So what's the story on this latest 400 flameout?

[HSDriver]

Great post and thanks.What I get is nobody knows the cause,so no fix.

There will never be a specific fix because they would have to admit the flaw. What you will get is some AFM changes and some mods and hopefully that will fix it before anybody dies. BTW I have heard of some people still taking the thing up to 430...

HS

 

[pamed19]

Raytheon has issued a statement on what procedures to follow.It is quoted in a new thread

 

[pamed19]

NTSB info

The NTSB has posted recommended procedures for the Beechjet.Still have not found the problem.

 

[infiniti757]

Ntsb

Here is a link to the NTSB recommendations.

http://www.ntsb.gov/Recs/letters/2006/A06_56_59.pdf

 

[ASC-LLC]

I'm sending this letter directly to each of you, emailing it to all Team
Members to keep them informed about our operations, and posting it on the
Crewmember Website. If you have any questions or concerns, please contact
any of your Assistant Program Managers, or the Safety
department.

________________________________


To each Beechjet crewmember:



This morning the NTSB confirmed that a Beechjet owned and operated by
another company sustained an in-flight loss of thrust on both engines on
June14, 2006. The aircraft was cruising at high altitude near convective
activity. When cleared to a lower altitude, after the crew reduced thrust
for the descent, both engines lost thrust. Engine anti-ice was not on. The
pilots stated the engines restarted on their own and they landed without
incident. Preliminary information indicates that the fuel was normal with
adequate Prist concentration. The environmental conditions and flight
profile were similar to previous loss of thrust incidents.



Here's the actual NTSB release



*** BEGIN QUOTE***



NTSB Identification: ENG06IA020

14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation

Incident occurred Wednesday, June 14, 2006 in Norfolk, VA

Aircraft: Raytheon Corporate Jets Beechjet 400A, registration: N440DS

Injuries: 2 Uninjured.



This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors.
Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been
completed.



On June 14, 2006, at about 1615 eastern daylight time, Beechjet 400A,
N440DS, lost all power from both Pratt & Whitney Canada JT15D-5 engines
while the airplane was in cruise flight at flight level (FL) 380 near
Norfolk, Virginia. The pilots reported that they were in cruise flight in
visual meteorological conditions at 0.76 Mach about 70 miles south of
Norfolk when air traffic control gave them a new heading that was toward
what appeared to be an upsloping cloud deck. The clouds were known to be the
remnants of tropical storm Alberto. The pilots stated that they were unsure
if they would remain clear of the clouds, so they decided to turn on the
engine anti-ice. They stated that they turned on the engines' igniters and
then retarded the power from 101.5 percent to 89.5 percent N1. The pilots
stated that after they had retarded the power but before they could reach up
to turn on the engine anti-ice, both engines flamed out simultaneously. The
pilots stated that they put on their oxygen masks, declared an emergency,
and turned towards Norfolk. The pilots stated that they maintained FL 380
while they slowed the airplane down to 180 knots before descending. The
pilots stated that they maintained 220 to 250 knots in the descent and that
the engines' cockpit indicators showed the engines were windmilling. The
pilots stated that the left engine restarted on its own at about FL 300 and
the right engine restarted on its own at about FL 240. The pilots stated
that they continued to Norfolk where they landed without further incident.
The airplane was operating on an instrument flight rules flight plan under
the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91. The two pilots on board were not injured.
Testing of the fuel that was drained from the airplane confirmed the fuel
system icing inhibitor was present and in the correct concentration and that
the fuel met the requirements for Jet A.



***END QUOTE***



The NTSB and the FAA, along with the engine and airframe manufacturers, are
investigating this most recent incident. These parties, along with company
representatives, also continue to analyze the previous incidents. As the
investigation continues, we wish to reemphasize our view that the
implementation of the procedure previously sent to our Beechjet crews will
mitigate the possibility of another such occurrence. I have included that
procedure below.



