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SWA lands at wrong Branson Airport

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you should instead just stick to touting the overall safety record. Frankly, the record is impressive (even though I think it's purely luck).

That's not what I said, clearly... because your safety practices are certainly not superior to theirs.
The only way to evaluate safety practices is to measure their effectiveness. The only way to measure their effectiveness is to analyze statistical data about how well those practices mitigate and prevent accidents. You are making subjective judgements about safety practices in direct opposition to statistical data refuting your claims. If you want to continue to make arguments that are in no way backed by factual data and chalk it all up to luck then be my guest, just don't expect anyone to lend any credence to your ramblings.
 
So to be clear, you are claiming that your safety practices are superior to all of the other airlines?

Funny. Hilarious, in fact.
 
So to be clear, you are claiming that your safety practices are superior to all of the other airlines?

Funny. Hilarious, in fact.
I'm claiming the only way to evaluate safety practices is to analyze the data about how each airlines practices mitigate accidents. If you have another method please share it. If not, take a look at the statistical data available and draw a conclusion based upon that data. I'm making no claims as to whose practices are better or worse, I'm simply analyzing available statistical data about which practices are statistically effective at preventing accidents. Clearly some airlines have more effective practices and some airlines have practices that are less effective than SWA. If you choose to refute that, please do it with some other argument than: "Because I said so."
 
I think when the same type of incidents keep happening to an airline, it's not just random chance. It's probably time for Southwest pilots to stand down, stop trying to explain away these incidents, and figure out what we're doing wrong, before we really do screw up bad.
 
Let me fix it for you PCL...


No passenger has ever perished on a SW plane. Ever.

Even after 3000 flights a day for almost 42 years (that's over 15 thousand days). And I hope that record continues for another 40+ years.

Was the MDW accident tragic? Absolutely. But you have trouble with the SW safety record above?

Ever? Never ever? Didn't some of yall's pax put a hurtin' on some deranged fool soon after 9-11?
 
Ever? Never ever? Didn't some of yall's pax put a hurtin' on some deranged fool soon after 9-11?

Yes ever. I'm sure we've had some heart attacks and strokes too if you want to throw them in. Operationally...none.

Nindiri,

I completely agree with you and it can happen to anyone. We've had some recent events and need to learn from them. No doubt. I'm not throwing stones at others because I know it can change quickly. Still proud of our record, and again, I pray it continues. We have some fine aviators.

Many years ago we had a complete flap spindle failure. Sheared off completely. Those pilots (thru skill) saved that aircraft and everyone on board. It should have been a hull loss with multiple deaths but it wasn't.

I hope we all (every carrier operating) has an unblemished safety record year after year. Loss of an aircraft and life is a horrible event.
 
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I think when the same type of incidents keep happening to an airline, it's not just random chance. It's probably time for Southwest pilots to stand down, stop trying to explain away these incidents, and figure out what we're doing wrong, before we really do screw up bad.

Really? While Southwest certainly can learn from any incident (as well as could other carriers learn from anyone's incident), what are you getting at here? The "same type of incidents" that apparently keep happening to Southwest? What exact "same type" is that?

As I see it, the incidents that have happened to Southwest in recent years have been considerably different from each other, and we have learned from each of them. From each incident (with a complete investigation, that is), Southwest has "figure[d] out what we're doing wrong," and addressed the issue at hand.

Do you have specific examples of Southwest "explaining away," or ignoring what we're doing wrong? ('Cause I can give you numerous examples of what we've learned and changed after some of our worse incidents).

Or did you just wanna' bitch about Southwest on an anonymous board like everyone else? If that's the case, then by all means, carry on.

Bubba
 
Well, lets see. Just since 2000, two disastrous runway overruns that could have been prevented by go-arounds, an airplane driven into the runway and wrecked at LGA because the CA wouldn't go-around, and now a crew rushes into landing at the wrong airport and narrowly averts a deadly overrun. Do you really not see how this keeps happening?

Maybe it happens at other airlines too, but that's their concern. We need to step back and see what it is that we need to change here at SWA before our luck runs out and we hurt someone.
 
red, while that's a more honest statement, it's still intentionally deceptive. Your company's airplane struck a car and killed a child. Perhaps instead of talking about how no one has died on your airplanes, you should instead just stick to touting the overall safety record. Frankly, the record is impressive (even though I think it's purely luck). You shouldn't need to spin the truth to make it sound good.

In 7 years here at SWA I've yet to find one line pilot or exec who claims we haven't had a fatality.

And you won't source who has-

So please- either source it or shut up. And red- I draw no good conclusion from distinguishing between a passenger and someone on the ground. As a pilot I think it's worse to kill people on the ground. At least when one buys an airline ticket they are agreeing to take on the risks of an airline flight, however minimal they may be

Pcl- you're acting like garbage lately- what's your deal?
You understand and represent a lot of good ideas that you now seem to be working hard to discredit. I don't think there's any winners with your online postings about SWA -
Hint: you aren't discrediting swa- you're just finding new ways to discredit yourself and alpa
 
That's not what I said, clearly. But you've had no fatalities on your airplanes over the same time period that most other airlines have had at least some. My point is that that is luck, because your safety practices are certainly not superior to theirs. The overall radical improvement in safety industry-wide has definitely not been luck, which can be attributed to a lot of things.

