Regional Pilots Kill 228 People by Pulling up After Stall Warning

[kf4amu]

Are you talking about the Air France pilot? The Captain was on break, it was a long flight, and the two FOs were flying. That is common practice at all INTL airlines. What was the experience of the other FO? The PF was probably the younger pilot, but there are usually more senior FOs in the other seat. The floating FO sits in the Capt's seat when he is on break, and the FO's during his break. There still was someone else there that had more experience most likely, that could hold the FO position on the trip. The Capt and original FO probably were senior, they were laying over in Rio de Janero.

I would think the hiring practices at AF are probably strict than most US Regionals. There are plenty of French Regional airlines too, so the hiring pool was probably experienced wanting a shot at the national airline (AF). 3000 hours for Air France could have involved Military time, or Regional time. He could have been hired at AF with 1000 hours, but had 2000 hours on the A320 before going to the A330.


And, if the pitot tubes were the problem, it would have been tough to recover in the dark, with thunderstorms around. As I stated, a DL A330 had the same problem and landed safely, but the difference was it was day and VFR. Your comments about lack of experience don't matter here, and even great pilots would have had a tough time with this problem if it popped up at night in the weather. It was a combination of problems, not just one, and it was unfortunate.



Bye Bye---General Lee

You said a lot of qualifiers, and I won't argue any of them. But they are all "ifs". A 3000 hr major airline pilot "may" have had great training and experience. Who knows.

And so what if he was the least experienced. At some point he becomes a captain with lots of flight time but not much experience. In this case he was PF, and this reinforces the importance of EVERYONE involved in flying, not just the Captain or the FO who was so senior that they could lay over in Rio.

I think if he came from a regional it's even worse. Regional or not, it's a 121 airline. One level of safety? Take what this pilot learned from his Air France experience AND the regional, subtract it from his experience bank, and then ask yourself if he is qualified to fly for an airline. 3000 hours doesnt appear to be very strict for a Major airline.

I look at my job as routinely boring but rarely tough. The job involves being ready for the tough parts, not the easy ones. I worry that many pilots are only able to handle the routinely boring flights since that's all we are trained for. The last time I was tested on blocked pitot tubes was 10 years ago. The last time I was required to perform a stall was 5 years ago. Both maneuvers were responsible for recent accidents, and failure to recognize and react appropriately were factors. Had I ever been an instructor, teaching students on these 2 specific subjects, I'd be much more likely to recognize them and react appropriately if they happened to me, instead of panicking.

However, due to the state of the airline industry, I was hired with very little experience. I quickly recognized that flying for hours and hours at a regional airline does not teach me very much airmanship, and I know that people like myself are the norm rather than the exception.

This needs to change. Quickly.

Higher pay will attract better qualified candidates of course, but that will never happen unless the FAA mandates higher qualifications.

 

[Leroy Smith]

The companion piece is also fascinating

http://www.flightglobal.com/article...ous-flaws-in-pilot-training-for-handling.html[

Despite the sometimes fickle nature of the automation, she observes, pilots frequently abdicate too much responsibility to automated systems. The reasons for this, she found, include: a perceived lack of trust in pilot performance by the airline; policies that encourage use of automated systems rather than manual operations; and insufficient training, experience or judgment, the result of which is that "pilots may not be prepared to handle non-routine situations".
Abbott has discovered particular vulnerabilities in automated systems and their man/machine interfaces. These include: mode confusion, and a pilot tendency to use information from automated systems instead of raw data. Another problem she identified is that much of the information supplied to pilots is, itself, automated - what she calls "information automation". Abbot also found that there was no consistency among operators in their policies for the use of automated systems.
Pilot knowledge was found seriously lacking in many areas relating to automated systems, including: understanding of flight director, autopilot, autothrottle/autothrust, and flight management system/computer systems and their limitations; operating procedures, mode transitions and behaviour; and unusual attitude recognition and recovery.
/QUOTE]

I dont know if there is an easy answer. It gets harder and harder to overcome our recipe flying conditioning that is beaten into us to a greater degree every year by an liability adverse yet cost-cutting industry, and a regulatory body that is becoming irrelevant with its SOP nit-picking myopia that causes it to ignore some of the big issues.

I can only hope that if it happens to me, I will be able to use the SOP as needed, but shake off all the "did I do this checklist/callout/profile/ ect exactly the way the LCA, company, FAA or whoever wants it done" and remember to bust any SOP, limitation or clearance needed to allow me to miss everything hard and imovable by an inch or more and find a place to put down without hurting anyone.

