AA Jamaica UPDATE: Jamaican Investigator claims poor landing

[GuppyWN]

I'm sure Joshua Woods parents find that pretty funny....

Those are fighting words mother f###er!

I am a Southwest Airlines pilot. I think of Joshua Woods much more often than you do. That incident clearly showed braking actions that were less than reported, thrust reversers that were slow to deploy, and two pilots that flew a textbook approach and landing. They were unlucky.

I was trying to give a laugh to those who have been very quick to hurl a dart at Southwest in the past for taxi speeds and our Burbank over-run.

I'm usually a pretty laid back dude but I'd gladly give you a chance to repeat your quip to my face.

Gup

 

[humveedriver]

As a ball park figure I see most pilots float about 500 feet for each 5 kts of tailwind (normal flare technique). So assuming they got caught by a 15kt gust component at flare thats about 1500 feet. So if you aim for the 1500 ft mark thats 3000 ft downfield. Thrown in night, rain, and gusts... 4000 ft downfield is not unbelievable to me. I'm sure they recognized they were long and immediately got on the brakes, well beyond auto 3 (which for non-737 guys, behaves like something above normal braking). I suspect the anti-skid kicked in on the wet, rubbery surface towards the end of the runway, and the rest is history. I am only on my second year of carribean flying experience, and I hope to learn from this accident, best of luck to AA and the pilots.

 

[satpak77]

this incident as generated some hangar discussion at my place, as a result, can anyone post the "official" FAA/NTSB/NASA/ALPA/ETC "endorsed" criteria for go-arounds, etc?

I recall you should land on the first third of the runway, however I personally try to physically land on top of the 1000 foot markers, but at 10:40 PM at night I can't dig up any official guidance.

thanks

 

[ImbracableCrunk]

this incident as generated some hangar discussion at my place, as a result, can anyone post the "official" FAA/NTSB/NASA/ALPA/ETC "endorsed" criteria for go-arounds, etc?

I recall you should land on the first third of the runway, however I personally try to physically land on top of the 1000 foot markers, but at 10:40 PM at night I can't dig up any official guidance.

thanks

http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/864.pdf

Good stuff here, too:

http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/922.pdf

 

[Remington]

Most accidents at the majors happen when the PIC is flying.

 

[ableone]

Those are fighting words mother f###er!

I am a Southwest Airlines pilot. I think of Joshua Woods much more often than you do. That incident clearly showed braking actions that were less than reported, thrust reversers that were slow to deploy, and two pilots that flew a textbook approach and landing. They were unlucky.

I was trying to give a laugh to those who have been very quick to hurl a dart at Southwest in the past for taxi speeds and our Burbank over-run.

I'm usually a pretty laid back dude but I'd gladly give you a chance to repeat your quip to my face.

Gup

It should also be noted that Boeing persuaded the FAA to allow NG737 landing data to include the use of thrust reversers. The accident crew was unaware of this change (As was I and I was a 737 CA at the time) and thought that the reversers would give them an extra margin over their data.

I am all for calling a spade a spade but for my money one of the primary drivers of this accident is that the landing performance data was changed for the NG737 and the crew was not aware.

When the FAA decides to change shjt like this they need to have a big red placard installed on the panel that says "THIS AIRPLANE'S LANDING DATA INCLUDES THE USE OF THRUST REVERSERS UNLIKE EVERY OTHER JET ON THE PLANET!" Instead it was probably a footnote on some B.S. distance learning module.

 

[ableone]

This is the third time American has been placed on double secret probation for having three incidents or accidents in a row.

I have friends over there and have never believed the B.S. about one group being "the best" but I have always wondered WTF goes on over there.

 

[satpak77]

How much time does the most junior FO have on the job? I mean we (in theory) should be talking about some pretty senior crews up front in AA cockpits.

Little Rock was a senior management pilot plus a new rookie, not the ideal CRM formula.

But today? I doubt that pairing is still happening.

 

[Singlecoil]

This statement is in no way a comment on the accident in question, but is intended as a review for 737 drivers: To select max autobrakes, you have to pull the knob out as you turn it to the right. For the other selections, you don't have to pull it out. I've seen more than one pilot get confused when you can't turn the knob all the way to max. You have to pull it out first and I don't believe there is a placard for that.

 

[waveflyer]

In addition to tailwind flare issues- they probably had a signicant ref + target speed- which means you have to fly the mains to the ground- a normal flare can have you floating for a while.

AA is very much a captain's airline. Unempowered FOs are not good safety wise.
I've already talked about their dependency on automation. It's a number of factors- they ought to address them- but I'm like the poster above- I don't wish trumped up Feds on any airline.

 

[booo]

Those are fighting words mother f###er!

I am a Southwest Airlines pilot. I think of Joshua Woods much more often than you do. That incident clearly showed braking actions that were less than reported, thrust reversers that were slow to deploy, and two pilots that flew a textbook approach and landing. They were unlucky.

I was trying to give a laugh to those who have been very quick to hurl a dart at Southwest in the past for taxi speeds and our Burbank over-run.

I'm usually a pretty laid back dude but I'd gladly give you a chance to repeat your quip to my face.

