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FAA won't back training requirements

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Quote:
As one European captain told me "hand flying is dangerous"
"If you want perfect entertainment post a thread like this on pprune. "

Hey that sounds fun I need some free entertainment! Just like what Kevin Kline said in Fish Called Wanda, " you British think your so superior". It would be fun to mess with them.
 
Be prepared for a long battle. There's quite a bit of animosity towards "the yanks that don't know how to fly, lack knowledge, education etc."

Although I don't support the (total) reliance on automation, most EU operators have been quite lucky with regards to (no pilot-error) accidents. It might just be a statistical fact, since there are more flights in the US. Just my $.02.

Good luck!
 
Be prepared for a long battle. There's quite a bit of animosity towards "the yanks that don't know how to fly, lack knowledge, education etc."
I got a bit of that towards the end of a contract I flew over in Italy. I couldn't quote the book formulas but I nailed every single arc transition, waypoint transition onto the ILS, etc, and greased every landing, including the gusting to 40 kt winds they wanted to divert for (it was only 15 degrees across the runway for crying out loud).

Yes, you need book knowledge as well, but I agree that most pilots outside the U.S. are SOOO focused on the books and avionics that they forget what it means to just fly the airplane.

I suggested to the Ryan Air crew that scared me so badly on the crosswind approach in Rome that they should hand-fly the airplane down the approach (it was VMC) to get a feel for what the wind was doing, rather than waiting until 100 feet to disconnect the autopilot and suddenly have to start fighting for it just prior to the flare (I was in the 2nd row and could hear the cavalry charge disconnect tone on each approach). They looked at me like I had lost my mind and said "That's not our procedure." I answered "Well, what do I know, I've only been doing this for 20 years with almost 10,000 hours..." I'd call them idiots but I just don't think they know any better.

Although I don't support the (total) reliance on automation, most EU operators have been quite lucky with regards to (no pilot-error) accidents. It might just be a statistical fact, since there are more flights in the US. Just my $.02.
My money is simply that the system is SO structured and the Airbus and advanced Boeings have SUCH a low failure rate of the avionics suite that the automation takes the brunt of the problem when they DO have an abnormal or an emergency.

Honestly, after flying at Pinnacle for 5 years, I can absolutely tell you that the only thing that's kept MORE accidents from happening is the reliance on the automation, dedication to procedures, and sheer, dumb luck. You'll notice that most of the accidents have happened when either the automation was disconnected, overridden, or there wasn't a high enough level of automation (autothrottles) to keep the airplane flying when the flight crew did something stupid. In Europe, they've made things SO automated and are SUCH sticklers for procedure (autopilot on at 600 feet after takeoff, off 100 feet before landing, auto lands as often as possible in IMC) that it would likely take a catastrophic avionics failure with crappy weather to start having problems.

Stick skills are almost completely gone, and I also blame it on the Children of the Magenta training methodology. We're the old men, my friend. After our generation is gone, with the exception of military pilots, I don't think there'll be 1 pilot left in 50 who could fly a 20-series Lear or a 727 or even a Pitts if you threw them in one.
 
Quote:
As one European captain told me "hand flying is dangerous"
"If you want perfect entertainment post a thread like this on pprune. "

PPRune is funny, they seem to be speaking (writing, typing, whatever) English, but I don't understand a single thing they say.

They have some very peculiar ideas, BUT, I notice they hate the low-balling just as much as we do. Of course, they have no shortage of bright eyed wannabees, either...the only difference is they get their money from "mum" instead of "mom".

Nu
 
I've been in training outside of the States for a little over a month now, and I noticed something funny in the training center:

On the paper tigers, some of buttons and switches are pretty worn from use. The most worn area - the FMC Line Select Keys. The students over here must be memorizing things like PERF INIT - 6R - 6R - CI 30, etc. The screens don't work, but they're in there punching away. . .
 
Another chance missed

Yet another mark missed by one of our gov't. agencies. No, this is not a slam on the current White House residents, but a slam on the blinder wearing Feds, period!!

This was a window to correct a few short-comings and they (the FAA and Congress) failed to make a difference.

Not sure how many more people must be killed while traveling our nation's airways.
 
I got a bit of that towards the end of a contract I flew over in Italy. I couldn't quote the book formulas but I nailed every single arc transition, waypoint transition onto the ILS, etc, and greased every landing, including the gusting to 40 kt winds they wanted to divert for (it was only 15 degrees across the runway for crying out loud).

Yes, you need book knowledge as well, but I agree that most pilots outside the U.S. are SOOO focused on the books and avionics that they forget what it means to just fly the airplane.

I suggested to the Ryan Air crew that scared me so badly on the crosswind approach in Rome that they should hand-fly the airplane down the approach (it was VMC) to get a feel for what the wind was doing, rather than waiting until 100 feet to disconnect the autopilot and suddenly have to start fighting for it just prior to the flare (I was in the 2nd row and could hear the cavalry charge disconnect tone on each approach). They looked at me like I had lost my mind and said "That's not our procedure." I answered "Well, what do I know, I've only been doing this for 20 years with almost 10,000 hours..." I'd call them idiots but I just don't think they know any better.


My money is simply that the system is SO structured and the Airbus and advanced Boeings have SUCH a low failure rate of the avionics suite that the automation takes the brunt of the problem when they DO have an abnormal or an emergency.

