Colgan Air crew experience.

[Motive Flow]

Yes but some have rules in place however for upgrading.

I believe here at Piedmont you have to have 3000hrs to upgrade. So if you were hired with 500hrs you'll have some pretty good experience in the plane before you upgrade.

Finally, someone with an actual common sense solution. Trans States had similar upgrade mins a few years ago (one of the few things I agreed with ). It was 3000 hours for turboprop and 4000 hours for jet. This could be reduced a little with company flight time.

 

[GuppyWN]

Gup, you rule (in your world). If we're talking any abnormality, I'd take the person with more time in THAT airframe! I don't give a crap about your hours, half of which are reading the newpaper, trust me, that is where I am now. You will never be a better pilot than if you flew turboprops in NE winters. Can't speak for guys and gals that have APs, my 4 yrs at CJC were in the 1900.

Let the investigation continue before drawing conclusion all!

You're right. But I can read the HELL out of a newspaper. imp: I wasn't trying to be cocky or condescending. The point I was trying to make was would you rather have a 600 hour wonder boy or someone with literally years spent in the cockpit of one particular aircraft.

Sorry for the misdirect.

God bless the Colgan crew,
Gup

 

[BSkin]

You're right. But I can read the HELL out of a newspaper. imp: I wasn't trying to be cocky or condescending. The point I was trying to make was would you rather have a 600 hour wonder boy or someone with literally years spent in the cockpit of one particular aircraft.

Sorry for the misdirect.

God bless the Colgan crew,
Gup

Just came across a little harsh at the time, having worked there for 4 years. Beers on me if we ever meet!

 

[surplus1]

Read this article

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123492905826906821.html

This is an excerpt of the first two paragraphs. Reportedly, the source is 'the investigators' (NTSB)

"Investigators examining last week's Continental Connection plane crash have gathered evidence that pilot commands -- not a buildup of ice on the wings and tail -- likely initiated the fatal dive of the twin-engine Bombardier Q400 into a neighborhood six miles short of the Buffalo, N.Y., airport, according to people familiar with the situation.

The commuter plane slowed to an unsafe speed as it approached the airport, causing an automatic stall warning, these people said. The pilot pulled back sharply on the plane's controls and added power instead of following the proper procedure of pushing forward to lower the plane's nose to regain speed, they said. He held the controls there, locking the airplane into a deadly stall, they added."

Now look closely at the second paragraph.

My opinion: A) The first sentence (2nd paragraph) is plausible. B) I do not believe the second sentence. I think the NTSB's assumption is wrong.

This is telling us that when the shaker activated and the autopilot disconnected - the pilot pulled back hard on the yoke, added power and then held the back pressure throughout.

To put it simply, I think that's unadulterated BS!

I believe the NTSB (at present) is misinterpreting the pitch -up data (which aggravated the stall) as being caused by or resulting from incorrect pilot input.

If true this is damning.

It is also the complete opposite of training and I just don't believe it.

In critical situations pilots (initially) automatically react in accordance with their training. When the shaker goes off - you push not pull.

I think that whatever 'investigator' said this is overlooking the nose-up trim induced by the autopilot prior to the disconnect.

It may turn out that mistakes were made by the crew prior to the upset - but I just don't buy that one.

For now I'll stick to my theory of elevator trim as the cause of the pitch up and the progression from shaker to pusher - the initial stall of the wing.

After the pusher took effect and pitched the nose down - then yes - the pilot applied back pressure. But not before.

These folks were flying on instruments. You just can't convince me that any pilot who looks at the ADI and sees a servere pitch-up is going to try to correct it by pulling on the yoke - no matter what noise the shaker might be making.

If this really came from an investigator - then they're doing a lot more "speculating" than anyone in this thread.

 

[WSurf]

My earlier post I questioned the approach speed as compared to Dash 8 300 series. So I guess in fact reading some post from other Q400 drivers that they were approaching at a very slow speed.

