Regional Pilots Kill 228 People by Pulling up After Stall Warning

[AC560]

When everything revolves around seniority instead of skill or job performance the results are to be expected.

 

[GogglesPisano]

When everything revolves around seniority instead of skill or job performance the results are to be expected.

And skill and performance aren't rigorously checked periodically at your airline? They are at mine, and no slackers a let slip through the cracks. At an airline with 500, 1,000, 10,000 pilots, there is no objective way to assign promotions. The seniority system has worked fine for generations. It eliminates cronyism, ass-kissing and ladder climbing you see so often in corporate aviation. As long as everyone passes the checkride you can’t use the seniority system as a scapegoat.

 

[AC560]

at your airline?

I am evil management scum in the airline industry (cargo) but not currently at an airline. I have a stint at FT (non flying).

And skill and performance aren't rigorously checked periodically

Few if any get drummed out for qualification issues. Once you are in you are in, we have posts all the time on the forum about various captains/FO's which are a danger to themselves and everyone else in the air.

The seniority system has worked fine for generations.

Tell that to Pan Am, TWA, America West, Eastern, and the list goes on. If a 20,000hr pilot starts at Regional X tomorrow he is swinging gear for a 2000hr Captain. That isn't putting the most qualified in charge.

The seniority system is effective for those hired at a specific time to ensure rank and privilege. It does nothing to ensure the quality of the people sitting in the cockpit though. This isn't to imply that the vast majority of the people out there aren't qualified, just that the seniority system has nothing to do with safety or quality and ultimately as the airlines merge and dissolve it works to serve the people it was intended to serve even less.

 

[glasspilot]

Tell that to Pan Am, TWA, America West, Eastern, and the list goes on. If a 20,000hr pilot starts at Regional X tomorrow he is swinging gear for a 2000hr Captain. That isn't putting the most qualified in charge.

The seniority system is effective for those hired at a specific time to ensure rank and privilege. It does nothing to ensure the quality of the people sitting in the cockpit though. This isn't to imply that the vast majority of the people out there aren't qualified, just that the seniority system has nothing to do with safety or quality and ultimately as the airlines merge and dissolve it works to serve the people it was intended to serve even less.

Amen brother! Fricken post of the year right there.

 

[GogglesPisano]

And how would you guys handle upgrade selection? What type of impartial aptitude and judgment metric would you use to determine who sits in what seat?

Pure total hours of experience? Turbine? PIC? Do you think it fair that a pilot with ten years at a major, about to upgrade based on his seniority, loses that chance because a newhire from a failed carrier has 100 more hours than he does?

 

[DYLIN]

Sorry I have to call BS on this one. Show me some official documentation and I'll gladly eat my words

Wow.

You've got a lot to learn.

 

[Flyer1015]

You know, I understand the political spin the thread is trying to imply, but this is still different from Colgan. Here, you had multiple internal failures of the A330, stemming from pitot tubes, a problem known in the industry, and the multiple failures leading to different speed indications. From valid speeds to invalid dashes, and probably everything in between, with autopilot disconnect horns, autothrottle disconnect horns, the associated warnings, the failures of all 3 ADIRUs, etc, etc etc. That all added to the confusion on the flight deck, and for reasons including the above mentioned, the crew put the aircraft in an undesired state while facing malfunctioning flight instruments.

THAT, as opposed to Colgan, where a perfectly flyable airplane with perfectly functioning instruments, with a perfectly good autopilot, and a perfectly good air data reference system, was just outright approached to stall speed, stalled, and then nosed up recovery which led to a stall/spin scenario.

IMO, given the facts so far, it's a different situation. The AF sounds like multiple failures in night IMC with aural warnings, visual warnings, and a lot on their plate. The Colgan crash was just sheer incompetence, from an improper stall recovery (nose waaay up at shaker, around 25 degrees up, to raising the flaps while the aircraft was entering a spin, while stalled).

