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So what's the story on this latest 400 flameout?
- Thread starter Ultra Grump
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CaptainSpaz
lackey
- Joined
- Oct 20, 2005
- Posts
- 353
pamed19 said:
I am as puzzled as the rest of us... but I have to agree that lack of Prist is seeming less likely.
I will tell you this, I am not going extended overwater unless it can be done under FL350 until this gets solved. And I am not talking about solved like TWA 800 or AA 961... still cant believe that guy referred to those two flights in reference to this issue.
RossTwivel
Member
- Joined
- Jun 19, 2006
- Posts
- 8
CaptainSpaz
lackey
- Joined
- Oct 20, 2005
- Posts
- 353
RossTwivel said:
Dude, your first post to this entire messageboard was a copied lesson in atmospheric science that you pasted directly from Wikipedia and added nothing to.
Your second post was erroneous and condecending, offering little to the substance of this topic.
I am not trying to sound smarter. It just ticks me off a little that you show up out of nowhere to give us a remedial lesson in the science of how to fly a jet.
Last edited:
From today's AINalerts:
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] A Third Beechjet Flameout Under Investigation
On June 14, Beechjet 400A N440DS lost all power from both Pratt & Whitney Canada JT15D-5 engines while the airplane was in cruise flight at FL380 near Norfolk, Va. Unsure if they could remain clear of clouds, the pilots decided to turn on the engine anti-ice. They told the NTSB that they turned on the engines’ igniters and then retarded the power from 101.5 percent to 89.5 percent N1, but before they could reach up to turn on the anti-ice, both engines flamed out simultaneously. The left engine restarted on its own at about FL300 and the right engine restarted on its own at about FL240. Testing of the fuel that was drained from the airplane confirmed that icing inhibitor was present and in the correct concentration and that the fuel was jet-A. The NTSB is also investigating two previous Beechjet dual engine flameouts—on July 12, 2004, over the Gulf of Mexico and another on Nov. 28, 2005, near Jacksonville, Fla. Both of these aircraft were being operated by Flight Options. Investigations of all three incidents are ongoing.
[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] A Third Beechjet Flameout Under Investigation
On June 14, Beechjet 400A N440DS lost all power from both Pratt & Whitney Canada JT15D-5 engines while the airplane was in cruise flight at FL380 near Norfolk, Va. Unsure if they could remain clear of clouds, the pilots decided to turn on the engine anti-ice. They told the NTSB that they turned on the engines’ igniters and then retarded the power from 101.5 percent to 89.5 percent N1, but before they could reach up to turn on the anti-ice, both engines flamed out simultaneously. The left engine restarted on its own at about FL300 and the right engine restarted on its own at about FL240. Testing of the fuel that was drained from the airplane confirmed that icing inhibitor was present and in the correct concentration and that the fuel was jet-A. The NTSB is also investigating two previous Beechjet dual engine flameouts—on July 12, 2004, over the Gulf of Mexico and another on Nov. 28, 2005, near Jacksonville, Fla. Both of these aircraft were being operated by Flight Options. Investigations of all three incidents are ongoing.
[/FONT]
*#$% Headwinds
Well-known member
- Joined
- Feb 24, 2005
- Posts
- 58
OK, back from FSI and here is what they told us...
In the ORF flameout, the crew did as prescribed and lowered power to about 89% N1 prior to turning on engine anti-ice, and the engines flamed out before they could get the anti-ice on. They did get one engine restarted in the descent.
Apparently, FLOPS and NJ are telling their crews to turn on engine anti-ice in ANY visible moisture, even high altitude ice crystals. The theory is that perhaps those wispy high altitude clouds that you sometimes don't even realize you are flying in, have ice crystals that are turning into water vapor when they enter the engine, then build up in the low compressor. When power is reduced, presto...flameout. The advice from FLOPS and NJ is that there is no lower limit to use engine anti-ice.
The only problem is this latest crew reduced power prior to turning on the engine anti-ice, as required by the airplane manual to preserve the cool air boundary in the combustion can to extend engine life. It was reported by someone in the class (not an Options pilot) that FLOPS is recommending to turn engine anti-ice on without lowering N1 first. That would solve the theoretical problem at the probable expense of long term engine reliability and against the Handbook recommendation from Pratt & Whitney. I do know that a careful pilot can turn on engine anti-ice and reduce power simultanously without raising N1. That probably still doesn't prevent the heat from burning up the combustion can. The other suggested action of turning on ignitors and boost pumps before reducing power at altitude could be useful. Another suggestion thrown around by FLOPS crews was reducing power on one engine at a time, so at least you do not suffer a dual simultaneous flameout.
