News just reported CRJ crash...

[Rhoid]

Some new info from another board:



Excerpt from a pilot who works with the safety portion of the union:

"Because the plane was empty, the crew probably thought they could fly at 410 no problem. Well the plane stalled and dual engine flameout occured. They recovered around 330 and tried to relight the engines. They spent the next 24 or so minutes getting vectors from ATC. Relight never occured and it looks like it was due to the slow airspeed they were tying to relight at. It sounds like the NTSB will be implementing the rule that CRJ 100/200's are limited to 350. It is a very sad way to learn a lesson, but the 200's should not be up a 410. Sounds like the engines were melted because of the heavy loads of fuel passed through and not enough speed. No checklists were used in the entire 24 minute period. Pinnacle uses memory items."

 

[JetPilot_Mike]

Some new info from another board:
Excerpt from a pilot who works with the safety portion of the union:
"Because the plane was empty, the crew probably thought they could fly at 410 no problem. Well the plane stalled and dual engine flameout occured. They recovered around 330 and tried to relight the engines. They spent the next 24 or so minutes getting vectors from ATC. Relight never occured and it looks like it was due to the slow airspeed they were tying to relight at. It sounds like the NTSB will be implementing the rule that CRJ 100/200's are limited to 350. It is a very sad way to learn a lesson, but the 200's should not be up a 410. Sounds like the engines were melted because of the heavy loads of fuel passed through and not enough speed. No checklists were used in the entire 24 minute period. Pinnacle uses memory items."

I'm not saying that I agree with this, but hopefully they used the QRH after the initial memory items for Double Engine Failure, because that is one long a$s procedure. Also, if they went to single engine driftdown speed (Vfs +30) that probably isnt fast enough to do a relight.

 

[efiscompmon]

And until now I thought that my Rhoid Rage was from tight, damp undies. Didn't know it was from the tool above.

-----

Yes there are memory items, followed by a CHECKLIST--big red tab. Hard to miss.

NTSB doesn't implement ANY rules--my private pilot applicants know that.

Engines were melted? WTF?

I know almost every person on PCL's Air safety committee and their chair once flew as my FO--none of them would say sh!t if they had a mouth full of it.

Clearly it's more than your mouth--you're full of it.

 

[Rhoid]

Don't shoot the messenger, I copied from another message board pal.

 

[Palerider957]

If the engines are found to be at fault, this has tremendous implications in a world full of CRJ's. At ASA we have certainly had our share of probs. with the GE engines.

I'm concerned that (like the NYC Airbus) crash, they will quickly blame the pilots. It's easier to blame two dead guys, then ground a world full of airplanes. I have a feeling this investigation will get nasty.

 

[efiscompmon]

care to source that message board?

 

[Relic01]

Godspeed to both of these guys. May their sould rest in peace. These are difficult times and they require strength in grieving with our colleagues at Pinnacle and the families of these gentlemen. However, we must never forget what caused this tragedy, we have a very dangerous job. I have heard new hires tell me that this is the easiest job they have ever had...not so. This job is dangerous and very difficult. We can never rest on our laurels or become complacent.

There should be a forum for the safety issues within our industry without bashing.

...to be continued.

 

[Lear70]

Flamebait

Don't shoot the messenger, I copied from another message board pal.

No you didn't... at least not from any message board associated with Pinnacle Airlines or our Safety Committee. This isn't ANYWHERE on our ALPA board or our private message board, so I have to call "BULLSH*T" on you buddy, and pretty uninformed B.S. at that because,

1. Engines don't spontaneously "Melt". If it was operating at 41,0 using max climb thrust, engine temperatures would be about 100 deg C below red line which is probably another 300 to 400 degrees below where damage starts occurring, not to mention most of the moving parts in there are titanium which wouldn't "melt" until about 1500 deg C. Do you even know what the normal operating temp of a turbine engine is? Oh, I forgot, you only fly bugsmashers.

2. The aircraft doesn't have to be accelerated to spool the engine up to do a relight if you're using a "starter assisted" relight.

