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Colgan 3407 NTSB Animation

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It seems to me the maneuver he performed when the autopilot kicked off at stick shaker was a ground prox escape maneuver. I can almost hear his sim instructor telling him to, "Pull back until you get stick shaker and add full power." Why he did the wrong thing at that time we will never know? Micro sleep woken up by stick shaker? Who knows.
 
Well, then fine. But I disagree, in fact, I've asked about a pusher and any training in the event it happens, but no one does it. Why? The FAA doesn't require it. Hell, yes, we should not stall. And YES, we should recover at just the onset of a stick shaker. But once the pusher goes off, I don't recall any training ever in the sim, in terms of what to do next. It's pretty much up to you, let the pusher do its thing, lower the nose, and let the airspeed rise. Not a big deal when you're 10,000' or higher. A HUGE deal when you're only 1,000 to 1,500 AGL. At that point, who knows, human instinct might to be pull up to avoid the pusher taking you into the ground. I wouldn't know.

But I think we should all get ready and be prepared for stall profile changes, and training right up to and in the pusher. Our airline already did away with stall profiles. I'm sure others will be changing soon, more to follow.

They weren't at 1,000 AGL!! They actually CLIMBED ABOVE glideslope intercept altitude! There were not standard calls by the FO for vertical speed. Just "uhhh". Are there no calls by the pilot not flying at Colgan during windshear training? Do you not experience a pusher in windshear or unusual attitude training. It's NOT just about stall recovery training. We don't do stall recovery training we recover from slow flight in the sims. But that's not all the required training we get. There are other skills that could have carried the day here.

And we can whine and cry about the company's fatiguing schedules. IF YOU ARE F'N FATIGUED CALL IN FATIGUED! BE THE PROFESSIONAL AND MAKE THE CALL! You want the company having someone walk around giving you alertness quizes all the time? How about we just make the call when necessary? How about pilots call in sick when they're sick instead of expecting someone else to do it for them? How about we all act like adults and take responsibility for our own actions?
 
Thank you.
If any of us were there, we would be dead too. I for one welcome the finding of the crew being at fault. Would you rather the airframe be suspect and have to go strap on a Q400 for work?
PBR
 
Every PC or RFT I've taken there were stalls demonstrated on approach or just after takeoff in a turn. Don't other companies do the same?
 
The crew stalled the plane, its pilot error. Fatigue may have played a roll, poor training, etc, etc, but they put themselves in the situation that never should've happened in the first place. Ultimately, their actions (or the lack thereof) were the main reason for the loss of many lives. Extremely sad, but very true.
 
...For example a Captain with 5 check ride failures and 100 hours in type paired with a very inexperienced FO should never happen.

What is so ironic is that the PRIA report would show these failures. So in the Colgan case, everyone knew about his substandard performance. The irony is that it was repeated PC failures on the part of the Eagle captain that killed everyone, including himself in RDU that night, that led to PRIA, as that information was never disiminated to AE. AE likey may have never hired him.

In the Colgan case, they knowling had a cheeseball, and still sent him into battle.

Pretty predictable on what the outcome will be....
 
If any of us were there, we would be dead too. I for one welcome the finding of the crew being at fault. Would you rather the airframe be suspect and have to go strap on a Q400 for work?
PBR


Depends on what you mean by "if any of us were there." If you mean, "If any of us were there after the stall had begun, and the captain well and truly stalled the plane," then I suppose you are correct. Once the plane was fully stalled and rolled to 100 degrees, it would have been difficult, if not impossible to recover.

I disagree, however, that none of us reading this would have been able to prevent the stall in the first place. That is where the breakdown truly happened, and most of us here who are professional pilots wouldn't have allowed it to get that far, despite what the media tries to say about our lack of professionalism and experience.

I'm not saying that it couldn't happen to me, quite the contrary. Anyone could have made this mistake, but on average, most of us would have caught this before it got that bad. That is why there aren't many more accidents like this.
 
...For example a Captain with 5 check ride failures and 100 hours in type paired with a very inexperienced FO should never happen.

What is so ironic is that the PRIA report would show these failures. So in the Colgan case, everyone knew about his substandard performance. The irony is that it was repeated PC failures on the part of the Eagle captain that killed everyone, including himself in RDU that night, that led to PRIA, as that information was never disiminated to AE. AE likey may have never hired him.

In the Colgan case, they knowling had a cheeseball, and still sent him into battle.

Pretty predictable on what the outcome will be....
 
