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AA Jamaica UPDATE: Jamaican Investigator claims poor landing

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Seems uncannily similar to what happened in Sao Paulo, Congonhas airport 3 years ago. Only in this case, nobody died. Lucky for them there wasn't a maint. hangar at the end of the runway.
 
I'm sure Joshua Woods parents find that pretty funny....

Get a grip, I'm sure he's referring to the speeds they taxi at. (tounge-in-cheek)
The loss of that child was tragic, but is there an airline that's been around for as long as SWA that hasn't had an overrun?
 
Latest report;

Air Traffic Control offered a circling approach to runway 30 in order to land in a headwind, the crew however declined and elected to land on runway 12 with a tailwind of 14 knots. The captain was pilot flying and used a head up display during the approach. ATC advised, that the runway was wet.

The crew gained visual contact with the runway between 1000 and 700 feet AGL and were not concerned at all with the approach. The aircraft was slightly below maximum landing weight.

The airplane touched down about 4000 feet (1220 meters) down the 8900 feet (2713 meters) long runway 12 at 162 knots ground speed (148 KIAS) in heavy rain and gusting winds and bounced before settling on the runway. Autobrakes engaged, the spoilers extended, the airplane decelerated according to an autobrakes 3 settings, the crew felt however the airplane did not decelerate and applied maximum manual braking. The airplane overran the end of the runway at a ground speed of 63 knots.

The flight data recorder indicated no anomalies with the brakes, spoilers or thrust reversers. The data indicate, deceleration was normal for a wet runway. No mechanical problems with the aircraft have been identified so far.

The ground based equipment (ILS) was checked by a check aircraft and was found working normally.

The investigation still tries to determine why the airplane landed long. Analysis of cockpit voice and flight data recorders is still ongoing. The investigation also focusses on the actual weather at the time of the accident, runway friction tests have been scheduled to start Jan 6th. Tyres, brakes and several other parts are being sent to the US for closer examination, the wreckage will also be moved to the US into a NTSB hangar though remaining under control of the Jamaican CAA.
 
may have landed at 148 kts but what was the speed when they started the flare. may have taken them half a runway to slow to 148
 
3 "incidents" / accidents in less than a month!? AA drug a wing tip in Charlotte then this crash in Jamaica then another wing tip stike on Christmas Eve - what's going on at AA?! GOD bless the guys on this flight if they landed long, the FAA is on the war path.
 
If you miss the marker by that much knowing you accepted a tailwind....well, you shouldve known somethign wasnt right.

how feasible would it have been to go around at this juncture? wasnt this at least a possiblity especially given the condtions (gusty, rainy, non-grooved, etc.) ??
 
3 "incidents" / accidents in less than a month!? AA drug a wing tip in Charlotte then this crash in Jamaica then another wing tip stike on Christmas Eve - what's going on at AA?! GOD bless the guys on this flight if they landed long, the FAA is on the war path.

when it rains, it pours.... AA is not the first airline this happens to, and won't be the last. All airlines go through crappy statistic cycles. AA's just happen to be in the last 10 years. believe me, it hits home as an employee to have to read about it.
 
It would have been possible to institute a balked landing if the Thrust Reversers weren't deployed yet I believe..

The Jamacian final report will be released after the afternoon fat spliff has been passed.
 
I'm sure Joshua Woods parents find that pretty funny....

Those are fighting words mother f###er!

I am a Southwest Airlines pilot. I think of Joshua Woods much more often than you do. That incident clearly showed braking actions that were less than reported, thrust reversers that were slow to deploy, and two pilots that flew a textbook approach and landing. They were unlucky.

I was trying to give a laugh to those who have been very quick to hurl a dart at Southwest in the past for taxi speeds and our Burbank over-run.

I'm usually a pretty laid back dude but I'd gladly give you a chance to repeat your quip to my face.

Gup
 
As a ball park figure I see most pilots float about 500 feet for each 5 kts of tailwind (normal flare technique). So assuming they got caught by a 15kt gust component at flare thats about 1500 feet. So if you aim for the 1500 ft mark thats 3000 ft downfield. Thrown in night, rain, and gusts... 4000 ft downfield is not unbelievable to me. I'm sure they recognized they were long and immediately got on the brakes, well beyond auto 3 (which for non-737 guys, behaves like something above normal braking). I suspect the anti-skid kicked in on the wet, rubbery surface towards the end of the runway, and the rest is history. I am only on my second year of carribean flying experience, and I hope to learn from this accident, best of luck to AA and the pilots.
 
this incident as generated some hangar discussion at my place, as a result, can anyone post the "official" FAA/NTSB/NASA/ALPA/ETC "endorsed" criteria for go-arounds, etc?

I recall you should land on the first third of the runway, however I personally try to physically land on top of the 1000 foot markers, but at 10:40 PM at night I can't dig up any official guidance.

thanks
 
this incident as generated some hangar discussion at my place, as a result, can anyone post the "official" FAA/NTSB/NASA/ALPA/ETC "endorsed" criteria for go-arounds, etc?

I recall you should land on the first third of the runway, however I personally try to physically land on top of the 1000 foot markers, but at 10:40 PM at night I can't dig up any official guidance.

thanks

http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/864.pdf

Good stuff here, too:

http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/922.pdf
 
Those are fighting words mother f###er!

I am a Southwest Airlines pilot. I think of Joshua Woods much more often than you do. That incident clearly showed braking actions that were less than reported, thrust reversers that were slow to deploy, and two pilots that flew a textbook approach and landing. They were unlucky.

I was trying to give a laugh to those who have been very quick to hurl a dart at Southwest in the past for taxi speeds and our Burbank over-run.

I'm usually a pretty laid back dude but I'd gladly give you a chance to repeat your quip to my face.

Gup

It should also be noted that Boeing persuaded the FAA to allow NG737 landing data to include the use of thrust reversers. The accident crew was unaware of this change (As was I and I was a 737 CA at the time) and thought that the reversers would give them an extra margin over their data.

I am all for calling a spade a spade but for my money one of the primary drivers of this accident is that the landing performance data was changed for the NG737 and the crew was not aware.

When the FAA decides to change shjt like this they need to have a big red placard installed on the panel that says "THIS AIRPLANE'S LANDING DATA INCLUDES THE USE OF THRUST REVERSERS UNLIKE EVERY OTHER JET ON THE PLANET!" Instead it was probably a footnote on some B.S. distance learning module.
 
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This is the third time American has been placed on double secret probation for having three incidents or accidents in a row.

I have friends over there and have never believed the B.S. about one group being "the best" but I have always wondered WTF goes on over there.
 
How much time does the most junior FO have on the job? I mean we (in theory) should be talking about some pretty senior crews up front in AA cockpits.

Little Rock was a senior management pilot plus a new rookie, not the ideal CRM formula.

But today? I doubt that pairing is still happening.
 
This statement is in no way a comment on the accident in question, but is intended as a review for 737 drivers: To select max autobrakes, you have to pull the knob out as you turn it to the right. For the other selections, you don't have to pull it out. I've seen more than one pilot get confused when you can't turn the knob all the way to max. You have to pull it out first and I don't believe there is a placard for that.
 
In addition to tailwind flare issues- they probably had a signicant ref + target speed- which means you have to fly the mains to the ground- a normal flare can have you floating for a while.

AA is very much a captain's airline. Unempowered FOs are not good safety wise.
I've already talked about their dependency on automation. It's a number of factors- they ought to address them- but I'm like the poster above- I don't wish trumped up Feds on any airline.
 

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