~~~^~~~
Well-known member
- Joined
- Dec 21, 2001
- Posts
- 6,137
Reprint from RJDC's Web Site
______________________________
Scope Bulletin
December 2, 2002
ALPA Boasts that it Re-Imposed Limits on Delta Connection
On Friday, November 18, 2002, the Delta pilot leadership announced to its pilots that it had reached a new scope agreement with Delta management. In exchange for its approval of the domestic alliance with Northwest and Continental Airlines, the Delta pilot leadership proudly claimed that it had successfully re-imposed limits upon Delta Connection. The relevant portions of the "new" scope are as follows:
57 CRJ-700's, despite pre-existing options for 165 more.
All Delta Connection flying limited to approximately 45% of total system flying in 2004, with changes linked to corporate financial performance.
Penalty provisions that could force a reduction in Delta Connection flying if ratios are exceeded.
Stage-length, hub, and route restrictions.
Agreement null & void if government blocks approval of DAL-NWA-CAL domestic alliance.
Note: To put the new ratio numbers in context, if only the minimum mainline block-hours are achieved, DCI is "permitted" an additional 90 to 130 aircraft. However, ASA and Comair alone have orders and options totaling 458 aircraft.
Notwithstanding ALPA’s two-year high profile effort to "study" the scope problem, the new agreement should put to rest any hope that the union’s leadership is prepared to voluntarily purge itself of the inherent conflict of interest created by its support, coordination, and funding of mainline predatory bargaining. If left to its own devices, ALPA will apparently continue to ignore its lawful duties to its "Express" members and permit the mainline interests to engage in predatory bargaining and to use their ill-gotten scope restrictions as bargaining capital to secure other contractual objectives.
Is the Agreement only a StopGap Measure?
In a letter to its members, the Delta pilot leadership wrote that the re-establishment of the restrictions would benefit future negotiations. Such statements would seem to imply that the Delta pilot leadership feels that this is only the first of several rounds of mainline bargaining that may take place as the upheaval in the airline industry continues. A close examination of what the new agreement doesn’t address would appear to support the notion that the Delta pilot leadership will soon find themselves back at the bargaining table.
The Scope’s Fundamental Flaws
Artificial restrictions upon the RJ will not preserve mainline jobs nor promote mainline growth. The tragic events of 9/11 merely accentuated the fundamental flaws in the old scope and accelerated the inevitable. Since the mechanics of the "new" scope are virtually identical to the "old," there is no reason to believe that it will fare any better than its predecessor.
The 57 CRJ-700 Limit
With 165 CRJ-700 options still on the books, it is only logical to believe that Delta will protect its competitive RJ advantage and fill the 70 to 100 passenger "seat gap" in its fleet. Based upon Delta’s published fleet plan, the 57 CRJ-700’s "permitted" by the current scope only amounts to 25% of what the company apparently feels it needs.
The Mainline Cost Structure
The new scope agreement does little to address the mainline cost structure. With the pilots at Delta’s mainline competitors agreeing to give up 15 to 20% of their pay and benefits, Delta may presumably seek to do likewise. If the company seeks further cost reductions from its mainline pilots, scope will undoubtedly be part of the bargaining equation.
Delta MEC Says New Agreement Does Not Substantially Affect the Career Security of the Delta Pilots
In a weak attempt to justify its decision not to permit the rank and file to vote on the new agreement, the Delta pilot leadership claimed that no vote was required because the new agreement did not fit the MEC’s policy requiring a vote of the pilots on any agreement that substantially affects their pay, working conditions, retirement or career security.
Taken at face value, the Delta MEC’s statement is nothing short of an admission that the numerical and operational restrictions imposed upon ASA and Comair are in reality political and collective bargaining tools-and as such, have little to do with mainline job security. At the very least, the Delta MEC’s apparent flip-flop testifies to what extent ALPA’s leadership will go to protect its ability to wheel and deal with management using small jet restrictions as bargaining capital.
Will the New Agreement Add to ALPA’s Legal Woes?
While some may wish to believe the new agreement will help ALPA extricate itself from its legal predicament, the negotiation and content of the agreement may have the opposite effect for several reasons.
