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80 kt call out

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That is what you THINK. It is not true. It has been shown in the SIM and I have seen it over and over again with many students. If given the failure (between 80 kts and V1) and you simultaneously make your go/no-go decision and the failure is also immediately removed, most pilots can't tell you exactly what the failure was accurately with 100% certainty. You might be in the ballpark, and you might get lucky with a 50/50/90, but generally, you haven't had enough time to determine which light is blinking at you and why or what has failed or why you have lost control, etc.

(Edited to clarify that we are talking about the few seconds between 80kts and V1)
**Also, it depends on how close 80 kts is to V1 speed, obvisously.

We do this very thing in the sim every recurrent. You're right that I have seen guys reject for a trivial message or failure in the high-speed envelope, but I can't recall being caught by it yet, mainly because of the reasons I pointed out. And I rely heavily on a strong right seater to keep me in the loop when I'm in the left seat. There are way more stories of airplanes overrunning a runway than there are of ones going flying with a problem. This is more of a crew issue than a philosophy issue. The person in the right seat has no other job other than to monitor the airplane during the takeoff roll. If he's sitting there staring out the window then you're gonna get caught. But you scan the cockpit effectively during the takeoff, you can see most of these problems before a message appear, or before a light would come on. There are only 3 basic high-speed reject items.

How hard is it to detect a loss of directional control?

How hard is it to recognize an engine failure?

How hard is it to recognize a fire?

You would both have to be unconscious to misread two of those three things. The first two have the same symptom (and cure), so it's almost one item. The third is pretty simple, A big, red light, or CAS message and a triple chime or ringing fire bell. Either way, you ask yourself, is that a fire message? Yes=Stop, No=Go. That's not high level math, and my experience in the sim is that it works very well. Guys get caught in the sim because they are expecting an engine failure somewhere prior to or at V1, so at the first sign of trouble they slam the throttles shut and stand on the brakes. More sim instructors should include non-reject occurrences this way, to train out this bias toward the high-speed reject. Indication are, from my experience, that this is a simism. Because I've flown with same people in the past, who when on the runway hauling azz, continued the takeoff as they should have when a nuisance light came on.

I agree that judging the perception of an unflyable airplane is tougher to judge, but it probably involves more senses than just your eyes.
 
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We do this very thing in the sim every recurrent. You're right that I have seen guys reject for a trivial message or failure in the high-speed envelope, but I can't recall being caught by it yet, mainly because of the reasons I pointed out.... Indication are, from my experience, that this is a simism. Because I've flown with same people in the past, who when on the runway hauling azz, continued the takeoff as they should have when a nuisance light came on.

I agree that judging the perception of an unflyable airplane is tougher to judge, but it probably involves more senses than just your eyes.

I agree that, in addition to everybody being "spring loaded" for a major failure in the sim, they are also compensating for the fact that simulators are not very good at simulating grey-area abort items. I believe (and hope) that the same guy who aborts for a blown tire at 120kts in the sim, will continue the takeoff in the real airplane based on the fact that more of their "senses" as svtc said are coming into play in the decision. Including the desire for survival. Somehow there just seems to be more energy in an airplane at 120kts then there does in a simulator - or is that just me?

But hey, as this thread proves, you ask 10 different pilots how something is supposed to be done, and you'll get 12 different answers with each pilot ready to defend their position to their dying breath...
 
I have officially adopted the philosophy that any failure below v1 we abort, after v1 we go. 80kts is (should be) an airspeed crosscheck. I also set the policy for my flight department and don't have someone trying to tell me otherwise so your situation may vary, but think about it.

When you say ANY failure, do you mean just that? Anything?

A master caution for a hydraulic failure and an engine failure are worlds apart when it comes to committing to a high speed abort just prior to V1. How about a tire failure? Your takeoff data goes out the window if you blow a tire and lose braking on that wheel. You'd be better off taking it into the air, dumping gas and dealing with it in a more controlled situation. You'll also have way more runway in front of you to stop than you did at V1.

