80 kt call out

[2-o'sinGoose]

Does anyone have any good info on 80kt callout? I know due to low energy etc. But any good links/details?

 

[crjdude]

Not 100% sure but I always thought it has something to do with brake cooling after an RTO.

Would love to hear from someone that knows for sure...

crjdude

 

[landlover]

for take off, isn't that is when you start to have rudder authority? As in, get off the tiller and "fly" the airplane even though you aren't airborne yet.

For landing, never heard of an 80kt call out.

 

[aeolian]

Does anyone have any good info on 80kt callout? I know due to low energy etc. But any good links/details?

In high performance aircraft the 80 knot call identifies the point beyond which a reject should be executed only for fire, failure, config warning or the sense the airplane won't fly (your out). The rationale is the risk reward equation of high speed aborts for any reason shifts dramatically toward the disaster of runway overrun and the attendant unpleasantries. And the callout reinforces the idea that after 80 knots we are going flying.

The callout is initiated at 80 knots unlike the V1 call which is often called 5 knots early so as to insure the reject is initiated before V1 as the data favors continuing.

Hope this helps....

 

[ackattacker]

The 80kt callout and check also ensures both airspeed indicators are working correctly.

 

[pilotyip]

80 kts on take off for power set, on landing 80 for reversers having to be stowed by 60

 

[Jim]

In high performance aircraft the 80 knot call identifies the point beyond which a reject should be executed only for fire, failure, config warning or the sense the airplane won't fly (your out). The rationale is the risk reward equation of high speed aborts for any reason shifts dramatically toward the disaster of runway overrun and the attendant unpleasantries. And the callout reinforces the idea that after 80 knots we are going flying.

The callout is initiated at 80 knots unlike the V1 call which is often called 5 knots early so as to insure the reject is initiated before V1 as the data favors continuing.

Hope this helps....

Totally wrong for the 2 part 121 airline, 1 part 125 job and 2 part 135 corporate jobs I've held. Also neve taught this way at any of the 4 type rating courses I've attended.

V1 is called at V1 and 80 kts has nothing to do with making abort criteria more stringent. 80 kts is an airspeed indicator check and in the 767 when the engines should be at t/o power with the autothrottles in "throttle hold".

 

[Jim]

for take off, isn't that is when you start to have rudder authority? As in, get off the tiller and "fly" the airplane even though you aren't airborne yet.

For landing, never heard of an 80kt call out.

If the planes I've flown, if you're on the tiller at 80 kts, you're luck if you stay on the runway.

As pilotyip said: 80 kts on rollout to give the pilot flying an idea 60kts/reversers stowed is coming shortly. We actuall call 100, 80 & 60 on the landing rollout.

 

[pal]

80 knot call

While the 80 knot call serves the purpose of airspeed and power checks on takeoff, it is also the threshold between the low and high speed takeoff abort/reject regimes. Most reputable operators and air carriers have specific criteria for high speed aborts, and rightfully so (e.g. fire, sudden power loss, major damage or loss of directional control)...

 

[HalinTexas]

At a little over 80 KIAS one some airplanes, the autobrake RTO function is armed, but I like pal's explanation the best.

 

[landlover]

If the planes I've flown, if you're on the tiller at 80 kts, you're luck if you stay on the runway.

As pilotyip said: 80 kts on rollout to give the pilot flying an idea 60kts/reversers stowed is coming shortly. We actuall call 100, 80 & 60 on the landing rollout.

the original question is too broad. the answer depends on operation and aircraft type specific. For example, on landing roll out in a GIV it's 70kts for reverses to idle and there is no requirement for them to be stowed. In a falcon 20 you can use the tiller right up to v1 and maintain center line very easily if you so desired.

 

[regionalcap]

Totally wrong for the 2 part 121 airline, 1 part 125 job and 2 part 135 corporate jobs I've held. Also neve taught this way at any of the 4 type rating courses I've attended.

V1 is called at V1 and 80 kts has nothing to do with making abort criteria more stringent. 80 kts is an airspeed indicator check and in the 767 when the engines should be at t/o power with the autothrottles in "throttle hold".

