Regional Pilots Kill 228 People by Pulling up After Stall Warning

[SLUF4]

even an impending stall you wouldn't do that..we do hold the stick all the way back for GPWS recovery ..maybe he's thinking of that

 

[777forever]

For you non Airbus types, the correct escape manuever for a stall "under normal law" is to pull the sidestick full aft at full power. Yes you read that right. Yes, he did this as this is how they are trained. Problem was, he did not recognize that at that point the plane was in "alternate law". (with so many failures in such a short amount of time who knows if any of us could have reacted correctly in time) This is much different than the Colgan crash in a 'normal' type of airplane. Keep in mind, Airbus thinks its computers are smarter than its pilots. In "normal law" you can crank the stick all the way back and all the way to one side and the plane will go to a max of 60 degrees bank and @ 20 degrees nose up and no matter how hard you yank on it, the computers will over ride you.

First off, they did recognize that they were in alternate law, or at least the guy sitting on the left side of the plane verbalized that he did.

http://www.airbusdriver.net/ look under the 'info' tab then 'flight control laws'.

I was off by a couple of degrees, but the jest of the matter is this:

ProtectionsLoad factor Limitation

• Prevents pilot from overstressing the aircraft even if full sidestick deflections are applied.

Attitude Protection

• Pitch limited to 30 deg up, 15 deg down, and 67 deg of bank.
• These limits are indicated by green = signs on the PFD.
• Bank angles in excess of 33 deg require constant sidestick input.
• If input is released the aircraft returns to and maintains 33 deg of bank.

High Angle of Attack Protection (alpha):

• When alpha exceeds alpha prot, elevator control switches to alpha protection mode in which angle of attack is proportional to sidestick deflection.
• Alpha max will not be exceeded even if the pilot applies full aft deflection

High Speed Protection:

• Prevents exceeding VMO or MMO by introducing a pitch up load factor demand.
• The pilot can NOT override the pitch up command.

Would you like some salt with your meal??

Not quite ready for some salt. In bold is your exact words and you still haven't come up with official documentation that the normal law procedure for a stall in the Airbus is to "pull the sidestick full aft at full power"

 

[777forever]

BEA preliminary report

http://www.bea.aero/fr/enquetes/vol.af.447/point.enquete.af447.27mai2011.en.pdf

At 2 h 10 min 51 , the stall warning was triggered again. The thrust levers were positioned
in the TO/GA detent and the PF maintained nose-up inputs. The recorded angle of attack, of
around 6 degrees at the triggering of the stall warning, continued to increase. The trimmable
horizontal stabilizer (THS) passed from 3 to 13 degrees nose-up in about 1 minute and
remained in the latter position until the end of the flight.
Around fifteen seconds later, the speed displayed on the ISIS increased sharply towards 185*****kt;
it was then consistent with the other recorded speed. The PF continued to make nose-up
inputs. The airplane’s altitude reached its maximum of about 38,000 ft, its pitch attitude and
angle of attack being 16 degrees.
Note: The inconsistency between the speeds displayed on the left side and on the ISIS lasted a little less
than one minute.
At around 2 h 11 min 40 , the Captain re-entered the cockpit. During the following seconds,
all of the recorded speeds became invalid and the stall warning stopped.
Note: When the measured speeds are below 60 kt, the measured angle of attack values are considered
invalid and are not taken into account by the systems. When they are below 30 kt, the speed values
themselves are considered invalid.The altitude was then about 35,000 ft, the angle of attack exceeded 40 degrees and the vertical
speed was about -10,000 ft/min. The airplane’s pitch attitude did not exceed 15 degrees
and the engines’ N1’s were close to 100%. The airplane was subject to roll oscillations that
sometimes reached 40 degrees. The PF made an input on the sidestick to the left and nose-up
stops, which lasted about 30 seconds.

For those that say that this is completely different from the Colgan accident, I say, there are at least some similarities.

For one, the reaction to the stall warning horn by the PF in both accidents was similar, TOGA power and pitch up. From this report, we know the stall warning horn was on from 2 hr 10min 51sec to at least 2 hr 11min 40 sec when the Captain returned to flightdeck and the within a few seconds the speeds became invalid due to measured speeds being under 60 kts

A key focus on this investigation that I believe will play a pivotal role in future training, is why for 49secs did the PF maintain nose up inputs with the stall warning horn blaring.

One issue I do see with the report is it states pitch and AOA was 16 degrees. That makes no sense. Probably a French to English translation issue as the original report was in french.

 

[dojetdriver]

For one, the reaction to the stall warning horn by the PF in both accidents was similar, TOGA power and pitch up. From this report, we know the stall warning horn was on from 2 hr 10min 51sec to at least 2 hr 11min 40 sec when the Captain returned to flightdeck and the within a few seconds the speeds became invalid due to measured speeds being under 60 kts

A key focus on this investigation that I believe will play a pivotal role in future training, is why for 49secs did the PF maintain nose up inputs with the stall warning horn blaring.

Step 1, Put MS flght sim on your laptop
Step 2, Find a commercial size dryer unit
Step 3, Get into dryer unit with flight sim ready to go
Step 4, Have friend close door and turn dryer unit on
Step 6. Try to fly whatever airplane you loaded into flight sim.

You ever observed a sim session, where a complex and/or detailed emergency was being thrown at the crew? Seriously, it can be almost comical to watch the actions/reactions we pilots are capable of when things are going way wrong quickly.

Even the UAL CA at Sioux City admits one of the dumbest things he ever said in his long career was "I have the aircraft" when they were done briefing an it was time to put it on the ground.

