Comair's Sole Crash Survivor wants to fly again

[Flybet3]

This is the exact reason why I have strayed away from this forum for a long time. Every few days I stroll through FI just to get a glimpse of the "happenings" in aviation. In the past, we used to argue a bit, but it was usually over facts with a little PFT thrown in the mix. Lately, it has degraded to the biggest piece of ******************** forum on the net, solely because of guys like YOU. Not only that, but your comments show your scab mentality as you break the unity of our fine group of pilots seeking improved safety within the industry. Thanks for that. Have you noticed that it improved your current career position on the ladder?

No, it didn't.

Gentlemen (and ladies), this is ridiculous. Do you all think you are that great of pilots that you are immune to this type of accident or mistake? I find your comments hard to believe and find them extremely unprofessional. This isn't your buddy falling off of a skateboard busting his knee, people died over this! Anyone can be a victim of a poor decision, mistake, or simple fatigue. Next time you experience a micro-sleep, think about your plane slamming into a mountain and you dying. Think about what its like to be dead and make those comments again.

If you actually understood the responsibility that you have as a whiny ass regional pilot in that shiny jet, you would not be making these comments. This kind of thing can happen to your co-workers, friends, or yourself tomorrow. You are all in such a rush to get to the "next step", that you are ignorant in your teachings and unable to gain experience due to your arrogance. If any of you had the slightest idea what causes accidents, and how scary it truly is, you would keep your little inexperienced asses shut instead of crapping all over a fellow pilot.

Forget the money. This guy MUST sue to protect his life from all the greedy families that know nothing about inherent danger and accepting personal responsibility. If you consider a defensive suit to protect a fellow pilot to be a negative aspect of his character, then you are an idiot.

I wouldn't want to share a cockpit with ANY of you.

******************** YOU!

Daaaaaaaammmmmmnnnnn! Very well said. You are so right, everyone now a days is soooo quick to pass judgement.

 

[V-1]

Question, weren't they jacking around on the flight deck also? According to the tapes, you heard a lot of laughing and jacking around. I am not for or against this guy coming back, but I think that something needs to be said about the crew that day being unsafe themselves.

Not to call you out personally, just wanted to ensure a couple of inaccuracies are not further propogated here.

I doubt anyone participating on this board has "heard a lot of laughing and jacking around" on the CVR "tapes", as I believe those are not available to the general public...yes, we are the general public. We may have read transcripts from the CVR. I have, and I believe the transcripts, for the most part, indicate a normal conversation for a first flight for a crew.

If one actually matches the times on the CVR transcript with the times on the FDR, one can easily see that 90% of the conversation that is appears a violation of sterile cockpit is actually not...the aircraft is not in motion. I'm not aware of any FAR that prohibits laughing on the flight deck, or building comraderie among my crewmembers before the day's insanity begins.

There are, as I recall, one or two short sentences from the First Officer that are in violation of sterile cockpit. The Captain's responses as the aircraft moves are very short, and seem more polite than engaging. Certainly the Captain could have been more assertive in requesting compliance with sterile cockpit, but it is my opinion that violation of sterile cockpit had a very minor role in this accident.

To pin the probable cause for this accident on two sentences that violated sterile cockpit was a huge disservice to the victims of that accident, and to all of us as professionals.

I doubt any intelligent person would argue that requiring the First Officer to perform roughly thirty checklist items and first flight of the day checks during a thirty second taxi from the terminal to the runway could compromise the ability of the First Officer to remain situationally aware of what was going on outside the airplane. I'm not saying the First Officer shouldn't have asked the Captain to slow down or stop, but this is the environment in which First Officers are expected to operate. Pinning blame on a sterile cocpit violation didn't serve to correct this problem.

I doubt any intelligent person would argue that incorrect charts are an issue that still affects us today. Pinning blame on a sterile cockpit violation didn't serve to correct this problem.

I doubt any intelligent person would argue that incorrect signage during construction is an issue. Pinning blame on a sterile cockpit violation didn't serve to correct this problem.

I doubt any intelligent person would argue that an airport authority that allows structures to be built (parking garage) that prohibit controllers in the tower from actually seeing what is going on on the airport's primary runway is an issue. Pinning blame on a sterile cockpit violation didn't serve to correct this problem.

