Welcome to Flightinfo.com
- Register now and join the discussion
- Friendliest aviation Ccmmunity on the web
- Modern site for PC's, Phones, Tablets - no 3rd party apps required
- Ask questions, help others, promote aviation
- Share the passion for aviation
- Invite everyone to Flightinfo.com and let's have fun
The JetBlue Incident Shows Why Pilots Should Make 200K
- Thread starter Ace757
- Start date
- Watchers 33
Welcome to Flightinfo.com
- Register now and join the discussion
- Modern secure site, no 3rd party apps required
- Invite your friends
- Share the passion of aviation
- Friendliest aviation community on the web
Sticky
Never Trust A Monkey
- Joined
- Sep 11, 2003
- Posts
- 289
Ace757 said:
So...EMTs should make 100K as well because they save lives too? Police and fireman should make 200K because they serve and protect.
Why don't they? Because anyone can and will do their job...just like pilots. The medical doctors of the world make very good money because very few can and want to do it.
No one deserves a good paycheck, you must earn it.
Mike
Last edited:
Ace757
Well-known member
- Joined
- Aug 2, 2003
- Posts
- 267
This job seems easy to you because you have been doing it for awhile, and feel comfortable. I bet Dr's who have been around awhile don't think there job is that hard. Just rememer all the training you had to go through to get where you are. Remember how much money it cost you. Remember working as a CFI for $10 an hr. Remember taking a pay cut to go to the regionals, remember waiting 10 years to make a descent wage. Remember all you have sacrificed for this career. Don't let anyone take any meaning away from that. No one works harder to get to the top than a pilot. Hell.....you get tested every 6 months, and have to get medicals, and if anything shows up your career is over. Yes there are alot of pilots. BUT, all and all I think we are a pretty inteligent group. I don't think it is true that anyone can fly an airplane. It just seems that way to you now because you know what you are doing.
Nindiri
Well-known member
- Joined
- Oct 1, 2002
- Posts
- 1,141
Dizel8
Douglas metal
- Joined
- Feb 27, 2003
- Posts
- 2,817
Pretty (impressive) picture:
http://www.airliners.net/open.file?id=926274&size=L&width=1500&height=971&sok=JURER%20%20%28cubgbtencure%20%3D%20%27Naqerj%20Z%27%29%20%20BEQRE%20OL%20cubgb_vq%20QRFP&photo_nr=1&prev_id=&next_id=NEXTID
Notice the AA guys on the lifts, one looks like he might have gotten a picture
http://www.airliners.net/open.file?id=926274&size=L&width=1500&height=971&sok=JURER%20%20%28cubgbtencure%20%3D%20%27Naqerj%20Z%27%29%20%20BEQRE%20OL%20cubgb_vq%20QRFP&photo_nr=1&prev_id=&next_id=NEXTID
Notice the AA guys on the lifts, one looks like he might have gotten a picture
Last edited:
bluejuice787
Well-known member
- Joined
- Apr 21, 2005
- Posts
- 226
Dizel8
Douglas metal
- Joined
- Feb 27, 2003
- Posts
- 2,817
NYC99IA062
On February 16, 1999, at 1602 Eastern Standard Time, an Airbus A-320-231, N628AW, operated by America West Airlines as flight 2811, received minor damage when it landed at Port Columbus International Airport (CMH), Columbus, Ohio, with the nose wheels rotated 90 degrees. There were no injuries to the 2 certificated pilots, 3 flight attendants and 26 passengers. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the scheduled passenger flight which had departed from Newark (EWR), New Jersey, about 1404. Flight 2811 was operated on an instrument flight rules flight plan conducted under 14 CFR Part 121.
According to statements from the flight crew, flight 2811 was uneventful until the landing gear was lowered prior to landing at CMH. After the landing gear was extended to the down-and-locked position, the flight crew received indications of dual landing gear control and interface unit (LGCIU) faults.