The content of the "new" agreement and the manner in which it was negotiated is apparently identical to the last round of predatory bargaining which spawned the litigation. By again ignoring its duty to the ASA and Comair pilots and "restoring" the harmful scope restrictions, ALPA can no longer claim that its disputed actions were the result of inadvertent oversights or omissions.
In both written and verbal arguments to the court, ALPA argued that the force majeure exemption rendered the scope ratios unenforceable thereby making any legal claims moot. However, ALPA’s apparent decision to withhold the fact that it was actively re-negotiating those very same provisions raises serious questions as to the sincerity of its arguments to the court.
As a consequence of ALPA’s uncertainty as to whether there would ever be reset negotiations, the Court issued instructions to ALPA to keep plaintiffs apprised of the status of any reset negotiations. The fact that ALPA planned, conducted, and concluded scope reset negotiations without providing any notice to the plaintiffs raises serious questions regarding ALPA’s compliance with the Court’s instructions.
When after the Delta MEC announced that it had entered into scope negotiations with Delta management, five Comair pilots filed contractual grievances questioning whether the negotiation, or re-negotiation, of certain scope provisions would violate the Comair working agreement. In response to repeated requests, ALPA claimed it did not have any evidence that would support the grievance. The revelation, after the fact, that it was in scope reset negotiations at the same time it denied having any pertinent information would appear to indicate that the union’s responses to the grievance was inaccurate and in bad faith.
Conclusion
ALPA’s decision to repair the Delta scope by merely "re-establishing" its harmful provisions is yet another clear indication that the union’s conduct is indeed arbitrary, discriminatory, and in bad faith. Notwithstanding the obvious conflict of interest, ALPA is intent upon supporting, coordinating, and funding the efforts of its mainline members to use scope as a remote control device to unilaterally impose any restrictions upon the union’s other members.
Not only are such actions an egregious violation of the union’s duty to the ASA and Comair pilots, but as the last year has shown, the political follies of the union leadership has proved harmful to all of ALPA’s members. While litigation is the least desirable of remedies, ALPA’s support of the Delta MEC’s predatory agenda proves that we have no other recourse at this time. However, we stand willing and prepared to engage in more constructive approach whenever ALPA can demonstrate that it is willing to resolve the current dispute and represent all its members at Delta fairly and equally.
______________________________
Scope Bulletin
December 2, 2002
ALPA Boasts that it Re-Imposed Limits on Delta Connection
On Friday, November 18, 2002, the Delta pilot leadership announced to its pilots that it had reached a new scope agreement with Delta management. In exchange for its approval of the domestic alliance with Northwest and Continental Airlines, the Delta pilot leadership proudly claimed that it had successfully re-imposed limits upon Delta Connection. The relevant portions of the "new" scope are as follows:
57 CRJ-700's, despite pre-existing options for 165 more.
All Delta Connection flying limited to approximately 45% of total system flying in 2004, with changes linked to corporate financial performance.
Penalty provisions that could force a reduction in Delta Connection flying if ratios are exceeded.
Stage-length, hub, and route restrictions.
Agreement null & void if government blocks approval of DAL-NWA-CAL domestic alliance.
Note: To put the new ratio numbers in context, if only the minimum mainline block-hours are achieved, DCI is "permitted" an additional 90 to 130 aircraft. However, ASA and Comair alone have orders and options totaling 458 aircraft.
Notwithstanding ALPA’s two-year high profile effort to "study" the scope problem, the new agreement should put to rest any hope that the union’s leadership is prepared to voluntarily purge itself of the inherent conflict of interest created by its support, coordination, and funding of mainline predatory bargaining. If left to its own devices, ALPA will apparently continue to ignore its lawful duties to its "Express" members and permit the mainline interests to engage in predatory bargaining and to use their ill-gotten scope restrictions as bargaining capital to secure other contractual objectives.
Is the Agreement only a StopGap Measure?
In a letter to its members, the Delta pilot leadership wrote that the re-establishment of the restrictions would benefit future negotiations. Such statements would seem to imply that the Delta pilot leadership feels that this is only the first of several rounds of mainline bargaining that may take place as the upheaval in the airline industry continues. A close examination of what the new agreement doesn’t address would appear to support the notion that the Delta pilot leadership will soon find themselves back at the bargaining table.