The thing that really annoys me is that Raytheon says it is unable to comment on the incident because it is a "participant" in the investigation. That just sounds like a chickensh!t backdoor way to try to avoid additional liability risk. They should at least have a "best practice" procedure out there already. Mutiple dual flameouts under similar circumstances should warrant either an immediate response or an emergency AD grounding the fleet in my opinion.
Another consideration. Both engines that were restarted were not lit until about 14,000'. That implies temperatures above freezing. If this were to happen in an area where the surface temps are below freezing, a restart might be very unlikely.
In the ORF flameout, the crew did as prescribed and lowered power to about 89% N1 prior to turning on engine anti-ice, and the engines flamed out before they could get the anti-ice on. They did get one engine restarted in the descent.
Apparently, FLOPS and NJ are telling their crews to turn on engine anti-ice in ANY visible moisture, even high altitude ice crystals. The theory is that perhaps those wispy high altitude clouds that you sometimes don't even realize you are flying in, have ice crystals that are turning into water vapor when they enter the engine, then build up in the low compressor. When power is reduced, presto...flameout. The advice from FLOPS and NJ is that there is no lower limit to use engine anti-ice.
The only problem is this latest crew reduced power prior to turning on the engine anti-ice, as required by the airplane manual to preserve the cool air boundary in the combustion can to extend engine life. It was reported by someone in the class (not an Options pilot) that FLOPS is recommending to turn engine anti-ice on without lowering N1 first. That would solve the theoretical problem at the probable expense of long term engine reliability and against the Handbook recommendation from Pratt & Whitney. I do know that a careful pilot can turn on engine anti-ice and reduce power simultanously without raising N1. That probably still doesn't prevent the heat from burning up the combustion can. The other suggested action of turning on ignitors and boost pumps before reducing power at altitude could be useful. Another suggestion thrown around by FLOPS crews was reducing power on one engine at a time, so at least you do not suffer a dual simultaneous flameout.
The thing that really annoys me is that Raytheon says it is unable to comment on the incident because it is a "participant" in the investigation. That just sounds like a chickensh!t backdoor way to try to avoid additional liability risk. They should at least have a "best practice" procedure out there already. Mutiple dual flameouts under similar circumstances should warrant either an immediate response or an emergency AD grounding the fleet in my opinion.
Another consideration. Both engines that were restarted were not lit until about 14,000'. That implies temperatures above freezing. If this were to happen in an area where the surface temps are below freezing, a restart might be very unlikely.
Last edited:
Beechjet flameout story in this month's AIN: http://www.ainonline.com/Issues/08_06/flamout_1.htm
HSDriver
Well-known member
- Joined
- Apr 19, 2004
- Posts
- 148
infiniti757
Active member
- Joined
- Jan 22, 2006
- Posts
- 29
Ntsb
Here is a link to the NTSB recommendations.
http://www.ntsb.gov/Recs/letters/2006/A06_56_59.pdf
Here is a link to the NTSB recommendations.
http://www.ntsb.gov/Recs/letters/2006/A06_56_59.pdf
ASC-LLC
Member
- Joined
- Jun 19, 2006
- Posts
- 8
I'm sending this letter directly to each of you, emailing it to all Team
Members to keep them informed about our operations, and posting it on the
Crewmember Website. If you have any questions or concerns, please contact
any of your Assistant Program Managers, or the Safety
department.
________________________________
To each Beechjet crewmember:
This morning the NTSB confirmed that a Beechjet owned and operated by
another company sustained an in-flight loss of thrust on both engines on
June14, 2006. The aircraft was cruising at high altitude near convective
activity. When cleared to a lower altitude, after the crew reduced thrust
for the descent, both engines lost thrust. Engine anti-ice was not on. The
pilots stated the engines restarted on their own and they landed without
incident. Preliminary information indicates that the fuel was normal with
adequate Prist concentration. The environmental conditions and flight
profile were similar to previous loss of thrust incidents.
Here's the actual NTSB release
*** BEGIN QUOTE***
NTSB Identification: ENG06IA020
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Incident occurred Wednesday, June 14, 2006 in Norfolk, VA
Aircraft: Raytheon Corporate Jets Beechjet 400A, registration: N440DS
Injuries: 2 Uninjured.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors.
Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been
completed.