I think your policy is setting your pilots up to accept unnecessary high speed aborts. I agree with you that reject criteria needs to be simple and well thought out. You can't have a laundry list and you have to have put some thought into it before you're on takeoff roll.

At my company, we will reject at high speed for a fire, engine failure, any windshear alert/warning or if the aircraft is unsafe or unable to fly. Beyond that, anything else is most likely safer to take into the air and deal with off the runway. High speed rejects (especially those executed poorly or late) have way more potential for disaster than a simple "failure" just prior to V1.
 
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This.

"80kts we'll abort for any malfunction (low speed regime), above 80kts we'll abort for engine fire, failure, red warning or loss of directional control (high speed regime)".

I don't know what is written in your SOP's, but I think you would be well served to drop the "engine" from "engine fire". In my opinion a cabin or cockpit fire is a much bigger deal, and is one of the most time critical events you can encounter on an airplane. Either would certainly warrant a high speed abort.

"...We will abort for any problem prior to 80kts. After 80kts, we will abort for any red light, any fire, engine failure or loss of directional control. Etc. etc..."
 
I don't know what is written in your SOP's, but I think you would be well served to drop the "engine" from "engine fire". In my opinion a cabin or cockpit fire is a much bigger deal, and is one of the most time critical events you can encounter on an airplane. Either would certainly warrant a high speed abort.

"...We will abort for any problem prior to 80kts. After 80kts, we will abort for any red light, any fire, engine failure or loss of directional control. Etc. etc..."

What I wrote is our SOP.

While your point about the dangers of any fire onboard an aircraft is well taken, I think this is splitting hairs.

I'm not willing to initiate a risky high-speed abort for a problem I cannot see, feel and verify via a message/annunciator, and a cabin fire fits that mold. Between 80kts and V1 there just isn't enough time for somebody in the cabin to shout FIRE, hear it, have the PNF turn around, look, say "Holy shiz there's flame/smoke!" and the PF to initiate previously mentioned risky high-speed abort based upon that...because at this point you're now accelerating past V2.

No, I'll take the airplane flying since there's nothing immediately preventing it from safely doing so and perform an immediate RTB. You and others may not agree with that, and that's fine.

One simply cannot brief every possible contingency that might occur in an aircraft...
 
What I wrote is our SOP.

While your point about the dangers of any fire onboard an aircraft is well taken, I think this is splitting hairs.

I'm not willing to initiate a risky high-speed abort for a problem I cannot see, feel and verify via a message/annunciator, and a cabin fire fits that mold. Between 80kts and V1 there just isn't enough time for somebody in the cabin to shout FIRE, hear it, have the PNF turn around, look, say "Holy shiz there's flame/smoke!" and the PF to initiate previously mentioned risky high-speed abort based upon that...because at this point you're now accelerating past V2.

No, I'll take the airplane flying since there's nothing immediately preventing it from safely doing so and perform an immediate RTB. You and others may not agree with that, and that's fine.

One simply cannot brief every possible contingency that might occur in an aircraft...

It's your call, but I absolutely disagree. Engines are designed to burn, and engine fires very rarely pose an immediate threat to the aircraft. A cockpit or cabin fire can kill everyone very quickly. Not trying to split hairs or start a fight, but I urge you to reconsider.
 
It's your call, but I absolutely disagree. Engines are designed to burn, and engine fires very rarely pose an immediate threat to the aircraft. A cockpit or cabin fire can kill everyone very quickly. Not trying to split hairs or start a fight, but I urge you to reconsider.

This is a great discussion. I agree that engines are designed to be on fire. They are always on fire when they're running, as it has been said, and I'm not the sort to come out of his skin because of a fire indication. Let it burn. That having been said, the takeoff brief is a game of odds making. As Boiler said, you can't brief every single contingency, so we brief the biggies. A cabin fire can be hard to identify in all but the case of a raging open fire, which is very unlikely, especially when you try to align it with the timing required to make it happen at that exact moment in time. I've even heard of cabin crews trying to talk a family member in to diverting a 777 over the N. Atlantic because of what turned out to be a passenger's bad perfume. The F.A. involved was determined that it was a fire somewhere, and when the relief guy was sent to investigate, it was determined otherwise. Strange but true story. We certainly can't begin rejecting takeoffs for such an occurrence.

