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PSA runs off runway during a aborted takeoff at CRW!

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The 700's nosegear had to be replaced after they got done towing it out of the mud if I remember correctly
 
The 700's nosegear had to be replaced after they got done towing it out of the mud if I remember correctly


It was damaged, but not from the overrun. The word I heard was that the damage came from the tow out of the grass.


Also, so far as the numbers from the ACARS, I vaguely remember some language somewhere that mentioned that the numbers from the ACARS were 'optimized' to include the stopway and clearway in performance calculations. If my memory serves (doubtful, but possible), this was something that ASA didn't do in times past.
 
They may include the stopway and clearway based on *distance* but do not take into account the opposing force and friction that EMAS provides, so it's a moot point in this case. Without the EMAS the plane would have dashed right off the end of the runway and probably ended up in a flaming wreckage some ways down considering it was probably just fueled before it took off.

I just want to know what the reason for the abort was and, perhaps more importantly, why the calculations didn't work (assuming they aborted prior to V1). Not only did the calculations not work, they failed miserably. If the reports are anywhere near correct, they were apparently going fast enough to plow through most of the EMAS before coming to a stop.
 
If the reports are anywhere near correct, they were apparently going fast enough to plow through most of the EMAS before coming to a stop.

Looking at the video someone posted earlier, it looks like they went less than 100' past the threshold. Either they were fairly slow when they entered the EMAS, or that stuff works really well.
 
AntiSkid on the CRJ200 is operational down to 10kts wheel speed. It does look suspicious.

18170_253941328089_85843703089_3205072_6362555_n.jpg
 
Pants replacement needed around the 5er......................

This is going to be interesting to see and hear the details on. Hopefully, our traning department is looking at this and taking notes for recurrent- I've often wondered about this event prior to this debacle. Next time into CRW, take a look at the amount of runway left at V1 when you take off from runway 23. Do you honestly think you'd stop the RJ on that much pavement without the EMAS? I don't think so...............
 
Pants replacement needed around the 5er......................

This is going to be interesting to see and hear the details on. Hopefully, our traning department is looking at this and taking notes for recurrent- I've often wondered about this event prior to this debacle. Next time into CRW, take a look at the amount of runway left at V1 when you take off from runway 23. Do you honestly think you'd stop the RJ on that much pavement without the EMAS? I don't think so...............


They will have to review this. Sometimes the Go decisions is better then the no go one.
If they hit V1, and still had a engine then they shoulda' went. But then again I have absolutely no details at all on what happened.
Just glad everyone is safe and the plane had mininumal damage.
 
Could it have been a flap config warning? The flaps are up in both pictures.

They're probably up in order to make it easier for the recovery effort- less hanging in the way for airbags.......... Just a guess.

If they were up before the T/O Roll, they should have gotten a config warning well before V1. That would have been a 60/80 knot abort at most................
 
EMAS cannot be considered when calculating balance field length....remember accelerate stop distance is not the same thing.
EMAS portion of the runway is a part of the balanced field length because it is considered to be a part of the stopway or so I had thought?
 
If the takeoff config flaps warning worked. Things can fail. There is nothing in my QRH that tells me to put the flaps up after what they did. Good observation about the flaps.. Things that make you go hum...
 
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Not judging this crew, since I do not know the specifics of the situation.

Past history of rejected TOs has shown pilots carrying aborts for things that would still have made the aircraft flyable/controllable in the air, with worse results ending in the high speed abort.

During recurrent this past year, an instructor asked if you'd take a highspeed abort for a hydraulic system 3 caution. You'd be surprised how many people will say 'yes.' You'd be silly to. Assuming you have lost all hydraulic system 3, you just lost your inboard brakes on the CR2. Good luck stopping now. Much better to continue the TO, do a pattern/QRH, and come back for a landing.

Pinnacle's book used to be written to abort for a master warning or a perception that an aircraft is unable or unsafe to fly. Now they removed the master warning portion, and now it says below V1, a TO is aborted if there is any perception if the aircraft is unable or unsafe to fly.

Think of what this means. They do not want you @#%@# around in the highspeed regime of takeoff. Personally, I think we should call out V1 at V1-5 knots. Several CR2 operators already do this. If you callout V1 at V1, and a problem occurs a second before, by the time you abort, the aircraft will be above V1. All book calculations of stopping are now out the window.
 

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