The flight crew entered into a holding pattern and attempted to troubleshoot the faults; however, they were unable to determine the source of the problem. The flight crew then prepared for a landing at CMH, with nosewheel steering and thrust reversers inoperative due to the faults. During the final approach, at the flight crew's request, the control tower performed a visual check of the landing gear, which revealed that the nosewheels were rotated about 90 degrees.
The flight crew then initiated a missed approach and declared an emergency. The cabin crew was notified of an impending emergency landing, and the cabin and passengers were prepared for the landing. The captain initiated the approach, and described the touchdown as soft. The airplane stopped on the 10,250-foot-long runway with about 2,500 feet of runway remaining. Damage was limited to the nose landing gear tires and rims.
The captain reported that after landing, he noticed smoke was drifting up on the right side of the airplane. He said he attempted to contact the control tower and confirm if a fire was present, but was unable due to frequency congestion. He then initiated an emergency evacuation using the left and right side overwing exits.
A review of the air/ground communications, as recorded by the Columbus Air Traffic Control Tower, did not reveal a congested frequency when the emergency evacuation was initiated.
According to Airbus, nose wheel steering was hydraulically actuated through either the cockpit tiller and/or the rudder pedals.
A post-incident visual inspection of the nose landing gear assembly revealed no anomalies. The steering control module was replaced, and a subsequent functional check of the nosewheel steering was successful.
The steering control module was a sealed unit, opened only during overhaul, with no specified overhaul time, and had accumulated 3,860 hours since last overhauled on March 3, 1998. It was shipped to Messier-Bugatti, the manufacturer, and examined under the supervision of the French Bureau Enquetes Accidents (BEA). The examination revealed that the external hydraulic O-ring seals on the steering control module's selector valve were extruded (distorted out of the seal's groove). A small offset was found in the steering control valve.
Airbus further reported that while the offset would have been measurable, it would not have been noticeable under normal operations. Additionally, during landing gear extension, the brake and steering control unit (BSCU) would have been energized and hydraulic pressure would have been directed toward the steering servo valve. The BSCU would have then commanded a small rotation of the nose wheel to check for proper movement. Any disagreement between the commanded position and actual position of the nose wheel would have deactivated the nose wheel steering. However, if hydraulic pressure had bypassed the steering control valve, there would have been continued pressurization to the servo valve, and because of the servo valve's inherent offset, in-flight rotation of the nose wheels.
Procedures existed for removal of hydraulic pressure from the steering control module. However, once the nosewheel strut had deflected 90 degrees, the centering cam would have been rotated to a flat area, and would have been incapable of overriding the 3,000 PSI hydraulic system, and returning the nose wheels to a centered position.
Documents from Airbus indicated there have been three similar incidents in which A320 airplanes landed with the nose wheels rotated about 90 degrees. Examination of the steering control modules on two of the airplanes revealed extrusion of the selector valve's external seals similar to that found on N628AW. Airbus had attributed the extrusion failures to the lack of a backup seal or the effects of aging on the seals. As a result of these incidents, Airbus issued Service Bulletin (SB) A320-32-1197 on October 8, 1998, to recommend replacement of the external seals on the steering control module's selector valve on A320 and A321 airplanes within 18 months of the SB's issuance.
At the time of the incident, neither the French Direction General de l'Aviation Civile (DGAC), or the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), had adopted the service bulletin as an airworthiness directive. The operator was not required to comply with the service bulletin, and had not complied with it.
On March 24, 1999, the DGAC issued Airworthiness Directive (AD) 1999-124-129(B) to require compliance with the SB. On December 17, 1999, the FAA issued AD 99-23-09 which was based upon the French AD, with a 12 month time of compliance for modification of the nose wheel steering control valve.
On February 16, 1999, at 1602 Eastern Standard Time, an Airbus A-320-231, N628AW, operated by America West Airlines as flight 2811, received minor damage when it landed at Port Columbus International Airport (CMH), Columbus, Ohio, with the nose wheels rotated 90 degrees. There were no injuries to the 2 certificated pilots, 3 flight attendants and 26 passengers. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the scheduled passenger flight which had departed from Newark (EWR), New Jersey, about 1404. Flight 2811 was operated on an instrument flight rules flight plan conducted under 14 CFR Part 121.
