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Regional Pilots Kill 228 People by Pulling up After Stall Warning

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You also said the following;



Are you cherry picking what to believe as fact from the report?




And that's all I'm getting at. Who the hell knows what the plane was doing with all the component failures they were experiencing.

Not cherry picking at all. For that particular part I quoted it looks like a minor translation mistake from the French version. Pitch was just under 16 degrees with AOA somewhere around 40 degrees.
 
For the Airbus guys, is that because that's where they had been since TO?



But can it be confirmed that it was pilot selected, or airplane selected?



I'm not trying to argue with you guys. Again, all I'm saying is who the hell knows what went on prior to the engines coming back to 55% along with a corresponding TL angle. The report says the pilots selected TOGA, but again for the Airbus guys, would the autothrust system do that for them?

Have read the report? It is linked on this thread.

The autothrust was kicked off as well when the autopilot disconnected.

It appears like all manual control was given to the pilots after the airspeed disagree, which according to the report only lasted few seconds

Only other thing I don't understand that may play a factor is the THS trim
 
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Have read the report? It is linked on this thread.

The autothrust was kicked off as well when the autopilot disconnected.

Even with the autothrust off, they will still command TOGA if needed as long as the system is operational.
 
For the Airbus guys, is that because that's where they had been since TO?


But can it be confirmed that it was pilot selected, or airplane selected?

The detent must be selected, TOGA is beyond the autothrust range. At 1500', the thrust levers are moved to the climb detent.



If they were in the TOGA detent, they were manually placed there.
 
Even with the autothrust off, they will still command TOGA if needed as long as the system is operational.

Wait, by themselves they will command TOGA in alternate law without pilot input? Or did you mean with pilot input?

Nevermind you just answered it!
 
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Alpha Floor is only a Normal low protection. In Alternate law, the levers must be manually placed in the TOGA Detent.
 
Airbus sux. Auto this, auto that, throttles that don't move, yokes that don't move, "ALPHA PROT" (WTF is that? can't you just call it stall protection?)... always wondering what it's doing....

Rode j/s on an A320 not long ago... the engines were all over the place during descent and who the heck knew what they were doing? the throttles stayed fixed at climb power. Talk about removing the pilot from the airplane!

Gimmee a Boeing! You can still barrel roll a 777 if you need to.
 
Sheesh! Airbus. Normal law, alternate law, direct law, gravity law, anti-defacate law. This protection, that protection.

Remember the Air Inter A320 crash? On a non-precision approach, pilots selected 3.0 on the autopilot control, thinking they had set FPA (Flight Path angle) of 3.0 degrees. In reality, they had VS selected, and the aircraft nosed down to achieve 3000 fpm descent. With no GPWS installed, they crashed onto a downslope hillside. Oops. Airbus engineers fixed this problem by displaying two zeroes at the end when in vertical speed mode. So now it will read 30oo for VS of 3000fpm.
 
Sheesh! Airbus. Normal law, alternate law, direct law, gravity law, anti-defacate law. This protection, that protection...........


The only law that ever matters is the law of AOA. And when you break that law on the ANU stalled-side, you can only fix it by pushing!
 
this new report said aoa information is not displayed to pilots. It seems like if they had aoa information they could have held things together.
 
How is AOA determined on the airbus? Is there an AOA vanes (like the CRJ) or is it derived from the Air Data probes (like the E170).
 
this new report said aoa information is not displayed to pilots. It seems like if they had aoa information they could have held things together.

They did have some AOA information, the stall warning horn. However they may have believed it was false since the speeds were acting up. What added to the confusion was the stall warning horn going away when ias dropped below 60 kts because the plane recognizes speeds below 60 kts as invalid. To make the confusion even worse, during the 10,000ft/min descent, when the PF pushed down the speed increased past 60 kts, became valid again, and stall warning came back on. The PF then pulled back again and it went away. Then he states they had no valid indications.

I think in future training it will be emphasized to always respect the stall warning, whether or not you think the system is giving a false warning due to inaccurate speed indications
 
They did have some AOA information, the stall warning horn. However they may have believed it was false since the speeds were acting up. What added to the confusion was the stall warning horn going away when ias dropped below 60 kts because the plane recognizes speeds below 60 kts as invalid. To make the confusion even worse, during the 10,000ft/min descent, when the PF pushed down the speed increased past 60 kts, became valid again, and stall warning came back on. The PF then pulled back again and it went away. Then he states they had no valid indications.

I think in future training it will be emphasized to always respect the stall warning, whether or not you think the system is giving a false warning due to inaccurate speed indications

I think future training should emphasize aoa based stall recoveries. If the aoa on this airbus wasn't determined by the adc (a vane based gauge) and it was displayed...it could have turned out differently.
 
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I think future training should emphasize aoa based stall recoveries. If the aoa on this airbus wasn't determined by the adc (a vane based gauge) and it was displayed...it could have turned out differently.

AOA is not displayed on the Airbus.
 

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