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New WSJ article on awful Pilot Pay in Colgan crash

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They misinterpreted this as an icing tail-plane stall which would have been the correct procedure. After the conversation of heavy icing what would your initial response be.......

I disagree, nothing in the dialogue made it appear they thought it was Tail Stall.
 
We all know his recovery, or lack of, caused the crash. However, I believe the real culprit here is fatigue. Both of them where dead tired. F/O and Capt. commuted in, and neither of them had any sleep.


Careful there, skippy. 99% of the commuters out there are responsible when it comes to their commutes. I, along with most of my colleagues, posses the ability to look at the first day of my trip, calculate the fatigue factor, and then judge whether or not I can afford the luxury of a same day commute. If you're going to start trying to tie commuting into fatigue, you're asking for trouble. As a commuter, my attitude is that it is my responsibility to be reasonably rested for the first duty day of my trip. If, looking at my trip, I don't feel like I can do that with a same day commute, I'll come in the day before. Most are just like me. Most are responsible. The moment we as a group try to pin even one link of the error chain in the accident on commuting is the moment we risk losing the ability to commute. Be careful what you wish for unless your idea of fun is packing the wife and kids up in a moving van every time a base closes or opens...

In my 20 years in this business, I dare say I've only ever met one "truly irresponsible" commuter...
 
I know it's been mentioned- but it still seems like the captain mis-identified this as a tail stall- or at least got the two confused and didn't know what was going on. But the fact that this stall happened in ice at a configuration change- and his strange recovery leads me to think a tail stall was at least in his head.

The only training we get is that tail ice video- and it's just not enough. We should be in the sim and shown and practice tail and wing stall's simultaneously in the ice.

There's been way too many accidents and mishaps involving turboprops and ice. At some point, you have to look at training.

I'm always happy to hear the media cover wages in the regionals. It isn't enough to always be safe-and every regional pilot knows this. You find yourself doing bad commutes, and not spending money on hotels, and/or working too much to make ends meet.
 
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Careful there, skippy. 99% of the commuters out there are responsible when it comes to their commutes. I, along with most of my colleagues, posses the ability to look at the first day of my trip, calculate the fatigue factor, and then judge whether or not I can afford the luxury of a same day commute. If you're going to start trying to tie commuting into fatigue, you're asking for trouble. As a commuter, my attitude is that it is my responsibility to be reasonably rested for the first duty day of my trip. If, looking at my trip, I don't feel like I can do that with a same day commute, I'll come in the day before. Most are just like me. Most are responsible. The moment we as a group try to pin even one link of the error chain in the accident on commuting is the moment we risk losing the ability to commute. Be careful what you wish for unless your idea of fun is packing the wife and kids up in a moving van every time a base closes or opens...

In my 20 years in this business, I dare say I've only ever met one "truly irresponsible" commuter...

be a little less naive. Commuting helps airlines avoid very standard moving expenses that is completely business standard at every other professional job. They brand commuting as being something they tolerate- but they speak out of both sides of their mouth. "Well you can always commute" "It's your choice to commute" I've heard both when it suits management.
 
I know it's been mentioned- but it still seems like the captain mis-identified this as a tail stall- or at least got the two confused and didn't know what was going on. But the fact that this stall happened in ice at a configuration change- and his strange recovery leads me to think a tail stall was at least in his head.

The only training we get is that tail ice video- and it's just not enough. We should be in the sim and shown and practice tail and wing stall's simultaneously in the ice.

There's been way too many accidents and mishaps involving turboprops and ice. At some point, you have to look at training.

I'm always happy to hear the media cover wages in the regionals. It isn't enough to always be safe-and every regional pilot knows this. You find yourself doing bad commutes, and not spending money on hotels, and/or working too much to make ends meet.

This crew would not have had enough experience to identify a tail stall even if that was the culprit.

In my opinion the media is skirting the real problem. In order to save a buck the major carriers are dumping experienced crews on the street to make way for the "acme/walmart" regional with the lowest bid. You think UAL,AAA,DL ect gives a rats a$$ about the experience level in those cockpits? I agree with a previous post stating not all regionals are created the same. I commute from a city that uses gojet/trans states to service chicago. I am not comfortable to put it mildly. Also it's not just the flight crews. If a regional doesn't care about who they hire in the cockpit I wonder where they are getting their mechanics?? On the other hand I will commute on eagle any day and feel as though I am in good hands.

I wonder how many of those families bought their tickets on Coninental.com and thought they were getting on a CO flight. That is fraud plain and simple. I am not picking on CO here as all of the majors are doing it. It's still fraud

I hope those families get everything they deserve which obviousley will never get enough.
 
