Regional Pilots Kill 228 People by Pulling up After Stall Warning

[AC560]

When everything revolves around seniority instead of skill or job performance the results are to be expected.

 

[GogglesPisano]

When everything revolves around seniority instead of skill or job performance the results are to be expected.

And skill and performance aren't rigorously checked periodically at your airline? They are at mine, and no slackers a let slip through the cracks. At an airline with 500, 1,000, 10,000 pilots, there is no objective way to assign promotions. The seniority system has worked fine for generations. It eliminates cronyism, ass-kissing and ladder climbing you see so often in corporate aviation. As long as everyone passes the checkride you can’t use the seniority system as a scapegoat.

 

[AC560]

at your airline?

I am evil management scum in the airline industry (cargo) but not currently at an airline. I have a stint at FT (non flying).

And skill and performance aren't rigorously checked periodically

Few if any get drummed out for qualification issues. Once you are in you are in, we have posts all the time on the forum about various captains/FO's which are a danger to themselves and everyone else in the air.

The seniority system has worked fine for generations.

Tell that to Pan Am, TWA, America West, Eastern, and the list goes on. If a 20,000hr pilot starts at Regional X tomorrow he is swinging gear for a 2000hr Captain. That isn't putting the most qualified in charge.

The seniority system is effective for those hired at a specific time to ensure rank and privilege. It does nothing to ensure the quality of the people sitting in the cockpit though. This isn't to imply that the vast majority of the people out there aren't qualified, just that the seniority system has nothing to do with safety or quality and ultimately as the airlines merge and dissolve it works to serve the people it was intended to serve even less.

 

[glasspilot]

Tell that to Pan Am, TWA, America West, Eastern, and the list goes on. If a 20,000hr pilot starts at Regional X tomorrow he is swinging gear for a 2000hr Captain. That isn't putting the most qualified in charge.

The seniority system is effective for those hired at a specific time to ensure rank and privilege. It does nothing to ensure the quality of the people sitting in the cockpit though. This isn't to imply that the vast majority of the people out there aren't qualified, just that the seniority system has nothing to do with safety or quality and ultimately as the airlines merge and dissolve it works to serve the people it was intended to serve even less.

Amen brother! Fricken post of the year right there.

 

[GogglesPisano]

And how would you guys handle upgrade selection? What type of impartial aptitude and judgment metric would you use to determine who sits in what seat?

Pure total hours of experience? Turbine? PIC? Do you think it fair that a pilot with ten years at a major, about to upgrade based on his seniority, loses that chance because a newhire from a failed carrier has 100 more hours than he does?

 

[DYLIN]

Sorry I have to call BS on this one. Show me some official documentation and I'll gladly eat my words

Wow.

You've got a lot to learn.

 

[Flyer1015]

You know, I understand the political spin the thread is trying to imply, but this is still different from Colgan. Here, you had multiple internal failures of the A330, stemming from pitot tubes, a problem known in the industry, and the multiple failures leading to different speed indications. From valid speeds to invalid dashes, and probably everything in between, with autopilot disconnect horns, autothrottle disconnect horns, the associated warnings, the failures of all 3 ADIRUs, etc, etc etc. That all added to the confusion on the flight deck, and for reasons including the above mentioned, the crew put the aircraft in an undesired state while facing malfunctioning flight instruments.

THAT, as opposed to Colgan, where a perfectly flyable airplane with perfectly functioning instruments, with a perfectly good autopilot, and a perfectly good air data reference system, was just outright approached to stall speed, stalled, and then nosed up recovery which led to a stall/spin scenario.

IMO, given the facts so far, it's a different situation. The AF sounds like multiple failures in night IMC with aural warnings, visual warnings, and a lot on their plate. The Colgan crash was just sheer incompetence, from an improper stall recovery (nose waaay up at shaker, around 25 degrees up, to raising the flaps while the aircraft was entering a spin, while stalled).

Apples/Oranges.

Also, the thread title isn't accurate. It states pilot pulled up at stall warning. Some A330 pilot can chime in, but my understanding is once all 3 pitots were iced and malfunctioning, the 3 ADIRUs were gone, autopilot/autothrottles disconnected, and for these reasons, the aircraft went from normal law to alternate law, and stall protection is not provided in alternate law.

 

[bailout]

Sorry I have to call BS on this one. Show me some official documentation and I'll gladly eat my words

http://www.airbusdriver.net/ look under the 'info' tab then 'flight control laws'.

I was off by a couple of degrees, but the jest of the matter is this:

ProtectionsLoad factor Limitation

• Prevents pilot from overstressing the aircraft even if full sidestick deflections are applied.

Attitude Protection

• Pitch limited to 30 deg up, 15 deg down, and 67 deg of bank.
• These limits are indicated by green = signs on the PFD.
• Bank angles in excess of 33 deg require constant sidestick input.
• If input is released the aircraft returns to and maintains 33 deg of bank.

High Angle of Attack Protection (alpha):

• When alpha exceeds alpha prot, elevator control switches to alpha protection mode in which angle of attack is proportional to sidestick deflection.
• Alpha max will not be exceeded even if the pilot applies full aft deflection

High Speed Protection:

• Prevents exceeding VMO or MMO by introducing a pitch up load factor demand.
• The pilot can NOT override the pitch up command.

Would you like some salt with your meal??

 

[Buzo]

http://www.airbusdriver.net/ look under the 'info' tab then 'flight control laws'.

I was off by a couple of degrees, but the jest of the matter is this:

ProtectionsLoad factor Limitation

• Prevents pilot from overstressing the aircraft even if full sidestick deflections are applied.

Attitude Protection

• Pitch limited to 30 deg up, 15 deg down, and 67 deg of bank.
• These limits are indicated by green = signs on the PFD.
• Bank angles in excess of 33 deg require constant sidestick input.
• If input is released the aircraft returns to and maintains 33 deg of bank.

High Angle of Attack Protection (alpha):

• When alpha exceeds alpha prot, elevator control switches to alpha protection mode in which angle of attack is proportional to sidestick deflection.
• Alpha max will not be exceeded even if the pilot applies full aft deflection

High Speed Protection:

• Prevents exceeding VMO or MMO by introducing a pitch up load factor demand.
• The pilot can NOT override the pitch up command.

Would you like some salt with your meal??

You just listed all of the normal law protections, nothing about stall recovery. The first item on the stall recovery procedure is to lower the nose.

 

[blott]

seriously?


Airbus

Stall Recovery


Step PF PM
1 Recognize and confirm the situation
2 Autopilot - Disconnect


Pitch
• Apply nose down elevator with the sidestick to reduce the angle of attack until buffet and/or aural stall warning stops
• Nose down stabilizer trim may be needed1
• In case of insufficient pitch down authority, reducing thrust may be necessary


Roll
• Roll in the shortest direction to wings level if needed2


Thrust
• Adjust as needed


3 Configuration
• SPEED BRAKE – retract
• Do not alter gear/flap configuration


4 After Stall Recovery
• Resume normal flight
• If below 20,000 feet and in clean configuration request FLAPS 1


1If the sidestick does not provide the needed response, stabilizer trim may be necessary. Excessive use of pitch trim may aggravate the condition, or may result in loss of control or in high structural loads.
2Excessive use of pitch trim or rudder may aggravate the condition, or may result in loss of control or in high structural loads.