DATE: 10 Nov 04
ATA: General MODEL: CL-600-2B19
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON CRJ200 CRASH IN JEFFERSON CITY, MISSOURI
The following message is sent to all Bombardier CRJ Operators and Bombardier Aerospace Field Service Representatives. This message contains information requiring attention and/or action. Please ensure timely and appropriate distribution within maintenance and flight operations departments.
DISCUSSION:
This All Operator’s Message is intended to provide Operators with an update on the status of this investigation.
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is tasked with leading this investigation. Assisting the NTSB are representatives from the Transportation Safety Board of Canada, Transport Canada, the Federal Aviation Administration, the engine OEM, the Airline, the Airline Pilot Association and Bombardier Aerospace.
Although considerably more information is known about this accident than has been announced to the public, Bombardier Aerospace is bound to a strict confidentiality agreement (as are all other parties to the investigation). Information learned during the investigation process must not be released, without the prior approval of the NTSB.
However, we believe the following will be of interest to our Operators. The quoted paragraphs below, were published by the NTSB in a press release dated October 20th 2004:
Begin Quote:
The National Transportation Safety Board today released the following update on its investigation of the October 14, 2004 crash of Pinnacle Airlines flight 3701 in a residential area in Jefferson City, Missouri, about three miles south of the Jefferson City, Missouri, airport. The crash resulted in the deaths of the two crewmen. The airplane was destroyed by the impact forces and a post crash fire. There were no passengers onboard, nor were there any injuries on the ground.
On October 14, 2004, the aircraft departed Little Rock, Arkansas about 9:21 p.m. (CDT), on a repositioning flight en-route to Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota.
Air Traffic Control
At about 9:43 p.m., the flight crew checked in with Kansas City Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) and indicated that they were climbing to 41,000 feet. At approximately 9:52 p.m., the flight crew acknowledged that they were at 41,000 feet. At about 9:54 p.m., the flight crew asked for a lower altitude. At about 9:55 p.m. the flight crew declared an emergency. At about 9:59 p.m. the flight crew requested an altitude of 13,000 feet. At about 10:03 p.m., the flight crew reported that they had experienced an engine failure at 41,000. At 10:08 p.m., the flight crew stated that they had a double engine failure and that they wanted a direct route to any airport (According to the Flight Data Recorder both engines stopped operating almost simultaneously at 41,000 feet.)
Kansas City ARTCC directed the flight to Jefferson City Missouri Airport. At about 10:13 p.m., the flight crew stated that they had the runway approach end in sight. The last radar contact for the flight was at 900 feet above ground. The plane crashed at about 10:15 p.m.
End Quote:
The flight crew of flight 3701 requested a descent below FL 410. Prior to the descent clearance being obtained, the aircraft Stall Protection System (SPS) activated to alert the flight crew of the onset of an aerodynamic stall. The SPS further activated to prevent the stall. The SPS system functioned several times, as intended, during the aircraft upset. However, the aircraft eventually aerodynamically stalled and aircraft attitudes beyond engine certification requirements were experienced. During the upset, both engines experienced a near simultaneous loss of power. At an altitude of approximately FL 290, the aircraft had been recovered to a stable flight condition.
The Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) was running by FL 290. The windmill start procedures, as defined in the CRJ-200 Aircraft Flight Manual (AFM) require a minimum airspeed of 300 knots indicated at an altitude of FL 210 or below before this procedure should be attempted. The 300-knot airspeed requirement was never achieved during the descent.
It appears that several APU starter assisted in-flight relights were attempted once the upper edge of the envelope was reached at 13,000 feet. The engine start attempts were not successful. The investigation is continuing.
Out of control from 410-290,
For an APU relight a couple of key steps must be taken-- 10th bleeds closed and APU LCV open. Below 13,000 of course.