The flap retraction killed them... if the flaps had been left down the plane wouldn't have departed so violently and they would've had a pretty good chance to pull it out. Right wing down, nose down and airspeed rapidly increasing, they would've had the knots to transition to a nose low unusual attitude... but w/ the flaps coming up all bets were off. The plane rapidly departed and fliped over which doomed them to a bad outcome. When you stall an airplane you don't change configuration until you are coming out of it... end of post.

Tailhookah

PS- I never have said that the CA didn't get them into it... the FO didn't help out and probably doomed the flight to a heinous ending.

I just can't see how the flaps being retracted had anything to do with the crash. They were already beyond the point of return when that happened. The captain's initial reaction to the shaker was to immediately pull back. Initially the left wing drops to which the captain reacts by applying right aileron. I am pretty sure the the Q400 has roll spoilers and as soon as he starts fighting the stall with the ailerons, he is losing what little lift he has left. He rolls almost 60 degrees to the left, then almost 90 degrees to the right before the flaps are touched. He is beyond 90 degrees before the flaps have had time to move more than 1 or 2 degrees.

Each time he fights the stall with the ailerons, he just makes it worse. He would have done better just letting go.
 
It's about risk management. All airlines have a "risk management" department that analyzes the company's practices, including hiring, scheduling, etc, and attach a dollar sign to a hull loss accident like this one and compare it to what they're saving by cutting those corners.

I had this EXACT discussion with Phil Trenary, David White, and Jon Young back when Pinnacle was small enough for the "bigwigs" to actually meet with the pilots. I had an issue with the GIA pilots we were hiring - had one freeze on me in an abnormal situation and another one try to run me into a 747 on final in DTW in the same week in CAVU conditions, and asked them what was the price if we lost a plane because of it instead of increasing pilot pay and attracting higher-time pilots in that competitive marketplace.

Their answer: risk analysis. They believed that the risk of having an accident was so low that it offset the cost savings from paying so little and getting whoever was "FAR qualified" to fill the seat, then said something about our CA's being good enough to handle a "single pilot" kind of incident like I had described.

Airline management is well-aware of what they're doing. PCL just happens to be one of the operators that pushes their luck too far. It's their own "chain of events":

1. Hire sub-standard, VERY low-time pilots and HOPE they'll get enough experience and be OK before they cause a problem.
2. Train them as little as possible to just get them on the line and let the CA's do the rest of the work bringing them up to speed over their first year.
3. Schedule to the ultimate bare-bones minimums of the contract and the FAR's to squeeze every last hour of productivity out of them.
4. Push them when they question the completability of an assignment due to safety (TVC crash, and did it with me on multiple ocassions).

Out of the accidents, you've got 3 out of those 4 above in every single one of them.

I came from PCL. I have quite a few good friends over there who are EXCELLENT pilots, great CA's, but I also flew with enough pilots there that I would prefer to avoid a PCL flight unless I know the pilots personally and it's someone I trust or I can sit on the flight deck jumpseat for the flight. Same goes for some of the other regional carriers that have similar practices and low-time F/O new-hires and bare-minimum CA upgrades (although those have been diminishing since the economy slowed the hiring and expansion plans).
 
This crew would not have had enough experience to identify a tail stall even if that was the culprit.

In my opinion the media is skirting the real problem. In order to save a buck the major carriers are dumping experienced crews on the street to make way for the "acme/walmart" regional with the lowest bid. You think UAL,AAA,DL ect gives a rats a$$ about the experience level in those cockpits? I agree with a previous post stating not all regionals are created the same. I commute from a city that uses gojet/trans states to service chicago. I am not comfortable to put it mildly. Also it's not just the flight crews. If a regional doesn't care about who they hire in the cockpit I wonder where they are getting their mechanics?? On the other hand I will commute on eagle any day and feel as though I am in good hands.

I wonder how many of those families bought their tickets on Coninental.com and thought they were getting on a CO flight. That is fraud plain and simple. I am not picking on CO here as all of the majors are doing it. It's still fraud

I hope those families get everything they deserve which obviousley will never get enough.

An idiotic and completely unfair generalization, and valid only if "acme/walmart" crews were all alike, AND the only ones in history ever to do something stupid. Enjoy your scary commute.
 
