Colgan Air crew experience.

[surplus1]

Surplus, you were a Comair guy, so you know how we train stalls in the 121 world, as asinine as it is. What do you remember as the recovery procedure for a stall (in airline training only)? Full power, hold backpressure on the yoke, minimize altitude loss.

Hello 172driver. Yes, I was a Comair guy and proud of it – for the last 12 years of a 35-year airline career (CMR was my 2nd go round so to speak – I do some things backwards). Mentally I will always be a Comair guy – great people - although I haven’t at all forgotten my previous carrier or experiences, which were a bit more glamorous [and paid a whole lot more]. Lol

It’s been 10 years since I retired so I don’t know what CMR is teaching now for stall recoveries but I will find out. I do remember when I was there that stall recovery training included a configuration change. That was totally against everything I had previously been trained to do (in much heavier equipment) and I objected strongly – to no avail. At the time I thought CMR’s stall training was light airplane stuff. I also think I recall that the POI at the time had never flown anything bigger than a Twin Comanche [which explains a lot] and was more or less afraid of jets. I do hope that has been changed.

What you say disturbs me. I’m all for minimum altitude loss – but at the same time I believe that effective stall recovery in a T-category airplane will always involve some loss of altitude. It is far more important to get the airplane flying again that to try to maintain altitude, which is quite likely to induce secondary stalls.

There's a big difference between minimum loss and zero loss.

I also remember very clearly the loss of CMR 3272, which I think (not sure), may have preceded your hire date. This particular accident has way too many similarities for comfort.

That was a very sad time at CMR and I fully appreciate how the Colgan guys must feel. My heart goes out to them.

Before CMR I was lucky. My previous airline never had an accident and only one serious incident in 60 years of operation. When I think of how many errors I personally made while at my prior company it still scares the daylights out of me.

FLY SAFE – Brother.

 

[Captzaahlie]

Have you been involved at a regional level? You might be surprised.

Once again, you'd be suprised. How about +140000.

Better than 140,000 hours is a lot of time!

Thats 15.98 continuous years of flying, when

did you have a chance to stop and buy a computer?

 

[Newf Dog]

With all the talk of stall recovery techniques and training, if the crew lost situational awareness with regard to airspeed, it's going to come down to a matter of what would have prevented them from losing that situational awareness in the first place.

Somebody once said "don't put yourself in a situation that requires your superior airmanship skills to get you out of it" or something like that.

If it comes down to the shaker activating after dropping the gear 5 knots below Vref at only flaps 5, how did they get that slow to begin with and nobody noticed?

 

[MALSR]

If the PF pulled back to override the pusher, the airplane would then pitch way up due to the fact that just before the stall, the a/p was putting in nose up trim to counter the decreasing airspeed just prior to shaker activation. Also, once the pusher was overridden, I would imagine the control column would be pulled back quite far due to the force being applied to overcome the pusher. Just a thought.

 

[FMEpilot]

I asked this on the other thread but got no response, was the non rev capt riding in the jumpseat?

 

[clarkwgriswald]

At comair nowadays, the low altitude stall recovery does not include configuration changes. Basically at the first indication of an approaching stall, example being stick shaker, full power is applied, the pitch is held accordingly to maintain altitude, any configuration changes are made after the aircraft has accelerated away from the stall, usually in the sim world depending on the configuration prior to recovery, positive rate gear, and flaps on normal speed schedule.
I believe this recovery technique assumes an approach to stall, in an actual stall condition I'm pretty sure the angle of attack has to still be reduced.

 

[Captzaahlie]

I asked this on the other thread but got no response, was the non rev capt riding in the jumpseat?

For some reason I recall a mention that he was riding in the back, which makes sense... only 45 pax. I can not place the source though...

 

[Captzaahlie]

My earlier post I questioned the approach speed as compared to Dash 8 300 series. So I guess in fact reading some post from other Q400 drivers that they were approaching at a very slow speed.

I don't think you can call any of the positions of the Yoke or Power levels bs. These parameters are encoded in the FDR.
Maybe he mistaked the stick shaker as something that was caused by the icing?
I still think Ice contributed to this accident only because the crew seemed really preoccupied and concerned about it. Fixating on the ice might have diverted there real job in flying the airplane.

I am sure in a few more days we will get more detail, but as this investigation continues it looks more and more likely to be crew error.

I heard some one say that if the fdr is misinterpreted it's probably because of 3 gee's input up there...... (Very bad but funny inside pdt joke, that i get no credit for!)

 

[Captzaahlie]

Experience in terms of total time doesn't mean anything. I've flown with 20 year captains that can't land a 737 within 50' of the centerline, and I've flown with 200 hrs copilots who were just blessed with ability.

I just had the great pleasure of flying with a guy who had just come off the MD-80 at Alaska. Had been on it for 18 years and hadnt been north of seattle (except for OE) at all. He had 3 landings in the last two months, and none up in SE alaska. You got it, first trip together we get ANC SIT, JNU, SEA together. Want to know how this guy got my utmost respect? Instead of puffing his chest out and telling me how "experienced" he was with his 15k hrs, he said "dude...I'd like to say I'm comfortable up here, but I"m not. I'm going to need your help. Cool?" and he meant it. Toughest day of weather I've ever flown in, but instead of dividing along lines of our TT experience, he had the wherewithall to, god forbid, trust someone who had more "experience" in a different type of flying.

I guess my point is, don't have a ********************ing ego in a cockpit. it WILL bite you in the ass someday.

Mookie

Great post Mookie, I wish we all had attitudes like that....

 

[chimichanga]

The ones that will kill you are the Chuck Yeager wannbe's that have 300hrs. The one's that huff and puff when you tell them what there doing is wrong.

Tell me about it!