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LEX Comair Crew on a nap/cdo/

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Soverytired said:
Ah, another perfect pilot enters our midst.

By your "logic"

Pilots don't need EGPWS . . . we have altimeters and navs for positional awareness.

Pilots don't need gear warning horns . . . we have checklist.

Pilots don't need TCAS . . . . for that is the job of equally infallible ATC.

Pilots don't need runway incursion warning systems or hold short lighting at busy airports. . . .for we have paint on the pavement.

Pilots don't need Windshear warning systems . . . for we have weather reports and airspeed indicators.

Pilots don't need stall warning systems and shakers . . . for pilots would never fly below Vs 1.3.

Pilots don't need overspeed indicators . . . for we would never exceed a flap speed for VMO thanks to our airspeed indicators.
I would agree with every one of those statments. Thanks for making my point for me.
 
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ReportCanoa said:
Correct. The only time I've seen the CDI lined up with the runway is on an off-the-runway RNAV DP out of Atlanta where the first path terminator is runway heading to an altitude.

777jackarse, you have been ignored.
Your wit is as fast as that electric scooter you use as your avatar
 
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I have read only sections of this post. OMG! Are you_all really "reagional" pilots flying under the same crack head regs that I am? Because, there is a lot of strange comments out there about this accident. To me it reeks of fatigue, but that is my opinion. If you think it is human to fly these "regional" schedules and make good decisions, then fine,,, have a nice time. Also, you may try an iron man triathalon, sounds like that would suit you as well. The mistake these pilots made here was extraordinary, so maybe some of your thoughts should reflect that...
 
777_Jackpot said:
I would agree with every one of those statments. Thanks for making my point for me.
Yup... I agree...

Jerkpot is an A$$HOLE.

Next on the hit parade is YPF come to tell us what he does in YIP...

The best two on that list was:

Pilots don't need TCAS . . . . for that is the job of equally infallible ATC.
I have filed no fewer than 6 TCAS RA deviations in my career because ATC wasn't paying attention to what they were doing.

and,

Pilots don't need Windshear warning systems . . . for we have weather reports and airspeed indicators.
I have TWICE been in clear-air Windshear as annunciated by the Windshear alerting system a good 2-3 seconds before the ASI and VSI dropped out from under us. Both times the nearest cell was more than 10 miles away. Thanks to that software, I had an extra 2-3 seconds of engine spoolup that I wouldn't have otherwise had.

Jackpot, you have been officially b*tch slapped. You should know better, you pompous a$$.

Can't wait for the day people like you get your tit in a wringer and look back on this with rueful regret...

"There's two kinds: those that have and those that will". You can't escape the laws of probability... no matter HOW good you are.
 
Lear70 said:
Yup... I agree...

Jerkpot is an A$$HOLE.

Next on the hit parade is YPF come to tell us what he does in YIP...

The best two on that list was:


I have filed no fewer than 6 TCAS RA deviations in my career because ATC wasn't paying attention to what they were doing.

and,


I have TWICE been in clear-air Windshear as annunciated by the Windshear alerting system a good 2-3 seconds before the ASI and VSI dropped out from under us. Both times the nearest cell was more than 10 miles away. Thanks to that software, I had an extra 2-3 seconds of engine spoolup that I wouldn't have otherwise had.

Jackpot, you have been officially b*tch slapped. You should know better, you pompous a$$.

Can't wait for the day people like you get your tit in a wringer and look back on this with rueful regret...

"There's two kinds: those that have and those that will". You can't escape the laws of probability... no matter HOW good you are.

How many times did you launch down the wrong runway?
 
777_Jackpot said:
How many times did you launch down the wrong runway?
That is the issue of this thread.

That is NOT the issue we all have with YOU, Mr. Perfect.

I've started to enter / choose a wrong runway at least once or twice before either the runway heading, size, or some other external input (the F/O smacking me upside the head with the QRH) straightened me out.

The problem I have here is that YOU seem to have all the answers.

YOU seem to be perfect.

YOU are ready to be the pilots' judge, jury, and executioner WITHOUT knowing ALL the FACTS.