3. Info from the paper says people on the ground saw landing lights - that requires AC electrical power which means the APU more than likely WAS running, but even if it wasn't and the people on the ground are not remembering clearly, the checklist VERY CLEARLY gives the windmilling relight flight envelop of which I have no doubt Captain Rhodes would have followed correctly.

You don't know anything, stop spreading smack or quote your source.

 

[Crossky]

I'm not a crash expert, but I've been thinking about the possible causes of this and would like to share them. This is a tragedy and I don't mean to disrespect or demean the cerw for anything they did or didn't do. I'll try not to speculate on that too much.

the NTSB is now saying that both engines stalled or failed at FL410, and the aircraft's 15th stage bleed system was worked on by mechanics after an aborted TO in Little Rock after the crew received a 14th stage bleed overheat warning.

I don't have a CRJ200 MEL in front of me, but I assume maint MEL'D the 14th stage bleed system, which provides bleed air to the cowl and wing anti-ice systems. I assume they rendered the 14th stage shut off valves (SOV) closed, possibly placarding the cockpit switches and physically safety wiring the SOV's closed. I propose that the cowl and wing anti-ice was inoperative per the MEL. This means the crew had to avoid icing conditions in flight and be dispatched safely on a route and altitude which would permit them to avoid icing conditions.

If they encountered icing condtions and were unable to use the cowl anti-ice, that would endanger the engines.

Additionally, another scenario is that the CRJ200 has a limitation that if you operate it above FL400 then one air conditioning unit (PACK) or cowl anti-ice must be selected on for each engine. If somehow one or both PACK's failed at FL410 the aircraft would be operating in violation of this limitation, especially because the cowl anti-ice would be inoperative. I don't know the exact reason for this limitation, I asked during training and the instructor didn't know. I guess it would have to do with the engine needing to get rid of excess air at that altitude to enable combustion to continue. I don't believe dispatch would have filed the flight at FL410 if they had read the MEL and been doing their homework.

The PACK's have fewer protections if operated in manual mode. With two pilots and no passengers at FL410, it would've been a cold one and the PACK's would need a high output duct supply temp to warm the cabin. According to my system class notes automatic pack shutdown occurs if the pack outlet temp exceed 93 - 103 degrees C while being operated in manual mode. The PACK's have a high temp shutdown protection in Automatic mode.

Additionally, if somehow the aircraft was operated with one PACK inoperative at FL410, that is another limitation violation. The maximum single PACK altitude is FL250. I assume this is for the capability of the aircraft to have satisfactory pressurization, my fear is it also has to do with the operating pressure of the PACK. My systems notes tell me that during dual pack operation the pressure delivered to the packs is regulated to 30 psi on the ground, 41 psi for single pack operations, and the pack will shutdown with a pressure of greater than 51 psi.

If they encountered icing this theory accounts for a dual engine loss, if they lost one pack it proposes why they lost one engine and is murkey on the second loss. I have no idea why they were not able to restart the engines.

I can't believe another crash happened in MO. Continued thoughts and prayers go out for those affected by the Corporate Airlines crash.

 

[Russ]

Icing at 410 is unlikely.

 

[Crossky]

Icing at 410 is unlikely.

Ok, you make a valid point. I read somewhere there were scattered to broken clouds that night, don't know what altitudes. STD temp at FL410 is -67 C according to standard lapse rate, but I believe it would be higher than that.

I read the NTSB release from yesterday, it looks like Maint replaced the R 14th stage bleed air sensing loop. After a satisfactory test they released the aircraft to service. The plane had a history of ignitor replacements also.

So, my theory of operating with an inoperative cowl and wing anti-ice system appears to be proven false.

My mouth and my theories are shut for now.

 

[Tycer]

3. Info from the paper says people on the ground saw landing lights - that requires AC electrical power which means the APU more than likely WAS running, but even if it wasn't and the people on the ground are not remembering clearly,

Or the ADG was deployed.

 

[Crossky]

The NTSB reported thermal damage to the R engine. Looks like the bleed air system could posibly have been involved after all. The NTSB release is as below.



