That's pretty low, from an ex-Mesa, now a big guy Westie.
Florida Gulf was never a PFT outfit.....
PSA was
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That's pretty low, from an ex-Mesa, now a big guy Westie.
That's pretty low, from an ex-Mesa, now a big guy Westie.
A highspeed abort on a 6,200 ft runway? At the highspeed regime at CRW, unless a wing fell off, I'm going.........
I always understood the T/O data to include the use of the stopway, or in this case, the EMAS. In short, I fealt that C.W. was a departure not to be aborted unless a wing fell off..............
Installing EMAS would actually do more damage to an airframe at several airports rather than the grass at the end. It's too expensive and very impractical for many airports. If the ASA 700 would have used the EMAS at SAV, it would have torn some stuff up good (gear doors, struts, belly skin, etc.). With the grass at the end, it probably just needed to be hosed off and given an inspection with few, if any, broken parts as a result............
From what I understand they were almost stoppped when they went into the EMAS
From what I understand they were almost stoppped when they went into the EMAS
From what I understand they were almost stoppped when they went into the EMAS
Think of what this means. They do not want you @#%@# around in the highspeed regime of takeoff. Personally, I think we should call out V1 at V1-5 knots. Several CR2 operators already do this. If you callout V1 at V1, and a problem occurs a second before, by the time you abort, the aircraft will be above V1. All book calculations of stopping are now out the window.
Under part 25 certification there is a 2 second delay at Vef (engine failure) speed before any thing is done to stop the aircraft.Aren't "all book calculations" based on average reaction times?
If that is the case did the Takeoff Config flaps fail and they tried to take off with no flaps?
Without that EMAS they would have stopped down by the river.
By ANDY PASZTOR
A fundamental breakdown of pilot discipline, including personal conversation in the cockpit, apparently was the major reason a US Airways commuter plane ran off the end of a West Virginia runway last month, according to industry officials.
Now, three weeks after the nonfatal incident, the circumstances are prompting extensive discussion and concern among pilots and safety experts, who consider it the latest example of cockpit distraction and erosion of pilot discipline.
The Jan. 19 event involved a twin-engine Bombardier jet that ran off the runway at Yeager Airport in Charleston, W. Va., after pilots abandoned takeoff. Operated by PSA Airlines Inc., a unit of US Airways Group Inc., the plane was damaged when it smashed into a crushable concrete safety zone at the end of the strip. None of the 34 people aboard was hurt, and the incident has generated relatively little media attention.
But among many safety experts, it is viewed as the latest example of a loss of pilot focus, and a symbol of what some regulators believe is a broader problem of lack of pilot professionalism.
A US Airways spokesman said the airline is cooperating fully with the National Transportation Safety Board's investigation and has launched its own probe. But he declined to comment about specifics. The spokesman also said the two pilots, whose names haven't been released, were placed on administrative leave and taken off flying duties, as is normal after such an event.
PSA Airlines hasn't had a fatal accident or incident since it became part of US Airways, or what was then called USAir, in 1995.
Preliminary data collected from the cockpit voice recorder indicates that prior to the botched takeoff, the two pilots of US Airways Express Flight 2495 engaged in stretches of nonpertinent chatter that didn't deal with flight preparations, checklists or pilot tasks, according to industry officials familiar with the details.
Pilots are strictly prohibited from engaging in such private, extraneous conversations during critical phases of flight, particularly takeoff, descent and landing.
A spokesman for the safety board declined to comment on the investigation.
The board's probe comes at a time when Randy Babbitt, the head of Federal Aviation Administration, is stressing the importance of maintaining pilot professionalism and avoiding distractions behind the controls. Mr. Babbbitt, for example, told a House aviation subcommittee last week that the FAA is looking for methods to transfer the experience of veteran aviators to younger commuter pilots. He said such programs are an "important way to raise professional standards and improve cockpit discipline."
Industry officials describe the following sequence of events on Flight 2495. Before starting the takeoff roll, the crew is believed to have incorrectly set the flaps -- movable panels at the rear of the wings that provide essential lift. As the jet accelerated down the runway, reached almost 100 miles per hour and its front landing gear was lifting off the ground, the crew realized the mistake, according to these officials. The pilots quickly readjusted the flaps, prompting an automated cockpit warning to abandon takeoff. The crew then tried but failed to stop the jet before it rolled into the safety area.
Pilots said it is generally considered unsafe and quite unusual to adjust flap settings during takeoff. Airlines typically train crews to work together to handle so-called rejected takeoffs, including practicing decisions about what speeds and runway conditions make it safer to continue climbing instead of slowing down and attempting to stop.
They need to teach better on exactly what constitutes a high speed abort. You'd think it's common sense, but many don't seem to "get it." I cringe when I hear some pilots brief they will abort for any "Master Caution or Warning" below V1. Really? You'd take a 120 knot abort due to a master caution for something as stupid as a L Windshield heat msg? On the CRJ, above 80-100 knots, I can't think of any master caution I'd abort for. Short of flight control failure or the actual airplane being unable to lift itself off the runway, I would continue.