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New WSJ article on awful Pilot Pay in Colgan crash

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Like I said before. This is a horrible error chain that was not broken. One event changed and they would have been talking about this over beers, and we would not taking about this over the loss of all of those people.

Learn from this. Next time you want to do something that is not along the FOM guidelines, hopefully this will come to your mind. If it does you are what defines a professional.
 
I think the transcript shows her as saying "I put the flaps up" or something like that. But I agree, that action was so far into the sequence of events that even though it is A link in the chain, it is not one of the most important or preventable. I think they were around 90 aob at the time and probably only had a second or two left to positively effect a change to the outcome. the previous 30 seconds when airspeed bled off and and then the incorrect stall recovery are the links that are most likely to be changed in the future.
 
"...Learn from this. Next time you want to do something that is not along the FOM guidelines..."


So, in your opinion, is there never a circumstance to willingly disregard the FOM/Approved Procedures/Checklist?

Because I can tell you without question, there are times where doing exactly what the book says will cause you more trouble than it is worth.

I learned at an very early age ...Don't be a " Procedures Monkey" .

Think before you act.

Granted, in this and many other situations the luxury of time to think is not afforded.


YKMKR
 
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"...Learn from this. Next time you want to do something that is not along the FOM guidelines..."


So, in your opinion, is there never a circumstance to willingly disregard the FOM/Approved Procedures/Checklist?

Because I can tell you without question, there are times where doing exactly what the book says will cause you more trouble than it is worth.

I learned at a very early age ...Don't be a " Procedures Monkey" .

Think before you act.

Granted, in this and many other situations the luxury of time to think is not afforded.


YKMKR
Agreed, but the point was and is, that doing something that you have never seen before is generally not the correct action to take.
I agree that we as professionals need to think and act accordingly, but when you go so far out side the box or bubble as my employer like to say, there is little protection that they can offer. I was not referring to being a "procedures monkey." But everyone of those checklists better be enunciated clearly for the CVR.
 
"...doing something that you have never seen before is generally not the correct action to take. "


Are you referring to the co-pilot throwing up the flaps arbitrarily?

If so, I would have to agree.


"..everyone of those checklists better be enunciated clearly for the CVR. "

Here I might differ. I once had to tell my crew, against their better judgement , on the CVR , while totally throwing CRM out the window, that we would not be following the checklist and/or approved procedures.

Had we followed the checklist we would have made a big mess that would have wound up with A) ( Best Case ) a huge inconvenience, needless paperwork, media attention, and negative publicity... or B) ( Worst Case) Corpses strewn across central Florida.

Remember, the folks who write ( and endlessly re-write ) checklists and procedures for airplanes that have been flown by 20 different carriers over 30 some odd years are generally just line pilots who are trying to re-invent the wheel, or just build a better mousetrap. Sometimes they hit the mark. Sometimes, they don't.

We're all Human.

Godspeed Captain Renslow, First Officer Shaw, and Pax.

Over, and out.


YKMKR
 
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If I am thinking of the checklist you are talking about then I agree. ( There are a few checklists that are poorly written and have dire consequence is you follow them in sequence) I am referring to normal ops. (Emergency and abnormals are just that.)

I am referring to the Flaps being retracted and the pulling on the pusher. Two things that go against ALMOST all training.
If this airplane was susceptible to tail plane icing they would have been train for those procedures.
 
No I don't. Read the whole post first and not one of my later posts out of context. He did a lot wrong... he got them into the stall and didn't react well to it. But nonetheless he was keeping the AC mostly wings level and things didn't get real bad until the flaps started to come up. He left the power off while configuring and didn't add full power when the shaker went off. Also he pulled up... but as soon as the flaps started moving up is when the "departure" came. Big difference between a departure and a stall. How many of you are trained in an aircraft for out of control flight? You can fly a plane in a deep stall for a long time... but a departure? No... you flip over and point 70-80 degrees down... you have maybe seconds to react at that altitude to maybe get out of it.

Where's all her help? Calling out airspeeds and altitudes and backing up the PF... he screwed up but he was buying time although w/ a crappy technique, things didn't get real bad until the flaps were retracted. Study the film. Maybe there was some icing that helped make it worse, but surley the flaps being brought up at that time was a critical error that was uncommanded by the PF and Captain! She would've helped much more had she just shut up and done nothing... bring up the flaps? Get real guys... it's a move that most likely cost them and their pax their lives!

