Engine Failure while Holding

[FN FAL]

So why do they put those checklists in the manual?

For one reason only, to eliminate or reduce risk of liability lawsuits against the manufacturer.

http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief2.asp?ev_id=20030603X00765&ntsbno=CHI03FA138&akey=1

 

[Airway]

Alright maybe I oughtta rephrase what I was trying to say. I didn't mean stop everything , go through your secure checklist, etc. I was trying to just explain that you need to fly the plane first. In other words, if you're having trouble keeping control while maintaining the hold, focus on getting your plane together first.

I see where what I wrote could have been interpreted other ways, though. I just did a shitty job of explaining what I was trying to say. Your entering a hold and you have an engine failure (that's what I was always taught, more of as a rule of thumb), I'd level off for a few seconds if that's what it takes to get the plane together. I'd declare an emergency too, but until ATC clears me for anything else, yeah I'd still fly the hold.

The point I was trying to make which I did a shitty job of making was that I'd just be careful when turning into the dead engine (not that it's not doable). Again I just wrote that without really thinking, my main point was to fly the plane first.

Anyway sorry for that one. And no I've never taught anyone that (just picked up the Multi/MEI). Trying to think why I wrote what I wrote like that in the first place.

 

[Tarzan]

Is it always smart to re-light a failed engine?

Would you shoot the ILS if the AWOS said visibility was 1/4?

What would you do after you got the failed engine relit and you switched fuel tanks, both engines sputtered to a stop?

No. I wouldn't relit one after a fire but I'd damn sure let one burn off the plane if I was already on approach if it was still making power.

Depends, but if that was going to be the fact, you can forget the flair, roll the trucks. I guess it would have mean I can't get somewhere with the fuel I already have and what caused the first failure. Could the other engine have sustained damage also?

Switch back. Crossfeed failure. If something you do causes an unfavorable result, put it back. If this doesn't help, I say the same word every other guy has before augering, "Sh1t."

 

[FN FAL]

Switch back. Crossfeed failure. If something you do causes an unfavorable result, put it back. If this doesn't help, I say the same word every other guy has before augering, "Sh1t."

Here's another thought on crossfeed. What if you go to crossfeed and whatever was in the failed engine's gas tank caused your running engine to quit as well?

I know you strain your tanks, I know I do...but we're talking "simple" failures here. Which would be pilot caused engine stoppages? I don't know what a simple failure is.

 

[Airway]

And to clarify another point, in case that was badly put, declare an emergency before any improvising (If you are in IMC you can't really just go off unless ATC knows). If for whatever reason you can't declare an emergency, you better be able to fly the hold on one engine.

No more brain farts..

 

[FN FAL]

And to clarify another point, in case that was badly put, declare an emergency before any improvising (If you are in IMC you can't really just go off unless ATC knows). If for whatever reason you can't declare an emergency, you better be able to fly the hold on one engine.

No more brain farts..

Or be able to hold altitude on the approach...

NTSB Identification: DCA93GA042 .
The docket is stored on NTSB microfiche number 50003.

14 CFR Public Use

Accident occurred Monday, April 19, 1993 in ZWINGLE, IA

Probable Cause Approval Date: 5/10/1994

Aircraft: MITSUBISHI MU-2B-60, registration: N86SD

Injuries: 8 Fatal.

WHILE CRUISING AT FL 240, A PROPELLER (PROP HUB ARM ON THE LEFT PROP FAILED, RELEASING THE PROP BLADE, WHICH STRUCK A 2ND BLADE, BREAKING OFF ITS TIP. THIS RESULTED IN A SEVERE ENGINE VIBRATION & SHUTDOWN OF THE LEFT ENGINE.

THE LEFT ENGINE WAS FORCED DOWNWARD & INBOARD ON ITS MOUNTS. THE CABIN DEPRESSURIZED, POSSIBLY FROM BLADE CONTACT.

