Engine Failure while Holding

[Airway]

Personally, I wouldn't continue to turn (especially depending on the direction of the turn, (i.e. into the critical engine). I'd get control first (even if it means level ing off for a sec and going through the mixture prop throt checklist), then declare an emergency immediately.


Airway

 

[mar]

As diplomatic as I can be.

Personally, I wouldn't continue to turn (especially depending on the direction of the turn, (i.e. into the critical engine). I'd get control first (even if it means level ing off for a sec and going through the mixture prop throt checklist), then declare an emergency immediately.


Airway

Listen my friend, lately everyone is pretty touchy around here, so I want to say right up front I'm not flaming you or trying to insult you or anything else.

But you should be able to make a turn into the dead engine with no problem.

It's much better to hold as published (stick to procedures) than to start improvising. There's a reason why you were assigned that position and direction of hold (terrain or traffic).

If you're not comfortable with turning into a dead engine then find someone who is and go practice it. It's a good confidence builder.

I've seen steep turns done (both directions) in a Seminole with one engine shutdown. Not a problem.

Good luck.

 

[ackattacker]

I agree with mar here. Under IMC you need to be prepared to continue flying whatever procedure you're flying. Turning the airplane (in either direction) is not really any more difficult than holding straight and level. You should have had to demonstrate this skill on your ME ride. Of course every situation is different, but in general you need to be mentally prepared to handle the emergency and continue with proper IFR procedures at the same time. You should train this way. It is bad news to develop an attitude than in case of engine failure you'll go straight ahead... what if it happens after takeoff and you have an obstacle DP? What if it happens doing a PT on an non-precision approach? Disregarding the IFR procedures could result in CFIT, or the abandonment of an approach that could have put you on the ground much sooner. Also, if you simply roll out on some random heading then you will quickly lose horizontal situational awareness.

 

[Lead Sled]

Aviate: Continue to fly the freak'n airplane be doing what it takes to keep it flying - like running checklists, etc.
Navigate: Continue to fly your clearance, i.e. continue to hold, if you are able. If you can't, ask for something you can do.
Communicate: Once you got things settled down and under control it would be the perfect time to declare an emergency and be moved to the head of the line.

Gee, I believe I've heard that advise in the past. I works pretty much perfectly here. Keep things simple. Avoid paralysis by analysis.

Personally, I wouldn't continue to turn (especially depending on the direction of the turn, (i.e. into the critical engine).

Airway, I almost hate to ask this, but are you really an MEI? Heavens man, you're not teaching that to your students are you?

'Sled

[Note: That's it, no more Mr. Nice guy, I've got to change my avatar.]

 

[FN FAL]

Why would you continue to hold? Out of courtesy to the other people who do not have an emergency? Or just to give you something to do until the second engine went fubar?

Is it always smart to re-light a failed engine?

Would you shoot the ILS if the AWOS said visibility was 1/4?

What would you do after you got the failed engine relit and you switched fuel tanks, both engines sputtered to a stop?

How long are you going to fly around with this "simple" engine failure, devoting all this time and effort trying to get the engine relit? What if you get it re-lit and the insides come unglued, placing you in a position where the prop can't be feathered, the engine comes out of the engine mounts or exhaust gasses cut your wingspar?

 

[FN FAL]

So why do they put those checklists in the manual?

For one reason only, to eliminate or reduce risk of liability lawsuits against the manufacturer.

http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief2.asp?ev_id=20030603X00765&ntsbno=CHI03FA138&akey=1

 

[Airway]

Alright maybe I oughtta rephrase what I was trying to say. I didn't mean stop everything , go through your secure checklist, etc. I was trying to just explain that you need to fly the plane first. In other words, if you're having trouble keeping control while maintaining the hold, focus on getting your plane together first.

I see where what I wrote could have been interpreted other ways, though. I just did a shitty job of explaining what I was trying to say. Your entering a hold and you have an engine failure (that's what I was always taught, more of as a rule of thumb), I'd level off for a few seconds if that's what it takes to get the plane together. I'd declare an emergency too, but until ATC clears me for anything else, yeah I'd still fly the hold.