According to statements from the flight crew, flight 2811 was uneventful until the landing gear was lowered prior to landing at CMH. After the landing gear was extended to the down-and-locked position, the flight crew received indications of dual landing gear control and interface unit (LGCIU) faults.
The flight crew entered into a holding pattern and attempted to troubleshoot the faults; however, they were unable to determine the source of the problem. The flight crew then prepared for a landing at CMH, with nosewheel steering and thrust reversers inoperative due to the faults. During the final approach, at the flight crew's request, the control tower performed a visual check of the landing gear, which revealed that the nosewheels were rotated about 90 degrees.
The flight crew then initiated a missed approach and declared an emergency. The cabin crew was notified of an impending emergency landing, and the cabin and passengers were prepared for the landing. The captain initiated the approach, and described the touchdown as soft. The airplane stopped on the 10,250-foot-long runway with about 2,500 feet of runway remaining. Damage was limited to the nose landing gear tires and rims.
The captain reported that after landing, he noticed smoke was drifting up on the right side of the airplane. He said he attempted to contact the control tower and confirm if a fire was present, but was unable due to frequency congestion. He then initiated an emergency evacuation using the left and right side overwing exits.
A review of the air/ground communications, as recorded by the Columbus Air Traffic Control Tower, did not reveal a congested frequency when the emergency evacuation was initiated.
According to Airbus, nose wheel steering was hydraulically actuated through either the cockpit tiller and/or the rudder pedals.
A post-incident visual inspection of the nose landing gear assembly revealed no anomalies. The steering control module was replaced, and a subsequent functional check of the nosewheel steering was successful.
The steering control module was a sealed unit, opened only during overhaul, with no specified overhaul time, and had accumulated 3,860 hours since last overhauled on March 3, 1998. It was shipped to Messier-Bugatti, the manufacturer, and examined under the supervision of the French Bureau Enquetes Accidents (BEA). The examination revealed that the external hydraulic O-ring seals on the steering control module's selector valve were extruded (distorted out of the seal's groove). A small offset was found in the steering control valve.
Airbus further reported that while the offset would have been measurable, it would not have been noticeable under normal operations. Additionally, during landing gear extension, the brake and steering control unit (BSCU) would have been energized and hydraulic pressure would have been directed toward the steering servo valve. The BSCU would have then commanded a small rotation of the nose wheel to check for proper movement. Any disagreement between the commanded position and actual position of the nose wheel would have deactivated the nose wheel steering. However, if hydraulic pressure had bypassed the steering control valve, there would have been continued pressurization to the servo valve, and because of the servo valve's inherent offset, in-flight rotation of the nose wheels.
Procedures existed for removal of hydraulic pressure from the steering control module. However, once the nosewheel strut had deflected 90 degrees, the centering cam would have been rotated to a flat area, and would have been incapable of overriding the 3,000 PSI hydraulic system, and returning the nose wheels to a centered position.
Documents from Airbus indicated there have been three similar incidents in which A320 airplanes landed with the nose wheels rotated about 90 degrees. Examination of the steering control modules on two of the airplanes revealed extrusion of the selector valve's external seals similar to that found on N628AW. Airbus had attributed the extrusion failures to the lack of a backup seal or the effects of aging on the seals. As a result of these incidents, Airbus issued Service Bulletin (SB) A320-32-1197 on October 8, 1998, to recommend replacement of the external seals on the steering control module's selector valve on A320 and A321 airplanes within 18 months of the SB's issuance.
At the time of the incident, neither the French Direction General de l'Aviation Civile (DGAC), or the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), had adopted the service bulletin as an airworthiness directive. The operator was not required to comply with the service bulletin, and had not complied with it.
On March 24, 1999, the DGAC issued Airworthiness Directive (AD) 1999-124-129(B) to require compliance with the SB. On December 17, 1999, the FAA issued AD 99-23-09 which was based upon the French AD, with a 12 month time of compliance for modification of the nose wheel steering control valve.