I do assert that our practices are better, online, even if our programs are not. Our flying culture is better - the same one that you lament as 'unsafe' is exactly why I think we are safer. The "slow is safe, paid by the minute, over reliant on automation" crowd is far less safe than our group. While I support us embracing technology we have by far the best example of a "flying" culture- we DO NOT subscribe to button pusher airline culture and we've been better off for it. We do work hard and play hard and after viewing cultures at 6 airlines- I think we focus better and are less complacent because of it. Our "get the job done, taxi as fast as we can safely, be efficient" culture has precisely the opposite effect that you and the other critiques fear it will.
That and SWA doesn't reverse our sleep schedule, so while every other airline is operating at fatigue levels well beyond safe while they fly til midnight on day 1 and lobby at 5am on day 4- we either fly AM or PM which means we're much better rested overall.

My opinion only of course-

(But way more valid than your inexperienced ass pcl)
(How's that for a sissy response?!;) )
 
Well, lets see. Just since 2000, two disastrous runway overruns that could have been prevented by go-arounds, an airplane driven into the runway and wrecked at LGA because the CA wouldn't go-around, and now a crew rushes into landing at the wrong airport and narrowly averts a deadly overrun. Do you really not see how this keeps happening?

Maybe it happens at other airlines too, but that's their concern. We need to step back and see what it is that we need to change here at SWA before our luck runs out and we hurt someone.

Did you not read what I wrote (or what you wrote, for that matter)?

These are not the "same type of incident." Even the two that were similar had completely different causes. And nobody has denied them, or excused them, and Southwest has indeed studied them, learned from them, and changed because of them:

BUR- the worst example of a pilot error. The captain completely dicked it away, and the FO didn't stop him. Resultant Southwest changes: complete overhaul of procedures and checklists to mitigate risks (SNORT), reworked stabilized approach criteria, and enhanced CRM procedures and training to ensure both pilots are proactive, especially in the area of calling a go-around.

MDW- a confluence of a lot of internal and external factors. They touched down on speed, exactly where they should have, so your claim that "they should have gone around" is complete BS on your part. After a normal touchdown, they didn't get the reversers out soon enough because one thrust lever was unknowingly slightly out of idle; the airport-advertised braking action of "fair," was actually "poor-to-nil" for the second half of the runway; and nobody knew at the time, but the OPC had different performance parameters then the data we got from Boeing. Resultant Southwest changes: training and procedural changes on autobrake usage; investigation that led to new Boeing data on stopping margin with/without reverser credit; and finally, Southwest got the MDW airport authority to spend more money and change their procedures to ensure more accurate determination of braking action throughout the entire runway.

LGA and BRG- investigations not complete, so I don't know what the result will be yet.

So anyway, like I said before, tell me how these are all the "same type of incidents," and how "no one's trying to figure what we're doing wrong." It's like you don't really know the first thing about any of these incidents. And you're claiming that you work for Southwest?

Tell you what, Nindiri: why don't you step back, use your superior intellect, and explain to us why these incidents are "exactly the same," and how we can address them, since, obviously, nobody else at Southwest seems to care about safety. Please save us, Nindiri.

Or, keep on randomly bitching anonymously like you seem to to do best. And keep ignoring any facts; they only get in your way.

Bubba
 
.
That and SWA doesn't reverse our sleep schedule, so while every other airline is operating at fatigue levels well beyond safe while they fly til midnight on day 1 and lobby at 5am on day 4- we either fly AM or PM which means we're much better rested overall.

Not gonna jump in on this debate ( SWA is not "better") but under the new regs, as I understand it, our (Hawaiian) inter-island pilots can no longer string together all AM's or all PM's. As you said, it makes sense to stay on either a PM or AM schedule. Under pt 117, on day 3, AM's have to switch to PM's to be legal. Major failing of PT 117, it created a more fatiguing schedule.
 
Why do you say that Dan?

And ndiri-
What bubba said- your post seemed like obvious flame to me it's that far out in left field
 
Did you not read what I wrote (or what you wrote, for that matter)?

These are not the "same type of incident." Even the two that were similar had completely different causes. And nobody has denied them, or excused them, and Southwest has indeed studied them, learned from them, and changed because of them:

BUR- the worst example of a pilot error. The captain completely dicked it away, and the FO didn't stop him. Resultant Southwest changes: complete overhaul of procedures and checklists to mitigate risks (SNORT), reworked stabilized approach criteria, and enhanced CRM procedures and training to ensure both pilots are proactive, especially in the area of calling a go-around.

