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Yes, after they were caught. It costs money to fly 2nd day, and alot more when you don't know you are doing it. It wasn't just second day either.
I'm talking about well over a year ago. Year and a half maybe. How does it cost more when you don't know? Not sure what you mean by that.
 
Shooter

Frankly I don't see why that would be an issue if clearly communicated. The same method of tracking "A" containers could have been applied to the "C" container.

Indeed that would have been possible, but ABX didn't want to assign ULD numbers to C containers ...

You and me may agree that the level of shipment detail DHL is asking for is somewhat over the top, but that's really not the issue here. That's the way they want it, and that's what ABX should have provided. But, they refused to number the C-cans, refused to do all the check-points required and refused to implement a number of critical IT-systems that would have provided the required transparancy.

I can't beleive that could be done without the knowledge and consent of DHL's system control. BTW, the other side of that arguement is that is makes no sense to provide (and pay for) linehaul to a destination if a partially empty aircraft is going there. All one need do is hold the freight for 2nd day delivery.

Belive you me mate, it was. DHL tried time and time again to impress the importance on ABX not to transport 2nd day by air, but never got through. Part of the reason may have been the way ABX was paid, i.e. cost + x. Therefore ABX managers had no financial incentive to cancel flights, as it would have had a detrimental effect on their bonuses. Never mind the service erosion it caused, nor the long term effects it had on revenues -a large number of customers stopped buying 1st day service, because their experience told them they could get the same delivery time buying 2nd day service.

Furthermore, the road linehauls had to operate regardless of how much freight was onboard, if for no other reason than to position for the return loads.

A few years ago the director of JFK gateway told ABX that they could safely hold 2 aircraft in ILN over christmas, as they didn't have the freight to fill them up. Nope, ABX said, we're sending them - the cost + x thing rears it's ugly head again, and the incredibly short-sighted behaviour of ABX managers. Result - 2 aircraft departed EMPTY from ILN to JFK, parked for the day and returned back, again EMPTY. Great way to loose money, but hey - the managers got their bonuses!

Yes, DHL should have had overall control of the network, and you point your finger at NCG. Well, NCG had to a very large extent no control over how ABX ran their air operation. Sadly, it was impossible to have ABX come around and work the way DHL wanted them to, and that was another in the long list of reasons why DHL failed so miserably. Not the biggest reason financially - not by a long shot, but probably the biggest reason operationally.
 
Shooter

A few years ago the director of JFK gateway told ABX that they could safely hold 2 aircraft in ILN over christmas, as they didn't have the freight to fill them up. Nope, ABX said, we're sending them - the cost + x thing rears it's ugly head again, and the incredibly short-sighted behaviour of ABX managers. Result - 2 aircraft departed EMPTY from ILN to JFK, parked for the day and returned back, again EMPTY. Great way to loose money, but hey - the managers got their bonuses!

Yes, DHL should have had overall control of the network, and you point your finger at NCG. Well, NCG had to a very large extent no control over how ABX ran their air operation. Sadly, it was impossible to have ABX come around and work the way DHL wanted them to, and that was another in the long list of reasons why DHL failed so miserably. Not the biggest reason financially - not by a long shot, but probably the biggest reason operationally.

That's not true....nowhere even CLOSE to how it works here and I would think you would know that. While NCG has no control over the operational control of the aircraft, they do control their network. They are the ones that make the call to cancel the flight due to their network, we would only do it for safety and legality. Again, they are the ones who control their network and if there were empty planes flying it is because DHL wanted them to fly that way. Either to prove to the Congress they are losing money or stupid I don't know but that is NOT an ABX call unless ABX was paying for the ferry costs of the aircraft.

You KNOW this weenie. Why try and blame that on ABX?
 
Shooter



Indeed that would have been possible, but ABX didn't want to assign ULD numbers to C containers ...

You and me may agree that the level of shipment detail DHL is asking for is somewhat over the top, but that's really not the issue here. That's the way they want it, and that's what ABX should have provided. But, they refused to number the C-cans, refused to do all the check-points required and refused to implement a number of critical IT-systems that would have provided the required transparancy.



Belive you me mate, it was. DHL tried time and time again to impress the importance on ABX not to transport 2nd day by air, but never got through. Part of the reason may have been the way ABX was paid, i.e. cost + x. Therefore ABX managers had no financial incentive to cancel flights, as it would have had a detrimental effect on their bonuses. Never mind the service erosion it caused, nor the long term effects it had on revenues -a large number of customers stopped buying 1st day service, because their experience told them they could get the same delivery time buying 2nd day service.

Furthermore, the road linehauls had to operate regardless of how much freight was onboard, if for no other reason than to position for the return loads.

A few years ago the director of JFK gateway told ABX that they could safely hold 2 aircraft in ILN over christmas, as they didn't have the freight to fill them up. Nope, ABX said, we're sending them - the cost + x thing rears it's ugly head again, and the incredibly short-sighted behaviour of ABX managers. Result - 2 aircraft departed EMPTY from ILN to JFK, parked for the day and returned back, again EMPTY. Great way to loose money, but hey - the managers got their bonuses!