This procedure was sent in the 12/02/05 Safety Bulletin and remains
mandatory until further notice:



Before beginning a descent from high altitude cruise (above FL 300 for 30+
minutes), turn the boost pumps ON and engine anti-ice ON prior to reducing
thrust for descent. Once established in a stabilized descent (2-3 minutes),
they may be turned OFF, one engine at a time. Engine anti-ice should remain
ON if environmental conditions require its continued use.



We are fully cooperating with the FAA and the NTSB during their
investigation and are providing any operational and/or technical support
necessary. We will immediately inform you of any other procedural change or
pertinent information we receive as a result of the ongoing FAA/NTSB
investigation.



Your Program Manager, prepared the following speaking points if
concerned owners ask you what the Company is doing to address this
industry-wide issue. We'd appreciate you sharing these actions with them:



1. In 2005, we published loss of thrust preventative measures by
implementing additional procedures crews are to perform prior to beginning
descents from high altitudes; that is, Engine Anti-ice ON (which activates
the engine igniters) and Boost Pumps ON. We have been informed that these
procedures are being utilized by other Beechjet operators. It is important
to note, however, that the incident aircraft in the NTSB report did not
follow these procedures.

2. We are currently in on-going discussions with the FAA,
NTSB, Raytheon Aircraft and Pratt & Whitney to analyze this recent incident
and develop procedures to be used worldwide to prevent any reoccurrence.

3. We continue emphasizing aircrews should follow strict company policy
to monitor aircraft fueling procedures, ensuring fuel is free of any
contaminants, and that the fuel contains the correct concentration of icing
inhibitor. In addition, our Fuels Department in routinely audits
the FBOs we purchase fuel from to ensure they meet our high-level quality
control requirements.

4. We been working in concert with NASA Glenn Research
Center in Cleveland, Ohio, to determine the adverse effects of icing on
corporate aircraft. This cooperative effort began some time ago and while
it is not directly related to current events, demonstrates our commitment to
ensuring we maintain the highest levels of safety for our Owners and for all
private aircraft operators.

Thank you for continuing to provide our owners the highest level of safety
and service.


Be safe out there,

 

[ASC-LLC]

National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, DC 20594

August 25, 2006

************************************************************

Safety Recommendation A-06-56-59

************************************************************

The National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the
Federal Aviation Administration:

Immediately require Beechjet 400 pilots to activate the
engine ignition and anti-ice systems at high altitude
whenever they are in or near visible moisture, or near
convective storm activity, or before any power reduction
unless the pilots can verify that the airplane is not in or
near visible moisture or near convective storm activity. (A-
06-56) Urgent

Require Raytheon to incorporate the information regarding
anti-ice operation and ice formation contained in Safety
Communiqué' No. 269 into the Beechjet 400 airplane flight
manual. (A-06-57)

Incorporate the information regarding anti-ice operation and
ice formation contained in Raytheon's Safety Communiqué' No.
269 into the airplane flight manuals of other JT15D-powered
airplanes. (A-06-58)

Work with engine and airplane manufacturers and other
industry personnel as well as the appropriate international
airworthiness authorities to actively pursue research to
develop an ice detector that would alert pilots to internal
engine icing and require that it be installed on new
production turbojet engines, as well as retrofitted to
existing turbojet engines. (A-06-59)

 

[ASC-LLC]

Raytheon Aircraft Company Safety Communiqué 269

Raytheon's new BE400 Safety Communique for Dual Engine Failure

​

Safety Communiqué No. 272
August, 2006
TO: ALL OWNERS AND OPERATORS, CHIEF PILOTS, DIRECTORS OF
OPERATIONS, CHIEF INSPECTORS, DIRECTORS OF MAINTENANCE, ALL
RAYTHEON AIRCRAFT AUTHORIZED SERVICE CENTERS, AND
INTERNATIONAL DISTRIBUTORS AND DEALERS.
MODELS: ALL RAYTHEON MITSUBISHI MODEL MU-300; BEECHJET MODEL 400,
400A (INCLUDING HAWKER 400XP); MODEL 400T (T-1A AND TX) AIRCRAFT
SUBJECT: DUAL ENGINE POWER LOSS


In April 2006, Raytheon Aircraft Company (RAC) issued Safety Communiqué 269 to inform operators of
an incident in which a Model 400A experienced complete loss of power from both engines during descent.
The Safety Communiqué also reminded operators of FAA Approved Airplane Flight Manual (AFM)
procedures pertaining to operation in possible icing conditions, proper use of fuel system icing inhibitors,
and preflight inspections.


