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AA Jamaica UPDATE: Jamaican Investigator claims poor landing

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I'm sure Joshua Woods parents find that pretty funny....

Those are fighting words mother f###er!

I am a Southwest Airlines pilot. I think of Joshua Woods much more often than you do. That incident clearly showed braking actions that were less than reported, thrust reversers that were slow to deploy, and two pilots that flew a textbook approach and landing. They were unlucky.

I was trying to give a laugh to those who have been very quick to hurl a dart at Southwest in the past for taxi speeds and our Burbank over-run.

I'm usually a pretty laid back dude but I'd gladly give you a chance to repeat your quip to my face.

Gup
 
As a ball park figure I see most pilots float about 500 feet for each 5 kts of tailwind (normal flare technique). So assuming they got caught by a 15kt gust component at flare thats about 1500 feet. So if you aim for the 1500 ft mark thats 3000 ft downfield. Thrown in night, rain, and gusts... 4000 ft downfield is not unbelievable to me. I'm sure they recognized they were long and immediately got on the brakes, well beyond auto 3 (which for non-737 guys, behaves like something above normal braking). I suspect the anti-skid kicked in on the wet, rubbery surface towards the end of the runway, and the rest is history. I am only on my second year of carribean flying experience, and I hope to learn from this accident, best of luck to AA and the pilots.
 
this incident as generated some hangar discussion at my place, as a result, can anyone post the "official" FAA/NTSB/NASA/ALPA/ETC "endorsed" criteria for go-arounds, etc?

I recall you should land on the first third of the runway, however I personally try to physically land on top of the 1000 foot markers, but at 10:40 PM at night I can't dig up any official guidance.

thanks
 
this incident as generated some hangar discussion at my place, as a result, can anyone post the "official" FAA/NTSB/NASA/ALPA/ETC "endorsed" criteria for go-arounds, etc?

I recall you should land on the first third of the runway, however I personally try to physically land on top of the 1000 foot markers, but at 10:40 PM at night I can't dig up any official guidance.

thanks

http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/864.pdf

Good stuff here, too:

http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/922.pdf
 
Those are fighting words mother f###er!

I am a Southwest Airlines pilot. I think of Joshua Woods much more often than you do. That incident clearly showed braking actions that were less than reported, thrust reversers that were slow to deploy, and two pilots that flew a textbook approach and landing. They were unlucky.

I was trying to give a laugh to those who have been very quick to hurl a dart at Southwest in the past for taxi speeds and our Burbank over-run.

I'm usually a pretty laid back dude but I'd gladly give you a chance to repeat your quip to my face.

Gup

It should also be noted that Boeing persuaded the FAA to allow NG737 landing data to include the use of thrust reversers. The accident crew was unaware of this change (As was I and I was a 737 CA at the time) and thought that the reversers would give them an extra margin over their data.

I am all for calling a spade a spade but for my money one of the primary drivers of this accident is that the landing performance data was changed for the NG737 and the crew was not aware.

When the FAA decides to change shjt like this they need to have a big red placard installed on the panel that says "THIS AIRPLANE'S LANDING DATA INCLUDES THE USE OF THRUST REVERSERS UNLIKE EVERY OTHER JET ON THE PLANET!" Instead it was probably a footnote on some B.S. distance learning module.
 
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This is the third time American has been placed on double secret probation for having three incidents or accidents in a row.

I have friends over there and have never believed the B.S. about one group being "the best" but I have always wondered WTF goes on over there.
 
How much time does the most junior FO have on the job? I mean we (in theory) should be talking about some pretty senior crews up front in AA cockpits.

Little Rock was a senior management pilot plus a new rookie, not the ideal CRM formula.

But today? I doubt that pairing is still happening.
 
This statement is in no way a comment on the accident in question, but is intended as a review for 737 drivers: To select max autobrakes, you have to pull the knob out as you turn it to the right. For the other selections, you don't have to pull it out. I've seen more than one pilot get confused when you can't turn the knob all the way to max. You have to pull it out first and I don't believe there is a placard for that.
 
In addition to tailwind flare issues- they probably had a signicant ref + target speed- which means you have to fly the mains to the ground- a normal flare can have you floating for a while.

AA is very much a captain's airline. Unempowered FOs are not good safety wise.
I've already talked about their dependency on automation. It's a number of factors- they ought to address them- but I'm like the poster above- I don't wish trumped up Feds on any airline.
 

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