If any of us were there, we would be dead too. I for one welcome the finding of the crew being at fault. Would you rather the airframe be suspect and have to go strap on a Q400 for work?
PBR

It seems to me the shaker/pusher went off around 130kts and 2300, the plane then climbed to 2500 before going down,

Keep flaps where they are, full power, and just five degrees nose down saves them..... I just cant relate to the yoke in his lap?
 
What is amazing to me is how long the thing flew at around 90kts while large rudder/aileron control inputs were applied. One would think it would have dropped off much sooner and entered a spin.
 
Training. We do a pretty good job teaching folks how to read glass and push buttons on an FMS. Perhaps teaching basic skills in an aircraft heavier than a C172 might be in order. I mean going up in the aircraft and let the pusher do its thing, do a steep turn, do single engine stuff. The feel is different. After all the simulator, even though a fine training machine, only sits in a room enclosed by four walls. It can only simulate. It isn't the real thing. Just my two cents worth.
 
The flaps up is what really confuses me, with no crew co-ordination either. She didn't even have increasing trends. The situation goes from bad to deadly with the throw of a lever, sad.

I can't help thinking about the families that are living through this hell.

I will always wonder what her picture was that she thought that would help their situation.
 
Well thank god you don't work for the NTSB. Even the NTSB has not released its final report. These are just public hearings, and the final report will come out much later. You, being an emo idiot, don't question the "why" of the overall picture. You said "inexperience" and "lack of attention." Inexperience? Maybe, but then again, how much time did YOU have when you were hired at the Airlink? ANd for "lack of attention"..... WHAT WERE THE CAUSES??? That is what the NTSB will investigate!

How about:
1. Grueling scheduling practices at Colgan
2. Long, tiring day
3. That lond tiring day exacerbated by commuting in.
4. Tiredness that night due to the long day
5. FATIGUE

These are the main issues! So quit crucifying the crew. I don't blame them, it is far to easy to blame the dead. How about blaming the system that failed on them? How about blaming Colgan's sub-standard training program? How about addressing industry wide fatigue and scheduling/rest issues?

Seven, you're stupid if you can't think the whole situation through, as I just described above.

You obviously have no time in a large turbo prop aircraft. At 22:16:10 the condition levers (props) are placed (not called for) to max. This is largest drag on the aircraft, it's like putting on the brakes. Within 17 seconds the aircraft looses 40 knots of airspeed and stalls simply because the power was left as flight idle. This is one of the BASIC flying skills in turbo prop flying.

Quit crucifying the crew? How about stop making excuses for them.
 
if you watch the animation... I don't think the pusher had anything to do with it, he yanked back on the controls when the sticker shaker went off. The pusher went off as the aircraft was already pitched way up.

absolutely pathetic for both pilots !!!!
 
The flaps up is what really confuses me, with no crew co-ordination either. She didn't even have increasing trends. The situation goes from bad to deadly with the throw of a lever, sad.

I can't help thinking about the families that are living through this hell.

I will always wonder what her picture was that she thought that would help their situation.

I am not condoning moving the flaps, but when she did it the airplane was rolling right through 90 degrees. The aircraft then came back to wing level momentarily. From that moment on if the ailerons were not used just rudder and max power applied while maintaining attitude the result would have been a lot different.

Yes her response to the flaps 15 and the shaker was UHHH. However if you notice right before that she had a hand off to the tower. It appears her head was down for a second as he made his calls she looked up as she selected the flaps and all hell started to break loose.

I wonder if the captains I used to fly with before my furlough that made fun of me for saying speed checks before I moved the flap or gear handle would laugh at me now?
 
I would think the training issue is that in a very short time period you had 2 crews stall and airplane! Something is getting missed here is this keeps happening!

The BTV airplane didn't stall.....where did you get 2 from? :confused:
 
I am not condoning moving the flaps, but when she did it the airplane was rolling right through 90 degrees. The aircraft then came back to wing level momentarily. From that moment on if the ailerons were not used just rudder and max power applied while maintaining attitude the result would have been a lot different.


Ailerons? Missed it by THAT MUCH, but you're on to something.

Watch the plane and the yoke- serious food for thought about what happens to a wing when a pair of barn doors rotate up from the top at an unimaginably slow speed and off the chart AOA. As the yoke see-saws, they become "what's left of the lift" dumpers vice roll spoilers.

An eye opener, for sure.
 
They weren't at 1,000 AGL!!

Yes they were low enough. Cleared to 2,300 MSL, and that's where they were at, and airport elevation is 728' MSL. This means they were approximately 1,500 AGL when all the problems started. A shaker or pusher at that low an altitude is a serious thing, and espeically a pusher when you're only 1,000AGL to 1,500AGL, I don't even want to think what your brain will force you to do.
 