Well, the 2 121 airlines that I have worked for do change the abort criteria above 80 knots. You are entering the high speed regime and should only abort for certain things.

 

[ttflyer]

Totally wrong for the 2 part 121 airline, 1 part 125 job and 2 part 135 corporate jobs I've held. Also neve taught this way at any of the 4 type rating courses I've attended.

V1 is called at V1 and 80 kts has nothing to do with making abort criteria more stringent. 80 kts is an airspeed indicator check and in the 767 when the engines should be at t/o power with the autothrottles in "throttle hold".

Interesting... I've never flown the "heavy iron" you have, but I am surprised that a 767 operator wants you to abort for a non critical item one knot prior to V1. Also, the reason many operators, including me, call V1 5 kts early is that V1 is the speed "at which the abort maneuver must have been initiated" - in other words you need to be moving the power levers to idle and pressing the brakes AT V1 if you are going to make your numbers. Some call it early for this reason, some don't...

As to the 80kts call, lots of "milestone" events happen as has been mentioned:

Airspeed indicators cross checked, Power should be set, Rudder is effective (and time to transition from the tiller to the yoke on many aircraft types), abort criteria may be different (depending on SOP) and I'll add that many airplanes inhibit non-critical CAS messages above 80 kts - So it's just a oral signal that this important takeoff milestone has been passed and so far, everything is A-OK...

 

[dhc8fo]

One of the most once intresting things I have seen/learned over the years in several aircraft types and in the training department is that just about all pilots are not able to distinguish between failure TYPES in the small amount of time there is between 80kts and v1. So to sit there and say that you are going to abort for this, this, and this, but not this, this and this is silly. Youre off the end of the end of the runway by the time you decide whether to stop or go. I have officially adopted the philosophy that any failure below v1 we abort, after v1 we go. 80kts is (should be) an airspeed crosscheck. I also set the policy for my flight department and don't have someone trying to tell me otherwise so your situation may vary, but think about it.

 

[svcta]

Totally wrong for the 2 part 121 airline, 1 part 125 job and 2 part 135 corporate jobs I've held. Also neve taught this way at any of the 4 type rating courses I've attended.

V1 is called at V1 and 80 kts has nothing to do with making abort criteria more stringent. 80 kts is an airspeed indicator check and in the 767 when the engines should be at t/o power with the autothrottles in "throttle hold".

The old man was a 767 guy (and 727, 737, 777, even typed in the 787 and was a factory sim instructor for Boeing) according to him you are correct about the airspeed check and thottles, however, the Boeing philosophy meshes with mine and others here: 80 knots is the transition to the high-speed regime. From that point on the list of abort items is cut down to, quoting him: "Engine fire, excessive vibration (severe engine damage/failure), perception that the airplane will not fly, or a loss of directional control". Prior to 80 knots you would obviously abort for anything at all.

This is consistent with my understanding of the 80 knot call. Different manufacturers may attach other things to it, but the root of the matter is that this is the point where you've made the statement that you really don't want to abort unless you really, really have to.

My brief is always the same: "We'll abort for anything at all before 80 knots, either of us can call the abort. Between 80 and V1 we'll abort only for an engine failure, engine fire, loss of directional control, or if we think that the airplane will not fly. Anything at all after V1 we will take in flight. I will fly and talk on the radio, you run the appropriate checkllist when we get to a safe altitude." Then a quick run through of any weather or mechanical considerations (usually there are none). And the only airline I worked for directed us to call V1 at V1-5 for the reason that TTFlyer pointed out. It takes about 5 knots to complete the phrase "V1" in every jet I've flown. So if I call it at V1 you could very well be initiating an high speed reject at a speed well above V1.