I just can't see how the flaps being retracted had anything to do with the crash. They were already beyond the point of return when that happened. The captain's initial reaction to the shaker was to immediately pull back. Initially the left wing drops to which the captain reacts by applying right aileron. I am pretty sure the the Q400 has roll spoilers and as soon as he starts fighting the stall with the ailerons, he is losing what little lift he has left. He rolls almost 60 degrees to the left, then almost 90 degrees to the right before the flaps are touched. He is beyond 90 degrees before the flaps have had time to move more than 1 or 2 degrees.

Each time he fights the stall with the ailerons, he just makes it worse. He would have done better just letting go.


Don't forget the rudders. Once he pulled up, both wings were stalled (of course one more than another which caused him to go one direction before the other). The only reason he reversed his bank was his rudders. Ailerons were ineffective at that point. He also kept going back and forth overcorrecting everytime he put a rudder/aileron input in. If he would of just not over corrected and pushed forward on the stick...
 
I disagree, nothing in the dialogue made it appear they thought it was Tail Stall.

No, but why else would they have raised the flaps and the gear? We can speculate all we like. Just personally If I had discussed icing and entered a stall I may very well have reacted exactly the same way. It would be very difficult without any buffeting from an impending tail stall to segregate which stall in fact was happening.
 
An idiotic and completely unfair generalization, and valid only if "acme/walmart" crews were all alike, AND the only ones in history ever to do something stupid. Enjoy your scary commute.

No completeley fair. First off I didn't call the crews acme/walmart, I called certain regionals as having an acme/walmart attitude toward operating an airline and in their hiring practices. If you do not think that is true pull your head out of the sand and look around.

Do you really think MESA and Eagle (as an example) have the same hiring standards.Better yet you think MESA and AMR (eagle) have equal training departments and standards..Get real.
 
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No completeley fair. First off I didn't call the crews acme/walmart, I called certain regionals as having an acme/walmart attitude toward operating an airline and in their hiring practices. If you do not think that is true pull your head out of the sand and look around.

Do you really think MESA and Eagle (as an example) have the same hiring standards.Better yet you think MESA and AMR (eagle) have equal training departments and standards..Get real.

I agree with some of your points, but the real blame lies in airline management! Anytime a regional airline becomes successful as a company and the pilot group is able to achieve improvements in their contract. That regional immediately lands on the majors radar and loses flying.

This has happened time and time again at the regional level. United did it to both ACA and Air Wisconsin, Usair also did it to Air Wisconsin, Delta did it to Comair, and in this very instance Continental did it to ExpressJet. Until quality receives a higher priority then price it is only going to get worse! When safety is the key factor in the management decision making process and not the shareholders and bonuses thing may start to get better!
 
No, but why else would they have raised the flaps and the gear? We can speculate all we like. Just personally If I had discussed icing and entered a stall I may very well have reacted exactly the same way. It would be very difficult without any buffeting from an impending tail stall to segregate which stall in fact was happening.
You mean besides the fact that:

a. The airspeed was WAY down into the red tape
b. The shaker was going off
c. The pusher was going off

d. NONE OF THOSE HAPPEN IN A TAIL STALL!!

The way the tail's airfoil is shaped, it will only stall at airspeeds WELL BELOW where the wing stalls. Therefore, the only way a tail stall can happen BEFORE the wing stalls is if the tail accretes ice, prematurely separating airflow and stalling the tail.

IF that happens, the tail will stall at airspeeds well ABOVE the shaker, nudger, or pusher - that's why the danger exists - there's NO indication of it except for a "mushing out of the controls", lightening of up-pitch control column forces, and finally an UPWARD pitch movement of the aircraft.

If you're in the red tape, the shaker actuates, or the pusher actuates, it's not a tail stall, it's a wing stall. Basic icing training should have covered that simple fact. If that's what he was thinking, then he wasn't paying attention in the icing class.

It also appears that SHE was the one who raised the flaps. He never commanded them, and the CVR records her as saying "I got the flaps up, you want the gear?" If I was a betting man, I'd say she didn't see the unusual attitude, but DID see the airspeed increasing and yanked the flaps, thinking they were recovering. Bad news is that they were still well into the tape, wasn't NEAR time yet, the unusual attitude notwithstanding.

We'll never know what either of them was thinking, just have to learn what lessons we can and apply them going forward.
 
It's about risk management. All airlines have a "risk management" department that analyzes the company's practices, including hiring, scheduling, etc, and attach a dollar sign to a hull loss accident like this one and compare it to what they're saving by cutting those corners.

Heyas Lear,

Great post. You are dead on the mark.