The Scope’s Fundamental Flaws
Artificial restrictions upon the RJ will not preserve mainline jobs nor promote mainline growth. The tragic events of 9/11 merely accentuated the fundamental flaws in the old scope and accelerated the inevitable. Since the mechanics of the "new" scope are virtually identical to the "old," there is no reason to believe that it will fare any better than its predecessor.
The 57 CRJ-700 Limit
With 165 CRJ-700 options still on the books, it is only logical to believe that Delta will protect its competitive RJ advantage and fill the 70 to 100 passenger "seat gap" in its fleet. Based upon Delta’s published fleet plan, the 57 CRJ-700’s "permitted" by the current scope only amounts to 25% of what the company apparently feels it needs.
The Mainline Cost Structure
The new scope agreement does little to address the mainline cost structure. With the pilots at Delta’s mainline competitors agreeing to give up 15 to 20% of their pay and benefits, Delta may presumably seek to do likewise. If the company seeks further cost reductions from its mainline pilots, scope will undoubtedly be part of the bargaining equation.
Delta MEC Says New Agreement Does Not Substantially Affect the Career Security of the Delta Pilots
In a weak attempt to justify its decision not to permit the rank and file to vote on the new agreement, the Delta pilot leadership claimed that no vote was required because the new agreement did not fit the MEC’s policy requiring a vote of the pilots on any agreement that substantially affects their pay, working conditions, retirement or career security.
Taken at face value, the Delta MEC’s statement is nothing short of an admission that the numerical and operational restrictions imposed upon ASA and Comair are in reality political and collective bargaining tools-and as such, have little to do with mainline job security. At the very least, the Delta MEC’s apparent flip-flop testifies to what extent ALPA’s leadership will go to protect its ability to wheel and deal with management using small jet restrictions as bargaining capital.
Will the New Agreement Add to ALPA’s Legal Woes?
While some may wish to believe the new agreement will help ALPA extricate itself from its legal predicament, the negotiation and content of the agreement may have the opposite effect for several reasons.
The content of the "new" agreement and the manner in which it was negotiated is apparently identical to the last round of predatory bargaining which spawned the litigation. By again ignoring its duty to the ASA and Comair pilots and "restoring" the harmful scope restrictions, ALPA can no longer claim that its disputed actions were the result of inadvertent oversights or omissions.
In both written and verbal arguments to the court, ALPA argued that the force majeure exemption rendered the scope ratios unenforceable thereby making any legal claims moot. However, ALPA’s apparent decision to withhold the fact that it was actively re-negotiating those very same provisions raises serious questions as to the sincerity of its arguments to the court.
As a consequence of ALPA’s uncertainty as to whether there would ever be reset negotiations, the Court issued instructions to ALPA to keep plaintiffs apprised of the status of any reset negotiations. The fact that ALPA planned, conducted, and concluded scope reset negotiations without providing any notice to the plaintiffs raises serious questions regarding ALPA’s compliance with the Court’s instructions.
When after the Delta MEC announced that it had entered into scope negotiations with Delta management, five Comair pilots filed contractual grievances questioning whether the negotiation, or re-negotiation, of certain scope provisions would violate the Comair working agreement. In response to repeated requests, ALPA claimed it did not have any evidence that would support the grievance. The revelation, after the fact, that it was in scope reset negotiations at the same time it denied having any pertinent information would appear to indicate that the union’s responses to the grievance was inaccurate and in bad faith.
Conclusion
ALPA’s decision to repair the Delta scope by merely "re-establishing" its harmful provisions is yet another clear indication that the union’s conduct is indeed arbitrary, discriminatory, and in bad faith. Notwithstanding the obvious conflict of interest, ALPA is intent upon supporting, coordinating, and funding the efforts of its mainline members to use scope as a remote control device to unilaterally impose any restrictions upon the union’s other members.
Not only are such actions an egregious violation of the union’s duty to the ASA and Comair pilots, but as the last year has shown, the political follies of the union leadership has proved harmful to all of ALPA’s members. While litigation is the least desirable of remedies, ALPA’s support of the Delta MEC’s predatory agenda proves that we have no other recourse at this time. However, we stand willing and prepared to engage in more constructive approach whenever ALPA can demonstrate that it is willing to resolve the current dispute and represent all its members at Delta fairly and equally.