On June 14, 2006, at about 1615 eastern daylight time, Beechjet 400A,
N440DS, lost all power from both Pratt & Whitney Canada JT15D-5 engines
while the airplane was in cruise flight at flight level (FL) 380 near
Norfolk, Virginia. The pilots reported that they were in cruise flight in
visual meteorological conditions at 0.76 Mach about 70 miles south of
Norfolk when air traffic control gave them a new heading that was toward
what appeared to be an upsloping cloud deck. The clouds were known to be the
remnants of tropical storm Alberto. The pilots stated that they were unsure
if they would remain clear of the clouds, so they decided to turn on the
engine anti-ice. They stated that they turned on the engines' igniters and
then retarded the power from 101.5 percent to 89.5 percent N1. The pilots
stated that after they had retarded the power but before they could reach up
to turn on the engine anti-ice, both engines flamed out simultaneously. The
pilots stated that they put on their oxygen masks, declared an emergency,
and turned towards Norfolk. The pilots stated that they maintained FL 380
while they slowed the airplane down to 180 knots before descending. The
pilots stated that they maintained 220 to 250 knots in the descent and that
the engines' cockpit indicators showed the engines were windmilling. The
pilots stated that the left engine restarted on its own at about FL 300 and
the right engine restarted on its own at about FL 240. The pilots stated
that they continued to Norfolk where they landed without further incident.
The airplane was operating on an instrument flight rules flight plan under
the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91. The two pilots on board were not injured.
Testing of the fuel that was drained from the airplane confirmed the fuel
system icing inhibitor was present and in the correct concentration and that
the fuel met the requirements for Jet A.
***END QUOTE***
The NTSB and the FAA, along with the engine and airframe manufacturers, are
investigating this most recent incident. These parties, along with company
representatives, also continue to analyze the previous incidents. As the
investigation continues, we wish to reemphasize our view that the
implementation of the procedure previously sent to our Beechjet crews will
mitigate the possibility of another such occurrence. I have included that
procedure below.
This procedure was sent in the 12/02/05 Safety Bulletin and remains
mandatory until further notice:
Before beginning a descent from high altitude cruise (above FL 300 for 30+
minutes), turn the boost pumps ON and engine anti-ice ON prior to reducing
thrust for descent. Once established in a stabilized descent (2-3 minutes),
they may be turned OFF, one engine at a time. Engine anti-ice should remain
ON if environmental conditions require its continued use.
We are fully cooperating with the FAA and the NTSB during their
investigation and are providing any operational and/or technical support
necessary. We will immediately inform you of any other procedural change or
pertinent information we receive as a result of the ongoing FAA/NTSB
investigation.
Your Program Manager, prepared the following speaking points if
concerned owners ask you what the Company is doing to address this
industry-wide issue. We'd appreciate you sharing these actions with them:
1. In 2005, we published loss of thrust preventative measures by
implementing additional procedures crews are to perform prior to beginning
descents from high altitudes; that is, Engine Anti-ice ON (which activates
the engine igniters) and Boost Pumps ON. We have been informed that these
procedures are being utilized by other Beechjet operators. It is important
to note, however, that the incident aircraft in the NTSB report did not
follow these procedures.
2. We are currently in on-going discussions with the FAA,
NTSB, Raytheon Aircraft and Pratt & Whitney to analyze this recent incident
and develop procedures to be used worldwide to prevent any reoccurrence.
3. We continue emphasizing aircrews should follow strict company policy
to monitor aircraft fueling procedures, ensuring fuel is free of any
contaminants, and that the fuel contains the correct concentration of icing
inhibitor. In addition, our Fuels Department in routinely audits
the FBOs we purchase fuel from to ensure they meet our high-level quality
control requirements.
4. We been working in concert with NASA Glenn Research
Center in Cleveland, Ohio, to determine the adverse effects of icing on
corporate aircraft. This cooperative effort began some time ago and while
it is not directly related to current events, demonstrates our commitment to
ensuring we maintain the highest levels of safety for our Owners and for all
private aircraft operators.
Thank you for continuing to provide our owners the highest level of safety
and service.
Be safe out there,
Members to keep them informed about our operations, and posting it on the
Crewmember Website. If you have any questions or concerns, please contact
any of your Assistant Program Managers, or the Safety
department.
________________________________
To each Beechjet crewmember:
This morning the NTSB confirmed that a Beechjet owned and operated by
another company sustained an in-flight loss of thrust on both engines on
June14, 2006. The aircraft was cruising at high altitude near convective
activity. When cleared to a lower altitude, after the crew reduced thrust
for the descent, both engines lost thrust. Engine anti-ice was not on. The
pilots stated the engines restarted on their own and they landed without
incident. Preliminary information indicates that the fuel was normal with
adequate Prist concentration. The environmental conditions and flight
profile were similar to previous loss of thrust incidents.
