80 kt call out

[say again]

Great responses. The 80kt call is a hi/low speed abort number, airspeed comparison and engine check all in one. Abort criteria I use; anything before 80, after 80 it's for engine failure, fire, loss of DC, TR deployment. If we hear a bang and suspect tire failure, we continue as long as DC is maintained.

 

[Pickle]

Lots of good info out there, just google "80 knots high speed rejected takeoff" and click to your heart's content.

As I recall from the 737-800 I (and Hal) flew, from 84 knots to 6 seconds after lift off (IIRC) all AMBER caution messages were disabled, and only RED emergency messages would illuminate in the "high speed abort" regime.

I have seen crews (in the HS125 sim) brief the whole "anything before 80, and only fire, engine failure, loss of directional control after 80 to V1" reject AFTER 80 knots for, in addition to the aforementioned items:

1) they forgot to send the speeds (PL21 Hawker)
2) PFD or MFD failure, on either the PF or PM side
3) absolutely nothing.

This tells me one of two things. Either people are spring loaded to abort only in the sim, or they are spring loaded to abort all the time.

As was originally brought up by X-rated, and discussed by many, I too subscribe to the "any fire" philosophy after 80 knots but I will concede that there are indeed 2 sides to this coin.

 

[Pickle]

FWIW have you done the EVAS/smoke generator drill in the BBD-700? I know Wilmington FSI will do this for a modest fee. We have all done it and its a very good exercise, probably the best 20mins I ever spent in a simulator. Very enlightening....and I agree, a fast developing fire is nothing I ever want to have to deal with.

I've done EVAS/smoke in the Hawker sim and even though I knew it was coming I almost pooped my pants.

Maybe I'm just a wuss though.

 

[X-rated]

G200,

Actually, your briefing and mine are pretty much identical with the exception of the TRs. (It's not a Bombardier SOP) I don't actually say "any" fire because we too follow SOP's, and I believe it would be redundant anyway. I simply wrote "any" for effect.

You do bring up a good point though. It's important that we as crews understand what we mean when we brief "fire." I grant you the most likely fire on takeoff roll would be an engine fire. However, if I saw smoke, sparks or flame coming from under the instrument panel, or the other pilot called fire, or I heard the flight attendant yell fire, I would abort anytime before V1. I never said I would stop for unusual smells after 80kts, and I would seriously hope it would be obvious that I don't think that would be a good idea.

It's interesting that my initial post to Boiler suggested that he consider dropping the "engine" from "engine fire" which would make his briefing closer to yours and mine. However, your understanding of what we each mean is aligned with Boiler. There's probably a CRM lesson there somewhere.

I have not been to FSI for the GLEX. So far we have been training with CAE, but we may very well try FSI next time. If we do, I'll take your recommendation and request the smoke generator/hood training.

X

 

[Gulfstream 200]

That all makes sense to me!.....thanks.

 

[rice]

So I haven't heard one word about BFL or TODA in this entire discussion. Couple that with the Boeing data which I believe is ancient (lots of brake technology improvements since the 80's) and we have a new can of worms.
Lets say V1 is 116 and BFL is 4650' but the TODA is 7800'. The PF's PDU goes dark at 90 kts and the bell starts ringing. Would the wise choice be to abort/reject or say "you've got the controls" to the PNF who's attention has been split btwn in/outside?
Happened to me in my last recurrent. Guy passes control a split second before the triple chime, I abort (no problem) and when were stopped he looks at me like WTF?
Point is the 80 kt decision to abort or not is situational and I believe it has become one of those deals where it's taken on a life of it's own.
We typically land at speeds much faster than 80 kts and often faster than V1 and it's rarely a big deal. If there's sufficient runway available I'm keeping it on the ground unless I can instantly determine that it's an insignificant CAS message.

 

[svcta]

So your reject items and conditions are a moving target...for you and the guy sitting next to you.

I certainly understand the temptation to do this, but the idea for me is that both pilots should know every time by cold, hard rote memory what the reject items are and where the cutoffs are. Ther should be very few, if any, conditional gates for the thought process to pass through before the call is made. Besides, even under hard, IFR, what's the big deal with losing a display? I've spent plenty of time flying in one seat with the instruments on the other side of the cockpit. Far from an emergency, and an RTO is, in the eyes of the FAA essentially an emergency maneuver.

 

[sqh777]

I am new to the turbojet world, and I have captains that brief the 80kt call out and others that don't because we are not taught this in training. Recently a captain that doesnt brief the 80 kt call out had this very discussion. The example he gave me was you brief the 80 kt call out and hit the high spots(as brought up before). What happens if you have total electrical failure? To take it a step farther, it's low ifr, what do you do now? It wasn't briefed that you would abort for this. Would you stop or go? I should note that the 80 kt call out in our company sop is the "airspeed alive cross check no faults" call. It is just confusing to someone new to jet.