THE FLIGHT CREW MADE AN EMERGENCY DESCENT & RECEIVED A VECTOR TO DIVERT FOR AN ILS APPROACH TO DUBUQUE. THE AIRPLANE WAS INCAPABLE OF MAINTAINING ALTITUDE & DESCENDED IN INSTRUMENT CONDITIONS.

SUBSEQUENTLY, IT COLLIDED WITH A SILO & CRASHED ABOUT 8 MILES SOUTH OF DUBUQUE. AN INVESTIGATION REVEALED THE LEFT PROP HUB FAILED FROM FATIGUE THAT INITIATED FROM MULTIPLE INITIATION SITES ON THE INSIDE DIAMETER SURFACE OF THE HOLE FOR THE PILOT TUBE.

THERE WAS EVIDENCE THAT THE FATIGUE PROPERTIES OF THE HUB WERE REDUCED BY A COMBINATION OF FACTORS, INCLUDING MACHINING MARKS OR SCRATCHES, MIXED MICRO- STRUCTURE, CORROSION, DECARBURIZATION, AND RESIDUAL STRESSES. (FOR FURTHER INFO, SEE BLUE COVER RPRT: NTSB/ARR-93/08.)

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

THE FATIGUE CRACKING AND FRACTURE OF THE PROPELLER HUB ARM. THE RESULTANT SEPARATION OF THE HUB ARM AND THE PROPELLER BLADE DAMAGED THE ENGINE, NACELLE, WING, AND FUSELAGE, THEREBY CAUSING SIGNIFICANT DEGRADATION TO AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE AND CONTROL THAT MADE A SUCCESSFUL LANDING PROBLEMATIC.

THE CAUSE OF THE PROPELLER HUB ARM FRACTURE WAS A REDUCTION IN THE FATIGUE STRENGTH OF THE MATERIAL BECAUSE OF MANUFACTURING AND TIME-RELATED FACTORS(DECARBURIZATION, RESIDUAL STRESS, CORROSION, MIXED MICROSTRUCTURE, AND MACHINING/SCORING MARKS) THAT REDUCED THE FATIGUE RESISTANCE OF THE MATERIAL, PROBABLY COMBINED WITH EXPOSURE TO HIGHER-THAN NORMAL CYCLIC LOADS DURING OPERATION OF THE PROPELLER AT A CRITICAL VIBRATION FREQUENCY(REACTIONLESS MODE), WHICH WAS NOT APPROPRIATELY CONSIDERED DURING THE AIRPLANE/PROPELLER CERTIFICATION PROCESS.

 

[avbug]

FN,

I'm confused by your post. You emphatically make the erroneous and false statement that checklists are put in an aircraft flight manual "For one reason only, to eliminate or reduce risk of liability lawsuits against the manufacturer." You then cite a NTSB report regarding the destruction of a Navajo in which the checklist specifically called for the fuel selectors to be on the inboard position, but the pilot failed to do so and left one selector in the outboard position...

Seems that while we cannot conclusively say that the selector was the cause, you're supporting your point that checklists are for nothing more than liability purposes by showing a fatality report in which a pilot failed to adhere to the checklist. Not very consistant.

The left fuel selector valve was found positioned to the inboard main fuel tank. The crossfeed selector valve was found in the off position. The remainder of the left wing fuel system had extensive fire damage.

The right fuel selector valve was found positioned to the outboard auxiliary fuel tank. The remainder of the right wing fuel system had extensive fire damage.

The "Before Take-off" checklist contained in the FAA approved Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) for the PA-31P includes a line-item to set the fuel valves to the inboard tanks. The AFM further states in the section titled "Systems Operation And Checks";

10. FUEL MANAGEMENT
a. Inboard tanks must be selected for take-off and landing
b. Inboard tanks may be used for all phases of flight (takeoff, climb,
cruise, descent and landing)

Hardly academic or a mere liability issue. Checklists are there for a reason; Don't profer the advice that checklists and AFM proceedures are there for only liability reasons. Such counsel is foolish, and dangerous, and will get somebody killed. If you fail to use a checklist or adhere to manufacturer proceedures, fine...try not to eventually kill anybody else when you go...but don't spread that garbage counsel where some private pilot might read it and believe it.

