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New WSJ article on awful Pilot Pay in Colgan crash

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She was "out to lunch", and the CA should have been weeded out a long time ago. The end.

Yes I agree... just trying to point out that raising the flaps was a rookie move and stupid... he was balled up as well... he was as usefull as a fur lined sink.

Tailhookah
 
This whole thing is a shame but it seems like the root cause was simply lack of situational awareness by allowing the plane to get very slow. Icing conditions at low altitudes in a turboprop are a good time to be extra careful. This is the third major Part 121 crash I can think of with a turboprop in icing conditions in the great lakes area. Two of these crashes (this one and a Brasilia in the Detroit area) had very similiar circumstances. It almost sounds like if they had just added power, left the configuration alone and let the pusher shove the nose down that the plane would have kept flying. I haven't looked at the specifics all that closely so my opinion could be incorrect.

Having said that, I (and I'll bet most of us who are honest and have enough hours in the left seat to have been around the block a time or two) can think of a few times during my career where I was not paying attention or did something I should not have. Most of us have done things we later realized were less than safe but got away with them and leaned from the experience. This crew was in the wrong place at the wrong time and did the wrong thing and didn't get away with it. The job can get so routine sometimes that it's easy to get complacent; we must all make an effort to guard against that and this is an unfortunate reminder. It's a tragedy and I feel terrible for the people who lost their lives and their families.
 
. just trying to point out that raising the flaps was a rookie move and stupid.

so was throwing down gear, flaps, changing the prop condition levers, all w/o adding power.

you are stuck on saying she made a mistake. yes, she did. she was a rookie. he was supposed to be the experienced one in the cockpit but of all the mistakes in this chain, hers was the least important.

As is the case in most significant accidents, there was a chain of events. she was a link but of all the lessons to come out of this "don't move the flaps when you're at 90 aob and 50 knots below Vref" probably won't be in the top 5. Stuff like Colgan should really do a PRIA check to see if applicants are lying when they apply. fatigue. training. I'm sure there will be something about tailplane icing indicators need to be drilled as much if not more than what you do if you suspect you have it. there are many lessons in this tragedy. but this flap thing isn't one of the big ones.
 
firstthird wrote:



Look at the video of the NTSB recreation off the black box Chuck Yeager. You'll see that he got them into the stall... he was keeping the plane shiny side up and fighting it but it all went to hell went she put the flaps up at around 95 kias... he was screwed after that...

He got them into it... she killed them all. Just my opinion. I'll wait until the final report in about 8 months to tell you I told you so.

Tailhookah

I hope your kidding!
 
Seems to me, that the failure to maintain appropiate airspeed from the point they lowered the gear was the major cause.

The question becomes why, was it due to lack of SA due to fattigue or just lack of SA?

In a previous company, we discussed the Connie Kalitta crash at Gitmo, which was mostly caused by fattigue. Even though the other crewmembers, FO and FE, was telling the CA that he was getting slow, he stated that he was tired and wasn't paying attention to what they were saying or what the a/c was doing.

In this case, it would seem that fattigue may have been a factor as would lack of experience.

As the saying goes, in this bussiness, one starts out with two buckets, one low on experience, one full of luck, hopefully neither will ever become empty.
 
I agree in spirit, 'Hooker, that hers was the final mistake in the chain of events with yanking the flaps. However, at the end of the day, I don't think that's what killed them. I'm pretty sure they were done when he got the pusher, sadly enough. :(

It almost sounds like if they had just added power, left the configuration alone and let the pusher shove the nose down that the plane would have kept flying. I haven't looked at the specifics all that closely so my opinion could be incorrect.
The problem was their low altitude. At 2,500 AGL I don't think I'd have let the pusher shove the nose FULL over, either. Probably would have mashed the disconnect about the time I was passing through nose-level, rather than let the thing start descending at 4,000-6,000 fpm with 10-12 degrees nose-down (which is about what the pusher will push to - seen it in the sim on other Bombardier products doing high altitude stall recovery after 3701 at PCL).

Once he got the pusher, he had a very narrow window of recovery. If you let the pusher activate fully and wait for it to stop pushing, you hit the ground in 20 seconds unless you override it sometime before you hit and pull it out, hopefully with enough airspeed to fly out,,, or,,,

You override the pusher at 2-3 degrees nose-up (not 20) and hope it flies out of the stall as you're losing 1,500-2,000 fpm and have about 40-50 seconds before impact for the plane to get enough airspeed to level out.

At that altitude, you'd better be Chuck Yeager when the pusher actuates. What was that someone posted earlier about "experience hopefully keeps us out of situations where we are called upon to demonstrate exceptional flying skills"...?

:(
 
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I have never flown this airplane but I can guarantee you guys the glaring problem isn't the retraction of the flaps. The most alarming thing to me is that this captain's reaction to an iminent stall is to pitch 20+ degrees in an effort to correct it. This is basic aviation and stall recovery should be second nature.

If anyone encounters this in the future, simple gouge here: Cram the throttles up to the stops and give up 2-3 degrees. Worry about the trashed engines when you get on the ground.

If this captain had used the correct procedure the flap retraction would have been inconseqential.
 
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I have never flown this airplane but I can guarantee you guys the glaring problem isn't the retraction of the flaps. The most alarming thing to me is that this captain's reaction to an iminent stall is to pitch 20+ degrees in an effort to correct it. This is basic aviation and stall recovery should be second nature.

If anyone encounters this in the future, simple gouge here: Cram the throttles up into the instrument panel and give up 2-3 degrees. Worry about the trashed engines when you get on the ground.

If this captain had used the correct procedure the flap retraction would have been inconseqential.

Agreed, nose level, full power and clean up on schedule followed by an asap and end of story.
 
The only time I can ever imagine "Pulling on a Pusher" is in wind shear with ground contact imminent, but only slightly. Not like this.
Also many operators show you how to turn off the pusher if you are getting it incorrectly. Nowhere is there training to react like this.
 

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