Just to piggyback onto what you said: Contrary to popular opinion, management understands full well what motivates pilots AND how we do our jobs. Most guys want to get the job done and get home, and will take steps outside their job description to make sure that happens. Call the ramp multiple times to get them to do their jobs, sling the bags yourself, ask for reroutes to save time, whatever...

It has been shown time after time that when this cooperation stops, and pilot's STOP doing other people's jobs, the airline simply grinds to a halt. You need reasonable, intelligent, responsible people on site to manage operations, and pilots ARE IT. Pilots don't need to strike. Just do your job, and ONLY your job, and watch the fun.

In this respect, we are our own worst enemy. Everyone hates work, and just want's to be home, make the commute, hate to piss off the passengers, or whatever. It usually takes a LOT to piss off enough people to reach critical mass and there are always a few jackholes that will keep pulling no matter what.

Say after your event with the FO and the 747, you shut the game down and called the CP and said "I'm done, this guy is unsat, and the plane is parked until you get someone qualified". What would have happened?

Nu
 
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firstthird wrote:



Look at the video of the NTSB recreation off the black box Chuck Yeager. You'll see that he got them into the stall... he was keeping the plane shiny side up and fighting it but it all went to hell went she put the flaps up at around 95 kias... he was screwed after that...

He got them into it... she killed them all. Just my opinion. I'll wait until the final report in about 8 months to tell you I told you so.

Tailhookah

Tail...You've got a beef against women pilots it seems. Read on s l o w l y. The pilot flying gets himself in a stall condition which quickly proceeds into an UNUSUAL Attitude NOSE high condition. If you recover from this unusual attitude it will assist with stall recovery (reducing your AOA). The recovery procedures trained to me from private pilot and instrument training thru my airline profession, and for which I have trained has always been the same. You LOWER the nose (FORWARD pressure), roll the wing (his airplane is already rolling to the left - keep the roll going, DON"T fight it) while simultaneously adding FULL, and I repeat FULL power. Allow the nose to drop through the horizon before reversing the roll to a wing level condition and slowly recover from the ensuing dive. So you level off at 500 feet AGL- better than fighting the stall right into the ground.Take a closer look at his control imputs in the various stages of his nose high attiude and the resulting control imputs. My friend you don't fight a stall. You RECOVER from it. They both were not ready to fly that evening.
 
Say after your event with the FO and the 747, you shut the game down and called the CP and said "I'm done, this guy is unsat, and the plane is parked until you get someone qualified". What would have happened?
The first F/O who froze removed himself from flying after we returned to base, saying the event had "scared" him. It was just a flaps fail and a routine return to DTW with a zero-flap overweight landing. An abnormal, with 10,000+ feet of asphalt to stop on, but... whatever.

The 747 guy was removed and sent back to a check airman. To my knowledge, this guy was the lowest time pilot ever hired at PCL (340-something hours TOTAL time). After another month of O.E. focusing on situational awareness, he was sent back to the line.

That's the problem, there's so many pilots out there willing to step up and do the job for nothing, and no restrictions on the airlines from hiring them, that the practice will continue when pickings get slim for regional new-hires again. The ONLY way to fix the puppy mill problem is to regulate away from it by putting higher minimum flight time requirements for 121 flight crews to be hired to begin with.

Our pay overall is exactly as you described... nothing will fix it until pilots as a GROUP stand up and quit going the extra mile, doing only their job, and the operation ceases to function properly, costing the company more time and money than it would cost just to compensate us properly to begin with. That assessment of yours is dead-on!
 
Question: Does the Q-400 have auto-throttles?

Auto-pilot was on for the approach so one would assume auto-throttles were too ( if installed ).

Who was running the power?

Apparently, niether the crew nor the auto-flight system.

Why?

YKMKR

Okay, I answered my own question thank you.

No auto-throttles + partial automation + marginal situational awareness = BAD



.
 
I agree with some of your points, but the real blame lies in airline management! Anytime a regional airline becomes successful as a company and the pilot group is able to achieve improvements in their contract. That regional immediately lands on the majors radar and loses flying.

This has happened time and time again at the regional level. United did it to both ACA and Air Wisconsin, Usair also did it to Air Wisconsin, Delta did it to Comair, and in this very instance Continental did it to ExpressJet. Until quality receives a higher priority then price it is only going to get worse! When safety is the key factor in the management decision making process and not the shareholders and bonuses thing may start to get better!

I couldn't agree more. It is a huge problem generated by airline management greed. The end result being different levels of quality (translated into safety) at the regional level. Ual, the company I work for is one of the worst offenders, it's all quite sickening.
 

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