So we can't abort a takeoff for every Tom Dick and Harry of an occurrence. It's a big deal, as most of us agree. As far as "any fire"...I contend that a cabin full of smoke and flames qualifies as "perception that the airplane is unsafe to fly". An APU fire? Well, I"ve never flown an airplane that wouldn't automatically kill its APU in the case of a fire indication, so that should handle itself. Allowing us to safely continue the takeoff and RTB under controlled conditions.

What other kinds of fires are there that we could have an indication of other than choking and having our polyester pants fusing to our own lithe bottoms? A cargo fire maybe? But they are so often erroneous messages, do we want to get in the business of rejecting takeoffs because we had too much belt loader exhaust in there? Again, a quick RTB will likely be better WHEN YOU RUN THE ODDS. That's what this whole business is about to me. A brief that is quick enough to be run through practically without the other guy giving me a blank stare, but that will cover the events that are considered to be serious enough (according to industry data) to R (a) TO over, while excluding things that are considered statistically not work the risk. Otherwise, "Abort for anything prior to V1" would be the safest play in a vacuum and if we always had 15000' of runway. But we don't, and we can't get in to the business of changing our briefs to suit every different runway we operate off of in any given trip. So we standardize it to cover the things that history tells us are controlling.
 
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Otherwise, "Abort for anything prior to V1" would be the safest play in a vacuum and if we always had 15000' of runway. But we don't, and we can't get in to the business of changing our briefs to suit every different runway we operate off of in any given trip. So we standardize it to cover the things that history tells us are controlling.

I am enjoying reading everyone's thoughts as well.

I do have to question the folks who talk about "high speed aborts." An abort prior to or at V1 is not a high speed abort. After V1 is considered a high speed abort. If you have done proper performance calculations for your given conditions and runway, aborting at V1 will ensure adequate runway assuming proper procedures for the abort are followed.
 
At my current airline, the Captain decides if and when to abort when below V1. The standard brief from the Captain is "below V1 call out any abnormalities or malfunctions and if I decide to abort we will.....after V1 we will contiue the t/o and....". For anything abouve 100 kts we typically plan on calling out the fire equipment for at least a brake check. We also call V1 at V1.

I've jump seated in many major airline cockpits and I've never heard a briefing much different than this either. I have heard the "above 80 kts" thing while jumpseating in a regional cockpit last fall though. This is the only time I've ever been in a RJ cockpit and I remember thinking it was it was unusual and assumed it was that Captain's personal technique.

This is the same philosophy that has been been in place at all my flying jobs and taught at all my type training courses. It was also the philosophy at both of my USN P-3 squadrons.
 
As a first officer, it is good planning to know what the captain is going to abort for. It keeps everything standardized. Except for rare situations, most of the captains have the same abort brief and we are all on the same page. Of course, it is always the captain's decision. Every airline is going to teach it different though.
 
I used to brief engine fire as one of my above 80kts abort criteria, I have since changed it to any fire...
 
And the only airline I worked for directed us to call V1 at V1-5 for the reason that TTFlyer pointed out. It takes about 5 knots to complete the phrase "V1" in every jet I've flown. So if I call it at V1 you could very well be initiating an high speed reject at a speed well above V1.
The Boeing Abort movie says many accidents are caused by aborts after V1, part of this is the late call. They say the airplane is accelerating at 3-5 Kts per second, if the engine fails at V1 -5, the airplane does not stop accelerating, and it will still reach V1 in a couple seconds. An abort at V1 = 2 Kts will result I the airplane going well above V1 before it starts to deacclerate. I find many of my F/O's wait until the needle passes V1, I have made my abort decision at V1- 5kts, but I don't lift my hand until I hear V1 called.

Sure is nice to see a good discussion on this site for a change.
agreed, nice for a change, no name calling a nice touch for FI.
 