NTSB Advisory
National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, DC 20594
October 20, 2004
UPDATE ON PINNACLE AIRLINES CRASH IN JEFFERSON CITY, MISSOURI

The National Transportation Safety Board today released the following update on its investigation of the October 14, 2004 crash of Pinnacle Airlines flight 3701 in a residential area in Jefferson City, Missouri, about three miles south of the Jefferson City, Missouri, airport. The crash resulted in the deaths of the two crewmen. The airplane was destroyed by the impact forces and a post crash fire. There were no passengers onboard, nor were there any injuries on the ground.

On October 14, 2004, the aircraft departed Little Rock, Arkansas about 9:21 p.m. (CDT), on a repositioning flight en-route to Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota.

Air Traffic Control
At about 9:43 p.m., the flight crew checked in with Kansas City Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) and indicated that they were climbing to 41,000 feet. At approximately 9:52 p.m., the flight crew acknowledged that they were at 41,000 feet. At about 9:54 p.m., the flight crew asked for a lower altitude. At about 9:55 p.m. the flight crew declared an emergency. At about 9:59 p.m. the flight crew requested an altitude of 13,000 feet. At about 10:03 p.m., the flight crew reported that they had experienced an engine failure at 41,000. At 10:08 p.m., the flight crew stated that they had a double engine failure and that they wanted a direct route to any airport (According to the Flight Data Recorder both engines stopped operating almost simultaneously at 41,000 feet.) Kansas City ARTCC directed the flight to Jefferson City Missouri Airport. At about 10:13 p.m., the flight crew stated that they had the runway approach end in sight. The last radar contact for the flight was at 900 feet above ground. The plane crashed at about 10:15 p.m.

Maintenance
On October 14, the day of the accident, the airplane underwent maintenance to replace the 14th stage bleed air- sensing loop on the right engine. During a scheduled 7:45 a.m. departure from Little Rock, Arkansas to Minneapolis St.-Paul, Missouri, an Indicating Crew Alerting System (ICAS) message stating "R 14th duct" occurred during take- off and the flight crew (not the accident crew) aborted the take-off and returned to the gate. The 21 passengers were deplaned. The airplane never left the ground. Two mechanics from Pinnacle's Memphis, Tennessee facility did the repair. During a Safety Board interview on Saturday, the mechanics stated that they only replaced the No. 2 (right) engine's 14th stage bleed air sensing loop. The mechanics completed the repair and tested the system. The aircraft was released for flight. On-scene evidence confirms that the repair was done in accordance with the Aircraft Maintenance Manual.

The aircraft was equipped with two GE CF34-3B1 engines. The right engine had accumulated 2,303 hours and 1,971 cycles since new. It was installed new on the aircraft on October 23, 2003. The left hand engine had 8,856 hours and 8,480 cycles since new. It was removed from another aircraft on October 30, 2003 and installed on the accident aircraft on April 6, 2004. Maintenance records indicate that during an A4 check on June 9, 2004, the left engine igniters were replaced. During an A5 check on August 18, 2004, the right engine igniters were replaced. The most recent check was the A5 check performed on August 18, 2004.

Operations
The Operations group traveled to Memphis to interview pilots who had flown with the two crew members and to interview some of the airlines training personnel and managers. There are 10 to 12 interviews scheduled.

Wreckage
On-scene examination of the wreckage shows there was no sign of an in-flight fire on the structure of the aircraft. The airplane was found inverted and separated in several sections. All four major flight surfaces were found at the main wreckage site. The cockpit area was severely damaged by the post crash fire.

During the Safety Board's examination of the engines, it was noted that there was some thermal damage to the No. 2 engine and that will be further looked at during a teardown in Lynn, Mass. The engines will be shipped out today.

The wreckage is being shipped to Rantoul, Kansas.

Since the accident, the operator, Pinnacle Airlines, has placed a new company altitude restriction on the flight ceiling for their CL600-2B19s of 37,000 feet.

Parties to the investigation are Pinnacle Airlines, Federal Aviation Administration, Air Line Pilot's Association, National Air Traffic Controller's Association, and General Electric (GE). The Transportation Safety Board of Canada has sent an accredited representative along with technical advisors from Transport Canada, the agency that certified the aircraft, and Bombardier Aerospace, the manufacture of the aircraft.