I don't think you can call any of the positions of the Yoke or Power levels bs. These parameters are encoded in the FDR.
Maybe he mistaked the stick shaker as something that was caused by the icing?
I still think Ice contributed to this accident only because the crew seemed really preoccupied and concerned about it. Fixating on the ice might have diverted there real job in flying the airplane.

I am sure in a few more days we will get more detail, but as this investigation continues it looks more and more likely to be crew error.

 

[172driver]

Surplus, you were a Comair guy, so you know how we train stalls in the 121 world, as asinine as it is. What do you remember as the recovery procedure for a stall (in airline training only)? Full power, hold backpressure on the yoke, minimize altitude loss.

Due to this horrendous policy of the FAA, I would say it was quite possibly a natural and trained reaction for this pilot to pull back on the yoke in the stall. Add to the equation some adrenaline and the fact that they had a stick pusher and it seems very plausible that they pulled back.

 

[Newf Dog]

Since the conversation is trending toward lack of airspeed awareness and stall onset recognition I'll just throw this out there:

One "technique" I was always taught was that when the flying pilot called for flaps, the "pilot monitoring" should check the airspeed before moving the flap handle. Of course, the purpose of this "technique" was to prevent you from overspeeding the flaps. It's saved me from doing that several times and let's face it who hasn't accidentally called for flaps before the appropriate speed.

I never envisioned that this "technique" would help to identify a slow speed regime since I'd never seen that. We have no way of knowing whether the crew in question used this "technique", whether it would have helped them to identify their slow speed thereby preventing them getting to the shaker in the first place, whether they normally used this "technique" and becasue they were distracted by something neglected this "technique," or whether any of this is even relevant. Since the limited and selected information released (and/or leaked) by the NTSB seems to be pointing in the direction of lack of slow airspeed awareness (and it's frustrating and bogus the way the NTSB hangs snippets of information out there) I wonder if the NTSB might end up recommending that this "technique" now become "procedure" or if it is "procedure" at Colgan.

Anyway, in no way am I hanging the pilots of 3407 out there. I was at Comair when 5191 happened and by all accounts the captain of that flight was a damn good aviator. Even if this gets hung on the crew as pilot error the one thing I know for sure is that there is not a pilot among us who is immune from making a potentially catastrophic error at some point in his/her career no matter how good an aviator you think that you are. I'm just raising this point as a matter of "professional discussion."

My condolences to the Colgan family of pilots, friends and family.

 

[surplus1]

My earlier post I questioned the approach speed as compared to Dash 8 300 series. So I guess in fact reading some post from other Q400 drivers that they were approaching at a very slow speed.

I do not disagree with your assessment of the speed. It does appear to be slow, especially given the circumstances.

IF the crew did observe the IAS there has to be a reason why they did not appear to think it was too low. I can’t guess what that might be.

I don't think you can call any of the positions of the Yoke or Power levels bs. These parameters are encoded in the FDR.

Again I agree that the parameters are encoded in the FDR data. However, that tells us only where the yoke was over time. It does not tell us how it got there.

We can read the curves that indicate its position accurately but we must interpret (assume) the reason for those positions. That interpretation is an educated opinion not a fact. Telling me that something moved is accurate. Telling me why it moved or who moved it isn’t quite the same.

I’m not saying that the data is bs. What I am saying is that the idea that the yoke went to very nose up (initially) as the consequence of intentional pilot input is an opinion that is not found on an FDR and that opinion, in my opinion, is bs. There’s a huge difference in those two concepts.

What I’m not buying at this point is the interpretation of the data, not the actual data itself.

Maybe he mistaked the stick shaker as something that was caused by the icing?

That is possible. But I would not see that as being a mistake. It is quite possible that the ice was a factor in the shaker activating when it did. Granted the speed was slow, but if the Vref at landing weight had already been incremented (which they said) for the ice factor – that might trigger the shaker but it wouldn’t stall the wing. Even the non-incremented Vref is 30% above actual stall speed.