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It's your call, but I absolutely disagree. Engines are designed to burn, and engine fires very rarely pose an immediate threat to the aircraft. A cockpit or cabin fire can kill everyone very quickly. Not trying to split hairs or start a fight, but I urge you to reconsider.


I'm with that sharp fella BOILER UP...

What non-engine fire developed in that 35 seconds from power up to liftoff that you detected and aborted for? If anything chances are you smelled bleed air/conditioned air. I will shut that off airborne and return.

No hard rules for anything here, but again and again perfectly flyable planes go off the end of the runway, cant think of any that have burned up in the pattern due to the oven overheating.

In the plane I currently fly 80kts is a callout for airspeed tape comparison just after acceleration meter checks. After 80 kts its only abort for engine failure, fire, loss of directional control (over centerline with no immediate correction) or TR deployment.

The only light that even matters is ENG2 FAIL light (3 engine airplane) We dont care what any other lights/CAS say....we wont abort for any of them after 80KTS.

Common sense prevails, brief appropriately for the airport, weather, etc..

Good discussion.
 
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At my current airline, the Captain decides if and when to abort when below V1. The standard brief from the Captain is "below V1 call out any abnormalities or malfunctions and if I decide to abort we will.....after V1 we will contiue the t/o and....". For anything abouve 100 kts we typically plan on calling out the fire equipment for at least a brake check. We also call V1 at V1.

I've jump seated in many major airline cockpits and I've never heard a briefing much different than this either. I have heard the "above 80 kts" thing while jumpseating in a regional cockpit last fall though. This is the only time I've ever been in a RJ cockpit and I remember thinking it was it was unusual and assumed it was that Captain's personal technique.

This is the same philosophy that has been been in place at all my flying jobs and taught at all my type training courses. It was also the philosophy at both of my USN P-3 squadrons.

At the risk of sounding argumentative, I think the captain maintaining a secret mental list of reject items is a bad idea. It seriously diminishes the benefit of having qualified crew working together, and eliminates (what should be) a trained set of eyes and experience from participating in the second most critical phase of our flight statistically (if memory serves). I have only worked for one airline, a regional, and we absolutely delineated between what was considered a high-speed regime and low-speed regime with respect to when an RTO was initiated. And either pilot could call for the reject, too. I now fly corporate and we do it the same way (not because of me). I think that it is safer to ratchet down the list of possible reject items after 80, too, because now the guy in the right seat can monitor the takeoff only looking for a very short list of malfunctions, and he can devote his attention to telling the captain if one arises outside of the ones that make us head for a ditch (that really only leave 1 item for him to look out for). This allows the captain to fly the airplane. If I'm flying, the second I have to make an interpretation, which I cannot seem to do without looking inside, I'm more likely to let the airplane get ahead of me. I would assert that we're all probably pretty similar in that respect. This way we have a perfect understanding of our duties:

Captain: Look outside and fly
F.O.: Monitor and tell me what's going on inside.

And after 80 there is little that I want to hear other than "REJECT" or "CONTINUE" (or whatever our standard calls may be). I guess what I'm saying is that having a very short list of reject items after 80 knots eliminates the decision making process that takes time and attention during a critical phase of flight.

I would also contend that there is very little chance that you and I could
A:Me determine that there is a problem that you need to know about
B: You to hear me, interpret what I said, and form a GOOD decision
C: Communicate that plan to me, and
D: Execute it

in less than about 5 seconds. If we are accelerating well, let's say 4 knots per second, that means that this process of communication will cost of 20 knots. Which will very very likely lead to an RTO above V1, which we all agree is bad news. Think about it, if it takes a person 5 knots just to say "V1", how many does it take for me to say "We have a left hydraulic pressure low indication" and then for the captain to interpret and react to that? I would say that process could easily take as much as 20 knots, all the while the airplane is gaining more and more energy which has to be dealt with. There is now a giant possibility that I've just said V1 and you said "REJECT". Now we're getting really confused. As YIP posted, there is ample data to back this up. I can't even say "we have a left hydraulic pressure low indication" in less than 2 seconds, no matter how hard I try. And I'm quite a fast, er, smooth talker.