Gup

Textbook?
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?id=DCA06MA009&rpt=fi

Nope!

Guppy. grow a pair!

 

[Metrojet]

Those are fighting words mother f###er!

I am a Southwest Airlines pilot. I think of Joshua Woods much more often than you do. That incident clearly showed braking actions that were less than reported, thrust reversers that were slow to deploy, and two pilots that flew a textbook approach and landing. They were unlucky.

I was trying to give a laugh to those who have been very quick to hurl a dart at Southwest in the past for taxi speeds and our Burbank over-run.

I'm usually a pretty laid back dude but I'd gladly give you a chance to repeat your quip to my face.

Gup

Hi Gup:

No offense - but are you really saying that the crew in the BUR incident flew a textbook approach? I , like many here have read the report and I must have missed the comments about a "textbook approach".

I know your earlier comments were meant to get a laugh, and nothing more. But at the end of the day - if your approach is stable by 1000', then 99.999999 percent of the time will result in a normal landing - thats all I am saying.

Metrojet

 

[bubbers44]

Most accidents at the majors happen when the PIC is flying.

Probably because a lot of airlines require the captain to land if conditions are not ideal. Making approaches close to minimums or winds beyond a certain limit or special airports make it the captains landing.

 

[GogglesPisano]

touchdown usually occurs at 1,500 feet, or between 1,000 and 1,500 feet [down an 8,900-foot airstrip]," Derby said. "Why this aircraft touched down at 4,100 feet is something that we are investigating very carefully in order to determine what the cause might be."

... Lt Derby then nadded, "Monn."

 

[STL717]

Those are fighting words mother f###er!

I am a Southwest Airlines pilot. I think of Joshua Woods much more often than you do. That incident clearly showed braking actions that were less than reported, thrust reversers that were slow to deploy, and two pilots that flew a textbook approach and landing. They were unlucky.

I was trying to give a laugh to those who have been very quick to hurl a dart at Southwest in the past for taxi speeds and our Burbank over-run.

I'm usually a pretty laid back dude but I'd gladly give you a chance to repeat your quip to my face.

Gup

Guppy,
I wouldn’t get too upset if I were you.

There are still many southwest pilots doing things that can make a landing “unlucky”. By the way, your passengers did not buy a “chance”.

Years after the Southwest Airlines MDW accident I was inbound to MDW and an ILS to 31C with winds out of the southwest and the runway was wet. Numerous Southwest flights were landing on 31C.

My landing data showed the tailwind and wet runway would make landing on 31C unsafe. We alerted approach that we were unable to land on 31C.

Approach immediately said to expect 13C. All the Southwest flights that had been inbound to 31C advised they too could not accept 31C.

Why did all those Southwest flights reject 31C after I refused the runway?

 

[wild bill kelso]

No one has said anything about the crappy windshield wipers on the 737. During heavy rain they can't keep up are completely useless. I always keep rainex wipes in my flight bag.

 

[SuperFLUF]

No one has said anything about the crappy windshield wipers on the 737. During heavy rain they can't keep up are completely useless. I always keep rainex wipes in my flight bag.

This was discussed on the original thread about the accident. Its my guess that the horrible vis in a 737 during hvy rain certainly could have been a factor in why they landed long (and may not have known it).

Its my understanding that the feds don't look kindly upon pilots applying rainx to aircraft windsheilds. At CAL we can call mx and have them apply it.

 

[ImbracableCrunk]

The PIC was PF and probably using the HUD - or at least he put it down at some point.

I'm not in the left seat - how much would a HUD help or hinder touchdown accuracy? How about HUD vs rain? Which mode?

How about this: How do AA pilots on the 737 check landing performance?

Thanks.

 

[Mach 80]

If you stick with the information the HUD gives you and do exactly what it says, you can theoritically land in zero zero right on the touchdown zone on speed, on centerline. Turbulence from a thunderstorm and the distraction of visually looking "thru" the HUD (or HGS) for the runway can cause a huge distraction however.

 

[Skyboy722]

Hi Gup:

No offense - but are you really saying that the crew in the BUR incident flew a textbook approach? I , like many here have read the report and I must have missed the comments about a "textbook approach".



Metrojet

He was talking about the MDW accident, and he's right.

And no, BUR was not not even close to a textbook approach. It was even off the "unstable approach" chart.

 

[satpak77]

http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/864.pdf

Good stuff here, too:

http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/922.pdf

awesome, thanks. I "knew it all along" but its been many moons since I saw it in print, never a bad idea to review that stuff !

thanks again

 

[Whine Lover]

" He was talking about the MDW accident, and he's right. "

I would beg to differ:

" The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

The pilots' failure to use available reverse thrust in a timely manner to safely slow or stop the airplane after landing, which resulted
in a runway overrun. This failure occurred because the pilots' first experience and lack of familiarity with the airplane's autobrake
system distracted them from thrust reverser usage during the challenging landing....

...Also contributing to the accident was the pilots' failure to divert to another airport given reports that included poor braking action and a tailwind component greater than 5 knots. "

I don't believe we can call the above "textbook" performance.