MDW- a confluence of a lot of internal and external factors. They touched down on speed, exactly where they should have, so your claim that "they should have gone around" is complete BS on your part. After a normal touchdown, they didn't get the reversers out soon enough because one thrust lever was unknowingly slightly out of idle; the airport-advertised braking action of "fair," was actually "poor-to-nil" for the second half of the runway; and nobody knew at the time, but the OPC had different performance parameters then the data we got from Boeing. Resultant Southwest changes: training and procedural changes on autobrake usage; investigation that led to new Boeing data on stopping margin with/without reverser credit; and finally, Southwest got the MDW airport authority to spend more money and change their procedures to ensure more accurate determination of braking action throughout the entire runway.

LGA and BRG- investigations not complete, so I don't know what the result will be yet.

So anyway, like I said before, tell me how these are all the "same type of incidents," and how "no one's trying to figure what we're doing wrong." It's like you don't really know the first thing about any of these incidents. And you're claiming that you work for Southwest?

Tell you what, Nindiri: why don't you step back, use your superior intellect, and explain to us why these incidents are "exactly the same," and how we can address them, since, obviously, nobody else at Southwest seems to care about safety. Please save us, Nindiri.

Or, keep on randomly bitching anonymously like you seem to to do best. And keep ignoring any facts; they only get in your way.

Bubba

You asked for examples of pilots trying to rationalize and explain these incidents away. Your post here is a perfect example. You go on and on about people "bitching", but you fail to explain why these incidents keep happening. It's not about placing blame here, Bubba, it's about identifying what we're doing wrong and fixing it before someone gets hurt again.
 
You asked for examples of pilots trying to rationalize and explain these incidents away. Your post here is a perfect example. You go on and on about people "bitching", but you fail to explain why these incidents keep happening. It's not about placing blame here, Bubba, it's about identifying what we're doing wrong and fixing it before someone gets hurt again.

Whatever you say, Nindiri.

Yes, I asked for examples of "rationalizing" or "explaining away" incidents. However, you didn't actually give any such examples. The only thing that my post is only a perfect example of, is pointing out that you're characterization was completely off-base. In the examples you cited, I gave specifics on how Southwest was doing exactly what you said they didn't do: they studied and identified the pertinent issues in these incidents (i.e. "what we're doing wrong") and made procedural and operational changes as a result (i.e. "fixing it before someone gets hurt again"). I'm sorry that you have such a serious reading comprehension problem, but I'm not sure how I can put it any simpler: you were wrong.

Why don't you actually educate yourself on the actual history of these incidents, and the changes Southwest has made over the last 15 years, before you spout off random crap? Just a suggestion.

Bubba
 
Bubba and Wave-

I don't think Nindiri is flaming; I think he is being sincere. Many of the pilots who have transitioned over have expressed surprise and dismay at the lack of use of some of the technology that makes operating in todays' ATC environment safer and easier. I'm betting you will see these becoming SOP at SWA, but they don't seem to be yet.

A couple of examples-

IAN approaches- much more stabilized approach for nonprecision approaches

Deselecting Speed Mode- instead of disconnecting autothrottles entirely, it retains Alpha floor protection

Level Change- Maintain ATC assigned speed while descending in the terminal area (unlike Vert Speed)

If you haven't sat on the jumpseat of another 737 operator to see how they are doing things, I would highly recommend it. You may be quite surprised.

PS, Wave spare me the stories about your hairy-chested manly flying skills. :laugh:
 
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Why do you say that Dan?

And ndiri-
What bubba said- your post seemed like obvious flame to me it's that far out in left field

Because SWA is not "better" than the rest of the industry. Note I didn't say worse either. Airlines go through good periods or bad. Look at Delta in the 90's. Anyone thumping their chest about being better than anyone else is wrong. Right now SWA is making the news for all the wrong reasons, LGA and Branson. It could happen to any of us. We have a superior safety record than you. So what. It doesn't mean we are better. Hawaiian is doing a lot right right now, but I would hardly be smug about it.

Back to the AM's in row. Have you found that you can't do 3 days in a row of AM departures under the new regs? I don't do inter-island but that's what I heard.
 
Bubba and Wave-

I don't think Nindiri is flaming; I think he is being sincere. Many of the pilots who have transitioned over have expressed surprise and dismay at the lack of use of some of the technology that makes operating in todays' ATC environment safer and easier. I'm betting you will see these becoming SOP at SWA, but they don't seem to be yet.

A couple of examples-

IAN approaches- much more stabilized approach for nonprecision approaches

Deselecting Speed Mode- instead of disconnecting autothrottles entirely, it retains Alpha floor protection

Level Change- Maintain ATC assigned speed while descending in the terminal area (unlike Vert Speed)

If you haven't sat on the jumpseat of another 737 operator to see how they are doing things, I would highly recommend it. You may be quite surprised.

PS, Wave spare me the stories about your hairy-chested manly flying skills. :laugh:

Something I have come to appreciate having transition is that your procedures can be a lot more standardized when you have standardized aircraft fleets. Having two glass airplanes (717 and 737 ) is better than a fleet of steam and glass 737s. When the last -300 leaves the Max will be on property and we will still have some antiquated procedure because it's the -700s fault. Speaking of level change. The -300's chase airspeed in the descent like the 717 does in the climb. Two great examples of when v/s delivers smoother performance.
 

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