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So what's the story on this latest 400 flameout?
- Thread starter Ultra Grump
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CaptainSpaz
lackey
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pamed19 said:
I am as puzzled as the rest of us... but I have to agree that lack of Prist is seeming less likely.
I will tell you this, I am not going extended overwater unless it can be done under FL350 until this gets solved. And I am not talking about solved like TWA 800 or AA 961... still cant believe that guy referred to those two flights in reference to this issue.
RossTwivel
Member
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- Jun 19, 2006
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CaptainSpaz
lackey
- Joined
- Oct 20, 2005
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- 353
RossTwivel said:
Dude, your first post to this entire messageboard was a copied lesson in atmospheric science that you pasted directly from Wikipedia and added nothing to.
Your second post was erroneous and condecending, offering little to the substance of this topic.
I am not trying to sound smarter. It just ticks me off a little that you show up out of nowhere to give us a remedial lesson in the science of how to fly a jet.
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From today's AINalerts:
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] A Third Beechjet Flameout Under Investigation
On June 14, Beechjet 400A N440DS lost all power from both Pratt & Whitney Canada JT15D-5 engines while the airplane was in cruise flight at FL380 near Norfolk, Va. Unsure if they could remain clear of clouds, the pilots decided to turn on the engine anti-ice. They told the NTSB that they turned on the engines’ igniters and then retarded the power from 101.5 percent to 89.5 percent N1, but before they could reach up to turn on the anti-ice, both engines flamed out simultaneously. The left engine restarted on its own at about FL300 and the right engine restarted on its own at about FL240. Testing of the fuel that was drained from the airplane confirmed that icing inhibitor was present and in the correct concentration and that the fuel was jet-A. The NTSB is also investigating two previous Beechjet dual engine flameouts—on July 12, 2004, over the Gulf of Mexico and another on Nov. 28, 2005, near Jacksonville, Fla. Both of these aircraft were being operated by Flight Options. Investigations of all three incidents are ongoing.
[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif] A Third Beechjet Flameout Under Investigation
On June 14, Beechjet 400A N440DS lost all power from both Pratt & Whitney Canada JT15D-5 engines while the airplane was in cruise flight at FL380 near Norfolk, Va. Unsure if they could remain clear of clouds, the pilots decided to turn on the engine anti-ice. They told the NTSB that they turned on the engines’ igniters and then retarded the power from 101.5 percent to 89.5 percent N1, but before they could reach up to turn on the anti-ice, both engines flamed out simultaneously. The left engine restarted on its own at about FL300 and the right engine restarted on its own at about FL240. Testing of the fuel that was drained from the airplane confirmed that icing inhibitor was present and in the correct concentration and that the fuel was jet-A. The NTSB is also investigating two previous Beechjet dual engine flameouts—on July 12, 2004, over the Gulf of Mexico and another on Nov. 28, 2005, near Jacksonville, Fla. Both of these aircraft were being operated by Flight Options. Investigations of all three incidents are ongoing.
[/FONT]
*#$% Headwinds
Well-known member
- Joined
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- 58
OK, back from FSI and here is what they told us...
In the ORF flameout, the crew did as prescribed and lowered power to about 89% N1 prior to turning on engine anti-ice, and the engines flamed out before they could get the anti-ice on. They did get one engine restarted in the descent.
Apparently, FLOPS and NJ are telling their crews to turn on engine anti-ice in ANY visible moisture, even high altitude ice crystals. The theory is that perhaps those wispy high altitude clouds that you sometimes don't even realize you are flying in, have ice crystals that are turning into water vapor when they enter the engine, then build up in the low compressor. When power is reduced, presto...flameout. The advice from FLOPS and NJ is that there is no lower limit to use engine anti-ice.
The only problem is this latest crew reduced power prior to turning on the engine anti-ice, as required by the airplane manual to preserve the cool air boundary in the combustion can to extend engine life. It was reported by someone in the class (not an Options pilot) that FLOPS is recommending to turn engine anti-ice on without lowering N1 first. That would solve the theoretical problem at the probable expense of long term engine reliability and against the Handbook recommendation from Pratt & Whitney. I do know that a careful pilot can turn on engine anti-ice and reduce power simultanously without raising N1. That probably still doesn't prevent the heat from burning up the combustion can. The other suggested action of turning on ignitors and boost pumps before reducing power at altitude could be useful. Another suggestion thrown around by FLOPS crews was reducing power on one engine at a time, so at least you do not suffer a dual simultaneous flameout.
The thing that really annoys me is that Raytheon says it is unable to comment on the incident because it is a "participant" in the investigation. That just sounds like a chickensh!t backdoor way to try to avoid additional liability risk. They should at least have a "best practice" procedure out there already. Mutiple dual flameouts under similar circumstances should warrant either an immediate response or an emergency AD grounding the fleet in my opinion.
Another consideration. Both engines that were restarted were not lit until about 14,000'. That implies temperatures above freezing. If this were to happen in an area where the surface temps are below freezing, a restart might be very unlikely.
In the ORF flameout, the crew did as prescribed and lowered power to about 89% N1 prior to turning on engine anti-ice, and the engines flamed out before they could get the anti-ice on. They did get one engine restarted in the descent.
Apparently, FLOPS and NJ are telling their crews to turn on engine anti-ice in ANY visible moisture, even high altitude ice crystals. The theory is that perhaps those wispy high altitude clouds that you sometimes don't even realize you are flying in, have ice crystals that are turning into water vapor when they enter the engine, then build up in the low compressor. When power is reduced, presto...flameout. The advice from FLOPS and NJ is that there is no lower limit to use engine anti-ice.
The only problem is this latest crew reduced power prior to turning on the engine anti-ice, as required by the airplane manual to preserve the cool air boundary in the combustion can to extend engine life. It was reported by someone in the class (not an Options pilot) that FLOPS is recommending to turn engine anti-ice on without lowering N1 first. That would solve the theoretical problem at the probable expense of long term engine reliability and against the Handbook recommendation from Pratt & Whitney. I do know that a careful pilot can turn on engine anti-ice and reduce power simultanously without raising N1. That probably still doesn't prevent the heat from burning up the combustion can. The other suggested action of turning on ignitors and boost pumps before reducing power at altitude could be useful. Another suggestion thrown around by FLOPS crews was reducing power on one engine at a time, so at least you do not suffer a dual simultaneous flameout.
The thing that really annoys me is that Raytheon says it is unable to comment on the incident because it is a "participant" in the investigation. That just sounds like a chickensh!t backdoor way to try to avoid additional liability risk. They should at least have a "best practice" procedure out there already. Mutiple dual flameouts under similar circumstances should warrant either an immediate response or an emergency AD grounding the fleet in my opinion.
Another consideration. Both engines that were restarted were not lit until about 14,000'. That implies temperatures above freezing. If this were to happen in an area where the surface temps are below freezing, a restart might be very unlikely.
Last edited:
Beechjet flameout story in this month's AIN: http://www.ainonline.com/Issues/08_06/flamout_1.htm
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