The "we'll abort for anything prior to V1, now let's go" philosophy I find to be confounding. Let's assume V1 of 130. Here we go bouncing down the runway and some yellow message pops up at 126 knots. We going to reject for that? Why? If I'm the one flying I don't have the capability in 6 knots (probably less than two seconds of time), to look in to the cockpit, focus on a message, determine whether or not we can go or not, communicate that decision, and then take the proper action. Conversely the guy next to me would only have been told to "abort for anything" prior to V1, so he calls "ABORT!!!" and I slam on the brakes only to find out that he called a reject on a hydraulic message that left me with no anti-skid on a relatively short runway. Now we could have bigtime problems. Or what about a blown tire? Do we abort for that in the same scenario? I can think of more than one accident caused by a crew that was unsure of their reject procedures. One guy going, the guy sitting next to him not going- airplane ends up in a Piggly Wiggly across the street.

The point is that in most cases you're far better off taking most airplanes in the air with all but the most major of issues once you've crossed a certain point in takeoff roll. 80 knots seems to be a fairly universal acknowledgement of having crossed that line. You initiate a rejected T/O at V1-4 for a door message and you have made a test pilot of yourself (Caveat: unless you're flying an airplane that says "abort for a door message" in the AFM somewhere. )

 

[BoilerUP]

While the 80 knot call serves the purpose of airspeed and power checks on takeoff, it is also the threshold between the low and high speed takeoff abort/reject regimes.

This.

When I did my CE500 type, the sim center used a 70kt call for this...I had always used 80kts in previous aircraft so that's what I used and they were fine with that.

"80kts we'll abort for any malfunction (low speed regime), above 80kts we'll abort for engine fire, failure, red warning or loss of directional control (high speed regime)". Others may brief and operate differently, but this works for us.

Time and time again, high speed aborts have proven to be bad news.

 

[svcta]

One of the most once intresting things I have seen/learned over the years in several aircraft types and in the training department is that just about all pilots are not able to distinguish between failure TYPES in the small amount of time there is between 80kts and v1. So to sit there and say that you are going to abort for this, this, and this, but not this, this and this is silly. Youre off the end of the end of the runway by the time you decide whether to stop or go. I have officially adopted the philosophy that any failure below v1 we abort, after v1 we go. 80kts is (should be) an airspeed crosscheck. I also set the policy for my flight department and don't have someone trying to tell me otherwise so your situation may vary, but think about it.

Pretty easy 1: Fire message, that's a bell and a master warning light, hard to misinterpret

Pretty easy 2: Engine failure: The runway rapidly goes to one side of the windscreen and the guy flying says "oh, sh1t"

Pretty easy 3 : Loss of directional control, see pretty easy #2.

Admittedly less easy, but still I would imagine that when you know, you just know: Preception that that the airplane will not fly.

The point is that these events require almost ZERO interpretation.

 

[ttflyer]

One of the most once intresting things I have seen/learned over the years in several aircraft types and in the training department is that just about all pilots are not able to distinguish between failure TYPES in the small amount of time there is between 80kts and v1. So to sit there and say that you are going to abort for this, this, and this, but not this, this and this is silly. Youre off the end of the end of the runway by the time you decide whether to stop or go. I have officially adopted the philosophy that any failure below v1 we abort, after v1 we go. 80kts is (should be) an airspeed crosscheck. I also set the policy for my flight department and don't have someone trying to tell me otherwise so your situation may vary, but think about it.

That's fine if it's your SOP - "Abort below V1 for anything." If you're my boss, and that's the policy you set, I'll follow it. However, in my experience, there is time to make decisions above 80kts. I've had a non-critical message pop up (in an airplane that is supposed to inhibit non-critical CAS messages above 80kts) at about 100kts on a runway that was PLENTY long enough to stop, and I still evaluated the airplane's condition - good power, good control, no other issues, and elected to take that problem into the air. In retrospect, it was exactly the right decision. Just like so many other things in the world, this is not black and white. They pay us to make these decisions. Taking away that capability is lowest common denominator thinking, if you ask me...

 

[dhc8fo]

Pretty easy 1: Fire message, that's a bell and a master warning light, hard to misinterpret

Pretty easy 2: Engine failure: The runway rapidly goes to one side of the windscreen and the guy flying says "oh, sh1t"

Pretty easy 3 : Loss of directional control, see pretty easy #2.

