SWA flight continues for 75 minutes after rapid depresurization!!

[firstthird]

Obviously someone had better spell it out for linecheck.

In the 737, we don't drop cabin O2 for a fire or smoke and fumes. Reasons being 1 - oxygen might feed the fire.
2 - the pax only get a mixture of cabin air and oxygen anyway, so the masks in no way will help them in a smoke or fumes situation.

What we do is land ASAP, which is what I suspect every other airliner does after the Air Florida and Swiss Air disasters, you just never know how long you have to get it on the ground in a fire situation.

And any proficient crew could get a 737 from on high to 10,000 feet in under 10 minutes, so your theory that they would have depleted the crew oxygen does not pass the sniff test.

 

[SWA/FO]

... an example would be (from TV interviews) someone says "My kid is upset that T.O. has be suspended...thats my kid's hero".

Lets look at the full quote. This sounds like a DFW airport trick!! Just use the part of the quote that you want, huh? My kids know better then that.

 

[say again]

What we do is land ASAP, which is what I suspect every other airliner does after the Air Florida and Swiss Air disasters, you just never know how long you have to get it on the ground in a fire situation.

I believe you mean ValueJet , not Air Florida. Air Florida crashed in icing conditions, not because of a fire!!!

 

[firstthird]

You are right, I stand corrected. I meant the everglades crash not the bridge in DC.

 

[linecheck]

Taz, that was cute, thanks.

But back to the subject, I will concede that the probability of having a double emergency is slim to none. But nonetheless, it can not be precluded. ie. UAL232 comes to mind.

Regardless if the crew was in an emergency situation at the bottom of descent, the crew/company elected to continue for 75 minutes after an emergency event, with the rubber jungle hanging out, and with an important piece of cabin safety equipment expired: the pax O2 system and some of the crew O2 system. (and this of course is based on the information in the article which certainly can be heavily scrutinized.)

So why do we as "risk managers" want to take that risk? Why do pilots feel they need to place passenger/company needs above safety? This isn't directed specifically towards SWA, but I think the answer to this can be found within the company's culture.

To me its interesting comparing various company cultures and correlating that information to safety data as well as profitibility.

 

[Vladimir Lenin]

block time, baby, get the fouckoutta my way

 

[furlough-boy]

Those guys at KBUR were heroes too. Saved like 3 minutes on the approach by flying 250 to the numbers.

 

[scoreboard]

Yes, pass judgment before the facts are in...

Taz, that was cute, thanks.

But back to the subject, I will concede that the probability of having a double emergency is slim to none. But nonetheless, it can not be precluded. ie. UAL232 comes to mind.

Regardless if the crew was in an emergency situation at the bottom of descent, the crew/company elected to continue for 75 minutes after an emergency event, with the rubber jungle hanging out, and with an important piece of cabin safety equipment expired: the pax O2 system and some of the crew O2 system. (and this of course is based on the information in the article which certainly can be heavily scrutinized.)

So why do we as "risk managers" want to take that risk? Why do pilots feel they need to place passenger/company needs above safety? This isn't directed specifically towards SWA, but I think the answer to this can be found within the company's culture.

To me its interesting comparing various company cultures and correlating that information to safety data as well as profitibility.

To me it's interesting how many Monday morning QB's there are willing to throw out with the theories on what happened. I think you'll find the article to be wrong on many facts, lets wait and see eh?

 

[SWA/FO]

Hey Furlough-boy,

We are not talking about KBUR...

You know, we can always pull up stories from your previous carrier, the one you use to work for and make fun of them just as easy. Hey welcome to the Majors board, by the way? Don't you think we could make fun of eagle just as easy?

 

[TexaSWA]

Taz, that was cute, thanks.

But back to the subject, I will concede that the probability of having a double emergency is slim to none. But nonetheless, it can not be precluded. ie. UAL232 comes to mind.

Regardless if the crew was in an emergency situation at the bottom of descent, the crew/company elected to continue for 75 minutes after an emergency event, with the rubber jungle hanging out, and with an important piece of cabin safety equipment expired: the pax O2 system and some of the crew O2 system. (and this of course is based on the information in the article which certainly can be heavily scrutinized.)

So why do we as "risk managers" want to take that risk? Why do pilots feel they need to place passenger/company needs above safety? This isn't directed specifically towards SWA, but I think the answer to this can be found within the company's culture.

To me its interesting comparing various company cultures and correlating that information to safety data as well as profitibility.

The pax o2 is there to get pax from high altitude down an altitude where they can breathe in the event of a rapid depressurization. Once the aircraft is at 10000ft, pax o2 is of no use. If there were a fire in the cabin, the absence of pax o2 would be welcome.

The 6 or so minutes it would take to get from 370 down to 10 would use minimal crew 02. Heck, some of our FAs regularly use more than that sitting on the jumpseat trying to rid themselves of a hangover.

As far as the rubber jungle hanging out, I suppose someone could have become entangled in it and choked to death. But atleast the 136 surviving passengers would have arrived at their intended destination.

Im not sure where you're going with the reference to our corporate culture, safety data, and profitability. Those things speak for themselves.