Here's a news flash, hotshot. NONE OF US have all the facts as of yet.

So before you get back on your high horse and bash the crew some more, why don't you sit back, relax, wait for the NTSB final report to come out and, in the meantime, have a nice hot cup of STFU.

mmmKay? :uzi:
 
Lear70 said:
I've started to enter / choose a wrong runway at least once or twice before either the runway heading, size, or some other external input (the F/O smacking me upside the head with the QRH) straightened me out.

There is a huge difference between entering the wrong runway and rolling down the wrong runway. My point, and excuse me if everyone has misunderstood me, is that the solution/prevention to similar situations, is NOT more automation, prevention systems, etc. Its doing what you get paid to do... be a pilot, and all of the duties included with the title, most notably... not fu*king up.
 
Lear70 said:
"There's two kinds: those that have and those that will". You can't escape the laws of probability... no matter HOW good you are.

Well said.

"There you are, fat as can be. The whole world is yours and you’re the answer to the Wright brothers’ prayers. You say to yourself, nothing can go wrong ... all my trespasses are forgiven. Best you not believe it." - Ernest K. Gann
 
acaTerry said:

acaTerry...

Your original point was to agree with the poster who said "maybe we should never fly early mornings". I said as long as there was adequate rest...and I explained this I meant they had been given time toc adjust their sleep schedule (pattern) prior to the event, then beginning duty early mornings meant nothing. Sun up, sun down, big deal. We're humans not vampires, and given opportunity and time, we can adjust and perform just fine.

I've seen the expert produced circadian rythmn studies. They are studies, not definitive absolutes of performance. They've been produced and updated and revised for years now. Is that the first one you've seen? Good helpful information, but I've also seen people brainwash themselves into thinking they couldn't function if they didn't meet exactly what the latest revision suggested. Kind of like health food nuts who feel like crap if they don't get granola every day at 7 AM. Circadian rythmn studies can also convince you that we should work only 5 hours duty days...something I agree with.

Getting up early to fly if you're well -rested....adequately rested... means you might be tired for awhile. This is not the same as fatigue, and the ONLY way to acertain if fatigue exists is to see what someone's done over a period of days. Your problem is you haven't read my posts. If you had you'd see that when I say "rested" I'm not talking about the paperwork, FAA minimum "legal" rest period.

Which is why you misunderstood my point about more accidents occuring at the end of a long duty day than the beginning after a "legal" rest. If a person is fatigued and gets "legal" rest (not adequate), they can still usually function to a fairly high degree soon after a period of sleep, but only for awhile. 14 hours later, however, that fatigued yet "legal" person is functioning well below standard. That's when fatigue-related accidents are most likely to occur, at the end of that long duty day, and why the NTSB goes back so many days to check what rest actually occured. It's the only indicator that fatigue may be present.

I don't need a job..I've had the same one for years. You obviously misunderstood again and I was referring to your "Three strikes and you're out" company and how much it sucked.

No thanks on the NJA thing despite your good fatigue policy. I love my current situation and no offense but your pay scale is brutal.
 
777 JACKPOT: The moral of this tragedy is not "Don't F#%k UP".
There are valuable lessons that will be learned from the sacrifice of people lives here.
First, that it was not a single error by the pilots, but rather the culmination of errors by the crew, the tower controller and a list of other things yet to be determined. This may lead to devices to detect when aircraft are on the wrong taxiway/runway and further improve avaiation safety. All of us fly, or have flown, GA aircraft with raw data and we know it's very safe. When it comes to the flying public, we are bound by professional ethics to incorporate all means available and necessary to ensure their safety. More preventive measures and technology will be put into place to help illiminate the possibilities of another accident like this, and the victims will not have perished in vain.
 
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777_Jackpot said:
My point, and excuse me if everyone has misunderstood me, is that the solution/prevention to similar situations, is NOT more automation, prevention systems, etc. Its doing what you get paid to do... be a pilot, and all of the duties included with the title, most notably... not fu*king up.
If that was your point, you might have delivered it with a little less god-hood.

Otherwise, I agree with your statement, in certain less inflamatory terms.