Apples/Oranges.

Also, the thread title isn't accurate. It states pilot pulled up at stall warning. Some A330 pilot can chime in, but my understanding is once all 3 pitots were iced and malfunctioning, the 3 ADIRUs were gone, autopilot/autothrottles disconnected, and for these reasons, the aircraft went from normal law to alternate law, and stall protection is not provided in alternate law.

 

[bailout]

Sorry I have to call BS on this one. Show me some official documentation and I'll gladly eat my words

http://www.airbusdriver.net/ look under the 'info' tab then 'flight control laws'.

I was off by a couple of degrees, but the jest of the matter is this:

ProtectionsLoad factor Limitation

• Prevents pilot from overstressing the aircraft even if full sidestick deflections are applied.

Attitude Protection

• Pitch limited to 30 deg up, 15 deg down, and 67 deg of bank.
• These limits are indicated by green = signs on the PFD.
• Bank angles in excess of 33 deg require constant sidestick input.
• If input is released the aircraft returns to and maintains 33 deg of bank.

High Angle of Attack Protection (alpha):

• When alpha exceeds alpha prot, elevator control switches to alpha protection mode in which angle of attack is proportional to sidestick deflection.
• Alpha max will not be exceeded even if the pilot applies full aft deflection

High Speed Protection:

• Prevents exceeding VMO or MMO by introducing a pitch up load factor demand.
• The pilot can NOT override the pitch up command.

Would you like some salt with your meal??

 

[Buzo]

http://www.airbusdriver.net/ look under the 'info' tab then 'flight control laws'.

I was off by a couple of degrees, but the jest of the matter is this:

ProtectionsLoad factor Limitation

• Prevents pilot from overstressing the aircraft even if full sidestick deflections are applied.

Attitude Protection

• Pitch limited to 30 deg up, 15 deg down, and 67 deg of bank.
• These limits are indicated by green = signs on the PFD.
• Bank angles in excess of 33 deg require constant sidestick input.
• If input is released the aircraft returns to and maintains 33 deg of bank.

High Angle of Attack Protection (alpha):

• When alpha exceeds alpha prot, elevator control switches to alpha protection mode in which angle of attack is proportional to sidestick deflection.
• Alpha max will not be exceeded even if the pilot applies full aft deflection

High Speed Protection:

• Prevents exceeding VMO or MMO by introducing a pitch up load factor demand.
• The pilot can NOT override the pitch up command.

Would you like some salt with your meal??

You just listed all of the normal law protections, nothing about stall recovery. The first item on the stall recovery procedure is to lower the nose.

 

[blott]

seriously?


Airbus

Stall Recovery


Step PF PM
1 Recognize and confirm the situation
2 Autopilot - Disconnect


Pitch
• Apply nose down elevator with the sidestick to reduce the angle of attack until buffet and/or aural stall warning stops
• Nose down stabilizer trim may be needed1
• In case of insufficient pitch down authority, reducing thrust may be necessary


Roll
• Roll in the shortest direction to wings level if needed2


Thrust
• Adjust as needed


3 Configuration
• SPEED BRAKE – retract
• Do not alter gear/flap configuration


4 After Stall Recovery
• Resume normal flight
• If below 20,000 feet and in clean configuration request FLAPS 1


1If the sidestick does not provide the needed response, stabilizer trim may be necessary. Excessive use of pitch trim may aggravate the condition, or may result in loss of control or in high structural loads.
2Excessive use of pitch trim or rudder may aggravate the condition, or may result in loss of control or in high structural loads.

 

[BOX OFFICE]

Congress has to act on this now! 10,000 hrs to be a 121 FO. Anyone with less than 15,000 hrs is on the low time pilot observation program!

Getting back to the OP...

I almost never agree with GL, but this post is in poor taste. And it's not funny. There are almost no parallels with the Colgan crash.