A question for you. What if the PF is not the captain? Can he initiate a RTO? It stands to reason that if the captain is the only one who can decide whether or not we will reject a takeoff, then the FO should to all the takeoffs and let the captain monitor and focus on making these decisions. Allowing the FO to simply execute an RTO when told or Continuing safely in to the air, again when told. I mean, we don't even allow ourselves (in a perfect world) to turn our own heading knobs when we're hand flying the airplane way up in the sky, why now do we want to allow ourselves to be burdened with very critical thinking under a very real time pressure during one of the most dangerous parts of our flight?
 
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For those that would abort for anything right up to V1, I hope you would reconsider when the CAS message states in pretty cyan letters
ANTI-SKID FAIL.
 
my $.02

My experience with the 80 kt call was in line with most of what has been written here, until about a yr ago, which is when I left the corporate world to return to a major airline.

The whole abort decision is and has been a bit of a hot button system wide at this carrier and I have been in the sim and seen my training partner initiate an abort at approx 100 kts for 2 of 6 efis tubes going black. I would have done the same thing. Well, that was not satisfactory, and it was not consistent with the abort breifing taught there.

The debrief for this sim basically went like this: "It is the policy of flight operations management of this airline that you will abort for these _______ items only. If you abort for other items, you will have no support from the management of this airline for that action. The consequences of that action, if you are lucky enough to live through the action, may include intense legal scrutiny of you personally in front of an administrative law judge, a criminal court, and possibly a civil court. If you do not die and others die or are injured, you will be in some deep doo-doo. Even if nobody gets hurt, and you clear the runway fine, flight operations management does not appreciate you trashing the brakes, creating international misconnects, and causing us to have to put 200 pax in hotels for the night, unless it is necessary in the interest of safety. The interest of safety requires an abort above 80 knots for these XXXX items only. Now lets try that again."

At this carrier, there is no secret captains list of abort items above 80. There is a very specific list. They are very serious about it due to some past occurences that have cost some big $, but not a hull loss AFAIK.

I had been throught 6 type rating courses, in airline and corporate positions, and had never seen this hammered home in this way. Good training, I guess. But honestly, if I was flying a GLEX with a BFL of 4300 and taking off on 12000', I dont see the harm, as long as you dont F it up, FWIW.
 
At the risk of sounding argumentative, I think the captain maintaining a secret mental list of reject items is a bad idea.....
It is what it is at my airline and I have no problem with the way it is. I've done high speed aborts in DC-10 (as a FE) and in the 727 & 767 (as a FO) using these procedures. I never had a problem with the way it played out and I thought the CRM on all of them was perfectly acceptable. To me, what works works. This has worked. Further, I've never heard a Captain complain about this way of doing business or seen one try to change it. I also like the KISS principle and the procedures I've flown under fit that bill too. So I'm good and I'm happy to fly this way.
 
Really good read from the FAA and Boeing.

http://www.boeing.com/commercial/aeromagazine/aero_11/takeoff_story.html

http://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/airline_operators/training/media/takeoff_safety.pdf

From Airbus (an excerpt becuase it cites a lot of the same data)
"ABOVE 100KT AND BELOW V1
The consequence of an RTO maneuver becomes more and more critical as the speed increases. Therefore, only very severe conditions should lead to a STOP decision, when the aircraft is at high speeds. In the high speed segment, the crew should develop a “GO” state of mind. However,
the flight crew should never delay a STOP decision, if necessary. Major failures that may lead to the STOP decision include, but are not limited to:

Engine or APU fire warnings
Severe damages
Sudden loss of engine thrust
Takeoff configuration warning
Any malfunction where there is doubt that the aircraft will fly safely.
"

This really has been informative, I learned a lot about some fundamental things that I've always just taken for granted, especially with the FAA guide. Probably the best thing from the FAA that I've ever read.
 

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