At the end of the day, unless completely and totally snowed over by fatigue or being told incorrect data to where he / she doesn't know any better, it's the Captain's ultimate responsibility to be the show-stopper; the F/O shares a close 2nd responsibility as well - he's got a set of brakes, too.

We whine and b*tch all the time about how underpaid we are for the kind of risk we manage. We just proved that two of us, for WHATEVER reasons, didn't catch a fatal mistake and, therefore, didn't perform those duties and responsibilities that passengers entrust their lives to us to perform.

Do I think this could happen to any one of us on a bad day with a bad set of circumstances leading you down a bad path? You betcha. Would I welcome another addition in the electronic department to help? Absofreakinglutely! Does that relieve us of the moral responsibility to make sure, to the BEST of our ability, that it DOESN'T happen to us?

Absolutley NOT.

Use every resource, keep your situational awareness, don't get in a rush, screw the company's on-time performance in the face of safety. Period. I know all of you already do this anyway, but I like to remind myself from time to time as well.

-out-
 
CatYaaak said:
No thanks on the NJA thing despite your good fatigue policy. I love my current situation and no offense but your pay scale is brutal.

...should've seen it before the contract...

Anyway, I think you STILL misread the jist of my points. Try reading them like a book, not a personal attack on your disagreement with me. Perhaps if you spent some time at the regionals recently you'd see the point I and the other guys are making.
 
Lear70 said:
If that was your point, you might have delivered it with a little less god-hood.

Otherwise, I agree with your statement, in certain less inflamatory terms.

At the end of the day, unless completely and totally snowed over by fatigue or being told incorrect data to where he / she doesn't know any better, it's the Captain's ultimate responsibility to be the show-stopper; the F/O shares a close 2nd responsibility as well - he's got a set of brakes, too.

We whine and b*tch all the time about how underpaid we are for the kind of risk we manage. We just proved that two of us, for WHATEVER reasons, didn't catch a fatal mistake and, therefore, didn't perform those duties and responsibilities that passengers entrust their lives to us to perform.

Do I think this could happen to any one of us on a bad day with a bad set of circumstances leading you down a bad path? You betcha. Would I welcome another addition in the electronic department to help? Absofreakinglutely! Does that relieve us of the moral responsibility to make sure, to the BEST of our ability, that it DOESN'T happen to us?

Absolutley NOT.

Use every resource, keep your situational awareness, don't get in a rush, screw the company's on-time performance in the face of safety. Period. I know all of you already do this anyway, but I like to remind myself from time to time as well.

-out-


True words. Good post.
 
"Whenever we talk about a pilot who has been killed in a flying accident, we should all keep one thing in mind. He called upon the sum of all his knowledge and made a judgment. He believed in it so strongly that he knowingly bet his life on it. That his judgment was faulty is a tragedy, not stupidity. Every instructor, supervisor, and contemporary who ever spoke to him had an opportunity to influence his judgment, so a little bit of all of us goes with every pilot we lose."​
— author unknown,
R.I.P.​
 
This is a difficult time for the Comair family. While I am not an official spokesperson I know that all of us thank all of you that have expressed condolences.

With the help of the Creator, "we shall overcome."

In accordance with your individual beliefs we solicit your spiritual help for the speedy recovery of our stricken brother.

Thank you,

Surplus1
 
The latest and greatest news is that the controller was looking away and doing administrative duties. It also was a violation of policy to only have one controller on duty at a time.
Now I do not know about you guys but one contoller should be able to handle the 6 average nightly operations and serve whatever radar obligations are called for. Plus, when you only have 6 departures during you 8 hour shifts, seems reasonable to think you can acutally watch them depart.
None of this relieves the crew from noticing they were on an unlite runway on the wrong magnetic heading. I do not know if Comair uses go around mode for departure or sets departure heading but command bars would have been looking a bit strange. They screwed up but the controller who could of saved the day by watching his 6th operation of the night sure could have served them better.
 
Publishers said:
I do not know if Comair uses go around mode for departure or sets departure heading but command bars would have been looking a bit strange.

