Hudson Ditching Left Engine Running at 35%

[starchkr]

Great stuff boys and girls...especially Pocono, first time i have actually been witness to his/her/it's posts. Remind me to NEVER fly on any airline that has E145's...i would hate to be depending on this person for my life.

A lot of us do not realize that during this incident, we not only have engines quitting and rivers to be hitting, but we have many distractions occuring in the cockpit as well. CRC's are blaring, ECAM's are dinging probably non-stop and pilots are trying to scramble for checklists that go WAY beyond the QRH or any short listed checklist in our immediate reach.

Someone mentioned that they were flaps two at touchdown because they may have taken off that way...maybe, but i believe by that time they would have reached at least flaps 1 (with acceleration altitude being 1000' AGL), and most likely they would have been up altogether (at 0 for us airbus guys) by an altitude of 3000'. Just a guess though. Also, as for not following the checklist exactly...well, i believe the checklist says to land flaps 3 in a ditching scenario...they landed 2, it seems to have worked just fine, and by all means the captain has every authority to land however he wants, he must just remember he will need to explain his reasoning later. I say flaps 2 was a good idea in this case, especially since they may have never reached any ditching checklists in the first place, so they did a fine job.

Someone also mentioned that 35% N1 "should" have been enough to extend their glide. Well...in short...NO. 35% N1 is nothing. In the air (according to Airbus) zero drag occurs around 40% N1 in a windmilling or operating engine, therefore anything below that is actually more drag than anything else. Other Airbus guys can confirm this...what setting does the bus put the engines at during a fully managed descent?...right around 40-44% N1 right...zero drag. So NO, 35% percent would have done absolutely nothing to extend any glide they may have had, in fact it may have shortened it by a fraction...but it still would have been enough to run the electrical system and the hydraulics.

11 oh no wait 29...yeah, another reason to not put my life in PP's hands.

 

[Benjamin Dover]

Or the possibility that the missile hit the left wing first....

I heard it was a missile too - probably the same shooter that brought down TWA 800. All a big coverup, same as it ever was .........

 

[Captain X]

I heard it was a missile too - probably the same shooter that brought down TWA 800. All a big coverup, same as it ever was .........

No, they already used that missile...

On the Pentagon apparently.

 

[PlaneDrvr]

Great stuff boys and girls...especially Pocono, first time i have actually been witness to his/her/it's posts. Remind me to NEVER fly on any airline that has E145's...i would hate to be depending on this person for my life.

A lot of us do not realize that during this incident, we not only have engines quitting and rivers to be hitting, but we have many distractions occuring in the cockpit as well. CRC's are blaring, ECAM's are dinging probably non-stop and pilots are trying to scramble for checklists that go WAY beyond the QRH or any short listed checklist in our immediate reach.

Someone mentioned that they were flaps two at touchdown because they may have taken off that way...maybe, but i believe by that time they would have reached at least flaps 1 (with acceleration altitude being 1000' AGL), and most likely they would have been up altogether (at 0 for us airbus guys) by an altitude of 3000'. Just a guess though. Also, as for not following the checklist exactly...well, i believe the checklist says to land flaps 3 in a ditching scenario...they landed 2, it seems to have worked just fine, and by all means the captain has every authority to land however he wants, he must just remember he will need to explain his reasoning later. I say flaps 2 was a good idea in this case, especially since they may have never reached any ditching checklists in the first place, so they did a fine job.

Someone also mentioned that 35% N1 "should" have been enough to extend their glide. Well...in short...NO. 35% N1 is nothing. In the air (according to Airbus) zero drag occurs around 40% N1 in a windmilling or operating engine, therefore anything below that is actually more drag than anything else. Other Airbus guys can confirm this...what setting does the bus put the engines at during a fully managed descent?...right around 40-44% N1 right...zero drag. So NO, 35% percent would have done absolutely nothing to extend any glide they may have had, in fact it may have shortened it by a fraction...but it still would have been enough to run the electrical system and the hydraulics.

11 oh no wait 29...yeah, another reason to not put my life in PP's hands.

Very good post, and very much to the point.

Also, all of the morons on here need to realize the 'fact' that from the time the a/c took off until it touched down in the river was only about 3 mins. (maybe even a little less, but look at all the times on the camera video and it shows it clearly). Guys, that is only 180 seconds, to analize the situation, look at options, make a plan (mind you a 'quick plan'), and 'try' to even start checklists. Think about your last sim session, and how long it took to do a checklist procedure, or just to go through the motions of try to shutdown or re-start an engine. Think about??

The clock starts NOW, you have exactly 180 seconds to make all the decisions, plan, talk to atc, move the switches. Quick; in 180 seconds you are either going to successfully ditch in the river, or CRASH!!!!!

Also, you point about Pocono 'pilot??' is right on. I can honest say that I would be more afraid for my life sitting in a plane today (or any other day) with her in the cockpit, than I would being on US 1549. It is a scary thought that they (any airline) let anyone that totally stupid, actually handle the controls of an airliner with real people onboard??

For what its worth.

PD

 

[Crossky]

Yeah, but that's assuming that there were even any geese at all.

So far all we know is that the plane had engine trouble the day before, one engine was still producing power, he CA considered turning back to LGA.

It's possible that there might be more that we havn't heard yet.

