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Colgan 3407 NTSB Animation

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primary persons responsible. 1) Captain- he's Pilot in Command and has the ultimate responsibility for the safety of that aircraft. 2) SIC, she should have spoken up sooner. Let's not forget she is a REQUIRED crew member and "checked out" on the aircraft.
Bottom line, I understand there were contributing factors relating to th crash. There always are. But we must put primary blame on the Flight crew for Pilot Error. They made a student pilot mistake. They allowed the aircraft to run out of airspeed and fall out of the sky. When the stall occured, the Captain NEVER lowered the noise/angle of attack. UNACCEPTABLE!!!
Then if you blame this on pilot error, then every single recent crash is all to be blamed on pilot error: Comair taking off on wrong runway, AA pilot slamming rudder full deflections each way to the stop, snapping off tail, continuing in a storm to overrun a runway at LIT, slamming a perfectly fine 757 into a Columbian mountainside, and even the most recent Fedex crash in Japan. Do you blame pilot error and throw everyone under the bus?

"When the stall occured, the Captain NEVER lowered the noise/angle of attack. UNACCEPTABLE!!!"

Maybe he did what he did in the sim, and the way the training program taught him. I can tell you as a FACT that at our airline, on the CRJ, we are NOT told *initially* to lower the nose when the stick shaker goes off. We are taught max power, and minimize altitude loss by "staying" in the shaker (in some cases, this actually means slight BACK pressure), while letting the airspeed come up and VSI trend to increase. Only when that happens do we FINALLY lower the nose.

As I said, this is a training issue. At our airline, we've already done away with all 3 stall profiles. GONE. Now we just have a one page generic stall recovery procedure. No profiles. As for the repercussions from this accident, get ready for a complete change/overhaul in stall recovery procedures, and stall training all the way to the pusher.
 
I don't give a rat's ass what the training department teaches. In this case, if what is taught ain't working, it goes out the window. You can train a monkey to recover from a stall, but a captain should know that at some point your airspeed needs to get out of the "red snaky thingy"!.

And besides, what training department teaches a 30 degree nose up recovery?! I don't think so. In an RJ or a 400.
 
Then if you blame this on pilot error, then every single recent crash is all to be blamed on pilot error: Comair taking off on wrong runway, AA pilot slamming rudder full deflections each way to the stop, snapping off tail, continuing in a storm to overrun a runway at LIT, slamming a perfectly fine 757 into a Columbian mountainside, and even the most recent Fedex crash in Japan. Do you blame pilot error and throw everyone under the bus?

"When the stall occured, the Captain NEVER lowered the noise/angle of attack. UNACCEPTABLE!!!"

Maybe he did what he did in the sim, and the way the training program taught him. I can tell you as a FACT that at our airline, on the CRJ, we are NOT told *initially* to lower the nose when the stick shaker goes off. We are taught max power, and minimize altitude loss by "staying" in the shaker (in some cases, this actually means slight BACK pressure), while letting the airspeed come up and VSI trend to increase. Only when that happens do we FINALLY lower the nose.

As I said, this is a training issue. At our airline, we've already done away with all 3 stall profiles. GONE. Now we just have a one page generic stall recovery procedure. No profiles. As for the repercussions from this accident, get ready for a complete change/overhaul in stall recovery procedures, and stall training all the way to the pusher.

Key word..SLIGHT Back pressure. Not hold the hold in your lap and override the pusher. I HIGHLY doubt Colgan trained to recover from a stall like that. FO putting up the flaps didn't help either....
 
I don't give a rat's ass what the training department teaches.
Oh, you better! Because the NTSB and the FAA will be all over it.

Key word..SLIGHT Back pressure. Not hold the hold in your lap and override the pusher. I HIGHLY doubt Colgan trained to recover from a stall like that. FO putting up the flaps didn't help either....
Colgan stall profiles have already been released by the NTSB. They look like they are written and drawn by a 5 year old.
 
There are thousands of scenarios the training department does not cover. One of them includes some dolt pitching up beyond any conceivable angle.

Had he done the same stall recovery as part of a PC, they would have stopped the sim in utter disbelief and probably given him a sixth check failure. Unfortunately, for everyone, this was his last checkride.

With that said, maybe FO's will learn from this to be more assertive, as a last resort take controls and not let the guy in the left seat kill you.
 
