80 kt call out

[svcta]

My experience with the 80 kt call was in line with most of what has been written here, until about a yr ago, which is when I left the corporate world to return to a major airline.

The whole abort decision is and has been a bit of a hot button system wide at this carrier and I have been in the sim and seen my training partner initiate an abort at approx 100 kts for 2 of 6 efis tubes going black. I would have done the same thing. Well, that was not satisfactory, and it was not consistent with the abort breifing taught there.

The debrief for this sim basically went like this: "It is the policy of flight operations management of this airline that you will abort for these _______ items only. If you abort for other items, you will have no support from the management of this airline for that action. The consequences of that action, if you are lucky enough to live through the action, may include intense legal scrutiny of you personally in front of an administrative law judge, a criminal court, and possibly a civil court. If you do not die and others die or are injured, you will be in some deep doo-doo. Even if nobody gets hurt, and you clear the runway fine, flight operations management does not appreciate you trashing the brakes, creating international misconnects, and causing us to have to put 200 pax in hotels for the night, unless it is necessary in the interest of safety. The interest of safety requires an abort above 80 knots for these XXXX items only. Now lets try that again."

At this carrier, there is no secret captains list of abort items above 80. There is a very specific list. They are very serious about it due to some past occurences that have cost some big $, but not a hull loss AFAIK.

I had been throught 6 type rating courses, in airline and corporate positions, and had never seen this hammered home in this way. Good training, I guess. But honestly, if I was flying a GLEX with a BFL of 4300 and taking off on 12000', I dont see the harm, as long as you dont F it up, FWIW.

I guess that's kind of my point. There is an industry out there with far more collective experience than any one captain, or crew combined. And there are people that go out there and compile all this and probably enter a piece of paper with a bunch of holes punched in it in to a giant box with blinking lights and bloop-bleep noises coming out of it ...the lights dim and a small puff of smoke comes out and the guy in the lab coat and the pilot hat looks at a clip board and says: "once you cross a certain point there are only a few things that are worth risking an RTO over. These are those things."

I never argue with people holding clip boards. I mean, I don't really know what happens to the airplane I fly currently when it stalls at 45000'. I have an idea, but don't need to find out. The same way I don't need to find out what a RTO looks like on a 4500' runway from V1 minus 6 because of a door message.

Horse, I agree about Bizjets on long runways, but I always try to resist the temptation to allow a "soft V1" because of varying runway lengths. It just seems like a bad habit to get in to, though I'm not sure I posses the strength......to........resist.

Sorry I've been so on top of this thread, just haven't seen a really good discussion about a good topic in a while, I guess.

 

[X-rated]

I'm with that sharp fella BOILER UP...

What non-engine fire developed in that 35 seconds from power up to liftoff that you detected and aborted for? If anything chances are you smelled bleed air/conditioned air. I will shut that off airborne and return.

No hard rules for anything here, but again and again perfectly flyable planes go off the end of the runway, cant think of any that have burned up in the pattern due to the oven overheating.

In the plane I currently fly 80kts is a callout for airspeed tape comparison just after acceleration meter checks. After 80 kts its only abort for engine failure, fire, loss of directional control (over centerline with no immediate correction) or TR deployment.

The only light that even matters is ENG2 FAIL light (3 engine airplane) We dont care what any other lights/CAS say....we wont abort for any of them after 80KTS.

Common sense prevails, brief appropriately for the airport, weather, etc..

Good discussion.

G200,

Yes, Boiler is a pretty sharp fella as are you. I can't agree with you guys on this one though. If the airplane is on fire and I haven't yet reached V1, I'm stopping. Too many airplanes have been lost due to onboard fire which progressed frighteningly quickly. I know I have the performance to stop safely; I don't know if I can make it back safely. Accelerate Stop is rarely the limiting factor in my airplane, and in most cases there is a significant margin of available runway in excess of that required to stop the plane. In the rare case of a very short runway where Accelerate Stop becomes a serious factor, a more in depth briefing with tighter abort criteria might be justified.

I'm not sure if it was a typo or not, but in the brief you gave above, I would expect you to stop too since you said you would stop for fire and didn't specify only engine fire. I know you fly with the same guys all the time; hopefully, they know what you mean.

I also agree. It's a shame there aren't more discussions like this on this board.