I doubt any intelligent person would argue that control towers that are not adequately staffed per the F.A.A.'s own requirements is an issue. Pinning blame on a sterile cockpit violation didn't serve to correct this problem.

I doubt any intelligent person would argue that the fact that both pilots were concerned about the security of their jobs after Delta's announcement just a week before that it was taking steps to negatively affect these crewmembers financial future was not a factor in the accident...just read what the non-essential conversation in the cockpit was about...pilot attrition - as pilots scrambled to line up alternative employment options to counteract Delta's pursuit of the almighty dollar.

As professional pilots, we experience one or another of these problems throughout the system on a regular basis. In Lexington on one fateful morning, all these problems, and more, occurred at the same time, in the same place. Certainly the crew made a fatal error, but the system certainly was working against them.

The death of 49 people was, if nothing else, an opportunity for the NTSB to shine a spotlight on issues that impact safety throughout the aviation system. Unfortunately, the NTSB chose to sweep these issues under the rug and go for the cause that would make the biggest headline in the newspaper...pilots violated sterile cockpit.

Regarding the First Officer who survived...I wish him the best of luck with recovery and pursuit of his ambitions. He is going to have a heavy burden to carry the rest of his life...as he should. If somehow he manages to overcome his challenges and find himself on a flight deck somewhere, I suspect he'll be far more "safe" than the alternative 300-hour academy graduate who would be hired to replace him.

Personally, I hope civil litigation achieves what the NTSB failed to with this accident by assessing significant financial penalty to all parties who failed to act in the interest of safety. The First Officer and Comair's insurance provider should not be the only ones who pay a financial price for this event.

 

[Terry Hunter]

One thing to consider is the basis of the mistake (accident). Choose an option:

1. The crew made an inadvertent decision to depart on the wrong runway.

2. The crew disregarded ATC instructions, gambled that the heavy weight of the aircraft would not cause for any trouble off the shorter runway, thought it'd be "fun" to depart an unlit runway.

I think for every one of these accidents, there are 10,000 "almosts" or "that was close" indicents, and most of us are humbled by them.

 

[rightseatjocky]

Actually according to the transcrips they were jacking around and laughing during taxiing.
Yes, we all learned from their mistake and yes we all will be better pilots for it as we won't make that mistake becuase of new protocall that we have to make sure of. Do I like it? probably not, but it is something we all have to live with because of someones mistake.
According to your thread of doing 30 check items during taxi, I don't disagree, but on the other hand as a captain myself if a First Officer is not ready, I don't continue and always ask if he is caught up and ready. I am a newer captain (8 months) and I want to make sure we are as cought up as possible and no hanky panky on the flight deck. That is just me and what I do on the flight deck.
I again, don't hope any ill will on the guy as like you said he has a ton to deal with and it will always weigh on his chest.

 

[ifly4food]

This thread is embarrassing to all of us. You're insulting two fellow aviators here, one of whom is dead and can't even defend himself, the other scarred for life. Shame on all of you. I hope their families and kids aren't reading this.

This is a pilot forum. Let the ignorant conjecture of who screwed up, and insults of unprofessionalism take place on the general public websites. All of you should know better.

 

[Boris Badenov]

There but for the grace of God go we all. I wish him the best.

 

[Caveman]

Not to call you out personally, just wanted to ensure a couple of inaccuracies are not further propogated here.

I doubt anyone participating on this board has "heard a lot of laughing and jacking around" on the CVR "tapes", as I believe those are not available to the general public...yes, we are the general public. We may have read transcripts from the CVR. I have, and I believe the transcripts, for the most part, indicate a normal conversation for a first flight for a crew.

If one actually matches the times on the CVR transcript with the times on the FDR, one can easily see that 90% of the conversation that is appears a violation of sterile cockpit is actually not...the aircraft is not in motion. I'm not aware of any FAR that prohibits laughing on the flight deck, or building comraderie among my crewmembers before the day's insanity begins.

There are, as I recall, one or two short sentences from the First Officer that are in violation of sterile cockpit. The Captain's responses as the aircraft moves are very short, and seem more polite than engaging. Certainly the Captain could have been more assertive in requesting compliance with sterile cockpit, but it is my opinion that violation of sterile cockpit had a very minor role in this accident.

To pin the probable cause for this accident on two sentences that violated sterile cockpit was a huge disservice to the victims of that accident, and to all of us as professionals.