 

[FN FAL]

FN,

I'm confused by your post.

I'll say it for you again. Checklists and POH's sole purpose is limit liabilty of the manufacturer. Your not following them, places the liability on you...the negligent pilot.

 

[Huggyu2]

What's the best option?

Roll inverted, valsalva, and eject.

 

[Lead Sled]

I'll say it for you again. Checklists and POH's sole purpose is limit liabilty of the manufacturer. Your not following them, places the liability on you...the negligent pilot.

You don't have much jet time do you?

'Sled

 

[FN FAL]

You don't have much jet time do you?

'Sled

What are you saying, that a manufacturer of jets incurs no liability for not producing a POH or checklist for their aircraft?

 

[Lead Sled]

What are you saying, that a manufacturer of jets incurs no liability for not producing a POH or checklist for their aircraft?

That's not what I'm saying at all. They are produced because of certification requirements and the FARs require that they be used. The liability issue arises if they are not provided or used.

'Sled

 

[FN FAL]

That's not what I'm saying at all. They are produced because of certification requirements and the FARs require that they be used.

So you're saying the FAA bears the liability for a faulty manufacturer's checklist that they certified and required by the FARS? And that because the FAA certified and required the checklist, that the aircraft manufacturer is let out of the liability to produce an accurate publication?

The liability issue arises if they are not provided or used.
'Sled

REALLY? So if the manufacturer of the aircraft provides pilots with a faulty checklist, the liability issue only arises if they are not provided the checklist or if the pilots don't use the faulty checklist?

 

[MauleSkinner]

Since this report was submitted for this discussion, I'll mention one of the conclusions (made with the clarity of hindsight, naturally) regarding this accident that might have some relevance to this discussion...I was told that when the airplane depressurized, the pilot made an emergency descent down to 10,000 feet, at which time he started getting vectors to the airport. The configuration of the failed engine didn't allow the airplane to maintain altitude. Had he stopped his emergency descent at 15,000 (still a breathable altitude), he would have had enough altitude to get to the airport, and could possibly have landed safely. I believe I was told that the weather at the target airport was good enough that an approach would not have been required.

When we have an emergency, we can follow immediate-action procedures, and declare an emergency to enlist ATC's help. There are situations, such as an uncontrolled fire, where we need to get on the ground immediately. On the other hand, we need to make sure that when we declare the emergency and high-tail it out of our altitude or leave the holding pattern that we don't eliminate options further down the line.

Remember...impulsivity is considered one of the 5 hazardous attitudes in aviation. Immediate action may be required, but it needs to be a measured response that helps the situation rather than one that eliminates options.

I mean no disrespect to the pilot of the MU-2...he did a fantastic job with the conditions at hand, and almost made it. I don't know that I would have done any better, but hopefully I can use the information gleaned from hindsight to shape my actions should a situation arise.

Fly safe!

David

NTSB Identification: DCA93GA042 .
The docket is stored on NTSB microfiche number 50003.

14 CFR Public Use

Accident occurred Monday, April 19, 1993 in ZWINGLE, IA

Probable Cause Approval Date: 5/10/1994

Aircraft: MITSUBISHI MU-2B-60, registration: N86SD

Injuries: 8 Fatal.

WHILE CRUISING AT FL 240, A PROPELLER (PROP HUB ARM ON THE LEFT PROP FAILED, RELEASING THE PROP BLADE, WHICH STRUCK A 2ND BLADE, BREAKING OFF ITS TIP. THIS RESULTED IN A SEVERE ENGINE VIBRATION & SHUTDOWN OF THE LEFT ENGINE.

THE LEFT ENGINE WAS FORCED DOWNWARD & INBOARD ON ITS MOUNTS. THE CABIN DEPRESSURIZED, POSSIBLY FROM BLADE CONTACT.