I hope 777 forever realizes that a lot of people here know his true identity, including those who have moved on to mainline. And with his activity at OBAP and attendance at the career fairs, most know he wants to move to mainline, ASAP. For someone with such aspirations, putting stuff like this on the internet where everyone in the world can see it is just plain... stupid. It demonstrates poor judgment. He should think about it.

 

[aa73]

I haven't read this whole thread so I'm sorry but how does this AF accident get turned into a slam the low life regional pilot issue?

This is an unfortunate accident to say the least. I am just as baffled as anyone about the Colgan crew for not flying the Dash-8 at least the same way as they would a C-150 but twisting this A330 into a trash the regional pilot thread is absurd.

Besides even if they were from a regional background, weren't they saved from themselves by being allowed to get a job at mainline?

In a nutshell, there will always be a pissing contest between regional and mainline pilots.

Because of that, any time there is a major airline crash, regional pilots will post it in the Regionals section with a thread title along the lines of "Regional pilots screw up big time".

The poster who writes this knows very well that they weren't regional pilots. They are using sarcasm to convey that major pilots screw up just as much.

Likewise, whenever there is a regional crash, the mainline pilots lower themselves to the same level and gloat about it on the Majors board.

Both are immature and childish. But so is Jerry Springer...

 

[bailout]

You just listed all of the normal law protections, nothing about stall recovery. The first item on the stall recovery procedure is to lower the nose.

I thought he was talking about the sidestick limitations. As far as the stall recovery, I got that directly from an AB forum. I will dig deeper into that.

 

[SLUF4]

You don't pull back during a stall recovery...we do that in the sim just to demonstrate what the airbus will do in normal law..we also pull back in alternate law to watch what will happen.

 

[Abernathy]

I thought he was talking about the sidestick limitations. As far as the stall recovery, I got that directly from an AB forum. I will dig deeper into that.

Not a 'bus pilot but I'm wondering if what you are thinking of is recovery from an impending stall, not an actual full blown stall recovery.

 

[SLUF4]

even an impending stall you wouldn't do that..we do hold the stick all the way back for GPWS recovery ..maybe he's thinking of that

 

[777forever]

For you non Airbus types, the correct escape manuever for a stall "under normal law" is to pull the sidestick full aft at full power. Yes you read that right. Yes, he did this as this is how they are trained. Problem was, he did not recognize that at that point the plane was in "alternate law". (with so many failures in such a short amount of time who knows if any of us could have reacted correctly in time) This is much different than the Colgan crash in a 'normal' type of airplane. Keep in mind, Airbus thinks its computers are smarter than its pilots. In "normal law" you can crank the stick all the way back and all the way to one side and the plane will go to a max of 60 degrees bank and @ 20 degrees nose up and no matter how hard you yank on it, the computers will over ride you.

First off, they did recognize that they were in alternate law, or at least the guy sitting on the left side of the plane verbalized that he did.

http://www.airbusdriver.net/ look under the 'info' tab then 'flight control laws'.

I was off by a couple of degrees, but the jest of the matter is this:

ProtectionsLoad factor Limitation

• Prevents pilot from overstressing the aircraft even if full sidestick deflections are applied.

Attitude Protection

• Pitch limited to 30 deg up, 15 deg down, and 67 deg of bank.
• These limits are indicated by green = signs on the PFD.
• Bank angles in excess of 33 deg require constant sidestick input.
• If input is released the aircraft returns to and maintains 33 deg of bank.

High Angle of Attack Protection (alpha):

• When alpha exceeds alpha prot, elevator control switches to alpha protection mode in which angle of attack is proportional to sidestick deflection.
• Alpha max will not be exceeded even if the pilot applies full aft deflection

High Speed Protection:

• Prevents exceeding VMO or MMO by introducing a pitch up load factor demand.
• The pilot can NOT override the pitch up command.

Would you like some salt with your meal??