I doubt any intelligent person would argue that requiring the First Officer to perform roughly thirty checklist items and first flight of the day checks during a thirty second taxi from the terminal to the runway could compromise the ability of the First Officer to remain situationally aware of what was going on outside the airplane. I'm not saying the First Officer shouldn't have asked the Captain to slow down or stop, but this is the environment in which First Officers are expected to operate. Pinning blame on a sterile cocpit violation didn't serve to correct this problem.

I doubt any intelligent person would argue that incorrect charts are an issue that still affects us today. Pinning blame on a sterile cockpit violation didn't serve to correct this problem.

I doubt any intelligent person would argue that incorrect signage during construction is an issue. Pinning blame on a sterile cockpit violation didn't serve to correct this problem.

I doubt any intelligent person would argue that an airport authority that allows structures to be built (parking garage) that prohibit controllers in the tower from actually seeing what is going on on the airport's primary runway is an issue. Pinning blame on a sterile cockpit violation didn't serve to correct this problem.

I doubt any intelligent person would argue that control towers that are not adequately staffed per the F.A.A.'s own requirements is an issue. Pinning blame on a sterile cockpit violation didn't serve to correct this problem.

I doubt any intelligent person would argue that the fact that both pilots were concerned about the security of their jobs after Delta's announcement just a week before that it was taking steps to negatively affect these crewmembers financial future was not a factor in the accident...just read what the non-essential conversation in the cockpit was about...pilot attrition - as pilots scrambled to line up alternative employment options to counteract Delta's pursuit of the almighty dollar.

As professional pilots, we experience one or another of these problems throughout the system on a regular basis. In Lexington on one fateful morning, all these problems, and more, occurred at the same time, in the same place. Certainly the crew made a fatal error, but the system certainly was working against them.

The death of 49 people was, if nothing else, an opportunity for the NTSB to shine a spotlight on issues that impact safety throughout the aviation system. Unfortunately, the NTSB chose to sweep these issues under the rug and go for the cause that would make the biggest headline in the newspaper...pilots violated sterile cockpit.

Regarding the First Officer who survived...I wish him the best of luck with recovery and pursuit of his ambitions. He is going to have a heavy burden to carry the rest of his life...as he should. If somehow he manages to overcome his challenges and find himself on a flight deck somewhere, I suspect he'll be far more "safe" than the alternative 300-hour academy graduate who would be hired to replace him.

Personally, I hope civil litigation achieves what the NTSB failed to with this accident by assessing significant financial penalty to all parties who failed to act in the interest of safety. The First Officer and Comair's insurance provider should not be the only ones who pay a financial price for this event.

Outstanding post! I slightly disagree with your last sentence. I think flight crews should be immune from liability unless there is proof of criminal neglect or a willful violation. The rest is spot on. Very well said.

 

[wmuflyguy]

Actually according to the transcrips they were jacking around and laughing during taxiing.

]
http://aircrewhealth.com/Resources/Comair5191CVRtranscript.pdf

Here is the transcript...they guy talked about his kids during pushback, they chuckled twice

As for Taxing between the before taxi checklist and takeoff there were 7 sentences not related to the flight and NO laughing, hardly jacking around.

There was nothing but standard talk for two minutes prior to take-off...

I'm not saying they didn't screw up but check your facts before you spout off.

Page 30 is the start of push back and it ends on the top of page 34.

Taxi starts at the top of page 35.

 

[V-1]

Actually according to the transcrips they were jacking around and laughing during taxiing.
Yes, we all learned from their mistake and yes we all will be better pilots for it as we won't make that mistake becuase of new protocall that we have to make sure of. Do I like it? probably not, but it is something we all have to live with because of someones mistake.
According to your thread of doing 30 check items during taxi, I don't disagree, but on the other hand as a captain myself if a First Officer is not ready, I don't continue and always ask if he is caught up and ready. I am a newer captain (8 months) and I want to make sure we are as cought up as possible and no hanky panky on the flight deck. That is just me and what I do on the flight deck.
I again, don't hope any ill will on the guy as like you said he has a ton to deal with and it will always weigh on his chest.

Thanks for monitoring the workload of your First Officers. We all must do so.

That's odd, because I just reviewed my copy of the NTSB's Group Chairman's Factual Report from the CVR, dated November 17, 2006, and from the time the crew called for taxi, until they were cleared for takeoff, there was not a single laugh transcribed from either of them.