X

 

[Gulfstream 200]

G200,

Yes, Boiler is a pretty sharp fella as are you. I can't agree with you guys on this one though. If the airplane is on fire and I haven't yet reached V1, I'm stopping. Too many airplanes have been lost due to onboard fire which progressed frighteningly quickly. I know I have the performance to stop safely; I don't know if I can make it back safely. Accelerate Stop is rarely the limiting factor in my airplane, and in most cases there is a significant margin of available runway in excess of that required to stop the plane. In the rare case of a very short runway where Accelerate Stop becomes a serious factor, a more in depth briefing with tighter abort criteria might be justified.

I'm not sure if it was a typo or not, but in the brief you gave above, I would expect you to stop too since you said you would stop for fire and didn't specify only engine fire. I know you fly with the same guys all the time; hopefully, they know what you mean.

I also agree. It's a shame there aren't more discussions like this on this board.

X

Not a typo and yes everyone knows the abort citeria. Its pretty much a standard briefing that I have heard in every training center and every operation I have worked at/known. We do modify as needed as the majority of our ops are, in fact, off shorter runways at higher weights.

No right or wrong of course, but your brief is very unique. What is your FIRE criteria? smelling smoke? seeing flames? hearing screams? A muffin left in an oven or even one side of the cockpit (or pax) calling for more heat can emit something that can be interpretted as burning. Most people want hard info (lights/bells) and no interpretations of smells.

I cant think of one single aircraft that developed spontaneous combustion on the takeoff roll. Swissair was 3 hours into flight and Valujet/UPS were freight. We load the suitbags and the food, we are comfortable with what is there and we have Hazmat training.

FWIW have you done the EVAS/smoke generator drill in the BBD-700? I know Wilmington FSI will do this for a modest fee. We have all done it and its a very good exercise, probably the best 20mins I ever spent in a simulator. Very enlightening....and I agree, a fast developing fire is nothing I ever want to have to deal with.

It just seems that time and time again poor abort decisions keep failing - wrecking airplanes and careers...but airplanes dont burn up on climbout.

I understand no right answer here, its all opinion and adherence to SOPs (whatever they may be) is the critical part.

Have a good one.

 

[rettofly]

Gulfstream200: "I understand no right answer here, its all opinion and adherence to SOPs (whatever they may be) is the critical part."

Once in a while, the SOPs don't address the event, and you have to go with your gut. Ex: 35Kt wind shear at rotation. It's better to roll off the end at 40 Kt than to fly into the localizer antenna berm at 140.

It's crucial that the T/O brief clearly states that either pilot can call an abort. No PIC should ever reserve the abort decision to him/herself.

 

[HalinTexas]

One thing that might be mentioned here.

Fly the "eff'n" airplane!!! Even when it's just rolling.

Scenario: 80+ KIAS abort (reject) with an engine fire or other structural fire.

Depending on the aircraft type, i.e. fuselage vs. wing-mounted engines; corp. jet vs. airline, it's probably better to skip the "Engine Fire/Severe Damage" items and skip to the "Emergency Evac." items/checklist. Don't waste time doing the wrong checklist.

Another thing. Know the difference between smoke odors. Some pack odors aren't really fires. Non-engine/APU fires usually come with three things: Recirc. fans, ovens (which should never have been turned on), and inflight entertainment systems. Know where those switches are!! If you have FAs you might start trusting them, or have them removed. Put your "eff'n" mask on!! Fly the "eff'n" airplane!!!

 

[say again]

Great responses. The 80kt call is a hi/low speed abort number, airspeed comparison and engine check all in one. Abort criteria I use; anything before 80, after 80 it's for engine failure, fire, loss of DC, TR deployment. If we hear a bang and suspect tire failure, we continue as long as DC is maintained.

 

[Pickle]

Lots of good info out there, just google "80 knots high speed rejected takeoff" and click to your heart's content.

As I recall from the 737-800 I (and Hal) flew, from 84 knots to 6 seconds after lift off (IIRC) all AMBER caution messages were disabled, and only RED emergency messages would illuminate in the "high speed abort" regime.

I have seen crews (in the HS125 sim) brief the whole "anything before 80, and only fire, engine failure, loss of directional control after 80 to V1" reject AFTER 80 knots for, in addition to the aforementioned items:

1) they forgot to send the speeds (PL21 Hawker)
2) PFD or MFD failure, on either the PF or PM side
3) absolutely nothing.

This tells me one of two things. Either people are spring loaded to abort only in the sim, or they are spring loaded to abort all the time.

