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AA Jamaica UPDATE: Jamaican Investigator claims poor landing

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" He was talking about the MDW accident, and he's right. "

I would beg to differ:

" The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

The pilots' failure to use available reverse thrust in a timely manner to safely slow or stop the airplane after landing, which resulted
in a runway overrun. This failure occurred because the pilots' first experience and lack of familiarity with the airplane's autobrake
system
distracted them from thrust reverser usage during the challenging landing....

...Also contributing to the accident was the pilots' failure to divert to another airport given reports that included poor braking action and a tailwind component greater than 5 knots. "

I don't believe we can call the above "textbook" performance.

Nor is landing halfway down a rain soaked runway with a tailwind.

Accident Chain:

- Halfway

- Rain soaked

- Tailwind

Remove anyone of these links/variables in the chain and our AA friends would be enjoying the New Year.

There , but for the Grace of God ( and a well timed Go-Around ) go you and I.


YKW
 
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Well- let's get off the side-bar and just remember every day that people's lives depend on how well we do our job-

Now back to AA- get off your captain trip and handfly more.
And realize that at an airline this big- one incident isn't an indictment of all pilots. But culture and leading by example could save a life.
 
Now that there is an official report looks like pilot error was the cause. Touching down 4100 ft down the runway is hard to explain.
 
How many of us have sat holding short at KLGA watching planes touch down all over the place. No consistent touch down zone. We're supposed to be professional pilots. Let's look in the mirror and ask ourselves if we are up to the task. I see 2-3000ft touchdowns everyday. This should not be.
 
Those are fighting words mother f###er!

I am a Southwest Airlines pilot. I think of Joshua Woods much more often than you do. That incident clearly showed braking actions that were less than reported, thrust reversers that were slow to deploy, and two pilots that flew a textbook approach and landing. They were unlucky.

Pull your lips off of the Corndog Koolaid firehose and deal with reality. Those guys screwed up before they even started the approach. Perfectly good working airplane and the braking action was reported POOR on half of a 6500' runway with a tailwind. Many airlines use this accident as training on what NOT to do. Your doing your passengers a disservice by not learning the lesson.

It should also be noted that Boeing persuaded the FAA to allow NG737 landing data to include the use of thrust reversers. The accident crew was unaware of this change (As was I and I was a 737 CA at the time) and thought that the reversers would give them an extra margin over their data.

:confused:What the hell are you talking about?!?:confused:
A 737 Captain should be looking at his performance manuals to determine what his aircraft is certified for and not be listening to whomever told you this nonsense.
 
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" He was talking about the MDW accident, and he's right. "

I would beg to differ:

" The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

The pilots' failure to use available reverse thrust in a timely manner to safely slow or stop the airplane after landing, which resulted
in a runway overrun. This failure occurred because the pilots' first experience and lack of familiarity with the airplane's autobrake
system
distracted them from thrust reverser usage during the challenging landing....

...Also contributing to the accident was the pilots' failure to divert to another airport given reports that included poor braking action and a tailwind component greater than 5 knots. "

I don't believe we can call the above "textbook" performance.

Nor is landing halfway down a rain soaked runway with a tailwind.

Accident Chain:

- Halfway

- Rain soaked

- Tailwind

Remove anyone of these links/variables in the chain and our AA friends would be enjoying the New Year.

There , but for the Grace of God ( and a well timed Go-Around ) go you and I.


YKW

Couldn't agree more!

I think landing with a tailwind at MDW was crazy and was a huge factor. But, most SW guys I've talked with say "well our PDC says we Can Do it".

I like the big picture thinking,

- tailwind

- short runway

- snow covered

Just Don't Do it.
 
Couldn't agree more!

I think landing with a tailwind at MDW was crazy and was a huge factor. But, most SW guys I've talked with say "well our PDC says we Can Do it".

I like the big picture thinking,

- tailwind

- short runway

- snow covered

Just Don't Do it.


Wow hows the view up there?

Karma is a bitch, good luck.
 
Midway Accident (that's right, accident, NOT incident...)

3.2 Probable Cause​
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of
this accident was the pilots’ failure to use available reverse thrust in a timely manner
to safely slow or stop the airplane after landing, which resulted in a runway overrun.​
This failure occurred because the pilots’ first experience and lack of familiarity with​
the airplane’s autobrake system distracted them from thrust reverser usage during the
challenging landing.​
Contributing to the accident were Southwest Airlines’ 1) failure to provide its​
pilots with clear and consistent guidance and training regarding company policies and​
procedures related to arrival landing distance calculations; 2) programming and design​
of its on board performance computer, which did not present inherent assumptions in the​
program critical to pilot decision-making; 3) plan to implement new autobrake procedures
without a familiarization period; and 4) failure to include a margin of safety in the arrival​
assessment to account for operational uncertainties. Also contributing to the accident was
the pilots’ failure to divert to another airport given reports that included poor braking
actions and a tailwind component greater than 5 knots. Contributing to the severity of the
accident was the absence of an engineering materials arresting system, which was needed​
because of the limited runway safety area beyond the departure end of runway 31C.
 
Couldn't agree more!

I think landing with a tailwind at MDW was crazy and was a huge factor. But, most SW guys I've talked with say "well our PDC says we Can Do it".

I like the big picture thinking,

- tailwind

- short runway

- snow covered

Just Don't Do it.


What's more safe -

1. Landing on a short, snow covered runway with a tailwind and 1500 feet of stopping margin?

or

2. Landing heavy into the wind on a dry runway with 200 feet of stopping margin?

Gup
 

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