Here is the portion of the transcript from the time the crew calls for taxi until they are cleared for takeoff. I have put non-essential conversation in bold to illustrate just how little of it there was. There was perhaps what one would call "laughing and jacking around" at the beginning while the aircraft was not in motion at the gate, and not under the definition of sterile cockpit...but certainly nothing unprofessional or out of the ordinary. Notice I began this excerpt somewhere on page 28 from the CVR transcript. 27 pages of the crewmembers' activities and conversation was transcribed before sterile cockpit began. Also notice the subject of the conversation that was in violation of sterile cockpit. Keep in mind this is the primary cause of the accident, according to the NTSB.

06:02:01.3​

RDO-2

Comair one ninety one is ready to taxi we have ALPHA.​

06:02:03.8​

GND ​

Comair one ninety one, taxi to runway two two. altimeter three​

zero zero zero and the winds are two zero zero at eight.​

06208.9

RDO-2



​

three triple zero and taxi two two, Comair one ninety one.​

0602:12.6​

GND ​

Eagle flight runway two two, cleared for takeoff.​

0602:15.1​

HOT-1 ​

clear left.​

0602:17.3​

HOT-2 ​

on the right.​

0602:17.9​

GND ​

Skywest six eight nineteen radar contact, say altitude leaving.​

0602:18.9​

HOT-1 ​

flaps twenty, taxi check.​

0602:21.0​

HOT-2 ​

full right.​

0602:23.8​

GND ​

Skywest sixty eight nineteen, climb and maintain one zero thousand,​

ten thousand, join Victor one seventy one and resume *,​

own navigation.

0602:24.0

HOT-2 ​

​

full left.​

29 of 36​

INTRA-COCKPIT COMMUNICATION AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATION

TIME (EDT) TIME (EDT)

& SOURCE CONTENT & SOURCE CONTENT
DCA06MA064
0602:25.5
HOT-1 ​

​

​

​

 

[V-1]

test your brakes any time.
0602:31.1
HOT-2
I want to *** down.
0602:32.3
HOT-1
sure.
0602:41.5
HOT-2
let's see, comin' back.
0602:51.6
HOT-1
brakes.
0602:52.3
HOT-1
they're checked.
0602:53.2
HOT-2
right, flaps.
0602:54.4
HOT-1
set twenty, indicating twenty.
0602:55.6
HOT-2
flight controls.
0602:56.3
HOT-1
check left.
0602:58.3
HOT-2
on the right, trims.
0602:59.5
HOT-1
engage zero seven point two.
30 of 36
INTRA-COCKPIT COMMUNICATION AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATION
TIME (EDT) TIME (EDT)
& SOURCE CONTENT & SOURCE CONTENT
DCA06MA064
060302.2
HOT-2
radar terrain displays. [spoken in a yawning voice]
060304.0
HOT-2
all the taxi check's complete. [spoken in a yawning voice]
0603:12.0
HOT-1
finish it up your leisure.
0603:16.4
HOT-2
yeah, I know three guys at Kennedy. actually two guys uh....
@@ he went but he didn't get past the sim.
0603:26.7
HOT-1
oh, really.
0603:29.1
HOT-2
and then um, a First Officer from Cinci....
0603:34.5
GND
Eagle flight radar contact, radar contact. say altitude leaving.
0603:35.1
HOT-2
got through the second part....
0603:37.2
HOT-2
what do you do the uh, these tests.... and he didn't, and that's as
far as he got.
0603:40.8
GND
Eagle flight eight eighty two, climb and maintain one zero thousand,
ten thousand.
0603:49.3
HOT-2
and then @@ he actually got offered the position.
31 of 36
INTRA-COCKPIT COMMUNICATION AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATION
TIME (EDT) TIME (EDT)
& SOURCE CONTENT & SOURCE CONTENT
DCA06MA064
0603:54.5
HOT-1
did he take it or....
0603:55.5
HOT-2
yeah.
0603:56.1
HOT-1
ah, okay.
06001.2
HOT-2
second engine started, anti-ice probes windshield low.
060403.1
GND
* sixteen ninety one, previous question.
060405.6
HOT-2
hydraulics checked, APU's on, FMS we got runway two two out of
Lexington up to six.
0604:13.3
HOT-2
thrust reversers are armed, auto crossflow is manual, ignition is
off, altimeters three triple zero across the board, crosschecked. I'll
be in the back.
0604:24.8
HOT-1
got one.
0604:25.7
TWR
Skywest sixty eight nineteen contact Indy center one two six point
three seven.
0604:29.6
S6819
two six three seven, Skywest sixty eight nineteen.
32 of 36
INTRA-COCKPIT COMMUNICATION AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATION
TIME (EDT) TIME (EDT)
& SOURCE CONTENT & SOURCE CONTENT
DCA06MA064
0604:32.6
TWR
Eagle flight eight eighty two, turn right heading two seven zero,
join Victor one seventy-one. resume navigation.
0604:37.5
E882
two seven zero, join victor one seventy one, ****.
0604:38.2
PA-2
and folks one * time from the flight deck, we'd like to welcome you
aboard. we're going to be underway momentarily.... sit back relax
enjoy the flight. Kelly, when you have a chance, please prepare
the cabin.
0604:48.2
CAM
[sound hi-lo chime similar to cabin/cockpit interphone signal]
0604:49.3
HOT-2
pre-takeoff * complete cabin report received CAS.
0604:53.4
HOT-1
checked and clear.
0604:54.4
HOT-?
**, six seven, **. [whispered]
0604:56.6
HOT-1
oh.
0604:58.1
HOT-2
oh yeah.
0604:59.4
HOT-2
I'm looking at it 'cause like, okay I see seven but it's....
33 of 36
INTRA-COCKPIT COMMUNICATION AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATION
TIME (EDT) TIME (EDT)
& SOURCE CONTENT & SOURCE CONTENT
DCA06MA064
060501.9
HOT-1
yeah there's a green extra one there but....
060506.3
HOT-2
uuuh, cabin report's received, CAS clear, ** before takeoff check's
complete, ready.
0605:12.6
HOT-1
all set.
0605:15.1
RDO-2
"churliser" [at your leisure spoken very fast] Comair one twenty
one ready to go.
0605:17.7
TWR
Comair one ninety one, Lexington uh, tower, fly runway heading,
cleared for takeoff.
I can post the entire transcript if anyone would like...though I will not edit out all the smiley faces this board puts in place of a : and 0