Admittedly less easy, but still I would imagine that when you know, you just know: Preception that that the airplane will not fly.

The point is that these events require almost ZERO interpretation.

That is what you THINK. It is not true. It has been shown in the SIM and I have seen it over and over again with many students. If given the failure (between 80 kts and V1) and you simultaneously make your go/no-go decision and the failure is also immediately removed, most pilots can't tell you exactly what the failure was accurately with 100% certainty. You might be in the ballpark, and you might get lucky with a 50/50/90, but generally, you haven't had enough time to determine which light is blinking at you and why or what has failed or why you have lost control, etc.

(Edited to clarify that we are talking about the few seconds between 80kts and V1)
**Also, it depends on how close 80 kts is to V1 speed, obvisously.

 

[BoilerUP]

No way in hell I'd abort at V1 -5kts for a caution message like, oh I dunno, a bleed overheat or wing anti-ice or pitot/static heaters or door seal.

But that's just me.

 

[svcta]

That is what you THINK. It is not true. It has been shown in the SIM and I have seen it over and over again with many students. If given the failure (between 80 kts and V1) and you simultaneously make your go/no-go decision and the failure is also immediately removed, most pilots can't tell you exactly what the failure was accurately with 100% certainty. You might be in the ballpark, and you might get lucky with a 50/50/90, but generally, you haven't had enough time to determine which light is blinking at you and why or what has failed or why you have lost control, etc.

(Edited to clarify that we are talking about the few seconds between 80kts and V1)
**Also, it depends on how close 80 kts is to V1 speed, obvisously.

We do this very thing in the sim every recurrent. You're right that I have seen guys reject for a trivial message or failure in the high-speed envelope, but I can't recall being caught by it yet, mainly because of the reasons I pointed out. And I rely heavily on a strong right seater to keep me in the loop when I'm in the left seat. There are way more stories of airplanes overrunning a runway than there are of ones going flying with a problem. This is more of a crew issue than a philosophy issue. The person in the right seat has no other job other than to monitor the airplane during the takeoff roll. If he's sitting there staring out the window then you're gonna get caught. But you scan the cockpit effectively during the takeoff, you can see most of these problems before a message appear, or before a light would come on. There are only 3 basic high-speed reject items.

How hard is it to detect a loss of directional control?

How hard is it to recognize an engine failure?

How hard is it to recognize a fire?

You would both have to be unconscious to misread two of those three things. The first two have the same symptom (and cure), so it's almost one item. The third is pretty simple, A big, red light, or CAS message and a triple chime or ringing fire bell. Either way, you ask yourself, is that a fire message? Yes=Stop, No=Go. That's not high level math, and my experience in the sim is that it works very well. Guys get caught in the sim because they are expecting an engine failure somewhere prior to or at V1, so at the first sign of trouble they slam the throttles shut and stand on the brakes. More sim instructors should include non-reject occurrences this way, to train out this bias toward the high-speed reject. Indication are, from my experience, that this is a simism. Because I've flown with same people in the past, who when on the runway hauling azz, continued the takeoff as they should have when a nuisance light came on.

I agree that judging the perception of an unflyable airplane is tougher to judge, but it probably involves more senses than just your eyes.

 

[ttflyer]

We do this very thing in the sim every recurrent. You're right that I have seen guys reject for a trivial message or failure in the high-speed envelope, but I can't recall being caught by it yet, mainly because of the reasons I pointed out.... Indication are, from my experience, that this is a simism. Because I've flown with same people in the past, who when on the runway hauling azz, continued the takeoff as they should have when a nuisance light came on.

I agree that judging the perception of an unflyable airplane is tougher to judge, but it probably involves more senses than just your eyes.

I agree that, in addition to everybody being "spring loaded" for a major failure in the sim, they are also compensating for the fact that simulators are not very good at simulating grey-area abort items. I believe (and hope) that the same guy who aborts for a blown tire at 120kts in the sim, will continue the takeoff in the real airplane based on the fact that more of their "senses" as svtc said are coming into play in the decision. Including the desire for survival. Somehow there just seems to be more energy in an airplane at 120kts then there does in a simulator - or is that just me?