Then if you blame this on pilot error, then every single recent crash is all to be blamed on pilot error: Comair taking off on wrong runway, AA pilot slamming rudder full deflections each way to the stop, snapping off tail, continuing in a storm to overrun a runway at LIT, slamming a perfectly fine 757 into a Columbian mountainside, and even the most recent Fedex crash in Japan. Do you blame pilot error and throw everyone under the bus?

"When the stall occured, the Captain NEVER lowered the noise/angle of attack. UNACCEPTABLE!!!"

Maybe he did what he did in the sim, and the way the training program taught him. I can tell you as a FACT that at our airline, on the CRJ, we are NOT told *initially* to lower the nose when the stick shaker goes off. We are taught max power, and minimize altitude loss by "staying" in the shaker (in some cases, this actually means slight BACK pressure), while letting the airspeed come up and VSI trend to increase. Only when that happens do we FINALLY lower the nose.

As I said, this is a training issue. At our airline, we've already done away with all 3 stall profiles. GONE. Now we just have a one page generic stall recovery procedure. No profiles. As for the repercussions from this accident, get ready for a complete change/overhaul in stall recovery procedures, and stall training all the way to the pusher.

I think the problem with this crash is the topics of discussion amongst the crew. Everything from pay, to not being comfortable in icing conditions, to complaining about being sick and tired, etc. And it doesn't help that we now find out about the Captain's failures. It's so embarrassing to those of us that take this profession seriously even though we may be at a regional. This really makes us look incompetent and amateurish to the public. But with all those distractions, all the Captain had to simply do was apply the proper stall recovery technique and we wouldn't be having these discussion right now and we'd all be back to our normal flightinfo days of bashing some other regional. (I don't mean to be funny)
 
Well, then fine. But I disagree, in fact, I've asked about a pusher and any training in the event it happens, but no one does it. Why? The FAA doesn't require it. Hell, yes, we should not stall. And YES, we should recover at just the onset of a stick shaker. But once the pusher goes off, I don't recall any training ever in the sim, in terms of what to do next. It's pretty much up to you, let the pusher do its thing, lower the nose, and let the airspeed rise. Not a big deal when you're 10,000' or higher. A HUGE deal when you're only 1,000 to 1,500 AGL. At that point, who knows, human instinct might to be pull up to avoid the pusher taking you into the ground. I wouldn't know.

But I think we should all get ready and be prepared for stall profile changes, and training right up to and in the pusher. Our airline already did away with stall profiles. I'm sure others will be changing soon, more to follow.
 
Well, then fine. But I disagree, in fact, I've asked about a pusher and any training in the event it happens, but no one does it. Why? The FAA doesn't require it. Hell, yes, we should not stall. And YES, we should recover at just the onset of a stick shaker. But once the pusher goes off, I don't recall any training ever in the sim, in terms of what to do next. It's pretty much up to you, let the pusher do its thing, lower the nose, and let the airspeed rise. Not a big deal when you're 10,000' or higher. A HUGE deal when you're only 1,000 to 1,500 AGL. At that point, who knows, human instinct might to be pull up to avoid the pusher taking you into the ground. I wouldn't know.

But I think we should all get ready and be prepared for stall profile changes, and training right up to and in the pusher. Our airline already did away with stall profiles. I'm sure others will be changing soon, more to follow.

Finally. A valid point.

In fact, I think that disconnecting the stick pusher, which is never taught, should be incorporated into this training. For situations like this as well as erroneous stick pusher activations, etc.
 
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Well, then fine. But I disagree, in fact, I've asked about a pusher and any training in the event it happens, but no one does it. Why? The FAA doesn't require it. Hell, yes, we should not stall. And YES, we should recover at just the onset of a stick shaker. But once the pusher goes off, I don't recall any training ever in the sim, in terms of what to do next. It's pretty much up to you, let the pusher do its thing, lower the nose, and let the airspeed rise. Not a big deal when you're 10,000' or higher. A HUGE deal when you're only 1,000 to 1,500 AGL. At that point, who knows, human instinct might to be pull up to avoid the pusher taking you into the ground. I wouldn't know.

But I think we should all get ready and be prepared for stall profile changes, and training right up to and in the pusher. Our airline already did away with stall profiles. I'm sure others will be changing soon, more to follow.

Agreed... however... it appears to me from the animation that the problem was not the Captain's response to the pusher. It was his response to the *shaker*. The pusher only fired after he had yanked the nose up. And with the nose at 30 degrees up the writing was already on the wall.

All he had to do was fly an appropriate stall response when he got the shaker and it would have worked out, no pusher. Max power, flaps 15, nose stays where it is or a few degrees lower. Most of us DO train for this, although one might argue the entry scenarios are unrealistic.
 
here is what I see...