 

[V-1]

Thanks, Caveman. I did not communicate clearly in the last paragraph of my post. I agree with you. What I intended to communicate was that the First Officer and Comair's insurance company are, at present, the only two currently existing entities who have paid any price (not to ignore the victims' families, of course) for this accident.

 

[Moustache]

........Yawn

 

[Flybywire44]

One thing to consider is the basis of the mistake (accident). Choose an option:

1. The crew made an inadvertent decision to depart on the wrong runway.

2. The crew disregarded ATC instructions, gambled that the heavy weight of the aircraft would not cause for any trouble off the shorter runway, thought it'd be "fun" to depart an unlit runway.

I think for every one of these accidents, there are 10,000 "almosts" or "that was close" indicents, and most of us are humbled by them.

I like the last sentence of this post. There are those who have the opportunity to learn from their mistakes and those like his Capt who don't... I'm sure this guy has and if he can fly, let him fly.

 

[regionalcap]

Even if he was able to fly, did the FAA not take any legal action on his license?

 

[CFI2766]

Seriously though, did any of you hold the revised Jepp beside the older one the Captain used and examine the differences. I did. The one that Jeff, from 5191 did, in fact, direct him toward the wrong runway; and it isn't even illustrating the confusion and cluster #### that the construction caused. Be it because of the FAA or Jepp, the plate was absolutely wrong.

For those that are wanting to hang the guy, the difference between you, and him, is timing and place. What have you learned from his mistake? How sterile is your cockpit durring taxi out? Do you take the time to write down the taxiway/runway closures when you copy down the atis? Or do you sluff that taxi stuff off to the Captain to review. How often do you back the captain up on his taxi with the chart. I've seen very few F/O's, at a major or regional, taxi with their airport diagram out.

I can't tell you how many times I've been taxiing out with someone who wishes to tell me a life story. In essence, this has taught many of us nothing- except how to "monday morning quarterback" someone else's mistakes.

In many respects, I'd rather put myself on Polenke's airliner than many of your's. I'd be willing to bet, that even if he is lucky enough to eventually return to the line, his flightdeck would be one of the safest out there.

Well said. Good form.