Nor is landing halfway down a rain soaked runway with a tailwind.

Accident Chain:

- Halfway

- Rain soaked

- Tailwind

Remove anyone of these links/variables in the chain and our AA friends would be enjoying the New Year.

There , but for the Grace of God ( and a well timed Go-Around ) go you and I.


YKW

 

[waveflyer]

Well- let's get off the side-bar and just remember every day that people's lives depend on how well we do our job-

Now back to AA- get off your captain trip and handfly more.
And realize that at an airline this big- one incident isn't an indictment of all pilots. But culture and leading by example could save a life.

 

[bubbers44]

Now that there is an official report looks like pilot error was the cause. Touching down 4100 ft down the runway is hard to explain.

 

[Mickey]

How many of us have sat holding short at KLGA watching planes touch down all over the place. No consistent touch down zone. We're supposed to be professional pilots. Let's look in the mirror and ask ourselves if we are up to the task. I see 2-3000ft touchdowns everyday. This should not be.

 

[Hamburger]

Those are fighting words mother f###er!

I am a Southwest Airlines pilot. I think of Joshua Woods much more often than you do. That incident clearly showed braking actions that were less than reported, thrust reversers that were slow to deploy, and two pilots that flew a textbook approach and landing. They were unlucky.

Pull your lips off of the Corndog Koolaid firehose and deal with reality. Those guys screwed up before they even started the approach. Perfectly good working airplane and the braking action was reported POOR on half of a 6500' runway with a tailwind. Many airlines use this accident as training on what NOT to do. Your doing your passengers a disservice by not learning the lesson.

It should also be noted that Boeing persuaded the FAA to allow NG737 landing data to include the use of thrust reversers. The accident crew was unaware of this change (As was I and I was a 737 CA at the time) and thought that the reversers would give them an extra margin over their data.

What the hell are you talking about?!?
A 737 Captain should be looking at his performance manuals to determine what his aircraft is certified for and not be listening to whomever told you this nonsense.

 

[G. Costanza]

" He was talking about the MDW accident, and he's right. "

I would beg to differ:

" The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

The pilots' failure to use available reverse thrust in a timely manner to safely slow or stop the airplane after landing, which resulted
in a runway overrun. This failure occurred because the pilots' first experience and lack of familiarity with the airplane's autobrake
system distracted them from thrust reverser usage during the challenging landing....

...Also contributing to the accident was the pilots' failure to divert to another airport given reports that included poor braking action and a tailwind component greater than 5 knots. "

I don't believe we can call the above "textbook" performance.

Nor is landing halfway down a rain soaked runway with a tailwind.

Accident Chain:

- Halfway

- Rain soaked

- Tailwind

Remove anyone of these links/variables in the chain and our AA friends would be enjoying the New Year.

There , but for the Grace of God ( and a well timed Go-Around ) go you and I.


YKW

Couldn't agree more!

I think landing with a tailwind at MDW was crazy and was a huge factor. But, most SW guys I've talked with say "well our PDC says we Can Do it".

I like the big picture thinking,

- tailwind

- short runway

- snow covered

Just Don't Do it.

 

[slaquer5]

Couldn't agree more!

I think landing with a tailwind at MDW was crazy and was a huge factor. But, most SW guys I've talked with say "well our PDC says we Can Do it".

I like the big picture thinking,

- tailwind

- short runway

- snow covered

Just Don't Do it.

Wow hows the view up there?

Karma is a bitch, good luck.

 

[Dieterly]

Midway Accident (that's right, accident, NOT incident...)

3.2 Probable Cause​

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of
this accident was the pilots’ failure to use available reverse thrust in a timely manner
to safely slow or stop the airplane after landing, which resulted in a runway overrun.​

This failure occurred because the pilots’ first experience and lack of familiarity with​

the airplane’s autobrake system distracted them from thrust reverser usage during the
challenging landing.​

Contributing to the accident were Southwest Airlines’ 1) failure to provide its​

pilots with clear and consistent guidance and training regarding company policies and​

procedures related to arrival landing distance calculations; 2) programming and design​

of its on board performance computer, which did not present inherent assumptions in the​

program critical to pilot decision-making; 3) plan to implement new autobrake procedures
without a familiarization period; and 4) failure to include a margin of safety in the arrival​

assessment to account for operational uncertainties. Also contributing to the accident was
the pilots’ failure to divert to another airport given reports that included poor braking
actions and a tailwind component greater than 5 knots. Contributing to the severity of the
accident was the absence of an engineering materials arresting system, which was needed​

because of the limited runway safety area beyond the departure end of runway 31C.

 

[GuppyWN]

Couldn't agree more!

I think landing with a tailwind at MDW was crazy and was a huge factor. But, most SW guys I've talked with say "well our PDC says we Can Do it".

I like the big picture thinking,

- tailwind

- short runway

- snow covered

Just Don't Do it.

What's more safe -

1. Landing on a short, snow covered runway with a tailwind and 1500 feet of stopping margin?

or

2. Landing heavy into the wind on a dry runway with 200 feet of stopping margin?

Gup