 

[svcta]

We can throw out hypotheticals all day, the fact is that every brief cannot cover every possible contingency. It is a game of playing the odds and there are, according to Boeing, Airbus, and the FAA only a few items that are worth gaming an RTO over. The data (science) on the subject is pretty clear. Most of us seem to include the giant caveat "Perception that the airplane is unsafe (or will not) fly"

Your captain's total electrical failure scenario is swell, except what total electrical failure leaves you with no standby instruments in a jet? Okay, in an airliner, at least. And did this complete electrical failure leave our anti-skid intact? 'Cause now we may very well abort our way in to a real emergency (no tires). I have never flown a jet that didn't have a standby instrument or two that were battery powered. I would contend, given the scenario here on paper, that we could continue the t/o, carry on to out t/o alternate on the standbys, and execute a thoroughly planned, briefed and uneventful approach....after we ran the QRH for the problem...and may just fix it.

You can see that there are varying opinions and a case to me bade in either way, but I just haven't seen enough evidence yet to leave the side of the bulk of the manufacturers and the FAA. Besides, doing it their way keeps me from thinking myself in to a ditch somewhere. Always a good thing.

 

[pilotyip]

We can throw out hypotheticals all day, the fact is that every brief cannot cover every possible contingency. It is a game of playing the odds and there are, according to Boeing, Airbus, and the FAA only a few items that are worth gaming an RTO over. The data (science) on the subject is pretty clear. Most of us seem to include the giant caveat "Perception that the airplane is unsafe (or will not) fly"

Your captain's total electrical failure scenario is swell, except what total electrical failure leaves you with no standby instruments in a jet? Okay, in an airliner, at least. And did this complete electrical failure leave our anti-skid intact? 'Cause now we may very well abort our way in to a real emergency (no tires). I have never flown a jet that didn't have a standby instrument or two that were battery powered. I would contend, given the scenario here on paper, that we could continue the t/o, carry on to out t/o alternate on the standbys, and execute a thoroughly planned, briefed and uneventful approach....after we ran the QRH for the problem...and may just fix it.

You can see that there are varying opinions and a case to me bade in either way, but I just haven't seen enough evidence yet to leave the side of the bulk of the manufacturers and the FAA. Besides, doing it their way keeps me from thinking myself in to a ditch somewhere. Always a good thing.

Pilots tend to play the "What if" game into the nth degree. I mean “What if” 8 goats crossed the runway and were sucked into both engines after 80 kts, would it be OK to continue the take off?

 

[rice]

So your reject items and conditions are a moving target...for you and the guy sitting next to you.

I certainly understand the temptation to do this, but the idea for me is that both pilots should know every time by cold, hard rote memory what the reject items are and where the cutoffs are. Ther should be very few, if any, conditional gates for the thought process to pass through before the call is made. Besides, even under hard, IFR, what's the big deal with losing a display? I've spent plenty of time flying in one seat with the instruments on the other side of the cockpit. Far from an emergency, and an RTO is, in the eyes of the FAA essentially an emergency maneuver.

Nice condescending attitude in your post.
Where did I ever say our reject items are a moving target?
Our procedure is that anyone can call abort prior to V1 (this was relatively new). We are both typed and very experienced and always fly together.
However the point of the post was that runway available was more than 50% longer than the calculated BFL and the event happened well below V1.

Everything we do in aviation is conditional which is why we ALWAYS brief for the situation. What are you going to do when presented with a situation that is not covered by your "cold, hard rote memory" reject items?
Do you always brief for a runway incursion after 80kts? It's happened.
Is your night IFR contaminated runway brief the same as day VFR dry runway brief?

You might want to experience one of those unique and unusual events in the sim before you go passing judgement.

 

[earhart]

Pilots tend to play the "What if" game into the nth degree. I mean “What if” 8 goats crossed the runway and were sucked into both engines after 80 kts, would it be OK to continue the take off?

I have experienced the "what if." Checklists. POH, "what did that sim instructor say in '92? BULL********************!

I scared the living ******************** out of myself and my co-pilot with MY decision- we were right. I hope that you all have more time than i for your intellectual discussions (than I did....)

 

[gern_blanston]

... both pilots should know every time by cold, hard rote memory what the reject items are and where the cutoffs are.

That's a bad attitude to have if you're flying a jet. Just sayin'.

 

[earhart]

That's a bad attitude to have if you're flying a jet. Just sayin'.

I agree.

 

[AdlerDriver]

It's crucial that the T/O brief clearly states that either pilot can call an abort. No PIC should ever reserve the abort decision to him/herself.

From my experience(only 121/mil), this is NOT the norm. Every company I've worked for has made it clear that there is only one PIC when it comes to a reject. It's his call...... period. The F/O can call out any condition that he feels might warrant the Captain's attention, but the Captain is going to make the reject call.

There is way too much variation in experience in the right seat of a 121 bird to give the F/O the option to just grab a handful of throttles and reject anytime he feels the need.

Maybe your perspective is the result of flying in a small corporate setting with highly experienced pilots that fly together all the time and swap seats every leg. Maybe the "anyone can reject" option works there but it really wouldn't be an option at most airlines.