Should the book be closed on AA587?

[RP 04]

So did the FO push the rudder pedals, or not?

 

[Dangerkitty]

"Why dont we compare W2's instead. Up to the challenge?" Pea brain.......
As I said B4, run along son.

Must be skeered.

 

[ils2minimums]

So did the FO push the rudder pedals, or not?

Due to the filter on the DFDR, we will never know. Did the pedals move as a result of the rudder movement, or FO inputs? Unfortunately, it'll take another similar accident before the answer will get a closer look from the government.

 

[aa73]

Due to the filter on the DFDR, we will never know. Did the pedals move as a result of the rudder movement, or FO inputs? Unfortunately, it'll take another similar accident before the answer will get a closer look from the government.

Exactly.... and like I said earlier, it is much easier to blame the pilot and his airline than an airplane manufacturer that supplies a big chunk of the US airline fleet. We will most likely never know.... so therefore, duh, pilot error.

73

 

[b19]

eeeet snapped beekoz eeeet eeeze plaztique

Silly Americans with your overbuilt planes.

 

[b19]

I just can't believe the pilot swung the rudder multiple times, why? It goes against a career of flying and training, maybe there was one agressive input, but not multiple inputs, it just doesn't make sense. They are not here to defend themselves and we shouldn't be so quick to condem, it just doesn't make sense. How easy would it have been to blame the pilots on the first one or two 737's?

 

[pipe]

A note about the NTSB animations link in a post above. Those animations are based on a DFDR whose data was deemed ineffectual until it was reconstructed by two teams from, of all places, Airbus.

It is entirely possible that Airbus didn't look at things in a particularly objective fashion.

It reminds me a little of a company that discovered that they broke the DC-10's engine retainer pin - and then subsequently shredded the report.

PIPE

 

[igneousy2]

This would not be the first time the frenchies have been involved in a cover up.

Read:

http://www.amazon.com/Unheeded-Warning-Inside-American-Flight/dp/0070219516

Unheeded Warning documents the investigation of AE 4184 in Roslawn, Indiana. One part of the book claims that the State Department reversed an FAA grounding of the ATR. Yes...the State Department. Read this and you will never take an ATR into known icing again.



Later,

 

[Huck]

I cannot believe that more was not made of this:

According to the NTSB, N14053’s maintenance log revealed that during a preflight check on the morning of the accident, "the yaw damper and a pitch trim control would not engage ... The computer controlling these functions was reset."

- Aviation Today

Not that I'm a conspiracy theorist here, but guess what Egypt Air, AA 587 and the Alaska MD-80 with the bad jackscrew all have in common? They all had trouble with autopilot and/or yaw damper systems either not engaging or failing self-test immediately prior to their accidents.....

 

[Dangerkitty]

This would not be the first time the frenchies have been involved in a cover up.

Read:

http://www.amazon.com/Unheeded-Warning-Inside-American-Flight/dp/0070219516

Unheeded Warning documents the investigation of AE 4184 in Roslawn, Indiana. One part of the book claims that the State Department reversed an FAA grounding of the ATR. Yes...the State Department. Read this and you will never take an ATR into known icing again.



Later,

I guess holding for about 45 minutes in heavy icing with the flaps down had nothing to do with it.

 

[Oh-ryan]

I cannot believe that more was not made of this:

- Aviation Today

Not that I'm a conspiracy theorist here, but guess what Egypt Air, AA 587 and the Alaska MD-80 with the bad jackscrew all have in common? They all had trouble with autopilot and/or yaw damper systems either not engaging or failing self-test immediately prior to their accidents.....

Egypt Air also had a bad "I rely on Allah" system. CVR indicted it went off numerous times before impact despite all attempts to engage it by the relief FO.

 

[igneousy2]

I guess holding for about 45 minutes in heavy icing with the flaps down had nothing to do with it.

Yes and no.

Yes the plane would not have crashed had they not been in heavy icing with the flaps down for 45 minutes.

No...it should not have crashed under these circumstances. The main cause of the crash was an uncommanded roll caused by the Ailerons moving because of the way the ice tended to acrete on the ATR's wing. It was not the typical load the airplane with ice and stall scenario.

Since you probably aren't going to bother to read the book as you have flown the airplane in question but still haven't bothered to gain more than a laymans understanding of what happened I suggest you A. read the book or if you don't like conspiracy theories...B. read the NTSB report.

http://www.airdisaster.com/reports/ntsb/AAR96-01.pdf

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable causes of this accident were the loss of control, attributed to a sudden and unexpected aileron hinge moment reversal that occurred after a ridge of ice accreted beyond the deice boots because: 1) ATR failed to completely disclose to operators, and incorporate in the ATR 72 airplane flight manual, flightcrew operating manual and flightcrew training programs, adequate information concerning previously known effects of freezing precipitation on the stability and control characteristics, autopilot and related operational procedures when the ATR 72 was operated in such conditions; 2) the French Directorate General for Civil Aviation’s inadequate oversight of the ATR 42 and 72, and its failure to take the necessary corrective action to ensure continued airworthiness in icing conditions; and 3) the French Directorate General for Civil Aviation's failure to provide the Federal Aviation Administration with timely airworthiness information developed from previous ATR incidents and accidents in icing conditions, as specified under
the Bilateral Airworthiness Agreement and Annex 8 of the International Civil
Aviation Organization.​

One of the main points was that the ATR had boots that did not extend far enough back to prevent ice from accumulating behind the boots especially in the area immediatelly forward of the Ailerons. A ridge of ice would form that disrupted the airflow around the Ailerons in such a way that it would cause an uncommanded deflection of the control surface.

It was later determined that the boots needed to extend X% (I forget the number) of the wing chord to prevent the undesireable ice accretion. The ATR boots at the time of the accident actually extended back far less than the X% that was calculated. The ATR boots were redesigned by ATR to extend back further...closer to X after the accident, but for some reason, going back any further would cause the entire wing to need to be redesigned. So the redesigned boots extended farther back than the accident aircraft, however, in the FAA's view it was still not back far enough.

The FAA was not going to accept ATR's redesign but the State Department used it's much higher political clout to force the FAA to cave. This was during a time period where the 737 european certification was being threatened because of the uncommanded roll problems that the 737 was having. Basically, it was "you revoke the airworthiness certificate of the ATR we'll revoke the airworthiness of the 737" kind of situation.


Anyway, I read the book a long time ago, that's the jist of it as I remember it.

I wonder why AE never lets any of their ATR's any further north than Florida?

Later

 

[Dangerkitty]

Yes and no.

Yes the plane would not have crashed had they not been in heavy icing with the flaps down for 45 minutes.

No...it should not have crashed under these circumstances. The main cause of the crash was an uncommanded roll caused by the Ailerons moving because of the way the ice tended to acrete on the ATR's wing. It was not the typical load the airplane with ice and stall scenario.

Since you probably aren't going to bother to read the book as you have flown the airplane in question but still haven't bothered to gain more than a laymans understanding of what happened I suggest you A. read the book or if you don't like conspiracy theories...B. read the NTSB report.

http://www.airdisaster.com/reports/ntsb/AAR96-01.pdf

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable causes of this accident were the loss of control, attributed to a sudden and unexpected aileron hinge moment reversal that occurred after a ridge of ice accreted beyond the deice boots because: 1) ATR failed to completely disclose to operators, and incorporate in the ATR 72 airplane flight manual, flightcrew operating manual and flightcrew training programs, adequate information concerning previously known effects of freezing precipitation on the stability and control characteristics, autopilot and related operational procedures when the ATR 72 was operated in such conditions; 2) the French Directorate General for Civil Aviation’s inadequate oversight of the ATR 42 and 72, and its failure to take the necessary corrective action to ensure continued airworthiness in icing conditions; and 3) the French Directorate General for Civil Aviation's failure to provide the Federal Aviation Administration with timely airworthiness information developed from previous ATR incidents and accidents in icing conditions, as specified under
the Bilateral Airworthiness Agreement and Annex 8 of the International Civil
Aviation Organization.​

One of the main points was that the ATR had boots that did not extend far enough back to prevent ice from accumulating behind the boots especially in the area immediatelly forward of the Ailerons. A ridge of ice would form that disrupted the airflow around the Ailerons in such a way that it would cause an uncommanded deflection of the control surface.

It was later determined that the boots needed to extend X% (I forget the number) of the wing chord to prevent the undesireable ice accretion. The ATR boots at the time of the accident actually extended back far less than the X% that was calculated. The ATR boots were redesigned by ATR to extend back further...closer to X after the accident, but for some reason, going back any further would cause the entire wing to need to be redesigned. So the redesigned boots extended farther back than the accident aircraft, however, in the FAA's view it was still not back far enough.

The FAA was not going to accept ATR's redesign but the State Department used it's much higher political clout to force the FAA to cave. This was during a time period where the 737 european certification was being threatened because of the uncommanded roll problems that the 737 was having. Basically, it was "you revoke the airworthiness certificate of the ATR we'll revoke the airworthiness of the 737" kind of situation.


Anyway, I read the book a long time ago, that's the jist of it as I remember it.

I wonder why AE never lets any of their ATR's any further north than Florida?

Later

Actually I tried to get the book a few years ago but at the time it was out of print.

I understand and don't dispute what you are saying. However, de-ice boots are only there to buy the crew some time and give them some options. They should not be used to stay in icing conditions that are moderate at best.

Furthermore, while the FO was holding in icing the Captain was in the back socializing with the FA's. Not really the best use of CRM in my opinion.

 

[whymeworry?]

I have studied hundreds of aircraft accidents using various archives. Every Airbus accident I studied was ALWAYS blamed on the crew. Post-accident, Airbus would alter/ re-engineer their cockpit controls or software (which in many ways places them at fault for not engineering correctly in the first place) but would still stand their ground that their product is safe and that it is the pilots who cause crashes.

When their Chief Test pilot flew that 320 into the trees (AF livery), they not only blamed him, they had him thrown in jail for gross negligence. Nevermind that he was flying the way he was taught. They still felt he was flying wrecklessly.

That sort of behavior, that of denial of engineer short commings, is the sole reason I think Airbus products suck. If their own test pilot gets the shaft, surely they're not going to stand behind anyone else.

I love the bus cockpit. Wish my airline flew them or at least wish Boeing would drop the archaic yoke concept. That said, the rest of the airbus as an airplane pretty much bites. I'll stick with Boeing.

 

[Metro752]

Airbus throws a lot of money at any incident/accident to cover up that their airplanes are garbage.

Google what happened to the poor guy in the airshow crash of one of their first A320s