THE FLIGHT CREW MADE AN EMERGENCY DESCENT & RECEIVED A VECTOR TO DIVERT FOR AN ILS APPROACH TO DUBUQUE. THE AIRPLANE WAS INCAPABLE OF MAINTAINING ALTITUDE & DESCENDED IN INSTRUMENT CONDITIONS.

SUBSEQUENTLY, IT COLLIDED WITH A SILO & CRASHED ABOUT 8 MILES SOUTH OF DUBUQUE. AN INVESTIGATION REVEALED THE LEFT PROP HUB FAILED FROM FATIGUE THAT INITIATED FROM MULTIPLE INITIATION SITES ON THE INSIDE DIAMETER SURFACE OF THE HOLE FOR THE PILOT TUBE.

THERE WAS EVIDENCE THAT THE FATIGUE PROPERTIES OF THE HUB WERE REDUCED BY A COMBINATION OF FACTORS, INCLUDING MACHINING MARKS OR SCRATCHES, MIXED MICRO- STRUCTURE, CORROSION, DECARBURIZATION, AND RESIDUAL STRESSES. (FOR FURTHER INFO, SEE BLUE COVER RPRT: NTSB/ARR-93/08.)

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

THE FATIGUE CRACKING AND FRACTURE OF THE PROPELLER HUB ARM. THE RESULTANT SEPARATION OF THE HUB ARM AND THE PROPELLER BLADE DAMAGED THE ENGINE, NACELLE, WING, AND FUSELAGE, THEREBY CAUSING SIGNIFICANT DEGRADATION TO AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE AND CONTROL THAT MADE A SUCCESSFUL LANDING PROBLEMATIC.

THE CAUSE OF THE PROPELLER HUB ARM FRACTURE WAS A REDUCTION IN THE FATIGUE STRENGTH OF THE MATERIAL BECAUSE OF MANUFACTURING AND TIME-RELATED FACTORS(DECARBURIZATION, RESIDUAL STRESS, CORROSION, MIXED MICROSTRUCTURE, AND MACHINING/SCORING MARKS) THAT REDUCED THE FATIGUE RESISTANCE OF THE MATERIAL, PROBABLY COMBINED WITH EXPOSURE TO HIGHER-THAN NORMAL CYCLIC LOADS DURING OPERATION OF THE PROPELLER AT A CRITICAL VIBRATION FREQUENCY(REACTIONLESS MODE), WHICH WAS NOT APPROPRIATELY CONSIDERED DURING THE AIRPLANE/PROPELLER CERTIFICATION PROCESS.

 

[FN FAL]

[FONT=BNDEJI+TimesNewRoman]
[FONT=BNDEJI+TimesNewRoman]No such thing as faulty checklists? 4% of commercial accidents from 1990-2000 had faulty documentation as factors in the crashes...

[FONT=BNDEJI+TimesNewRoman]http://www.humanfactors.uiuc.edu/Reports&PapersPDFs/TechReport/03-11.pdf[/FONT]

[FONT=BNDEJI+TimesNewRoman]

Table 5. Degree of injury sustained from 60 commercial aviation accidents with organizational cause factors, 1990-2000. [/FONT]

[FONT=BNDEJI+TimesNewRoman]Assessing the assigned findings for the accident sequence of events led to a more comprehensive analysis of the organizational factors. Specifically, the 60 accidents were associated with 70 organizational factors as identified by the NTSB during the original investigation. Based on both the descriptors provided by the NTSB and a review of the narratives associated with each factors, we were able to cluster these organizational factors cluster around 10 broad categories:[/FONT]




[FONT=BNDEJI+TimesNewRoman]8. Faulty documentation (4%)[/FONT]

[FONT=BNDEJI+TimesNewRoman]Ex: Inaccurate checklists, signoffs, record keeping [/FONT]



