linecheckEver hear of the accident chain?[/quote said:Sure have. I've heard of an idiot before as well. How about you?
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linecheckEver hear of the accident chain?[/quote said:Sure have. I've heard of an idiot before as well. How about you?
linecheck said:So you're putzing along at 10,000 to 14,000 feet and did everything that your QRH and dispatch told you to do. You think to yourself, "wow, I'm an awesome SWA pilot now; my chief pilot is gonna be proud of me."
Then twenty minutes from destination, you begin to smell something. Smells like smoke and not the mexican burito that you had for lunch. Something is definetly burning, but what? Smells electrical. Then you begin to see smoke.
You look up and see how much oxygen you have left. Its significantly depleted from your emergency descent, not to mention that you had a jumpseater on board who used a lot of your O2 as well. It doesn't look like there's enough O2 for 20 more minutes of flying. Suddenly you realize that the 130 passengers you have on board have no oxygen because all of their O2 generators have been depleted.
Still want to fly for another 20 minutes so you don't have to inconvenience passengers and make SWA look bad? Ever hear of the accident chain?
linecheck said:So you're putzing along at 10,000 to 14,000 feet and did everything that your QRH and dispatch told you to do. You think to yourself, "wow, I'm an awesome SWA pilot now; my chief pilot is gonna be proud of me."
Then twenty minutes from destination, you begin to smell something. Smells like smoke and not the mexican burito that you had for lunch. Something is definetly burning, but what? Smells electrical. Then you begin to see smoke.
You look up and see how much oxygen you have left. Its significantly depleted from your emergency descent, not to mention that you had a jumpseater on board who used a lot of your O2 as well. It doesn't look like there's enough O2 for 20 more minutes of flying. Suddenly you realize that the 130 passengers you have on board have no oxygen because all of their O2 generators have been depleted.
Still want to fly for another 20 minutes so you don't have to inconvenience passengers and make SWA look bad? Ever hear of the accident chain?
linecheck said:So you're putzing along at 10,000 to 14,000 feet and did everything that your QRH and dispatch told you to do. You think to yourself, "wow, I'm an awesome SWA pilot now; my chief pilot is gonna be proud of me."
Then twenty minutes from destination, you begin to smell something. Smells like smoke and not the mexican burito that you had for lunch. Something is definetly burning, but what? Smells electrical. Then you begin to see smoke.
You look up and see how much oxygen you have left. Its significantly depleted from your emergency descent, not to mention that you had a jumpseater on board who used a lot of your O2 as well. It doesn't look like there's enough O2 for 20 more minutes of flying. Suddenly you realize that the 130 passengers you have on board have no oxygen because all of their O2 generators have been depleted.
Still want to fly for another 20 minutes so you don't have to inconvenience passengers and make SWA look bad? Ever hear of the accident chain?
SWA/FO said:Heros! Plane and simple.
TAZ MAN said:Dude, You are wrong on so many levels here that your license should be revoked.:nuts:
Spooky 1 said:Delte!!
SWA/FO said:... an example would be (from TV interviews) someone says "My kid is upset that T.O. has be suspended...thats my kid's hero".
firstthird said:What we do is land ASAP, which is what I suspect every other airliner does after the Air Florida and Swiss Air disasters, you just never know how long you have to get it on the ground in a fire situation.
linecheck said:Taz, that was cute, thanks.
But back to the subject, I will concede that the probability of having a double emergency is slim to none. But nonetheless, it can not be precluded. ie. UAL232 comes to mind.
Regardless if the crew was in an emergency situation at the bottom of descent, the crew/company elected to continue for 75 minutes after an emergency event, with the rubber jungle hanging out, and with an important piece of cabin safety equipment expired: the pax O2 system and some of the crew O2 system. (and this of course is based on the information in the article which certainly can be heavily scrutinized.)
So why do we as "risk managers" want to take that risk? Why do pilots feel they need to place passenger/company needs above safety? This isn't directed specifically towards SWA, but I think the answer to this can be found within the company's culture.
To me its interesting comparing various company cultures and correlating that information to safety data as well as profitibility.
linecheck said:Taz, that was cute, thanks.
But back to the subject, I will concede that the probability of having a double emergency is slim to none. But nonetheless, it can not be precluded. ie. UAL232 comes to mind.
Regardless if the crew was in an emergency situation at the bottom of descent, the crew/company elected to continue for 75 minutes after an emergency event, with the rubber jungle hanging out, and with an important piece of cabin safety equipment expired: the pax O2 system and some of the crew O2 system. (and this of course is based on the information in the article which certainly can be heavily scrutinized.)
So why do we as "risk managers" want to take that risk? Why do pilots feel they need to place passenger/company needs above safety? This isn't directed specifically towards SWA, but I think the answer to this can be found within the company's culture.
To me its interesting comparing various company cultures and correlating that information to safety data as well as profitibility.
erj-145mech said:The masks are just there to muffle the screams of the 137 pax.
linecheck said:Taz, that was cute, thanks.
But back to the subject, I will concede that the probability of having a double emergency is slim to none. But nonetheless, it can not be precluded. ie. UAL232 comes to mind.
Regardless if the crew was in an emergency situation at the bottom of descent, the crew/company elected to continue for 75 minutes after an emergency event, with the rubber jungle hanging out, and with an important piece of cabin safety equipment expired: the pax O2 system and some of the crew O2 system. (and this of course is based on the information in the article which certainly can be heavily scrutinized.)
So why do we as "risk managers" want to take that risk? Why do pilots feel they need to place passenger/company needs above safety? This isn't directed specifically towards SWA, but I think the answer to this can be found within the company's culture.
To me its interesting comparing various company cultures and correlating that information to safety data as well as profitibility.
furlough-boy said:Those guys at KBUR were heroes too. Saved like 3 minutes on the approach by flying 250 to the numbers.