NTSB Media Contact: Terry N. Williams, (202) 314-6100, [email protected]

 

[VABB]

Some new info from another board:



Excerpt from a pilot who works with the safety portion of the union:

"Because the plane was empty, the crew probably thought they could fly at 410 no problem. Well the plane stalled and dual engine flameout occured. They recovered around 330 and tried to relight the engines. They spent the next 24 or so minutes getting vectors from ATC. Relight never occured and it looks like it was due to the slow airspeed they were tying to relight at. It sounds like the NTSB will be implementing the rule that CRJ 100/200's are limited to 350. It is a very sad way to learn a lesson, but the 200's should not be up a 410. Sounds like the engines were melted because of the heavy loads of fuel passed through and not enough speed. No checklists were used in the entire 24 minute period. Pinnacle uses memory items."

Actually, the cause of this crash is quite simple. Gravity simply outweighed lift and the ground won.

 

[efiscompmon]

Well, Vabb does have a point.

The ADG cannot power the landing lights.

As indicated, the 14th stage had only their sensor loop replaced; so they wouldn't have been MELed--something that isn't regularly done because the thrust reversers are off of it too.

The igniters were not replaced abnormally early. In a 727, where continuous is selected for every t/o, we replace them even sooner.

In real life, air starting a turbofan is not the easiest endeavor.

That thermal damage could have been me in DTW a while back. Going to the 'zoo with twelve pax and 4000# of fuel--TLAR'ed the thrust levers, hit 103 on the left N1 before the FO trimmed it and lept off the runway in about 3600 feet. Cleared to 10, got a restriction for 8000 at 7000. Stopped the climb at 8600. I love giving IOE.

the operator, Pinnacle Airlines, has placed a new company altitude restriction on the flight ceiling for their CL600-2B19s of 37,000 feet

I believe it's called ballast. Which, had we paid for the mod, we wouldn't have to carry the weight, burn the fuel and bump cockpit jumpseaters. Good job, J.Y.! Just like those two-piece oxygen masks. Scumbags.

 

[enigma]

NTSB Advisory
National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, DC 20594
October 20, 2004
UPDATE ON PINNACLE AIRLINES CRASH IN JEFFERSON CITY, MISSOURI



Air Traffic Control
At about 9:43 p.m., the flight crew checked in with Kansas City Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) and indicated that they were climbing to 41,000 feet. At approximately 9:52 p.m., the flight crew acknowledged that they were at 41,000 feet. At about 9:54 p.m., the flight crew asked for a lower altitude. At about 9:55 p.m. the flight crew declared an emergency. At about 9:59 p.m. the flight crew requested an altitude of 13,000 feet. At about 10:03 p.m., the flight crew reported that they had experienced an engine failure at 41,000. At 10:08 p.m., the flight crew stated that they had a double engine failure and that they wanted a direct route to any airport (According to the Flight Data Recorder both engines stopped operating almost simultaneously at 41,000 feet.) Kansas City ARTCC directed the flight to Jefferson City Missouri Airport. At about 10:13 p.m., the flight crew stated that they had the runway approach end in sight. The last radar contact for the flight was at 900 feet above ground. The plane crashed at about 10:15 p.m.

I realize that this is a preliminary report, but it contains too many questions.
The published timeline is really a big question. First, it states that the crew reached FL410 at 9:52, then two minutes later (9:54)they asked for lower. Then one minute (9:55) later they declared an emergency. Then, four minutes later (9:59) they asked for 13000ft. Four minutes later (10:03), they told ATC that they had experienced an engine failure at FL410. Five minutes later (10:08) and a full 14 minutes from the initial lower request and 13 minutes after the emergency declaration, they told ATC that they had experienced dual engine failure and asked for vectors to the nearest airport.