You've posted here how many times and yet have the gall to spread this disinformation crap? Any reputable website shares the facts that the NTSB has now found soft body impact evidence IN BOTH ENGINES. This means that yes, both engines ingested Canadian honkers.

http://www.avherald.com/h?article=41370ebc/0016&opt=0

Maybe, maybe they could've glided back to LGA. Don't know what the winds were at altitude, and gear down definitely would reduce your glide the final minute. Teterboro was definitely much riskier with shorter runways and no water next to it. If they tried for LGA and came up short, best case would've been ditching in the east river before the airport, worst case would've been no water nearby and landing in a populated area. Rikers Island with the big jail is nearby, and that would present an obstacle. Coming up short landing at LGA, ditching in the water, having to retract the gear again, and with not enough water to slow down in ('plane out' distance) would be bad as well. There were too many unknowns.

CA Sully made a good decision, a damn good decision.

 

[jimcav]

Another FI classic.

Just a friendly observation. Renting a Jenna Jameson DVD is not the same as having the talent to make her see stars and rip the sheets with her fingernails, no matter how good you feel when the credits roll.

Now if someone was pointing a loaded Glock at your head the first time you tried the MS Sim scenario, and knowing the trigger gets pulled if you screwed the deadstick, that might be a more valid test. Would be fun to watch on a webcam too.:laugh:

With the exception of a few Ty Webb classics that was the funniest thing I have ever read here.

 

[B6Guy]

Lets say that the left engine WAS putting out some thrust, or at least it WAS freely windmilling.

Who says that this was going to continue?? When was the engine going to sieze, and become all drag like the right engine??

Second guessing this is really stupid,, a good decision was made the outcome could not have been better. To overfly populated areas full of obsticles would be really stupid... The water landing was the best choice.

B6Guy

 

[Pervis]

Subject: 1st Official Accident Report

January 29, 2009


Subject: US AIRWAYS Flight US1549 ACCIDENT IN NEW YORK

FROM : AIRBUS FLIGHT SAFETY DEPARTMENT TOULOUSE

ACCIDENT INFORMATION TELEX - ACCIDENT INFORMATION TELEX

SUBJECT: US AIRWAYS Flight US1549 ACCIDENT IN NEW YORK

OUR REF: USA US1549 AIT N°2 DATED 23rd JANUARY 2009
Previous=2
0ref: USA US1549 AIT N°1 DATED 16 JANUARY 2009

SUBJECT: US AIRWAYS Flight US1549 ACCIDENT IN NEW YORK

This is an update to the AIT N°1 issued on 16th January 2009.

The information which follow has been approved for release by the
US National Transport Safety Board (NTSB) and represent the highlights
from the initial analysis of the available data: mainly Digital
Flight Data Recorder, aircraft components, ATC script and radar.

The A320 aircraft was operating a scheduled flight US1549 from New
York, La Guardia airport to Charlotte, Virginia on 15th January 2009,
when the aircraft ditched on the Hudson river shortly after take-
off at 15:30 local time.

The aircraft performed a normal flex take-off in slats/flaps
configuration 2 from La Guardia airport with the co-pilot as Pilot
Flying.

At time T0, soon after the aircraft was in clean configuration at an
airspeed of about 210kts, both engines suffered a simultaneous and
sudden loss of thrust at about 3000ft pressure altitude. The
engines N1 decreased abruptly to 35% and 15% on engines 1 &2 respectively.
This sudden and simultaneous loss of engine thrust is consistent
with the reported bird strike on both engines and also with the initial
observations from the remaining engine 2. (Recovery of engine 1
being still in progress).

The captain took immediately control of the aircraft making smooth
nose-down pitch inputs to maintain the airspeed at about 200kts.

At approximately T0+20 sec, the crew changed the aircraft heading
towards the Hudson river.

There was no more response from the engine N°2. The engine N°1
continued to deliver a minimum thrust (N1 around 35%) for about 2
minutes and 20 seconds after T0.

At approximately T0+2min20sec, the crew attempted at about
500ft/200kts, a quick relight on engine 1 without success.

The crew then selected slat/flap configuration 2 which
was achieved.

From then on and until the ditching, the heading remained almost
constant. The speed decreased from 200kts to 130kts.

Ditching occurred 3 minutes and 30 seconds after the thrust loss
in the following conditions: - Airspeed was about 130kts (at the Gross
Weight, Valpha max is 125kts and Valpha prot is 132kts) - Pitch
attitude was 10 degrees up and bank attitude was at 0 degree. - Flaps
and slats were in configuration 2. Landing gear up.

It is to be noted that at all times during the event and up until the
ditching, the normal electrical supply (AC and DC buses) and all
three hydraulic systems were fully operational and the flight control law
remained in Normal law.


In line with ICAO Annex 13 International convention, the US NTSB
(National Transportation Safety Board) continues the investigation
assisted by Accredited Representatives from the French BEA
(Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses) as State of aircraft manufacturer.
Airbus continues to support the NTSB investigation with advisors on-site and
in the various investigation working groups.

Airbus has no specific recommendations at this stage. Should there be
the need for recommendation as a result of the investigation,
operators will be notified accordingly.

Yannick Malinge
Vice-president Flight Safety
Airbus Flight Safety


I guess the French are in on the "conspiracy" too. Well done, crew. The only thing more amazing than what the whole crew did are the few idiots second guessing.