Once the shaker activated and disconnected the autopilot – something had to suddenly increase the alpha to stall the wing. We need to find out what that something was. They’re saying ‘the pilot did it” – I don’t agree with that.

I still think Ice contributed to this accident only because the crew seemed really preoccupied and concerned about it. Fixating on the ice might have diverted there real job in flying the airplane.

I have no problem at all with the concept that ice was a contributing factor. It appears very evident that there was a loss of situational awareness and ice accretion was most likely the cause of that.

The loss of situational awareness would explain why the IAS was allowed to get so low (unobserved).

It is my theory that: As the a/c reached 2300 ft the autopilot captured and held the altitude. If no power or insufficient power was added at that point (the FDR should show this), the airspeed would continue to decrease slowly (unobserved) and the autopilot would trim nose up (also unobserved). Unless additional power is added, the decreasing trend in IAS will continue and so will the input of nose-up trim by the autopilot – until the critical AOA is reached and the shaker activates – disconnecting the autopilot.

I do not know if the FDR in this installation can record elevator trim in motion. If it can, we should be able to see that in the data.

At that point if the elevator returns to neutral the nose will pitch down (as the back pressure input from the autopilot is relieved. That relief of back pressure (yoke movement) should show on the FDR trace. If it doesn’t return to neutral, the displaced elevator will pitch the nose up – that will appear on the FDR trace as a nose-up (yoke back) control input.

Neither the airplane nor the FDR knows what put the elevator/yoke in that position (nose-up) – [unless the FDR recorded elevator trim in motion] - it only knows that’s where it went after the shaker activated. In other words, the data tells us where it was – it does not tell us how it got there. At least not yet. To assume 'the pilot did it' doesn't cut the mustard.

There are really only two possible ways, I would argue: their theory – pilot input, or my theory – autopilot input before disconnect.

The Board is apparently interpreting that to be intentional back pressure applied by the pilot. That is what I don’t agree with. I believe the cause of that up elevator was the nose-up trim previously input by the autopilot. They have to prove me wrong before I will buy their theory.

I am sure in a few more days we will get more detail, but as this investigation continues it looks more and more likely to be crew error.

Yes, we will get more information and eventually the Board will decide as to probable cause. The term probable is there for a reason. It means that is the educated opinion of the Board, based on their interpretation of the available data. Most often they are correct – sometimes they are not.

It is possible that crew error may eventually be decided as the probable cause.

I’m used to that but in itself that doesn’t satisfy me. IF the crew made an error or even a series of errors, I want to know, accurately, what those errors were.

Unless we know this it becomes extremely difficult to avoid repetition of the same errors in the future.

 

[jmreii]

There are some micro-burst accidents that weren't pilot error. This is obviously before we knew what micro-burst were, and before the low-level windshear alert systems were in place.

Many of the micro-burst/windshear accidents I can think for the last 35 years have been assigned weather related and crew error, Unless you have a specific accident that you would care to disclose.

 

[Donsa320]

Surplus, you were a Comair guy, so you know how we train stalls in the 121 world, as asinine as it is. What do you remember as the recovery procedure for a stall (in airline training only)? Full power, hold backpressure on the yoke, minimize altitude loss.

Due to this horrendous policy of the FAA, I would say it was quite possibly a natural and trained reaction for this pilot to pull back on the yoke in the stall. Add to the equation some adrenaline and the fact that they had a stick pusher and it seems very plausible that they pulled back.

Your argument has merit but the stall recovery you describe is for an "approach" to stall which is what we all practice by FAA mandate. To make that worse, minimum or no loss of altitude is stressed. I will stick my neck out and guess that in the training this gentleman received he may have had a check airman who beat him up a little about an altitude loss and thereafter was primed to do what it appears he did. Just an opinion.