They wouldn't have looked strange at all. They would be commanding wings level, regardless of where the heading bug was set.
 
The problem is at that time of the morning, all 6 of those departures are getting ready to go at the same time. That means other clearances and taxi instructions need to be issued in a relatively short time span. As for the command bars on takeoff, they go into TO/TO mode and will point straight ahead, even if you aren't aligned with the heading bug.
 
ReportCanoa said:
They wouldn't have looked strange at all. They would be commanding wings level, regardless of where the heading bug was set.

That must be different than ours. On the ERJ, the command bars would show a turn on the ground if the hdg bug was significantly off.
 
pianoman said:
That must be different than ours. On the ERJ, the command bars would show a turn on the ground if the hdg bug was significantly off.

When the TOGA buttons are pressed on the CRJ, the FD goes to TO/TO mode. That gives you 12 degrees of pitch and wings level on the FD until you select different modes on the FCP. TO/TO will normally be displayed until going to speed mode after gear up and heading/nav mode at 400 ft. The heading bug could be 90 degrees off and the FD will still show a wings level command on takeoff until hitting HDG mode at 400 ft.
 
acaTerry said:
...should've seen it before the contract...

Anyway, I think you STILL misread the jist of my points. Try reading them like a book, not a personal attack on your disagreement with me. Perhaps if you spent some time at the regionals recently you'd see the point I and the other guys are making.

My apologies if I've misunderstood. I'll read them again.

I have nothing but respect for regional pilots who do their job day in and out with vigilance in the cockpit, always keeping their head above the underlying morass of drawbacks, difficulties, and traps that are inherent in the job which is just routine enough to where complacency can be a huge issue. It's not the tupe of flying or lifestyle I'd choose.

Vigilance is the bedrock of safety. My type of flying actually promotes vigilance through the fact at least half the places we go are unfamiliar and remote, sub-standard conditions, facilities, and disseminated info are the norm, and the feeling that sometimes it seems that half the people are trying to kill me through language barrier misunderstandings, ignorance, or sheer incompetence. Drifting into complacency in this mine-field atmosphere would probably require being shot in the head, and at least it's not insidious.

For some reason vigilance broke down here in both crewmembers. It's axiomatic that fatigue is detrimental to vigilance, decision-making, and can be insidious. This thread meandered into a general discussion of fatigue based the early departure after it was known that it wan't a scheduled stand-up. But nobody here knows yet as to whether fatigue played a role.

Not one person here accepts the notion that just because the crew was FAA-mandated "legal" on a 24 hour scheduling look-back fatigue couldn't have contributed. Neither does the NTSB.

I've made my position clear on "rolling-reserve", about any 121 company that considers it a viable scheduling scheme when only a facade of "legal rest" is maintained while the reality of the scheme actually works against being able to sleep during "rest", and my opinion of Union leaders who accept this facade by not going to the mat during negotiations to banish it from scheduled ops. But that's a theoretical discussion because although possible, we don't know yet if this crew was caught up in that scenario. The investigation will tell.

I've also offered my opinion that if given a schedule that is NOT a facade, but actually allows REAL rest to occur, it is a pilot's responsibility to use that time as it was intended while off-duty to stave off fatigue. If those conditions are met, the mere time of day for departure won't automatically induce it. This crew may have been given the time, and done exactly that.

So it's pure speculation to assume that they WERE fatigued and therefore more succeptible to distractions, changed/confused/not-charted taxiways due to construction, and the other things people have pointed out and obviously this crew had to contend with, just because it was an early flight.

Perhaps "distractions" didn't play the center-stage role at all. Maybe this crew was rested, and furthermore dealt with those distractions...taxiways, construction, darkness, whatever... competently and with attention to detail, but still unfortunately made the critical mistake. "WHY" is the question it played out as it did, and we shouldn't assume this crew was overwhelmed.

Since nothing's ruled out yet, for all anyone here knows they could have been too-relaxed. It wouldn't be the first time, and all of us especially as our experience grows are aware how this experience can be a double-edged sword. If the forthcoming realities when they're revealed include some that seem harsh to us as pilots, we HAVE to face them because nothing is harsher than the event itself.