 

[flyboyike]

He's trying to compare the problems between the Colgan crash and the Air France crash, and equate them....those crashes were caused by different problems, and should not be equated by this guy.

Well, General, you have a point, but would you agree that poor airmanship has many causes, wears many uniforms and is found aboard many aircraft?

 

[dojetdriver]

For one, the reaction to the stall warning horn by the PF in both accidents was similar, TOGA power and pitch up. From this report, we know the stall warning horn was on from 2 hr 10min 51sec to at least 2 hr 11min 40 sec when the Captain returned to flightdeck and the within a few seconds the speeds became invalid due to measured speeds being under 60 kts

Along the lines of what you posted earlier, we may have to wait till an official document comes out. Also, something may have been lost in the translation.

Due to all the design "logic", the AF PF may have been "requesting" TOGA power by shoving the TL's though the stop, if they spooled down to idle and were waiting for an official command by the pilot "synch", it wouldn't have done them any good. In the "alpha prot" they should have, but again, who knows what the airplane was really doing?

Again, an official investigation should reveal what was going on.

 

[flyboyike]

And skill and performance aren't rigorously checked periodically at your airline? They are at mine, and no slackers a let slip through the cracks...

Really?

 

[Buzo]

Along the lines of what you posted earlier, we may have to wait till an official document comes out. Also, something may have been lost in the translation.

Due to all the design "logic", the AF PF may have been "requesting" TOGA power by shoving the TL's though the stop, if they spooled down to idle and were waiting for an official command by the pilot "synch", it wouldn't have done them any good. In the "alpha prot" they should have, but again, who knows what the airplane was really doing?

Again, an official investigation should reveal what was going on.

TOGA is TOGA no matter what, when the thrust levers are in the TOGA detent, that is what you get. Alpha Prot does not exist in Alternate law, it is a Normal law protection.

 

[dojetdriver]

TOGA is TOGA no matter what, when the thrust levers are in the TOGA detent, that is what you get. Alpha Prot does not exist in Alternate law, it is a Normal law protection.

Still begs the question, the article says the pilots selected TOGA. Is there an official source document that confirms that the airplane was indeed in TOGA power?

 

[777forever]

TOGA is TOGA no matter what, when the thrust levers are in the TOGA detent, that is what you get. Alpha Prot does not exist in Alternate law, it is a Normal law protection.

Correct. The BEA report states that engine thrust worked properly and responded to pilot input.

 

[777forever]

Still begs the question, the article says the pilots selected TOGA. Is there an official source document that confirms that the airplane was indeed in TOGA power?

The BEA preliminary report.

 

[Buzo]

Still begs the question, the article says the pilots selected TOGA. Is there an official source document that confirms that the airplane was indeed in TOGA power?

The TOGA detent is supposed to override the autothrust system and give you TOGA power. I don't whether the particular aircraft was in TOGA.

 

[dojetdriver]

The BEA preliminary report.

Correct. The BEA report states that engine thrust worked properly and responded to pilot input.

You also said the following;

One issue I do see with the report is it states pitch and AOA was 16 degrees. That makes no sense. Probably a French to English translation issue as the original report was in french.

Are you cherry picking what to believe as fact from the report?

The TOGA detent is supposed to override the autothrust system and give you TOGA power. I don't whether the particular aircraft was in TOGA.

And that's all I'm getting at. Who the hell knows what the plane was doing with all the component failures they were experiencing.

 

[wmuflyguy]

At 2 h 10 min 51 , the stall warning was triggered again. The thrust levers were positioned
in the TO/GA detent and the PF maintained nose-up inputs. The recorded angle of attack, of
around 6 degrees at the triggering of the stall warning, continued to increase. The trimmable
horizontal stabilizer (THS) passed from 3 to 13 degrees nose-up in about 1 minute and
remained in the latter position until the end of the flight.
Around fifteen seconds later, the speed displayed on the ISIS increased sharply towards 185 kt;
it was then consistent with the other recorded speed. The PF continued to make nose-up
inputs. The airplane’s altitude reached its maximum of about 38,000 ft, its pitch attitude and
angle of attack being 16 degrees.

At around 2 h 11 min 40 , the Captain re-entered the cockpit. During the following seconds,
all of the recorded speeds became invalid and the stall warning stopped. The altitude was then about 35,000 ft, the angle of attack exceeded 40 degrees and the vertical
speed was about -10,000 ft/min. The airplane’s pitch attitude did not exceed 15 degrees
and the engines’ N1’s were close to 100%. The airplane was subject to roll oscillations that
sometimes reached 40 degrees. The PF made an input on the sidestick to the left and nose-up
stops, which lasted about 30 seconds.

At 2 h 12 min 02, the PF said "I don’t have any more indications", and the PNF said "we have
no valid indications". At that moment, the thrust levers were in the IDLE detent and the
engines’ N1’s were at 55%. Around fifteen seconds later, the PF made pitch-down inputs. In
the following moments, the angle of attack decreased, the speeds became valid again and the
stall warning sounded again.

It sounds like they were working.

 

[dojetdriver]

The thrust levers were positioned
in the TO/GA detent

For the Airbus guys, is that because that's where they had been since TO?

engines’ N1’s were close to 100%

But can it be confirmed that it was pilot selected, or airplane selected?

At that moment, the thrust levers were in the IDLE detent and the
engines’ N1’s were at 55%

I'm not trying to argue with you guys. Again, all I'm saying is who the hell knows what went on prior to the engines coming back to 55% along with a corresponding TL angle. The report says the pilots selected TOGA, but again for the Airbus guys, would the autothrust system do that for them?