Tail...

Tail,

The plane was in a 90 degree bank to the right when she selected flaps up. Someone has posted that the flaps move pretty slowly in that area, so I doubt the flaps went to zero like "that."

Aerodynamics 101 tells me that a bank of 90 degrees has a much bigger effect on stall speed than changing the flap deflection by 10 degrees. Trying to use the ailerons to correct the roll probably had more effect as well.

It's a crew, and neither one was helping matters much, but this was literally a stick and rudder issue.
 
Anyone who thinks he was reacting while thinking "tailplane icing" is likely barking up the wrong tree IMHO. While not being a mind reader, ANYONE who understands tailplane icing would understand that the shaker/pusher would NOT be going off in a tail stall. He was likely thinking he was already at a low altitude and was trying to fly it out without getting closer to the ground and made two critical mistakes: failed to add emergency power and overrode the shaker/pusher and pulled it up into a full stall. She was "out to lunch", and the CA should have been weeded out a long time ago. The end.

Terrible tragedy. I hope the families get some comfort out of the regulatory changes that are coming. There's no way they can change where you live (restricting commuting is just asinine, won't happen), but I would bet money they'll probably put a cap on checkride failures to maintain your ATP. 5 is just inexcusable.
 
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She was "out to lunch", and the CA should have been weeded out a long time ago. The end.

Yes I agree... just trying to point out that raising the flaps was a rookie move and stupid... he was balled up as well... he was as usefull as a fur lined sink.

Tailhookah
 
This whole thing is a shame but it seems like the root cause was simply lack of situational awareness by allowing the plane to get very slow. Icing conditions at low altitudes in a turboprop are a good time to be extra careful. This is the third major Part 121 crash I can think of with a turboprop in icing conditions in the great lakes area. Two of these crashes (this one and a Brasilia in the Detroit area) had very similiar circumstances. It almost sounds like if they had just added power, left the configuration alone and let the pusher shove the nose down that the plane would have kept flying. I haven't looked at the specifics all that closely so my opinion could be incorrect.

Having said that, I (and I'll bet most of us who are honest and have enough hours in the left seat to have been around the block a time or two) can think of a few times during my career where I was not paying attention or did something I should not have. Most of us have done things we later realized were less than safe but got away with them and leaned from the experience. This crew was in the wrong place at the wrong time and did the wrong thing and didn't get away with it. The job can get so routine sometimes that it's easy to get complacent; we must all make an effort to guard against that and this is an unfortunate reminder. It's a tragedy and I feel terrible for the people who lost their lives and their families.
 
. just trying to point out that raising the flaps was a rookie move and stupid.

so was throwing down gear, flaps, changing the prop condition levers, all w/o adding power.

you are stuck on saying she made a mistake. yes, she did. she was a rookie. he was supposed to be the experienced one in the cockpit but of all the mistakes in this chain, hers was the least important.

As is the case in most significant accidents, there was a chain of events. she was a link but of all the lessons to come out of this "don't move the flaps when you're at 90 aob and 50 knots below Vref" probably won't be in the top 5. Stuff like Colgan should really do a PRIA check to see if applicants are lying when they apply. fatigue. training. I'm sure there will be something about tailplane icing indicators need to be drilled as much if not more than what you do if you suspect you have it. there are many lessons in this tragedy. but this flap thing isn't one of the big ones.
 
firstthird wrote:



Look at the video of the NTSB recreation off the black box Chuck Yeager. You'll see that he got them into the stall... he was keeping the plane shiny side up and fighting it but it all went to hell went she put the flaps up at around 95 kias... he was screwed after that...

He got them into it... she killed them all. Just my opinion. I'll wait until the final report in about 8 months to tell you I told you so.

Tailhookah

I hope your kidding!
 
Seems to me, that the failure to maintain appropiate airspeed from the point they lowered the gear was the major cause.

The question becomes why, was it due to lack of SA due to fattigue or just lack of SA?

In a previous company, we discussed the Connie Kalitta crash at Gitmo, which was mostly caused by fattigue. Even though the other crewmembers, FO and FE, was telling the CA that he was getting slow, he stated that he was tired and wasn't paying attention to what they were saying or what the a/c was doing.

In this case, it would seem that fattigue may have been a factor as would lack of experience.

As the saying goes, in this bussiness, one starts out with two buckets, one low on experience, one full of luck, hopefully neither will ever become empty.
 

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