As was originally brought up by X-rated, and discussed by many, I too subscribe to the "any fire" philosophy after 80 knots but I will concede that there are indeed 2 sides to this coin.

 

[Pickle]

FWIW have you done the EVAS/smoke generator drill in the BBD-700? I know Wilmington FSI will do this for a modest fee. We have all done it and its a very good exercise, probably the best 20mins I ever spent in a simulator. Very enlightening....and I agree, a fast developing fire is nothing I ever want to have to deal with.

I've done EVAS/smoke in the Hawker sim and even though I knew it was coming I almost pooped my pants.

Maybe I'm just a wuss though.

 

[X-rated]

G200,

Actually, your briefing and mine are pretty much identical with the exception of the TRs. (It's not a Bombardier SOP) I don't actually say "any" fire because we too follow SOP's, and I believe it would be redundant anyway. I simply wrote "any" for effect.

You do bring up a good point though. It's important that we as crews understand what we mean when we brief "fire." I grant you the most likely fire on takeoff roll would be an engine fire. However, if I saw smoke, sparks or flame coming from under the instrument panel, or the other pilot called fire, or I heard the flight attendant yell fire, I would abort anytime before V1. I never said I would stop for unusual smells after 80kts, and I would seriously hope it would be obvious that I don't think that would be a good idea.

It's interesting that my initial post to Boiler suggested that he consider dropping the "engine" from "engine fire" which would make his briefing closer to yours and mine. However, your understanding of what we each mean is aligned with Boiler. There's probably a CRM lesson there somewhere.

I have not been to FSI for the GLEX. So far we have been training with CAE, but we may very well try FSI next time. If we do, I'll take your recommendation and request the smoke generator/hood training.

X

 

[Gulfstream 200]

That all makes sense to me!.....thanks.

 

[rice]

So I haven't heard one word about BFL or TODA in this entire discussion. Couple that with the Boeing data which I believe is ancient (lots of brake technology improvements since the 80's) and we have a new can of worms.
Lets say V1 is 116 and BFL is 4650' but the TODA is 7800'. The PF's PDU goes dark at 90 kts and the bell starts ringing. Would the wise choice be to abort/reject or say "you've got the controls" to the PNF who's attention has been split btwn in/outside?
Happened to me in my last recurrent. Guy passes control a split second before the triple chime, I abort (no problem) and when were stopped he looks at me like WTF?
Point is the 80 kt decision to abort or not is situational and I believe it has become one of those deals where it's taken on a life of it's own.
We typically land at speeds much faster than 80 kts and often faster than V1 and it's rarely a big deal. If there's sufficient runway available I'm keeping it on the ground unless I can instantly determine that it's an insignificant CAS message.

 

[svcta]

So your reject items and conditions are a moving target...for you and the guy sitting next to you.

I certainly understand the temptation to do this, but the idea for me is that both pilots should know every time by cold, hard rote memory what the reject items are and where the cutoffs are. Ther should be very few, if any, conditional gates for the thought process to pass through before the call is made. Besides, even under hard, IFR, what's the big deal with losing a display? I've spent plenty of time flying in one seat with the instruments on the other side of the cockpit. Far from an emergency, and an RTO is, in the eyes of the FAA essentially an emergency maneuver.

 

[sqh777]

I am new to the turbojet world, and I have captains that brief the 80kt call out and others that don't because we are not taught this in training. Recently a captain that doesnt brief the 80 kt call out had this very discussion. The example he gave me was you brief the 80 kt call out and hit the high spots(as brought up before). What happens if you have total electrical failure? To take it a step farther, it's low ifr, what do you do now? It wasn't briefed that you would abort for this. Would you stop or go? I should note that the 80 kt call out in our company sop is the "airspeed alive cross check no faults" call. It is just confusing to someone new to jet.

 

[svcta]

We can throw out hypotheticals all day, the fact is that every brief cannot cover every possible contingency. It is a game of playing the odds and there are, according to Boeing, Airbus, and the FAA only a few items that are worth gaming an RTO over. The data (science) on the subject is pretty clear. Most of us seem to include the giant caveat "Perception that the airplane is unsafe (or will not) fly"

Your captain's total electrical failure scenario is swell, except what total electrical failure leaves you with no standby instruments in a jet? Okay, in an airliner, at least. And did this complete electrical failure leave our anti-skid intact? 'Cause now we may very well abort our way in to a real emergency (no tires). I have never flown a jet that didn't have a standby instrument or two that were battery powered. I would contend, given the scenario here on paper, that we could continue the t/o, carry on to out t/o alternate on the standbys, and execute a thoroughly planned, briefed and uneventful approach....after we ran the QRH for the problem...and may just fix it.