RAC is issuing this Safety Communiqué to provide updated information related to that event and other
occurrences of dual engine power loss. This Safety Communiqué also announces revisions to the various
model-specific AFMs. Due to design similarities, this information is applicable to all listed models.
From April, 2000 to June, 2006 RAC has received four reports of airplanes which experienced dual engine
power loss, including the incident referred to in Safety Communiqué 269. Following are brief summaries
of those reports (The referenced National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) reports may be viewed on
the internet at
www.ntsb.gov/NTSB/query.asp):

No NTSB Report
- On April 23, 2000, a Model 400A, Serial Number RK-122, departed Curacao and was
two hours 15 minutes into flight in clear air at an altitude of 41,000 feet (FL410) when the crew noticed
complete loss of power from the right engine, followed by a complete loss of power from the left engine
two seconds later. The crew reported they had experienced some thunderstorm activity, but were above
the tops of the clouds at the time of the incident. The left engine was successfully restarted and the
airplane landed without further incident at Macapa, Amapa (Northern Brazil).

NTSB Report ENG04IA021
- On July 12, 2004, a Model 400A, Serial Number RK-365, departed Duncan,
OK and was en route to Fort Myers, FL. Approximately 100 miles west of Sarasota, FL while descending
from FL410 in Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) the aircraft experienced a complete loss of
power from both engines. After several attempts, the right engine was restarted and the airplane landed
at Sarasota, FL without further incident.

NTSB Report DCA06IA007
- On November 28, 2005, a Model 400A, Serial Number RK-317, departed
Indianapolis, IN and was en route to Marco Island, FL. The flight cruised at FL350 for 45 minutes, then
requested an ascent to FL400 due to clouds. The flight was at FL400 for 30 minutes. The flight descended
to FL380 for five to 10 minutes and was in Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) in and out of the tops
of clouds. Shortly after decreasing power and initiating a descent from FL380, the crew reported a complete loss of power from the right engine, followed by the left engine ten seconds later. The crew was
unsuccessful in their attempts to restart the engines and landed successfully without engine power at
Jacksonville, FL.

NTSB Report ENG06IA020
- On June 14, 2006, a Model 400A, Serial Number RK-8 departed Quonset
Point, RI and was en route to Charleston, SC. The flight crew reported being about 70 miles south of
Norfolk, VA in VMC at FL380 with a solid cloud deck at FL350. The clouds were known to be the remnants
of tropical storm Alberto. After being directed to make a turn by ATC, the flight crew activated the engine
igniters and reduced engine power in preparation for activating engine anti-ice. After reducing engine
power but before activating engine anti-ice, the crew reported simultaneous and complete loss of engine
power. The crew was successful in restarting both engines and landed without further incident at Norfolk,
VA.

The last three incidents are still under investigation by the NTSB and no probable cause has been
determined at this time. However, it has been noted that certain circumstances are common to all of the
events:

*
The airplane was being operated near visible moisture and/or near convective activity.

*
The airplane was being operated at or above FL380.

*
Engine anti-ice was not in use at the time of power loss.