Here's the actual NTSB release
*** BEGIN QUOTE***
NTSB Identification: ENG06IA020
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Incident occurred Wednesday, June 14, 2006 in Norfolk, VA
Aircraft: Raytheon Corporate Jets Beechjet 400A, registration: N440DS
Injuries: 2 Uninjured.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors.
Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been
completed.
On June 14, 2006, at about 1615 eastern daylight time, Beechjet 400A,
N440DS, lost all power from both Pratt & Whitney Canada JT15D-5 engines
while the airplane was in cruise flight at flight level (FL) 380 near
Norfolk, Virginia. The pilots reported that they were in cruise flight in
visual meteorological conditions at 0.76 Mach about 70 miles south of
Norfolk when air traffic control gave them a new heading that was toward
what appeared to be an upsloping cloud deck. The clouds were known to be the
remnants of tropical storm Alberto. The pilots stated that they were unsure
if they would remain clear of the clouds, so they decided to turn on the
engine anti-ice. They stated that they turned on the engines' igniters and
then retarded the power from 101.5 percent to 89.5 percent N1. The pilots
stated that after they had retarded the power but before they could reach up
to turn on the engine anti-ice, both engines flamed out simultaneously. The
pilots stated that they put on their oxygen masks, declared an emergency,
and turned towards Norfolk. The pilots stated that they maintained FL 380
while they slowed the airplane down to 180 knots before descending. The
pilots stated that they maintained 220 to 250 knots in the descent and that
the engines' cockpit indicators showed the engines were windmilling. The
pilots stated that the left engine restarted on its own at about FL 300 and
the right engine restarted on its own at about FL 240. The pilots stated
that they continued to Norfolk where they landed without further incident.
The airplane was operating on an instrument flight rules flight plan under
the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91. The two pilots on board were not injured.
Testing of the fuel that was drained from the airplane confirmed the fuel
system icing inhibitor was present and in the correct concentration and that
the fuel met the requirements for Jet A.
***END QUOTE***
The NTSB and the FAA, along with the engine and airframe manufacturers, are
investigating this most recent incident. These parties, along with company
representatives, also continue to analyze the previous incidents. As the
investigation continues, we wish to reemphasize our view that the
implementation of the procedure previously sent to our Beechjet crews will
mitigate the possibility of another such occurrence. I have included that
procedure below.
This procedure was sent in the 12/02/05 Safety Bulletin and remains
mandatory until further notice:
Before beginning a descent from high altitude cruise (above FL 300 for 30+
minutes), turn the boost pumps ON and engine anti-ice ON prior to reducing
thrust for descent. Once established in a stabilized descent (2-3 minutes),
they may be turned OFF, one engine at a time. Engine anti-ice should remain
ON if environmental conditions require its continued use.
We are fully cooperating with the FAA and the NTSB during their
investigation and are providing any operational and/or technical support
necessary. We will immediately inform you of any other procedural change or
pertinent information we receive as a result of the ongoing FAA/NTSB
investigation.
Your Program Manager, prepared the following speaking points if
concerned owners ask you what the Company is doing to address this
industry-wide issue. We'd appreciate you sharing these actions with them:
1. In 2005, we published loss of thrust preventative measures by
implementing additional procedures crews are to perform prior to beginning
descents from high altitudes; that is, Engine Anti-ice ON (which activates
the engine igniters) and Boost Pumps ON. We have been informed that these
procedures are being utilized by other Beechjet operators. It is important
to note, however, that the incident aircraft in the NTSB report did not
follow these procedures.
2. We are currently in on-going discussions with the FAA,
NTSB, Raytheon Aircraft and Pratt & Whitney to analyze this recent incident
and develop procedures to be used worldwide to prevent any reoccurrence.
3. We continue emphasizing aircrews should follow strict company policy
to monitor aircraft fueling procedures, ensuring fuel is free of any
contaminants, and that the fuel contains the correct concentration of icing
inhibitor. In addition, our Fuels Department in routinely audits
the FBOs we purchase fuel from to ensure they meet our high-level quality
control requirements.
4. We been working in concert with NASA Glenn Research
Center in Cleveland, Ohio, to determine the adverse effects of icing on
corporate aircraft. This cooperative effort began some time ago and while
it is not directly related to current events, demonstrates our commitment to
ensuring we maintain the highest levels of safety for our Owners and for all
private aircraft operators.
Thank you for continuing to provide our owners the highest level of safety
and service.
Be safe out there,
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