In level flight, Flaps 0, the aircraft is flying at a steady 172 knots. The captain calls for flaps 5, and he appears to increase the power. The airspeed increases to 187 knots, in level flight. Right here, we see that airspeed is omitted from his scan. The acceleration is gradual, and not immediately corrected. We know that 15 knots of airspeed change is in excess of ATP PTS standards. And since this airspeed change was an acceleration while on an ILS intercept, it would seem to be unintentional (as opposed to a 15 knot gradual slowdown as you approach the airport to get set up for further flap increases).
You can see when the captain finally recognizes this airspeed deviation, because he then pulls the power to just above idle. If you watch, you will see that he never increases the power again until the stall. So, from 187 knots until the stall, the power sat at idle, including during the addition of flaps and gear. That is over 50 knots of rapid airspeed reduction that neither pilot notices or verbalizes.
Perhaps you can attribute the initial gain of 15 knots to fatigue. Maybe it was her illness (the CVR contains conversation about her ears being blocked, and slow descents to accomodate her ears). But either way, it was innattention on both their parts. The captain was not watching his airspeed for a decent amount of time before he set himself up for the stall.
I am surprised that during the stall event, the FO appeared to be thinking about how to exit the stall by suggesting configuration changes, but at no point does she advocate a lowering of the nose to accelerate. Neither pilot seemed to notice the speed winding down so incredibly low, and neither pilot seemed to remember the basics of stall recovery. Even if the captain thought he was in a tail stall (which he never suggests), the FO should have recognized what was going on. Low speed. Stick shaker. What do you do? Lower the nose. Add power. None of the above signs or actions requires you to be at the controls to recognize.
I doubt we will ever find out what checkride items the captain busted on, and I don't think we the public need to know either. But the one item that plagues this whole incident is his inattention to airspeed. He got fast in level flight, he got extrememly slow in level flight, he never noticed that his stall recovery efforts were not producing an increase in airspeed.
I am not claiming to be some super pilot, but never have I found myself in even close to such a situation. I've flown plenty of planes without autothrottles. I've flown at Colgan. The Colgan training program was basic, but it was all it needed to be. You the pilot had to bring pilotage to the sim and to the line. I can't imagine that an approved training program would teach anything other than lower the nose and add full power at stick shaker. Maybe there were some glaring deficiencies in Colgan's curriculum, and if so I am truly angry that all these people died as a result. However, monitoring the airspeed is not something that should have to be taught at the 121 level.
My apologies to those my post may have offended. I hope someone finds something I said useful in the future.
 
I can't open the FDR report, so I am basing this question from the animation.

It appears that the power levers never went to max during the initial reaction to the shaker. Were they ever pushed to the MAX position, didn't look like they were??

Does Colgan train unusual attitude recoveries? Nose high airspeed decreasing, nose low airspeed increasing etc.
 
If I remember correctly from reading the transcripts, they had their airspeed bugged for 119 & 114. Obviously they didn't take into account other factors, but those factors aside, is it possible that he was aware of what his airspeed was, but was keeping the power levers low to get to the "appropriate" speed and was caught off guard when the stick shaker activated at an airspeed that was 15 kts faster than his anticipated REF speed?

I'm playing devil's advocate here. Regardless of where the mistake occured (improperly bugging airpseeds or not paying attention to airspeed), the stall recovery was improperly conducted by both pilots.

Taking the training one step further than the stick pusher, I think everyone should do a full stall in the simulator. Whether it is required or not, it would be good to know how the "aircraft" acts in a stall. The stall profiles are a joke. Realistic stall scenarios should be practiced.
 
Taking the training one step further than the stick pusher, I think everyone should do a full stall in the simulator. Whether it is required or not, it would be good to know how the "aircraft" acts in a stall. The stall profiles are a joke. Realistic stall scenarios should be practiced.

BINGO BINGO BINGO! That's what I've been saying!
 
Stall lesson:

If your aircraft enters a stall, you're too ignorant to recover at the shaker, and you feel the pusher....LET GO! Let the other pilot save you.

NFPs/FOs.... don't let the other guy kill you! Take it from him/her if he's about to. If he/she fights the pusher. PUSH THE YOKE FORWARD! (unless you're in an airbus....whole other scenario) Then let go after the stick shaker stops. Don't let him/her enter a secondary.

FOs SPEAK UP! Fight about it later.
 

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