WN jet taking off the crossing runway, thats when you hear the CA say "********************" becasue they both lose visual contact with the runway.

FO was waiting on the CA who just sat there. After checking to make sure everything was still in one piece(no fire) he contact the tower and said they were off the runway. FA's called up at same time to ask to evacuate and he deciede there was no need to evacuate......much like WN in Midway.

Keep wishing for our demise at Repulic, it has become you moto

 

[booo]

Come on, guys.......Look at the "facts" those things that prove everything (supposedly).

No one cross referenced the FDR with the CVR. If the parking brake is set, conversations not relevant with the flight at hand are acceptable. And should not be published! End of story.

At 18:13:10 "eighty knots"/"checked".
6 seconds later (sound similar to flap handle movement) Captain realized they had briefed 20 degrees and they had selected only 8.
4 more seconds "#" (expletive) Captains hot mike. (The EICAS warning finally illuminates, "config flaps" and the Captain responds with profanity). The flaps are no longer at 8 and they aren't at 20 degrees yet so the system has a tizzy.
1 second later the F/O calls (V one) Don't slam him, V1 and VR are normally the same speed.
2 seconds later (sound of Master Waring) Ding, Ding, Ding, (it takes a few seconds for the computer to find the appropriate chime).
1 second later "oh #" Captains response to the flashing red Master Warning.
1 second later "config flaps" (it takes even longer for the computer to find the right tape recording).
1 second later (sound of Master Warning) Captain has initiated the Abort, throttles at idle setting but the fuel control computer is protecting the engines from sudden changes, but the config warning system is faster so now we get "config spoilers".

So now they are committed.

Did they screw up? Yes.

First, you don't reconfigure after initiating a takeoff and especially after 80 knots. But if you do, you should anticipate a config warning as the aircraft transitions between T/O flap settings. A better way to handle the situation would have been to continue the T/O with the knowledge that (depending on what company does your takeoff data) the difference between flaps 8 and flaps 20 is about 12 knots. Stay on the runway until you get the extra 12 or you hit the departure end fixed distance markers and rotate. This may have been fascinating to the crew as they removed the cushions from their buns but no one would know except them.

Second, you NEVER abort after V1 (okay, maybe in Salinas, KS) but NOT in Charlie West, EVER.

So the crew, mostly the Captain, screwed up. Should we hang them?

Maybe. But first let's look at the "facts".

Captain and F/O were well qualified. Captain had 9500 TT and 4600 in the CRJ. F/O had 3000 TT and nearly 2000 in the CRJ.

Both pilots had flown 4 hours in the previous 24 hours, 12 in the previous 7 days, and in the last 30, the Captain flew 39 hours, the F/O flew 103 (WOW!).

But the NTSB did not consider Fatigue to be a factor. In the Colgan/Buffalo accident, they debated whether Fatigue was a factor. Remember that the NTSB only looks back 72 hours!

Facts: a well rested man, under stress, may be "tired" in 72 hours of "heavy" work load, but should not be "fatigued". Fatigue is "chronic tiredness" and develops over a longer period of time. Also a "fatigued" person CANNOT recover in less than 72 hours, regardless of how much they sleep.

TT for the Captain in 12 months? 855 hours. The F/O? 928. These are "hard" hours, not "paid" hours. Were they "Fatigued"? A recent study of regional pilots indicated that 96 percent were fatigued. Don't care if they commuted, lived in base, lived at the airport.

Flight time/Duty time has to be rewritten NOW. Ride the brakes for maintenance? 1 hour flight time. Repo from maintenance to gate? 1 hour flight time or actual time served. One T/O/ landing? 1 hour minimum credit.
6 T/O/landings max per day. Fewer hours than the FAA has now. The regionals have no protection from the union contracts that the majors have.

Don't get it? Look at 16:12:53 in the transcript. "we're cleared to go right?" Too many days on, too many T/O's, not enough time off and you are stupid.

 

[Erlanger]

First, you don't reconfigure after initiating a takeoff and especially after 80 knots. But if you do, you should anticipate a config warning as the aircraft transitions between T/O flap settings. A better way to handle the situation would have been to continue the T/O with the knowledge that (depending on what company does your takeoff data) the difference between flaps 8 and flaps 20 is about 12 knots. Stay on the runway until you get the extra 12 or you hit the departure end fixed distance markers and rotate. This may have been fascinating to the crew as they removed the cushions from their buns but no one would know except them.

The runway was only 6300' which is why they went off after the abort. You'll never going to see flaps 8 on a runway that short. Even if they continued and rotated it could of be close on the climbout. I haven't been at that airport so what's at the end? Would they have cleared all obstacles with flaps 8 or even at some flap setting in between 8 and 20?