You can see that there are varying opinions and a case to me bade in either way, but I just haven't seen enough evidence yet to leave the side of the bulk of the manufacturers and the FAA. Besides, doing it their way keeps me from thinking myself in to a ditch somewhere. Always a good thing.

 

[pilotyip]

We can throw out hypotheticals all day, the fact is that every brief cannot cover every possible contingency. It is a game of playing the odds and there are, according to Boeing, Airbus, and the FAA only a few items that are worth gaming an RTO over. The data (science) on the subject is pretty clear. Most of us seem to include the giant caveat "Perception that the airplane is unsafe (or will not) fly"

Your captain's total electrical failure scenario is swell, except what total electrical failure leaves you with no standby instruments in a jet? Okay, in an airliner, at least. And did this complete electrical failure leave our anti-skid intact? 'Cause now we may very well abort our way in to a real emergency (no tires). I have never flown a jet that didn't have a standby instrument or two that were battery powered. I would contend, given the scenario here on paper, that we could continue the t/o, carry on to out t/o alternate on the standbys, and execute a thoroughly planned, briefed and uneventful approach....after we ran the QRH for the problem...and may just fix it.

You can see that there are varying opinions and a case to me bade in either way, but I just haven't seen enough evidence yet to leave the side of the bulk of the manufacturers and the FAA. Besides, doing it their way keeps me from thinking myself in to a ditch somewhere. Always a good thing.

Pilots tend to play the "What if" game into the nth degree. I mean “What if” 8 goats crossed the runway and were sucked into both engines after 80 kts, would it be OK to continue the take off?

 

[rice]

So your reject items and conditions are a moving target...for you and the guy sitting next to you.

I certainly understand the temptation to do this, but the idea for me is that both pilots should know every time by cold, hard rote memory what the reject items are and where the cutoffs are. Ther should be very few, if any, conditional gates for the thought process to pass through before the call is made. Besides, even under hard, IFR, what's the big deal with losing a display? I've spent plenty of time flying in one seat with the instruments on the other side of the cockpit. Far from an emergency, and an RTO is, in the eyes of the FAA essentially an emergency maneuver.

Nice condescending attitude in your post.
Where did I ever say our reject items are a moving target?
Our procedure is that anyone can call abort prior to V1 (this was relatively new). We are both typed and very experienced and always fly together.
However the point of the post was that runway available was more than 50% longer than the calculated BFL and the event happened well below V1.

Everything we do in aviation is conditional which is why we ALWAYS brief for the situation. What are you going to do when presented with a situation that is not covered by your "cold, hard rote memory" reject items?
Do you always brief for a runway incursion after 80kts? It's happened.
Is your night IFR contaminated runway brief the same as day VFR dry runway brief?

You might want to experience one of those unique and unusual events in the sim before you go passing judgement.

 

[earhart]

Pilots tend to play the "What if" game into the nth degree. I mean “What if” 8 goats crossed the runway and were sucked into both engines after 80 kts, would it be OK to continue the take off?

I have experienced the "what if." Checklists. POH, "what did that sim instructor say in '92? BULL********************!

I scared the living ******************** out of myself and my co-pilot with MY decision- we were right. I hope that you all have more time than i for your intellectual discussions (than I did....)

 

[gern_blanston]

... both pilots should know every time by cold, hard rote memory what the reject items are and where the cutoffs are.

That's a bad attitude to have if you're flying a jet. Just sayin'.

 

[earhart]

That's a bad attitude to have if you're flying a jet. Just sayin'.

I agree.

 

[AdlerDriver]

It's crucial that the T/O brief clearly states that either pilot can call an abort. No PIC should ever reserve the abort decision to him/herself.

From my experience(only 121/mil), this is NOT the norm. Every company I've worked for has made it clear that there is only one PIC when it comes to a reject. It's his call...... period. The F/O can call out any condition that he feels might warrant the Captain's attention, but the Captain is going to make the reject call.

There is way too much variation in experience in the right seat of a 121 bird to give the F/O the option to just grab a handful of throttles and reject anytime he feels the need.

Maybe your perspective is the result of flying in a small corporate setting with highly experienced pilots that fly together all the time and swap seats every leg. Maybe the "anyone can reject" option works there but it really wouldn't be an option at most airlines.