​

[FONT=BNDEJI+TimesNewRoman]NYC94FA123 [/FONT]
[FONT=BNDEJI+TimesNewRoman]Accident occurred 7/13/1994 [/FONT]
[FONT=BNDEJI+TimesNewRoman]Atlantic City[/FONT][FONT=BNDEJI+TimesNewRoman], NJ[/FONT]
[FONT=BNDEJI+TimesNewRoman]EGQA [/FONT]
[FONT=BNDEJI+TimesNewRoman]Lear LR-35 [/FONT]
[FONT=BNDEJI+TimesNewRoman]Non-scheduled, Part 135[/FONT]


[FONT=BNDEJI+TimesNewRoman]The takeoff was aborted because the pilot could not maintain directional control. The plane did not stop on the remaining runway. Improper maintenance, [/FONT][FONT=BNDEMJ+TimesNewRoman,Bold]incorrect checklist provided to aircrew (“reversed thrusters armed” missing on the checklist), and lack of pilot experience were factors in this accident. [/FONT]


[FONT=BNDEJI+TimesNewRoman]MIA96FA059 [/FONT]
[FONT=BNDEJI+TimesNewRoman]Accident occurred 1/7/1996 [/FONT]
[FONT=BNDEJI+TimesNewRoman]Nashville[/FONT][FONT=BNDEJI+TimesNewRoman], TN[/FONT]
[FONT=BNDEJI+TimesNewRoman]Airtran Airlines, Inc – VJ6A [/FONT]
[FONT=BNDEJI+TimesNewRoman]Doug DC-9-32 [/FONT]
[FONT=BNDEJI+TimesNewRoman]Scheduled, Part 121[/FONT]


[FONT=BNDEJI+TimesNewRoman]The flight crew’s improper procedures and actions in response to an in-flight abnormality resulted in the inadvertent in-flight activation of the ground spoilers during the approach to landing and the airplane’s excessively hard impact in the runway approach light area. [/FONT][FONT=BNDEMJ+TimesNewRoman,Bold]The incomplete procedural guidance contained in airline quick reference handbook and checklist, [/FONT][FONT=BNDEJI+TimesNewRoman]crews’ inadequate knowledge and understanding of aircraft systems and airline’s failure to incorporate cold weather nosegear servicing procedures in it operations and maintenance manuals were major causes of the accident. [/FONT]



[FONT=BNDEJI+TimesNewRoman]NYC96FA174 [/FONT]
[FONT=BNDEJI+TimesNewRoman]Accident occurred 8/25/1996 [/FONT]
[FONT=BNDEJI+TimesNewRoman]Jamaica[/FONT][FONT=BNDEJI+TimesNewRoman], NY [/FONT]
[FONT=BNDEJI+TimesNewRoman]TWA [/FONT]
[FONT=BNDEJI+TimesNewRoman]LKHEED L-1011 [/FONT]
[FONT=BNDEJI+TimesNewRoman]Scheduled, Part 121[/FONT]


[FONT=BNDEJI+TimesNewRoman]The flight crew failed to complete the published checklist and to adequately crosscheck each other, resulting in their failure to detect that the leading edge slats had not extended. This caused the tail to contact the runway during the computer-driven, auto-land flare for landing. Inadequate inspection procedures for the slat drive system, and the [/FONT][FONT=BNDEMJ+TimesNewRoman,Bold]operator's inadequate checklist, which did not include having the Flight Engineer monitor the double needle slat gauge were causes of the accident.[/FONT]

[/FONT][/FONT]

 

[Tarzan]

I'll play along here. For the EMB, on a dual engine failure, QRH makes no mention of sustaining a best glide (260 kts for the restart ain't it either) until prepared to attempt the relight. Thats alot of altitude ecspecial up at cruise that your going scrub off for no reason when that added time may allow you to make a field instead of how the Pinnacle boys ended up. I've heard only one instructor make mention of this and I'd doubt the 9E guys thought about it either because chances are it wasn't presented to them as an option. I don't know about the Pinnacle checklists.