I wish the NTSB would either give more complete info, or just withhold any info until they can give more complete inf. From the quoted report, it is fair to ask: why the crew asked for lower but not initially declare an emergency?, was the airplane descending between 9:55 and 9:59?, why they didn't initially report a dual engine failure (when the FDR indicates that both engines failed at FL410)?, did they report a failure but the initial report is just too brief to include all of that info?, why did they ask for 13000ft?, and most bothersome, why did they wait 13 minutes for asking for vectors to the nearest airport?

I hope that the brevity of the report is the cause of my confusion, and that these seeming discrepancies will be resolved when more information comes out.

I'm not questioning the crew, I'm just trying to make sense of this published timeline.

Any ideas?

enigma

 

[hmmm]

13000 is where you can do an engine start off of the apu. Meanwhile on the way down you begin to accelerate from 240 kts at about 25000 to reach at least 300 kts by passing 21000 where you begin to try to windmill start on your way down to 13000.

At 13000 feet bleed air can be extracted from the apu to start an engine while slowing down to aproximately 170 to 190kts depending on weight. This at an ITT of 90 or lower and at least 28% N2 after pressing the start button and a one minute starter motor duration with a start time limit of 25 seconds to acheive a stable idle after moving fuel lever from off to on.

If no start, fuel lever back off and motoring stopped by pressing the stop button and wait 30 seconds before trying again.

All the while airspeed is decreasing and must begin descent again reaching 170 to 190 kts again depending on weight in order to maintain speed.

This is not speculation.

This is right out of the Bombardier QRH. The airline in question uses a direct copy of Bombardiers QRH.

The aircraft was certified for flight at 410 by the manufacturer, the FAA and Transport Canada at the wieght and ISA temp on the night of the crash.


All the above is public information.

 

[N813CA]

41,000 ft which The RJ can and has done many times empty, is not because of the engines. They certify that because the FAA determines the aircraft pressurization can go to that, without structural damage. With a Margin of error.

 

[hmmm]

41,000 ft ---------->They certify that because the FAA determines the aircraft pressurization can go to that, without structural damage. With a Margin of error.

NO! That flat out is NOT the case.

It is FLAT OUT certified and tested throughout ALL regimes for civil passenger use up to FL 410 at the temp and weight on board the aircraft that night.

Their are buffer factors built in and tested in ALL regimes. The aircraft is certified for civil passenger use to that altitude at specific weights and temps.

Thats it.

There is no cert to that altitude just because the pressurization can make it there.

They certify the whole aircraft for passenger use to FL 410 as long as the wieght and temp meet the peramiters listed in the book.

They may have not been able to re-light the engines for some reason.
But the pilots are not the ones who certified the aircraft for that altitude. Transport Canada, FAA and Bombardier did.

There is no reason to doubt that certification so there should be no shirking of responsibility by the authorities that the pilots should not have been there.

 

[CF34-3B1]

I wish the NTSB would either give more complete info, or just withhold any info until they can give more complete inf. From the quoted report, it is fair to ask: why the crew asked for lower but not initially declare an emergency?, was the airplane descending between 9:55 and 9:59?, why they didn't initially report a dual engine failure (when the FDR indicates that both engines failed at FL410)?, did they report a failure but the initial report is just too brief to include all of that info?, why did they ask for 13000ft?, and most bothersome, why did they wait 13 minutes for asking for vectors to the nearest airport?

I hope that the brevity of the report is the cause of my confusion, and that these seeming discrepancies will be resolved when more information comes out.

I'm not questioning the crew, I'm just trying to make sense of this published timeline.

Any ideas?

enigma

Just a guess here, but one reason they may have requested lower before declaring an emergency could be they got too slow in the climb. Remember, mass airflow is critical to these engines. Get too slow, and firewalling the thrust levers will not give you any help. And what was it they used to tell us, the last 10% of the RPM is where 25% of the thrust is? I don't recall the numbers off the top of my head, but the point is, in the -200, you're so low on excess thrust to begin with, that if you get slow at very high altitude, you may very well not be able to accelerate, or even stop a speed decay.

This wouldn't explain why they were unable to relight one or both during the descent though.

My only guess would be some sort of fuel contamination or ice.

Guess we'll just have to wait and see what the NTSB says.