Sticky
Never Trust A Monkey
- Joined
- Sep 11, 2003
- Posts
- 289
Ace757 said:
I completely understand what you're saying. It's a true shame what is happening to our profession. Unfourtunately, what you and others have chose to sacrifice for an airline career doesn't play in the equation.
Nindiri said:
That is the bottom line. Why pay a life long professional pilot big bucks when a 22 year old can do the same for a fraction the cost? The 22 year old probably doesn't have a family to support, a house, a 401K, etc. They just want to "fly".
Ty Webb
Hostage to Fortune
- Joined
- Dec 10, 2001
- Posts
- 6,524
I have worked EMS and flown as a 737 Capt.
While EMT's and Paramedics deserve to be paid more than they are, there is no correlation with an airline pilot's job/pay. We deserve every freaking penny we get, and more.
My brother-in-law is in corporate sales. $200K is a lame year for him, and he's home almost every night and works from home about half the week. The world has changed, and if you think pilots are overpaid, you need to get out in the real world, and see what other people are making.
While EMT's and Paramedics deserve to be paid more than they are, there is no correlation with an airline pilot's job/pay. We deserve every freaking penny we get, and more.
My brother-in-law is in corporate sales. $200K is a lame year for him, and he's home almost every night and works from home about half the week. The world has changed, and if you think pilots are overpaid, you need to get out in the real world, and see what other people are making.
Ace757
Well-known member
- Joined
- Aug 2, 2003
- Posts
- 267
It seems like people are making big bucks for doing far less than we do. Can anyone say real estate? How hard could that be.
One other thing. I think you could compare a pilots life at the regionals to what a Dr. goes through on his residencey. Long hours, and low pay. BUT WHEN HE GET OUT, he makes his 300K because of all of the sacrifice he made to get there. How are pilots any different.
Somone said earlier that there are more pilots than doctors.....I would like to see the #'s on that. Im thinking thats gonna be false. Also look at lawyers, I know there are more lawyers than pilots.
One other thing. I think you could compare a pilots life at the regionals to what a Dr. goes through on his residencey. Long hours, and low pay. BUT WHEN HE GET OUT, he makes his 300K because of all of the sacrifice he made to get there. How are pilots any different.
Somone said earlier that there are more pilots than doctors.....I would like to see the #'s on that. Im thinking thats gonna be false. Also look at lawyers, I know there are more lawyers than pilots.
Floyd R. Turbo
Well-known member
- Joined
- Feb 23, 2005
- Posts
- 101
dane
I miss the MD80!!
- Joined
- Mar 3, 2003
- Posts
- 51
Nice
Very Nice.
Just saw the footage on CNN. They made it look easy which I am sure it wasn't. I noticed how the nose gear came down on the centerline and stayed there as the plane decelarated.
Impressive. And think about this: these guys knew that the cameras would be there to document it all. Then they went and did a great job.
Regards,
dane
Very Nice.
Just saw the footage on CNN. They made it look easy which I am sure it wasn't. I noticed how the nose gear came down on the centerline and stayed there as the plane decelarated.
Impressive. And think about this: these guys knew that the cameras would be there to document it all. Then they went and did a great job.
Regards,
dane
slowtationdrvr
New member
- Joined
- May 17, 2005
- Posts
- 2
slowtationdrvr
New member
- Joined
- May 17, 2005
- Posts
- 2
atrdriver
Living in Paradise
- Joined
- Apr 13, 2004
- Posts
- 9,271
Ace757 said:
I kind of doubt that. The last time I looked there were less than 300,000 certificated pilots in the US. That number included all pilots, private through ATP. Figure probably less than 100,000 ATP's in that group, and that number also includes those with expired medicals and those not current. But, there probably are more pilots than Dr's who are willing to work for nothing due to SJS.
Oh, BTW, GREAT JOB JB!!!
Share this page
Latest resources
-
-
-
-
-
AC 90-89C - Amateur-Built Aircraft and Ultralight Flight Testing HandbookAmateur-Built Aircraft and Ultralight Flight Testing Handbook
- Neal
- Updated:
