Should the book be closed on AA587?

[Oh-ryan]

I cannot believe that more was not made of this:

- Aviation Today

Not that I'm a conspiracy theorist here, but guess what Egypt Air, AA 587 and the Alaska MD-80 with the bad jackscrew all have in common? They all had trouble with autopilot and/or yaw damper systems either not engaging or failing self-test immediately prior to their accidents.....

Egypt Air also had a bad "I rely on Allah" system. CVR indicted it went off numerous times before impact despite all attempts to engage it by the relief FO.

 

[igneousy2]

I guess holding for about 45 minutes in heavy icing with the flaps down had nothing to do with it.

Yes and no.

Yes the plane would not have crashed had they not been in heavy icing with the flaps down for 45 minutes.

No...it should not have crashed under these circumstances. The main cause of the crash was an uncommanded roll caused by the Ailerons moving because of the way the ice tended to acrete on the ATR's wing. It was not the typical load the airplane with ice and stall scenario.

Since you probably aren't going to bother to read the book as you have flown the airplane in question but still haven't bothered to gain more than a laymans understanding of what happened I suggest you A. read the book or if you don't like conspiracy theories...B. read the NTSB report.

http://www.airdisaster.com/reports/ntsb/AAR96-01.pdf

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable causes of this accident were the loss of control, attributed to a sudden and unexpected aileron hinge moment reversal that occurred after a ridge of ice accreted beyond the deice boots because: 1) ATR failed to completely disclose to operators, and incorporate in the ATR 72 airplane flight manual, flightcrew operating manual and flightcrew training programs, adequate information concerning previously known effects of freezing precipitation on the stability and control characteristics, autopilot and related operational procedures when the ATR 72 was operated in such conditions; 2) the French Directorate General for Civil Aviation’s inadequate oversight of the ATR 42 and 72, and its failure to take the necessary corrective action to ensure continued airworthiness in icing conditions; and 3) the French Directorate General for Civil Aviation's failure to provide the Federal Aviation Administration with timely airworthiness information developed from previous ATR incidents and accidents in icing conditions, as specified under
the Bilateral Airworthiness Agreement and Annex 8 of the International Civil
Aviation Organization.​

One of the main points was that the ATR had boots that did not extend far enough back to prevent ice from accumulating behind the boots especially in the area immediatelly forward of the Ailerons. A ridge of ice would form that disrupted the airflow around the Ailerons in such a way that it would cause an uncommanded deflection of the control surface.

It was later determined that the boots needed to extend X% (I forget the number) of the wing chord to prevent the undesireable ice accretion. The ATR boots at the time of the accident actually extended back far less than the X% that was calculated. The ATR boots were redesigned by ATR to extend back further...closer to X after the accident, but for some reason, going back any further would cause the entire wing to need to be redesigned. So the redesigned boots extended farther back than the accident aircraft, however, in the FAA's view it was still not back far enough.

The FAA was not going to accept ATR's redesign but the State Department used it's much higher political clout to force the FAA to cave. This was during a time period where the 737 european certification was being threatened because of the uncommanded roll problems that the 737 was having. Basically, it was "you revoke the airworthiness certificate of the ATR we'll revoke the airworthiness of the 737" kind of situation.


Anyway, I read the book a long time ago, that's the jist of it as I remember it.

I wonder why AE never lets any of their ATR's any further north than Florida?

Later

 

[Dangerkitty]

Yes and no.

Yes the plane would not have crashed had they not been in heavy icing with the flaps down for 45 minutes.

No...it should not have crashed under these circumstances. The main cause of the crash was an uncommanded roll caused by the Ailerons moving because of the way the ice tended to acrete on the ATR's wing. It was not the typical load the airplane with ice and stall scenario.

Since you probably aren't going to bother to read the book as you have flown the airplane in question but still haven't bothered to gain more than a laymans understanding of what happened I suggest you A. read the book or if you don't like conspiracy theories...B. read the NTSB report.

http://www.airdisaster.com/reports/ntsb/AAR96-01.pdf

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable causes of this accident were the loss of control, attributed to a sudden and unexpected aileron hinge moment reversal that occurred after a ridge of ice accreted beyond the deice boots because: 1) ATR failed to completely disclose to operators, and incorporate in the ATR 72 airplane flight manual, flightcrew operating manual and flightcrew training programs, adequate information concerning previously known effects of freezing precipitation on the stability and control characteristics, autopilot and related operational procedures when the ATR 72 was operated in such conditions; 2) the French Directorate General for Civil Aviation’s inadequate oversight of the ATR 42 and 72, and its failure to take the necessary corrective action to ensure continued airworthiness in icing conditions; and 3) the French Directorate General for Civil Aviation's failure to provide the Federal Aviation Administration with timely airworthiness information developed from previous ATR incidents and accidents in icing conditions, as specified under
the Bilateral Airworthiness Agreement and Annex 8 of the International Civil
Aviation Organization.​

One of the main points was that the ATR had boots that did not extend far enough back to prevent ice from accumulating behind the boots especially in the area immediatelly forward of the Ailerons. A ridge of ice would form that disrupted the airflow around the Ailerons in such a way that it would cause an uncommanded deflection of the control surface.

It was later determined that the boots needed to extend X% (I forget the number) of the wing chord to prevent the undesireable ice accretion. The ATR boots at the time of the accident actually extended back far less than the X% that was calculated. The ATR boots were redesigned by ATR to extend back further...closer to X after the accident, but for some reason, going back any further would cause the entire wing to need to be redesigned. So the redesigned boots extended farther back than the accident aircraft, however, in the FAA's view it was still not back far enough.

The FAA was not going to accept ATR's redesign but the State Department used it's much higher political clout to force the FAA to cave. This was during a time period where the 737 european certification was being threatened because of the uncommanded roll problems that the 737 was having. Basically, it was "you revoke the airworthiness certificate of the ATR we'll revoke the airworthiness of the 737" kind of situation.


Anyway, I read the book a long time ago, that's the jist of it as I remember it.

I wonder why AE never lets any of their ATR's any further north than Florida?

Later

Actually I tried to get the book a few years ago but at the time it was out of print.

I understand and don't dispute what you are saying. However, de-ice boots are only there to buy the crew some time and give them some options. They should not be used to stay in icing conditions that are moderate at best.

Furthermore, while the FO was holding in icing the Captain was in the back socializing with the FA's. Not really the best use of CRM in my opinion.

 

[whymeworry?]

I have studied hundreds of aircraft accidents using various archives. Every Airbus accident I studied was ALWAYS blamed on the crew. Post-accident, Airbus would alter/ re-engineer their cockpit controls or software (which in many ways places them at fault for not engineering correctly in the first place) but would still stand their ground that their product is safe and that it is the pilots who cause crashes.

When their Chief Test pilot flew that 320 into the trees (AF livery), they not only blamed him, they had him thrown in jail for gross negligence. Nevermind that he was flying the way he was taught. They still felt he was flying wrecklessly.

That sort of behavior, that of denial of engineer short commings, is the sole reason I think Airbus products suck. If their own test pilot gets the shaft, surely they're not going to stand behind anyone else.

I love the bus cockpit. Wish my airline flew them or at least wish Boeing would drop the archaic yoke concept. That said, the rest of the airbus as an airplane pretty much bites. I'll stick with Boeing.

 

[Metro752]

Airbus throws a lot of money at any incident/accident to cover up that their airplanes are garbage.

Google what happened to the poor guy in the airshow crash of one of their first A320s

 

[Amish RakeFight]

Maybe I'm confusing this with another accident, but didn't AA587 (really the particular plane in service at the time) have some issues with improper tail damage repairs which may have caused a weakening of the rudder. Am I thinking of JAL 747 empennage or was this a possible factor in the Airbus accident as well?

 

[Crossky]

Maybe I'm confusing this with another accident, but didn't AA587 (really the particular plane in service at the time) have some issues with improper tail damage repairs which may have caused a weakening of the rudder. Am I thinking of JAL 747 empennage or was this a possible factor in the Airbus accident as well?

I rememer that they determined that the inspections they did do on the tail structure did not determine that the tail had cracks or damage they suspected, and post crash, determined that it had.

Airbus explained it's rudder system at NTSB hearings; that model has speed variable forces and deflections built into it, moreso than you would get with aerdynamic forces with changes in speed alone. At higher speeds rudder pedal breakout forces are very high, and full rudder deflection requires less pedal travel than at low speeds. I remember the numbers in the 50 lb range for breakout and maybe approx 2 in for full rudder deflection. That rudder wasn't designed for use except during engine failures.

And yes, I believe the FO was partly responsible, and he was previously counseled by another AA CA for using too much rudder and overcontrolling with it.

And while at a small, now history LCC out of MCI, I saw the infamous AA upset recovery video that recommended liberal use of uncoordinated rudder.

 

[igneousy2]

Actually I tried to get the book a few years ago but at the time it was out of print.

I understand and don't dispute what you are saying. However, de-ice boots are only there to buy the crew some time and give them some options. They should not be used to stay in icing conditions that are moderate at best.

Furthermore, while the FO was holding in icing the Captain was in the back socializing with the FA's. Not really the best use of CRM in my opinion.

Seriously dude...read the book, or at least the NTSB report, you have clearly inadvertently swallowed too much of the propoganda/urban legend that surrounds this accident. AE-Roselawn was NOT a pilot error accident, the NTSB placed the blame squarely on the FAA and the French equivilant...The pilots were not even blamed as a contributing factor to the accident.

As far as the "pilot's socilizing" that was another attempt of the frenchies to deflect blame...the "socilizing pilots" that you speak of lasted a couple minutes tops and it was the flight attendant coming up to the flight deck and the crew briefing her on what was going on...along with 1-2 minutes of small talk that is common in a routine situation like holding. The frenchies made a huge deal about it and the media circus picked up on it.

As far as your criticism of the crew for continuing to hold...you have to look at it from what the crew knew at the time...

1. ATR did not prohibit and in fact RECOMMENDED holding with flaps 15 in icing conditions.

From the NTSB report that you still haven't read yet...

"Based on the information provided by ATR at the time of the accident,
holding with flaps 15 extended at 175 KIAS provides a more desirable operating margin for stall protection than the flaps 0 configuration. Further, ATR’s 1992 All Weather Operations brochure advised flightcrews that if they recognized that they were in freezing rain, they should, “extend flaps as close to V​

fe as possible.”

The danger of holding with/without flaps for an extended period of time is that the ice is going to have more areas to accrete onto for a prolonged period and the airplane is going to get heavy and stall...

This is NOT what happened. The "idiots holding with flaps" scenario is completey irrelevant in this case.

2. As far as holding in greater than moderate icing...the flight crew was clearly in "severe" icing conditions as the end results demonstrate. The problem with this is that the description of icing conditions is subjective and is dependent on the type aircraft experiencing the icing conditions.

From the AIM:

Severe. The rate of accumulation is such that deicing/anti-icing equipment fails to reduce or control the hazard. Immediate flight diversion is necessary.



They were flying into O'hare on a crap weather day, planes holding everywhere, in an airplane, allegedlly certified in flight in known icing conditions, the boots appeared to be keeping up, and they were continuously issued "rolling EFC's" and never really knew how much longer they were going to be made to hold.

I may be mistaken, but I think this crash was the catalyst to the EDC system that is now in place.

Before you throw any more stones I suggest you at least read the NTSB report...I even provided a link. This thread is about cover ups and this case is a perfect example of how different entities spin what happened in an effort to deflect blame. I think you are a victim of the spin-doctors.

Later​

 

[The_Russian]

I did not read the entire thread, so please excuse me if this has been mentioned:

There is a video of AA587 EXPLODING in mid-air. If the tail ripped off, I don't think the aircraft would have exploded IMHO.

 

[Amish RakeFight]

I did not read the entire thread, so please excuse me if this has been mentioned:

There is a video of AA587 EXPLODING in mid-air. If the tail ripped off, I don't think the aircraft would have exploded IMHO.

Do you have a link to this video?

 

[The_Russian]

Video

http://www.ntsb.gov/Events/2001/AA587/tollbooth_web01.wmv

Watch lane 13. There is an explosion. Then a fire ensuses as the aircraft falls toward Queens.

 

[igneousy2]

I don't know if I buy the explosion theory...looked like something came apart and it looked more like mist. It appeared white to me...I believe any other color would have appeared some shade of grey. Additionally, I would have expected some thick black smoke if it was from an explosion and fire.

 

[Gorilla]

The story goes: rudder departs airplane. Yaw ensues. Severe engine pylon side loads rip engine off, thus we get fire.

I don't know if I buy this, but it is very true that those big engine nacelles, when exposed to severe side loads, will say adios and depart the jet. The engine mounts are super-strong loaded fore and aft, not so strong with a side load.