Honestly, after flying at Pinnacle for 5 years, I can absolutely tell you that the only thing that's kept MORE accidents from happening is the reliance on the automation, dedication to procedures, and sheer, dumb luck. You'll notice that most of the accidents have happened when either the automation was disconnected, overridden, or there wasn't a high enough level of automation (autothrottles) to keep the airplane flying when the flight crew did something stupid. In Europe, they've made things SO automated and are SUCH sticklers for procedure (autopilot on at 600 feet after takeoff, off 100 feet before landing, auto lands as often as possible in IMC) that it would likely take a catastrophic avionics failure with crappy weather to start having problems.

Stick skills are almost completely gone, and I also blame it on the Children of the Magenta training methodology. We're the old men, my friend. After our generation is gone, with the exception of military pilots, I don't think there'll be 1 pilot left in 50 who could fly a 20-series Lear or a 727 or even a Pitts if you threw them in one.

You speak the truth brother. Different set of circumstances but this is "no country for old men."
 
"We view this option as being more targeted than merely increasing the number of total flight hours required, because it will be obvious to the carrier what skills an individual pilot has rather than relying on an assumption that a certain number of hours has resulted in a comprehensive set of skills,"

This is a "false-choice" argument. The argument implies that we must EITHER have improved checking or assume a certain number of hours is good. We CAN and SHOULD have both...then we don't have to assume anything about the skills.

I think those of you against the increased hours are wrong in how you are thinking about what the 1500 hours mean. Nobody is saying that a 1500 hour pilot means you are suddenly and automatically a competent pilot.

The 1500 hours, and the other requirements of the ATP, are a vetting process. If you get through 1500 hours without a violation, accident, incident, or busted checkride, then you have either a. exceptional judgment, b. exceptional pilot skills, c. are damn lucky, or d. have sufficient quantaties of a, b, & c in combination to have survived your first 1500 hours. This is a lot more information than an employer would have about a 250 hour pilot. This is the reason the hour requirements are there to begin with.

When/if you were instructing a pre-solo student and up until now a student was unable to perform a landing without intervention on the controls on your part. Now you turn final...you flare...the student greases it on! Do you right then and there jump out of the airplane and send your student back into the pattern on their first solo? Maybe some of you would but I wouldn't! Wouldn't you want to see the student do that at least two, three or probably ten more times?

The 1500 hour requirement of an ATP insures that the airlines are looking at enough of the history of an applicant. A 300 hour pilot really has very little history to review.

And besides...some of you are acting as if they are proposing a 10,000 hour requirement. This is an extra 1-2 years of flying beyond a basic commercial rating. Give me a break.

As for Babbitt...

I'm off the fence...up until now I have been trying to give Babbitt the benefit of the doubt on some other issues...but this is it. He is definetly in the pocket of the ATA. He should no longer be trusted.
 
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My belief is to forget about hours and just require an ATP for both seats.

Sorry, but anybody who is into flying must know what a stick shaker is. I don't care what type of training you have received, the stick shaker is one of the most alarming things that can happen inside the cabin in a mechanically trouble free flight. It basically says that you are seconds from the point of no return of dying a horrible death.

I seem to remember that both crew members of the Buffalo crash had more than 1500 hours. Tell me how this change in rules would have saved any lives on that flight. The problem seems more related to the fact that Colgon's training was (is?) CRAP. I seem to recall the among other things, the Captain had never been trained on what the stick shaker felt like. WTF?
 
My belief is to forget about hours and just require an ATP for both seats.
Well, since an ATP is already REQUIRED for the left seat, and since the ATP requires a minimum number of flight hours, I don't really understand what you're getting at here.

Sorry, but anybody who is into flying must know what a stick shaker is. I don't care what type of training you have received, the stick shaker is one of the most alarming things that can happen inside the cabin in a mechanically trouble free flight. It basically says that you are seconds from the point of no return of dying a horrible death.
Unless your profile information is incorrect, you haven't flown an aircraft with a stick shaker.

Do you know what the stick shaker is telling you, from a TECHNICAL standpoint and how it relates to VsO? Do you understand the difference between tailplane icing recovery and wing icing recovery techniques?

If you read the thread, and the BUF accident report, you'll see the crew was concerned with icing, and tailplane icing requires a completely different response. Not to defend the CA, who was PF, but he had less than a second to react to what he thought was going on... and he chose poorly, but that's NOT the primary cause of the accident.

The primary cause of the accident was the CA not paying attention (due possibly to fatigue, or possibly to him not having the skillset to be in that seat in the first place as evidenced by multiple checkride failures), not increasing power after putting the condition levers forward on the props and adding more flaps (thus adding more drag), and the F/O's chatterbox talking and not paying attention, all of which allowed the aircraft to slow to stall speed and neither of them catching the mistake because they weren't paying the fu*k attention to what they were doing.

They paid for their mistakes with their lives.

There's a lot of secondary lessons to be learned from this accident, for certain, and I've been an advocate of an ATP to be an airline pilot for almost a decade now having been made to suffer through enough 300 hour wunderkid children of the magenta to realize just how useless they are (single pilot would be better much of the time, I don't have to watch what the hell you're doing over there as well as flying - I'm not a babysitter), as well as question what someone with 3, 4, or even 5 checkride failures inside 10 years of a career is even DOING in the left seat, but the primary lesson learned is not to get distracted and if you're fatigued, don't come to work.

The push for an ATP is just an additional help to our profession from what was a horrible tragedy.
 

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