I am not condoning moving the flaps, but when she did it the airplane was rolling right through 90 degrees. The aircraft then came back to wing level momentarily. From that moment on if the ailerons were not used just rudder and max power applied while maintaining attitude the result would have been a lot different.

Yes her response to the flaps 15 and the shaker was UHHH. However if you notice right before that she had a hand off to the tower. It appears her head was down for a second as he made his calls she looked up as she selected the flaps and all hell started to break loose.

I wonder if the captains I used to fly with before my furlough that made fun of me for saying speed checks before I moved the flap or gear handle would laugh at me now?

Yes they probably would still laugh at you because the speed did check before she moved the lever to 15*. I wouldn't call for the flaps above speed and if I did, I would preface the call with "on speed". Speed checks is not a call out in your SOP so why do you continue to use it?

I think with her limited time in any aircraft, she thought she was doing the right thing. She move the flap lever and the aircraft stalled...I'm guessing but she might have thought to undo what she did and the aircraft upset might end. In my eyes the CA was asleep at the wheel.
 
In approx. 15 sec. the speed goes from 180 to below 130 with no addition of power. 50 knots, gear down, 2 flap calls, and no power added. Two PILOTS missed a 50 knot decrease during reconfiguring for landing.

Who's the clown in here trying to use fatigue, commuting, and Colgan's training? GMAFB. This is 101. Looks like the Captain failed 101 AGAIN and killed all those people.

She chose to commute on a red-eye, he CHOSE to commute and sleep in the crew room, they CHOSE to chit chat below 10.

All the factors mentioned are relevent, but they are CLEARLY NOT the cause.


W
 
One thing I've noticed. Look at the animation at 22:16:27.

CA asked for "flaps 15, landing check." Flaps only made it to 10. At that time, speed hit 130KIAS, stick shaker activated simultaneously with an "uhhh" from the FO.

When she retracted the flaps (unrequested), at 16:36, the speed was 96 KIAS and the pusher was on. Additionally, the aircraft was in a right bank of about 100 degrees. Even though it was unrequested, the retraction was immaterial at this point.

Look at the CA's control inputs. Feet going all over, overcontrolling, the aircraft climbed 200' in the stall. He never "let" the nose go below the horizon. By the time it did, the stall was so aggravated, it was too late to recover.

Yep.

I was thinking the same thing. To everyone bashing the FO and her uncommanded change of configuration, I'm pretty sure she was thinking "I just changed the configuration and the airplane has departed controlled flight." Hence the "Uh..." She was probably just thinking her extension of flaps caused the departure and resetting them would rectify the situation.

I know I've heard that more than once about a departure from controlled flight after a configuration change in my career flying multiple turbine-powered aircraft.

Couple that with their combined limited experience in ice and type as well as her apprehension about the icing conditions (predisposed to thinking you have a situation you don't perhaps) and there are a lot of links in this chain.

But in the end, a loss of situational awareness and instrument scan, caused by any number of factors (duty day, fatigue, illness, stress, etc.) allowed the crew and PIC to miss potential cues that could have broken the chain.

Let's hope their loss, as well as that of the unsuspecting passengers on board, was not in vain.
 
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There is no substitue for Experience......

How much is enough?

Excerpts from a NTSB report

"
As the airplane climbed through 11,700 feet, the captain noted light rime ice accumulating on the windshield wiper blades and about a 1/2-inch-wide area of ice on the left wing. During this time, the crew failed to detect a decaying indicated airspeed due to the ice that was accumulating. As he began to activate the manual deice boot system, he felt a heavy vibration in the airframe and the windscreen immediately turned white with ice. The airplane's nose and left wing dropped and the autopilot disconnected. As he was grabbing the yoke, the clacker sounded (indicating an imminent stall), the stick shaker activated, and the ground proximity warning system emitted a "bank angle" aural warning. Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR) data showed that the indicated airspeed went from 144 to 130 KIAS over the 26 seconds before the upset, and that the rate of airspeed decay accelerated in the final 10 seconds before the autopilot disconnected. The airplane departed controlled flight at an indicated airspeed of 130 knots, and before the stall warning activated. The data establishes that the airplane went through a series of roll and pitch excursions, reaching maximum values of 86 degrees left wing down, 140 degrees right wing down, 23 degrees nose up, and 40 degrees nose down before the flight crew recovered control. The data also revealed that about 26 seconds before the stall while the airplane was at a speed of 144 KIAS, the airplane began to experience a likely ice-induced slight rolling anomaly that was counter to the direction of the aileron input. Aileron input from the autopilot arrested this slight rolling motion.