Not quite ready for some salt. In bold is your exact words and you still haven't come up with official documentation that the normal law procedure for a stall in the Airbus is to "pull the sidestick full aft at full power"

 

[777forever]

BEA preliminary report

http://www.bea.aero/fr/enquetes/vol.af.447/point.enquete.af447.27mai2011.en.pdf

At 2 h 10 min 51 , the stall warning was triggered again. The thrust levers were positioned
in the TO/GA detent and the PF maintained nose-up inputs. The recorded angle of attack, of
around 6 degrees at the triggering of the stall warning, continued to increase. The trimmable
horizontal stabilizer (THS) passed from 3 to 13 degrees nose-up in about 1 minute and
remained in the latter position until the end of the flight.
Around fifteen seconds later, the speed displayed on the ISIS increased sharply towards 185*****kt;
it was then consistent with the other recorded speed. The PF continued to make nose-up
inputs. The airplane’s altitude reached its maximum of about 38,000 ft, its pitch attitude and
angle of attack being 16 degrees.
Note: The inconsistency between the speeds displayed on the left side and on the ISIS lasted a little less
than one minute.
At around 2 h 11 min 40 , the Captain re-entered the cockpit. During the following seconds,
all of the recorded speeds became invalid and the stall warning stopped.
Note: When the measured speeds are below 60 kt, the measured angle of attack values are considered
invalid and are not taken into account by the systems. When they are below 30 kt, the speed values
themselves are considered invalid.The altitude was then about 35,000 ft, the angle of attack exceeded 40 degrees and the vertical
speed was about -10,000 ft/min. The airplane’s pitch attitude did not exceed 15 degrees
and the engines’ N1’s were close to 100%. The airplane was subject to roll oscillations that
sometimes reached 40 degrees. The PF made an input on the sidestick to the left and nose-up
stops, which lasted about 30 seconds.

For those that say that this is completely different from the Colgan accident, I say, there are at least some similarities.

For one, the reaction to the stall warning horn by the PF in both accidents was similar, TOGA power and pitch up. From this report, we know the stall warning horn was on from 2 hr 10min 51sec to at least 2 hr 11min 40 sec when the Captain returned to flightdeck and the within a few seconds the speeds became invalid due to measured speeds being under 60 kts

A key focus on this investigation that I believe will play a pivotal role in future training, is why for 49secs did the PF maintain nose up inputs with the stall warning horn blaring.

One issue I do see with the report is it states pitch and AOA was 16 degrees. That makes no sense. Probably a French to English translation issue as the original report was in french.

 

[dojetdriver]

For one, the reaction to the stall warning horn by the PF in both accidents was similar, TOGA power and pitch up. From this report, we know the stall warning horn was on from 2 hr 10min 51sec to at least 2 hr 11min 40 sec when the Captain returned to flightdeck and the within a few seconds the speeds became invalid due to measured speeds being under 60 kts

A key focus on this investigation that I believe will play a pivotal role in future training, is why for 49secs did the PF maintain nose up inputs with the stall warning horn blaring.

Step 1, Put MS flght sim on your laptop
Step 2, Find a commercial size dryer unit
Step 3, Get into dryer unit with flight sim ready to go
Step 4, Have friend close door and turn dryer unit on
Step 6. Try to fly whatever airplane you loaded into flight sim.

You ever observed a sim session, where a complex and/or detailed emergency was being thrown at the crew? Seriously, it can be almost comical to watch the actions/reactions we pilots are capable of when things are going way wrong quickly.

Even the UAL CA at Sioux City admits one of the dumbest things he ever said in his long career was "I have the aircraft" when they were done briefing an it was time to put it on the ground.

 

[flyboyike]

He's trying to compare the problems between the Colgan crash and the Air France crash, and equate them....those crashes were caused by different problems, and should not be equated by this guy.

Well, General, you have a point, but would you agree that poor airmanship has many causes, wears many uniforms and is found aboard many aircraft?