I hope that my pre- 121 experience kicks in and helps me rise above the habits and routines that 121 has put in me.

 

[dojetdriver]

After all of the recent RJ crashes, I wouldn't be bragging..........


Bye Bye---General Lee

Show me where I was bragging? The only thing the legacy incidents can brag about is they were lucky, NOT good.

 

[bailout]

For you non Airbus types, the correct escape manuever for a stall "under normal law" is to pull the sidestick full aft at full power. Yes you read that right. Yes, he did this as this is how they are trained. Problem was, he did not recognize that at that point the plane was in "alternate law". (with so many failures in such a short amount of time who knows if any of us could have reacted correctly in time) This is much different than the Colgan crash in a 'normal' type of airplane. Keep in mind, Airbus thinks its computers are smarter than its pilots. In "normal law" you can crank the stick all the way back and all the way to one side and the plane will go to a max of 60 degrees bank and @ 20 degrees nose up and no matter how hard you yank on it, the computers will over ride you.

 

[ultrarunner]

The companion piece is also fascinating

http://www.flightglobal.com/article...ous-flaws-in-pilot-training-for-handling.html

And the FAA is approving the training manuals.

 

[glasspilot]

For you non Airbus types, the correct escape manuever for a stall "under normal law" is to pull the sidestick full aft at full power. Yes you read that right. Yes, he did this as this is how they are trained. Problem was, he did not recognize that at that point the plane was in "alternate law". (with so many failures in such a short amount of time who knows if any of us could have reacted correctly in time) This is much different than the Colgan crash in a 'normal' type of airplane. Keep in mind, Airbus thinks its computers are smarter than its pilots. In "normal law" you can crank the stick all the way back and all the way to one side and the plane will go to a max of 60 degrees bank and @ 20 degrees nose up and no matter how hard you yank on it, the computers will over ride you.

HQ does an Airbus display to the pilots what law is in effect? Is there an aural tone involved too?

 

[Abernathy]

Problem was, he did not recognize that at that point the plane was in "alternate law".

Wasn't he quoted as saying "Alternate Law" during the recording early on?

 

[SLUF4]

For you non Airbus types, the correct escape manuever for a stall "under normal law" is to pull the sidestick full aft at full power. Yes you read that right. Yes, he did this as this is how they are trained. Problem was, he did not recognize that at that point the plane was in "alternate law". (with so many failures in such a short amount of time who knows if any of us could have reacted correctly in time) This is much different than the Colgan crash in a 'normal' type of airplane. Keep in mind, Airbus thinks its computers are smarter than its pilots. In "normal law" you can crank the stick all the way back and all the way to one side and the plane will go to a max of 60 degrees bank and @ 20 degrees nose up and no matter how hard you yank on it, the computers will over ride you.

My Airbus manual says this for stall recovery:
To recover from a stall, angle of attack must be reduced below the stalling angle.
Nose down pitch control must be applied and maintained until the wings are
unstalled. Application of forward control stick (as much as full forward may be
required) should provide sufficient elevator control to produce a nose-down pitch
rate.

Are you talking about the stall demo in normal law to show the protections available? I'm talking about a full stall in alternate law here like they were in

 

[GRAAB HIRBOUBI]

I haven't read this whole thread so I'm sorry but how does this AF accident get turned into a slam the low life regional pilot issue?

This is an unfortunate accident to say the least. I am just as baffled as anyone about the Colgan crew for not flying the Dash-8 at least the same way as they would a C-150 but twisting this A330 into a trash the regional pilot thread is absurd.

Besides even if they were from a regional background, weren't they saved from themselves by being allowed to get a job at mainline?

 

[777forever]

For you non Airbus types, the correct escape manuever for a stall "under normal law" is to pull the sidestick full aft at full power. Yes you read that right. Yes, he did this as this is how they are trained. Problem was, he did not recognize that at that point the plane was in "alternate law". (with so many failures in such a short amount of time who knows if any of us could have reacted correctly in time) This is much different than the Colgan crash in a 'normal' type of airplane. Keep in mind, Airbus thinks its computers are smarter than its pilots. In "normal law" you can crank the stick all the way back and all the way to one side and the plane will go to a max of 60 degrees bank and @ 20 degrees nose up and no matter how hard you yank on it, the computers will over ride you.

Sorry I have to call BS on this one. Show me some official documentation and I'll gladly eat my words