The airplane rolled to 86 degrees left wing down, and then went through a series of roll and pitch
movements. It reached 140 degrees of right roll, and a maximum pitch down angle of 48 degrees. It
rolled to 75 degrees left wing down, and a pitch of 31 degrees nose down. It then rolled to 94
degrees right wing down, followed by a pitch angle to 40 degrees nose down. Starting at 1440, the
altitude and outside air temperature parameters stopped recording valid data for a period of 15
seconds. At 1440:06, the airplane's pitch angle began to increase. It passed through 0 degrees
about 6 seconds later at an airspeed of 219 knots, and a recorded maximum vertical acceleration of
2.5 g's. The pitch reached 23 degrees nose up at 1440:24; the minimum recorded airspeed value of
105 knots occurred 11 seconds later while the airplane was at an altitude of 7,840 feet. The
parameters began to stabilize after this time.

The captain had a total flight time of 6,764.08 hours, with 3,981.87 hours accumulated in Saab 340
airplanes, of which 2,519.46 hours was as the pilot-in-command (PIC). He had a total of 970 hours
of instrument experience and between 1,700 and 1,900 hours of night flight. During the preceding 90
days, 30 days, and 24 hours, he reported that he had flown in both the capacity of PIC and
second-in-command (SIC) approximately 172, 47, and 7 hours, respectively. He added that he had
acquired numerous hours of aerobatic flight time in a Cessna 150 Aerobat airplane."

Anytime, anywhere
 
Yes they probably would still laugh at you because the speed did check before she moved the lever to 15*. I wouldn't call for the flaps above speed and if I did, I would preface the call with "on speed". Speed checks is not a call out in your SOP so why do you continue to use it?

I think with her limited time in any aircraft, she thought she was doing the right thing. She move the flap lever and the aircraft stalled...I'm guessing but she might have thought to undo what she did and the aircraft upset might end. In my eyes the CA was asleep at the wheel.

Ummmm look again at the speed before the flaps were selected 15 he was in the red arc. Yes lowering the flaps would lower the stall speed but, he was not making power increases while adding, flaps, gear, and props. Laugh all you want, but in that situation attention to the speed before the final notch of flaps probably would've had her asking about power! I know one thing if you are flying and we are in the red arc your not getting flaps before you bump up the power because at flight idle and already in the red arc they are not lift devices they are drag devices.
 
I wonder if the captains I used to fly with before my furlough that made fun of me for saying speed checks before I moved the flap or gear handle would laugh at me now?

So you are one of those idiots that make up their own callouts. If it is not a standard callout, then wtf are you doing saying it? Besides she just put them up, no one called for them.
 
So you are one of those idiots that make up their own callouts. If it is not a standard callout, then wtf are you doing saying it? Besides she just put them up, no one called for them.

Who the ******************** are you to call me a idiot! I challenge you to show me in a FOM anything prohibiting verbalization and communication. I have done it on PC's and received a positive response from the Check Airman! It is not making up my own callout, it is adding situational awareness. In this very instance it would have brought his attention to the rapid decay of airspeed before the final notch of flaps were selected!
 
Who the ******************** are you to call me a idiot! I challenge you to show me in a FOM anything prohibiting verbalization and communication. I have done it on PC's and received a positive response from the Check Airman! It is not making up my own callout, it is adding situational awareness. In this very instance it would have brought his attention to the rapid decay of airspeed before the final notch of flaps were selected!

I don't have to show you anything. If it is not a required callout, wtf are you doing saying it. I think everyone checks the speed after flaps are called for before moving the flaps. I think it is a great idea to check the speed, however there is no need to make up your own callout and say it every time. The FP is obviously looking at the airspeed, and you as the PM obviously are too, so why the need to make up a callout? You add to the situational awareness by checking the speed, not saying "speed checks". I never understand people like you who think they have a better way to fly the plane. The company pays you to fly the plane they way they tell you (eg. profiles, callouts), why is that so difficult?
 
I don't have to show you anything. If it is not a required callout, wtf are you doing saying it. I think everyone checks the speed after flaps are called for before moving the flaps. I think it is a great idea to check the speed, however there is no need to make up your own callout and say it every time. The FP is obviously looking at the airspeed, and you as the PM obviously are too, so why the need to make up a callout? You add to the situational awareness by checking the speed, not saying "speed checks". I never understand people like you who think they have a better way to fly the plane. The company pays you to fly the plane they way they tell you (eg. profiles, callouts), why is that so difficult?


I've read some pretty dumb things on this thread, but you take the cake with this comment. Had the pilot of this aircraft been monitoring his airspeed, there wouldn't have been accident to be discussing right now.
 

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