But hey, as this thread proves, you ask 10 different pilots how something is supposed to be done, and you'll get 12 different answers with each pilot ready to defend their position to their dying breath...

 

[AdlerDriver]

I have officially adopted the philosophy that any failure below v1 we abort, after v1 we go. 80kts is (should be) an airspeed crosscheck. I also set the policy for my flight department and don't have someone trying to tell me otherwise so your situation may vary, but think about it.

When you say ANY failure, do you mean just that? Anything?

A master caution for a hydraulic failure and an engine failure are worlds apart when it comes to committing to a high speed abort just prior to V1. How about a tire failure? Your takeoff data goes out the window if you blow a tire and lose braking on that wheel. You'd be better off taking it into the air, dumping gas and dealing with it in a more controlled situation. You'll also have way more runway in front of you to stop than you did at V1.

I think your policy is setting your pilots up to accept unnecessary high speed aborts. I agree with you that reject criteria needs to be simple and well thought out. You can't have a laundry list and you have to have put some thought into it before you're on takeoff roll.

At my company, we will reject at high speed for a fire, engine failure, any windshear alert/warning or if the aircraft is unsafe or unable to fly. Beyond that, anything else is most likely safer to take into the air and deal with off the runway. High speed rejects (especially those executed poorly or late) have way more potential for disaster than a simple "failure" just prior to V1.

 

[X-rated]

This.

"80kts we'll abort for any malfunction (low speed regime), above 80kts we'll abort for engine fire, failure, red warning or loss of directional control (high speed regime)".

I don't know what is written in your SOP's, but I think you would be well served to drop the "engine" from "engine fire". In my opinion a cabin or cockpit fire is a much bigger deal, and is one of the most time critical events you can encounter on an airplane. Either would certainly warrant a high speed abort.

"...We will abort for any problem prior to 80kts. After 80kts, we will abort for any red light, any fire, engine failure or loss of directional control. Etc. etc..."

 

[BoilerUP]

I don't know what is written in your SOP's, but I think you would be well served to drop the "engine" from "engine fire". In my opinion a cabin or cockpit fire is a much bigger deal, and is one of the most time critical events you can encounter on an airplane. Either would certainly warrant a high speed abort.

"...We will abort for any problem prior to 80kts. After 80kts, we will abort for any red light, any fire, engine failure or loss of directional control. Etc. etc..."

What I wrote is our SOP.

While your point about the dangers of any fire onboard an aircraft is well taken, I think this is splitting hairs.

I'm not willing to initiate a risky high-speed abort for a problem I cannot see, feel and verify via a message/annunciator, and a cabin fire fits that mold. Between 80kts and V1 there just isn't enough time for somebody in the cabin to shout FIRE, hear it, have the PNF turn around, look, say "Holy shiz there's flame/smoke!" and the PF to initiate previously mentioned risky high-speed abort based upon that...because at this point you're now accelerating past V2.

No, I'll take the airplane flying since there's nothing immediately preventing it from safely doing so and perform an immediate RTB. You and others may not agree with that, and that's fine.

One simply cannot brief every possible contingency that might occur in an aircraft...

 

[X-rated]

What I wrote is our SOP.

While your point about the dangers of any fire onboard an aircraft is well taken, I think this is splitting hairs.

I'm not willing to initiate a risky high-speed abort for a problem I cannot see, feel and verify via a message/annunciator, and a cabin fire fits that mold. Between 80kts and V1 there just isn't enough time for somebody in the cabin to shout FIRE, hear it, have the PNF turn around, look, say "Holy shiz there's flame/smoke!" and the PF to initiate previously mentioned risky high-speed abort based upon that...because at this point you're now accelerating past V2.

No, I'll take the airplane flying since there's nothing immediately preventing it from safely doing so and perform an immediate RTB. You and others may not agree with that, and that's fine.

One simply cannot brief every possible contingency that might occur in an aircraft...