*
Except for the right engine from RK-317, which was removed as part of the investigation, all of the
involved engines remained in situ on the airplane and were returned to service. Subsequently,
there has been no reported loss of power associated with any of those engines.
FAA, RAC, and Pratt & Whitney Canada (P&WC) are cooperatively assisting the NTSB in its investigation
of these incidents. As a result of this information sharing, RAC has elected to revise the respective AFM
procedures in order to clarify them and to incorporate industry practice with regard to operation in or near
icing conditions.
With reference to the current Model 400A AFM, there are two CAUTION statements in Section 4,

NORMAL PROCEDURES.
The first CAUTION located under ANTI/DEICE SYSTEMS (IN FLIGHT
OPERATIONS) reads as follows:

CAUTION
Do not operate anti/deice systems at Ram Air Temperatures greater than 10°C unless in actual
icing conditions, as indicated by illumination of the ICING annunciator (If installed) or airframe ice
accumulation. Ice protection systems should be on prior to encountering actual icing. Turn
systems off when clear of icing conditions.
The second
CAUTION, located under DESCENT, states the following:

CAUTION
If icing conditions are anticipated during descent and approach, turn ice protection systems ON as
early as possible prior to penetrating clouds. Maintain wing/deice operation light ON
(approximately 70% N
2) during descent to assure proper wing anti-ice operation.

Safety Communiqué No. 272 3 of 3
The export of these commodities, technology or software are subject to the US Export Administration Regulations. Diversion contrary to U.S. law is prohibited. For guidance on
export control requirements, contact the Commerce Department's Bureau of Export Administration at 202-482-4811 or at
www.bxa.doc.gov.

While observance of these
CAUTIONS remains paramount, RAC intends to expand the definition of engine icing conditions to include:

*
Illumination of the icing annunciator (If installed)

*
Airframe ice accumulation.

*
At all altitudes and Ram Air Temperatures (RAT) of 10°C or less in visible moisture (Any
obstruction to visibility should be considered visible moisture unless it can be determined to be
smoke, dust or ash).

*
Above 20,000 feet MSL, and RAT of 10°C or less and any of the following conditions:

o
Within approximately 5,000 feet above visible moisture associated with convective
activity

o
Within approximately 10 nm horizontally of visible moisture associated with convective
activity

o
In visible moisture

o
At any time that the conditions listed above cannot be verified
As was noted in Safety Communiqué No. 269, no lower temperature limit exists for the operation of antiice
systems. Operators should be aware that air moving through the engine experiences a significant
temperature increase as it passes through the compressor section. This increase could bring the air
temperature to a range where internal engine ice formation might occur if Engine Anti-Ice were not
operating. Operators should not assume ice formation to be impossible at very low ambient temperatures
(i.e., -30 degrees C or colder).


In addition, Safety Communiqué No. 269 states that activation of engine anti-ice is not recommended
above 90% N1 to prevent transient exceedance of engine ITT limits. This procedure has been reviewed by
RAC and P&WC and it has been determined that reduction of power below 90% N1 is not required. Engine
gauges should be monitored and thrust levers adjusted (if required) to maintain engine ITT limits following
activation of engine anti-ice.


RAC will be releasing a Temporary Change (TC) to all applicable Model AFMs, with subsequent AFM
revision, to incorporate this information. Additionally, RAC intends to request an Airworthiness Directive
from the FAA to introduce and distribute this change both domestically and internationally.
As noted previously, the NTSB is still investigating these incidents. RAC continues to assist the NTSB in
this investigation and will provide additional information as required.
For additional information on operating in or near icing conditions, refer to the applicable Pilot's Operating
Manual (POM), Section V, General Information on Specific Topics, Flight Operations, Flight in Icing
Conditions.

 

[ERJFO]

Pamed,

Whats to stop you from selling your share and investing in another aircraft?

 

[CaptainSpaz]

Pamed,

Whats to stop you from selling your share and investing in another aircraft?

Nothing is stopping him. Just like there is nothing stopping you from posting an apparent random post in this thread.

 

[pamed19]

A right without a remedy is the ghost that starks us all!

 

[AceCrackshot]

NTSB is planning on implementing a recommendation that engine ice detectors be installed in all turbojet aircraft.