crw overrun transcript

[Spoolingbyu]

Actually what caused the accident was not aborting rather deciding to continue when he saw that flaps were not set. What happened after V1 is another issue and I'm not saying at that point it's safer to abort than continue.

Aborting caused the accident. I don't know how we can all say this any other way.

Continuing would have been fine, but he changed his mind after V1 rolled past. People make mistakes. I will probably dutch oven my old lady tonight, it will be a bad use of CRM. But we are all human.

 

[ASA_Aviator]

Again you are using the mentality that it's safer to take it to the sky then to deal with it on the ground, that's what caused this accident. All he had to do was abort but instead he added flaps so they could get out of there and not miss the flow window. If you're on the takeoff roll and you notice that flaps aren't set, doesn't matter if they're 0 or 8, it's an automatic abort. However, if the CA had enough reflex to continue the roll and add flaps then he should have known to disregard flaps misconfig warning and continued. Again the take off phase is not a "set it and forget it" phase of flight, there are different segments which you need to pay attention to the airplane and the roll.

If you notice prior to 80 knots, I would agree, but after 80 knots with flaps 8, it is safer to continue (If flaps are over than 8 or 20, you will get a config warning well prior to 80 knots). An engine failure is much less likely than some boneheaded move in a >80 or >120 knot abort that gets you killed.

Aborting past V1 is just so counter to our training that it doesn't even merit comment.

The plane will fly with only 8 when it should have 20. In fact, I bet that it happens more than we know.

 

[ASA_Aviator]

Another case of the failed mentality to take to the air then deal with it up there. What they should have done which he obviously recognized after the accident was to abort instead of adding the flaps on the go. Just remember whenever it's getting too comfortable in the cockpit with the other guy/gal, stop for a second and refocus on what you're doing.

This attitude will get you killed someday. Prior to 80, anything. After 80, control issues, fire, and that's it. PRIOR TO V1 ONLY, of course.

 

[Mr Wu]

Jesus they don't even need to investigate this he decided to sit in the cockpit and just talk,

If the lawyer ALPA gets him is any good he will get everything after the CVR CB item on the checklist deemed as inadmissible. WV requires at least one party to a phone call to give their consent or be notified that a call is being recorded. The captain or the guy he called did neither as he had called for the checklist and had a reasonable expectation that it was completed.

 

[Paladin]

No, nothing has changed in 107 years. Fly the plane. When AA departed ORD and the engine departed the plane severing the hydraulics to the leading edge flaps, the F/O flew the "profile". They would have survived if they would have just lowered the nose and gained some speed. Sometimes you have to be creative. Sometimes the company procedures are wrong. See: Risky Business: "Sometimes you have to say 'What the F..."

Not to hijack this thread...but the F/O probably wouln't have flown the profile if there had been a stick shaker installed on the right side...just sayin.

 

[AvroJockey]

I must say...there are a ton of experts here. I think the NTSB should start their investigations with flightinfo.com from now on and stop waisting taxpayer dollars.

Anyways...
There are couple things I picked out from the CVR regarding how insidious threats and errors really are. We should all take this as a lesson learned, because this could have happened to any of us.

1. The call for Flap20 by the Captain was immediately followed with a call from ground. The FO selected the improper flap setting at the exact same moment.

2. I'm not sure what the exact SOPs are for PSA in the CRJ, but it seems the checklist calls are leading the Captain into thinking the flaps are at the proper setting. If the FO is saying the flap setting, the Captain is naturally inclined to interpret that as a confirmation of proper configuration...even if he has to repeat it, and especially after doing these checklists with the excessive repetition of a regional pilot. The dialog of the checklist should never lead with an indication of setting of a critical item.

I'm not saying the crew didn't make mistakes, but those who question professionalism need some reflection. The US is one of a few countries that takes a non-punative approach to it's investigations...I think it's a good system, as we're the leader in aviation safety. I've flown to several countries were they throw the Captain in prison and hide the key until they can prove their innocence. Let's take the former approach, rather than the latter.

 

[AvroJockey]

BTW...
For all we know the Captain could have had visions of Comair 5191 in his head as he was making quick decisions. Regardless the outcome of the investigations (NTSB, and flightinfo.com), this guy and all his passengers get to see another day.:beer:

 

[sniper]

PSA sets flaps after both engines have been started and usually on the taxi out.

PSA needs to re evaluate how their check airman are selected, stop bashing other pilots and look at the mirror.

Sorry but no excuse for such a f---up.

cheers go MU

 

[Long Time Gone]

2. I'm not sure what the exact SOPs are for PSA in the CRJ, but it seems the checklist calls are leading the Captain into thinking the flaps are at the proper setting. If the FO is saying the flap setting, the Captain is naturally inclined to interpret that as a confirmation of proper configuration...even if he has to repeat it, and especially after doing these checklists with the excessive repetition of a regional pilot. The dialog of the checklist should never lead with an indication of setting of a critical item.

However, look at 16 : 09 : 02 --

16 : 09 : 02
HOT-2 takeoff data forty four thousand pounds. flaps eight twenty seven twenty eight thirty four seventy three eighty seven point eight set.

The FO stated that the Flaps were at 8, even though the CA called for Flaps 20. The CA should have verified the Flap setting visually by the EICAS as well as the Flap Handle setting, regardless of what he previously called for.

Also, what exactly is the 5th speed he's referring to? Does PSA climb out at VT+15 instead of V2+15?

BTW, sorry for the way "16 : 09 : 02" is typed. If I wrote it normally, it would look like "16:09:02" and people would think I'm a happy person. I guess just because you put ":" and "0" together, people think you're a happy person.

 

[paulsalem]

HOT-2 takeoff data forty four thousand pounds. flaps eight twenty seven twenty eight thirty four seventy three eighty seven point eight set.

The FO stated that the Flaps were at 8, even though the CA called for Flaps 20. The CA should have verified the Flap setting visually by the EICAS as well as the Flap Handle setting, regardless of what he previously called for.

The procedure was for the FO to read off the data from the ACARS, and the Captain verifies the speeds on the PFD and the flap setting on the EICAS.

Also, what exactly is the 5th speed he's referring to? Does PSA climb out at VT+15 instead of V2+15?

"seven point eight" is the trim setting. Our procedure is to select speed mode after the gear is retracted, and climb out at that to 1,000 above field elevation.