The gist and point of what I'm saying is we shouldn't make a speculative fatigue (or any other) assumption based soley on the departure time. Because if investigation shows that fatigue issues weren't contributing, maintaining this assumption would form an innacurate causal premise that prevents focusing on and trying to find the ACTUAL reasons vigilance broke down in this particular case.

As pilots, don't we want the actual reasons in order to learn from this event and not repeat it, even if it means not being able to whip our favorite gripes? To do less would be a disservice to our profession, to the ones who perished, and our profession.
 
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I see. That makes sense. Our TOGA buttons defaults the FD to pitch up (different degrees based on flap setting) and ROL (roll) mode. Our company's procedure is to select HDG mode after pushing the TOGA buttons before departure. I suppose if we didn't, our FD would behave the same way you're describing.
 
That is what I was asking. I believe that it depends on the various airlines procedures. Some people like to set the heading for the departure heading regardless of the runway heading. When you use the TO mode, they usually are showing straight and level regardless of heading selection.
I am not familiar with Comair or the aircraft, but there should have been some clues if they set the heading bug. They did notice the lights were not on. They were not totally unfamiliar with the airport and the airport was not that complicated. We can know a bunch of things but not what that guy was thinking when he taxied out to the wrong place.
 
Publishers said:
They were not totally unfamiliar with the airport and the airport was not that complicated.

Actually the north end of LEX is a little tricky, especially factoring in an inaccurate 10-9, a closed taxiway for construction, night conditions, and lighting systems out of service. Not saying that the pilots shouldn't have noticed the clues that they were not on the proper runway, but there was more involved than just making the wrong turn. Don't forget, other aircraft have made the same mistake in LEX, including another airliner some years ago.
 
PCL_128 said:
When the TOGA buttons are pressed on the CRJ, the FD goes to TO/TO mode. That gives you 12 degrees of pitch and wings level on the FD until you select different modes on the FCP. TO/TO will normally be displayed until going to speed mode after gear up and heading/nav mode at 400 ft. The heading bug could be 90 degrees off and the FD will still show a wings level command on takeoff until hitting HDG mode at 400 ft.

Don't know how different the FD is on the Dash compared to the CRJ, but on the ground we hit the GoAround button, it gives you a straight out with the same 12 degrees pitch. After hitting the ToGo button we hit ALT and HDG select and it match the heading bug........ I think that would have helped them.... But like I said, don't know much about the CRJ's FlightDirector or Comair's SOP's..
 
WSurf said:
Don't know how different the FD is on the Dash compared to the CRJ, but on the ground we hit the GoAround button, it gives you a straight out with the same 12 degrees pitch. After hitting the ToGo button we hit ALT and HDG select and it match the heading bug........ I think that would have helped them.... But like I said, don't know much about the CRJ's FlightDirector or Comair's SOP's..
What do you follow for pitch and roll guidance if you lose an engine?

The Flight Director on the CRJ is set to give you the proper pitch if you bag one so that you can follow it, rather than having it distract you by pitching further up, lower down, or commanding a turn you don't want to do when you want to fly straight out to 1,000' (or higher if non-standard) then clean up.

At many airports, the engine out heading is different than BOTH runway heading AND the normal tower-assigned departure heading, just to further complicat things. Which one are you going to pre-set at takeoff?

THAT'S why the TOGA switches give you that pitch and wings level command. Selecting something else as your company does would skew the flight director a different way than you'd really want it to go if you lost an engine which is, with no obstacles, straight ahead to clean-up altitude before makine a turn.
 
No the Dash gives you proper pitch! Its just that when we hit HDG select is gives us the correct runway heading! The PF sets it to Runway Heading and the PNF sets his to the Tower Assigned or SID departure....
 
WSurf said:
No the Dash gives you proper pitch! Its just that when we hit HDG select is gives us the correct runway heading! The PF sets it to Runway Heading and the PNF sets his to the Tower Assigned or SID departure....
Oh, I gotcha.

The CRJ doesn't have independent heading bugs. Both are slaved together and set by the FCP.
 

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