How about aileron runaway. Chance are by the time you get a hand up there to disable your hydraulics, your inverted. Hmmmm, flying without hydraulics is hard as hell just in level flight making small banks. How in the heck are you going to roll wings level without it when your inverted? Memort item just says Control the airplane (yeah right),aileron system 1 and 2 OFF. Bad memory item there huh.

Checklists are not the end all. I think it's an easy place for the NTSH and FAA hang the blame along with operator error as a cause of a crash. Half those egotists have never had to see what it looks like when your going down with nothing creating any thrust. I have and it hard to make your brain work, it's more a reaction than a thought out plan of action.

 

[MauleSkinner]

Half those egotists have never had to see what it looks like when your going down with nothing creating any thrust. I have and it hard to make your brain work, it's more a reaction than a thought out plan of action.

A veteran Naval aviator had to eject for the first time on takeoff because the ship's catapault malfunctioned, and he didn't have enough thrust and speed to fly when he went off the front of the ship. Certainly not much time for thought.

Someone asked him "When did you decide to eject?" His response..."About 20 years ago."

This is why we train. This is why we have what appears to be a morbid interest in accident reports. This is why we ask questions on flightinfo.com...so that when the situation arises, the decision is already made; and our reactions, while immediate and reflexive, are carefully thought out in advance.

Fly safe!

David

 

[avbug]

I'll say it for you again. Checklists and POH's sole purpose is limit liabilty of the manufacturer. Your not following them, places the liability on you...the negligent pilot.

Thanks for clarifying that. It's what I thought you said.

What an utterly stupid thing to say.

 

[FN FAL]

Thanks for clarifying that. It's what I thought you said.

What an utterly stupid thing to say.

REEEEAAAAALY?

So what you're saying, is that the FAR required information in the POH is intended to EXPAND product liability on behalf of the manufacturer?

Ok, I get it now.

 

[ackattacker]

Once again a seemingly innocent thread goes into a tailspin. Maybe there should be a two-page limit on all threads.

Why would you continue to hold? Out of courtesy to the other people who do not have an emergency? Or just to give you something to do until the second engine went fubar?

.........

How long are you going to fly around with this "simple" engine failure, devoting all this time and effort trying to get the engine relit? What if you get it re-lit and the insides come unglued, placing you in a position where the prop can't be feathered, the engine comes out of the engine mounts or exhaust gasses cut your wingspar?

Why this antagonism? Nobody was advocating holding for any length of time. It's just that if you are in the middle of a procedure you need to be prepared to continue it and not just give up on navigation. You continue the procedure so that a) you maintain awareness of your position b) you don't have a midair c) you don't fly into the terrain

Once the immediate stuff is taken care of, by all means declare an emergency and get priority vectors to an landing as soon as practical.

Use the checklist unless you well and truly don't have time. It very well might save your life, particularly in a more complex airplane. Many emergencies, particularly system failures, can be tricky and the proper response not always obvious or easily remembered. Some dangerous advice is being dispensed on this board.

Checklists and POH's sole purpose is limit liabilty of the manufacturer. Your not following them, places the liability on you...the negligent pilot.

This statement seems open many interpretations, but at first glance is clearly wrong. There is no "sole purpose" of a checklist and POH. The most obvious purpose is to provide guidance on how to operate the aircraft safely in both normal and emegency situations, and therefore hopefully keep you from killing yourself and your passengers. Are there liability issues associated with checklist's and POH's? Sure. Can checklists and POH's be faulty? Sure. Do you think that, in the heat of an emergency, you are smarter than the guys who wrote the checklist? Foolish.

Whether it was your intent or not, you give the impression that you are advocating two thing:

1) in the event of an emergency, immediately disregard IFR procedures and put the aircraft on the ground immediately by any means possible.

2) Don't bother with the checklist, since it was only put there by the lawyers and is probably faulty anyway.

If this is not what you're saying, by all means clarify.