Not to pour salt on the wound, but as I recall from my interview with DayJet in April 08, the HR lady was quick to point out that DayJet does not in fact uses a seniority system. So to expect one out of thin air when it comes time to layoff is not entirely reasonable when one accepted the job knowing such is the fact.
However, I do think that laying off NOT in the order of hired or level of expertise (check airmen to be booted?!) is very bad manner!
As far as IF there are some sort of shenanigans going on with management, I cannot comment for sure. But bear two facts in mind:
1) The credit market is very very tight. Recovering from Billions of poor investments in the housing market, the banks are trying to stop the bleeding wherever and whenever they can. This lack of credit has put a few airlines out of business already (among other factors). Myself is a victim of this condition (Aloha Airlines).
2) DayJet's business plan, like Netjets, in order to be efficient, MUST be able to blanket the regions that it serves. This help reduces "dead-head" cost of repositioning flights, and provides customers with quick and reliable services. What good would taxis be if you cannot stand on the side of the curb and expect one to come by within 5 minutes?
It stands to reason then DayJet might have to shrink its service area in order to provide the frequency and reliability that serves by half the fleet. This of course, will turn some customers away. Its fair to say that Dayjet better find some capital, PRONTO!
This is terrible timing to start an aviation company (as there is actually no Ideal time!). Quoting from Warren Buffett's 2007 Berkshire's Annual Report:
Now let’s move to the gruesome. The worst sort of business is one that grows rapidly, requires
significant capital to engender the growth, and then earns little or no money. Think airlines. Here a
durable competitive advantage has proven elusive ever since the days of the Wright Brothers. Indeed, if a farsighted capitalist had been present at Kitty Hawk, he would have done his successors a huge favor by shooting Orville down.
The airline industry’s demand for capital ever since that first flight has been insatiable. Investors
have poured money into a bottomless pit, attracted by growth when they should have been repelled by it. And I, to my shame, participated in this foolishness when I had Berkshire buy U.S. Air preferred stock in 1989. As the ink was drying on our check, the company went into a tailspin, and before long our preferred dividend was no longer being paid. But we then got very lucky. In one of the recurrent, but always misguided, bursts of optimism for airlines, we were actually able to sell our shares in 1998 for a hefty gain. In the decade following our sale, the company went bankrupt. Twice.
To sum up, think of three types of “savings accounts.” The great one pays an extraordinarily high interest rate that will rise as the years pass. The good one pays an attractive rate of interest that will be earned also on deposits that are added. Finally, the gruesome account both pays an inadequate interest rate and requires you to keep adding money at those disappointing returns.