The point I was trying to make which I did a shitty job of making was that I'd just be careful when turning into the dead engine (not that it's not doable). Again I just wrote that without really thinking, my main point was to fly the plane first.

Anyway sorry for that one. And no I've never taught anyone that (just picked up the Multi/MEI). Trying to think why I wrote what I wrote like that in the first place.

 

[Tarzan]

Is it always smart to re-light a failed engine?

Would you shoot the ILS if the AWOS said visibility was 1/4?

What would you do after you got the failed engine relit and you switched fuel tanks, both engines sputtered to a stop?

No. I wouldn't relit one after a fire but I'd damn sure let one burn off the plane if I was already on approach if it was still making power.

Depends, but if that was going to be the fact, you can forget the flair, roll the trucks. I guess it would have mean I can't get somewhere with the fuel I already have and what caused the first failure. Could the other engine have sustained damage also?

Switch back. Crossfeed failure. If something you do causes an unfavorable result, put it back. If this doesn't help, I say the same word every other guy has before augering, "Sh1t."

 

[FN FAL]

Switch back. Crossfeed failure. If something you do causes an unfavorable result, put it back. If this doesn't help, I say the same word every other guy has before augering, "Sh1t."

Here's another thought on crossfeed. What if you go to crossfeed and whatever was in the failed engine's gas tank caused your running engine to quit as well?

I know you strain your tanks, I know I do...but we're talking "simple" failures here. Which would be pilot caused engine stoppages? I don't know what a simple failure is.

 

[Airway]

And to clarify another point, in case that was badly put, declare an emergency before any improvising (If you are in IMC you can't really just go off unless ATC knows). If for whatever reason you can't declare an emergency, you better be able to fly the hold on one engine.

No more brain farts..

 

[FN FAL]

And to clarify another point, in case that was badly put, declare an emergency before any improvising (If you are in IMC you can't really just go off unless ATC knows). If for whatever reason you can't declare an emergency, you better be able to fly the hold on one engine.

No more brain farts..

Or be able to hold altitude on the approach...

NTSB Identification: DCA93GA042 .
The docket is stored on NTSB microfiche number 50003.

14 CFR Public Use

Accident occurred Monday, April 19, 1993 in ZWINGLE, IA

Probable Cause Approval Date: 5/10/1994

Aircraft: MITSUBISHI MU-2B-60, registration: N86SD

Injuries: 8 Fatal.

WHILE CRUISING AT FL 240, A PROPELLER (PROP HUB ARM ON THE LEFT PROP FAILED, RELEASING THE PROP BLADE, WHICH STRUCK A 2ND BLADE, BREAKING OFF ITS TIP. THIS RESULTED IN A SEVERE ENGINE VIBRATION & SHUTDOWN OF THE LEFT ENGINE.

THE LEFT ENGINE WAS FORCED DOWNWARD & INBOARD ON ITS MOUNTS. THE CABIN DEPRESSURIZED, POSSIBLY FROM BLADE CONTACT.

THE FLIGHT CREW MADE AN EMERGENCY DESCENT & RECEIVED A VECTOR TO DIVERT FOR AN ILS APPROACH TO DUBUQUE. THE AIRPLANE WAS INCAPABLE OF MAINTAINING ALTITUDE & DESCENDED IN INSTRUMENT CONDITIONS.

SUBSEQUENTLY, IT COLLIDED WITH A SILO & CRASHED ABOUT 8 MILES SOUTH OF DUBUQUE. AN INVESTIGATION REVEALED THE LEFT PROP HUB FAILED FROM FATIGUE THAT INITIATED FROM MULTIPLE INITIATION SITES ON THE INSIDE DIAMETER SURFACE OF THE HOLE FOR THE PILOT TUBE.