It's your call, but I absolutely disagree. Engines are designed to burn, and engine fires very rarely pose an immediate threat to the aircraft. A cockpit or cabin fire can kill everyone very quickly. Not trying to split hairs or start a fight, but I urge you to reconsider.

 

[svcta]

It's your call, but I absolutely disagree. Engines are designed to burn, and engine fires very rarely pose an immediate threat to the aircraft. A cockpit or cabin fire can kill everyone very quickly. Not trying to split hairs or start a fight, but I urge you to reconsider.

This is a great discussion. I agree that engines are designed to be on fire. They are always on fire when they're running, as it has been said, and I'm not the sort to come out of his skin because of a fire indication. Let it burn. That having been said, the takeoff brief is a game of odds making. As Boiler said, you can't brief every single contingency, so we brief the biggies. A cabin fire can be hard to identify in all but the case of a raging open fire, which is very unlikely, especially when you try to align it with the timing required to make it happen at that exact moment in time. I've even heard of cabin crews trying to talk a family member in to diverting a 777 over the N. Atlantic because of what turned out to be a passenger's bad perfume. The F.A. involved was determined that it was a fire somewhere, and when the relief guy was sent to investigate, it was determined otherwise. Strange but true story. We certainly can't begin rejecting takeoffs for such an occurrence.

So we can't abort a takeoff for every Tom Dick and Harry of an occurrence. It's a big deal, as most of us agree. As far as "any fire"...I contend that a cabin full of smoke and flames qualifies as "perception that the airplane is unsafe to fly". An APU fire? Well, I"ve never flown an airplane that wouldn't automatically kill its APU in the case of a fire indication, so that should handle itself. Allowing us to safely continue the takeoff and RTB under controlled conditions.

What other kinds of fires are there that we could have an indication of other than choking and having our polyester pants fusing to our own lithe bottoms? A cargo fire maybe? But they are so often erroneous messages, do we want to get in the business of rejecting takeoffs because we had too much belt loader exhaust in there? Again, a quick RTB will likely be better WHEN YOU RUN THE ODDS. That's what this whole business is about to me. A brief that is quick enough to be run through practically without the other guy giving me a blank stare, but that will cover the events that are considered to be serious enough (according to industry data) to R (a) TO over, while excluding things that are considered statistically not work the risk. Otherwise, "Abort for anything prior to V1" would be the safest play in a vacuum and if we always had 15000' of runway. But we don't, and we can't get in to the business of changing our briefs to suit every different runway we operate off of in any given trip. So we standardize it to cover the things that history tells us are controlling.

 

[dhc8fo]

Otherwise, "Abort for anything prior to V1" would be the safest play in a vacuum and if we always had 15000' of runway. But we don't, and we can't get in to the business of changing our briefs to suit every different runway we operate off of in any given trip. So we standardize it to cover the things that history tells us are controlling.

I am enjoying reading everyone's thoughts as well.

I do have to question the folks who talk about "high speed aborts." An abort prior to or at V1 is not a high speed abort. After V1 is considered a high speed abort. If you have done proper performance calculations for your given conditions and runway, aborting at V1 will ensure adequate runway assuming proper procedures for the abort are followed.

 

[Jim]

At my current airline, the Captain decides if and when to abort when below V1. The standard brief from the Captain is "below V1 call out any abnormalities or malfunctions and if I decide to abort we will.....after V1 we will contiue the t/o and....". For anything abouve 100 kts we typically plan on calling out the fire equipment for at least a brake check. We also call V1 at V1.

I've jump seated in many major airline cockpits and I've never heard a briefing much different than this either. I have heard the "above 80 kts" thing while jumpseating in a regional cockpit last fall though. This is the only time I've ever been in a RJ cockpit and I remember thinking it was it was unusual and assumed it was that Captain's personal technique.

This is the same philosophy that has been been in place at all my flying jobs and taught at all my type training courses. It was also the philosophy at both of my USN P-3 squadrons.

 

[regionalcap]

Sure is nice to see a good discussion on this site for a change.