THERE WAS EVIDENCE THAT THE FATIGUE PROPERTIES OF THE HUB WERE REDUCED BY A COMBINATION OF FACTORS, INCLUDING MACHINING MARKS OR SCRATCHES, MIXED MICRO- STRUCTURE, CORROSION, DECARBURIZATION, AND RESIDUAL STRESSES. (FOR FURTHER INFO, SEE BLUE COVER RPRT: NTSB/ARR-93/08.)

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

THE FATIGUE CRACKING AND FRACTURE OF THE PROPELLER HUB ARM. THE RESULTANT SEPARATION OF THE HUB ARM AND THE PROPELLER BLADE DAMAGED THE ENGINE, NACELLE, WING, AND FUSELAGE, THEREBY CAUSING SIGNIFICANT DEGRADATION TO AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE AND CONTROL THAT MADE A SUCCESSFUL LANDING PROBLEMATIC.

THE CAUSE OF THE PROPELLER HUB ARM FRACTURE WAS A REDUCTION IN THE FATIGUE STRENGTH OF THE MATERIAL BECAUSE OF MANUFACTURING AND TIME-RELATED FACTORS(DECARBURIZATION, RESIDUAL STRESS, CORROSION, MIXED MICROSTRUCTURE, AND MACHINING/SCORING MARKS) THAT REDUCED THE FATIGUE RESISTANCE OF THE MATERIAL, PROBABLY COMBINED WITH EXPOSURE TO HIGHER-THAN NORMAL CYCLIC LOADS DURING OPERATION OF THE PROPELLER AT A CRITICAL VIBRATION FREQUENCY(REACTIONLESS MODE), WHICH WAS NOT APPROPRIATELY CONSIDERED DURING THE AIRPLANE/PROPELLER CERTIFICATION PROCESS.

 

[avbug]

FN,

I'm confused by your post. You emphatically make the erroneous and false statement that checklists are put in an aircraft flight manual "For one reason only, to eliminate or reduce risk of liability lawsuits against the manufacturer." You then cite a NTSB report regarding the destruction of a Navajo in which the checklist specifically called for the fuel selectors to be on the inboard position, but the pilot failed to do so and left one selector in the outboard position...

Seems that while we cannot conclusively say that the selector was the cause, you're supporting your point that checklists are for nothing more than liability purposes by showing a fatality report in which a pilot failed to adhere to the checklist. Not very consistant.

The left fuel selector valve was found positioned to the inboard main fuel tank. The crossfeed selector valve was found in the off position. The remainder of the left wing fuel system had extensive fire damage.

The right fuel selector valve was found positioned to the outboard auxiliary fuel tank. The remainder of the right wing fuel system had extensive fire damage.

The "Before Take-off" checklist contained in the FAA approved Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) for the PA-31P includes a line-item to set the fuel valves to the inboard tanks. The AFM further states in the section titled "Systems Operation And Checks";

10. FUEL MANAGEMENT
a. Inboard tanks must be selected for take-off and landing
b. Inboard tanks may be used for all phases of flight (takeoff, climb,
cruise, descent and landing)

Hardly academic or a mere liability issue. Checklists are there for a reason; Don't profer the advice that checklists and AFM proceedures are there for only liability reasons. Such counsel is foolish, and dangerous, and will get somebody killed. If you fail to use a checklist or adhere to manufacturer proceedures, fine...try not to eventually kill anybody else when you go...but don't spread that garbage counsel where some private pilot might read it and believe it.

 

[FN FAL]

FN,

I'm confused by your post.

I'll say it for you again. Checklists and POH's sole purpose is limit liabilty of the manufacturer. Your not following them, places the liability on you...the negligent pilot.

 

[Huggyu2]

What's the best option?

Roll inverted, valsalva, and eject.

 

[Lead Sled]

I'll say it for you again. Checklists and POH's sole purpose is limit liabilty of the manufacturer. Your not following them, places the liability on you...the negligent pilot.

You don't have much jet time do you?

'Sled