Yes, DHL should have had overall control of the network, and you point your finger at NCG. Well, NCG had to a very large extent no control over how ABX ran their air operation. Sadly, it was impossible to have ABX come around and work the way DHL wanted them to, and that was another in the long list of reasons why DHL failed so miserably. Not the biggest reason financially - not by a long shot, but probably the biggest reason operationally.


Euro, this is where the B.S. flag goes up. ABX never told DHL where the airplanes go DHL told ABX. Even after ABX begged DHL not send airplanes to a certain city or told them they could cancel a plane because of lite loads Dhl would not hear of it. DHL is the one who made all the stupid decisions about aircraft movement not ABX. Despite what your higher ups may have told you. This type of post tells me you really do not know anything. Keep pushing your broom stop using office computers.
 
nitefr8dog, you are 100% correct. These were decisions made by NCG (Network Control). You have examples of why we so affectionately call them the No Clue Group.

You know, it could be that the DHL NCG idiots have been lying to Plantation and Germany these past few years. But it is still no excuse for a network control group to not control their own network. (this includes the 2nd day drivel being tossed around. The DHL NCG had their people with every ABX supervisor in the sort. If this was going on NCG knew it.) Weenie and Germany should know this.
 
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DHL is too f***** up to change. Game over. ABX has already found a new customer for the six of the freighters that DHL would require. More to follow.
 
Hey Euro,
How about the HUGE snowstorm right before Christmas a few years back. ABX implored DHL not to bring the planes in that night, but DHL would not listen. The result was all the planes flew in to ILN, got thoroughly caked in ice and snow and departed anywhere from 12 -36 hours late. Had the inbound been canceled that one night, the storm would have passed and all would have been well the following night.
 
Guys, you may recall Euro was on here for a time last Spring also spouting off how all this was the fault of ABX. He clearly is NOT in any position which provides any real knowledge of the situation; just look at his first post here in which he say 40000, that's forty THOUSAND to be laid of by DHL; anyone hear of that many even in DHL employ?
 
but ABX didn't want to assign ULD numbers to C containers ...
.... they refused to number the C-cans, refused to do all the check-points required and refused to implement a number of critical IT-systems that would have provided the required transparancy.
Bullsh!t. ABX put little stickers with a bar code on every C container.

Euro, you've either been fed a bunch of BS or you're spewing it yourself. Probably both.
 
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I appreciate Euro's insight. I think the info. he posted is plausable. Lets face it if the UPS deal falls apart, which is likely, DHL will have to continue using ABX and Astar 767s, A300s and DC8s at least for a while. At some point they will pick one airline or the other but from what we have all seen it takes DHL a long time to make decisions. Either way, ILN is not an option for the few flights they are operating now.

I take the part about ABX screwing things up for DHL with a grain of salt. I am sure there is some truth to it but it may be exagerated.

As for the 40,000 lay offs, I think that may be an accurate number. He said INCLUDING contractors. DHL had 40,000 direct employees and I think about 25,000 of contract employees in the US.
 
I appreciate Euro's insight. I think the info. he posted is plausable. Lets face it if the UPS deal falls apart, which is likely, DHL will have to continue using ABX and Astar 767s, A300s and DC8s at least for a while. At some point they will pick one airline or the other but from what we have all seen it takes DHL a long time to make decisions. Either way, ILN is not an option for the few flights they are operating now.

I take the part about ABX screwing things up for DHL with a grain of salt. I am sure there is some truth to it but it may be exagerated.

As for the 40,000 lay offs, I think that may be an accurate number. He said INCLUDING contractors. DHL had 40,000 direct employees and I think about 25,000 of contract employees in the US.

Why would ILN not be an option for them? Not that it matters, I just would like to know how ILN is not feasible. Of course they would still have to dump it since it is costing them $$$$. But if they did dump it off to the state in exchange for landing fees to the property value, how would that not actually work to their favor to stay put?
 
Why would ILN not be an option for them? Not that it matters, I just would like to know how ILN is not feasible. Of course they would still have to dump it since it is costing them $$$$. But if they did dump it off to the state in exchange for landing fees to the property value, how would that not actually work to their favor to stay put?
Because it's not cost-effective to keep a facility the size of ILN open just to service 15-20 flights a day, 5 days a week? From what I've been told, the CVG hub had some problems, but was more than capable of handling 100,000 shipments per night.

Whatever flying is left will probably be put out to bid.
 
Thats right Dan. It wouldnt be feasible for the state to takeover the airport and maintain it so DHL could operate about 100 flights a week and employ about 1,000 people. The only way the state would do that is if they could attract other airlines to the airpark. And with ILN being such a small town and the fact that there are at least 2 other underutilized airports within an hour and a half drive, that is very unlikely.
 
My thoughts are they would not need the whole sort. They would just use the new F sort building and let the state do whatever they want with the rest of the property. I still don't see how it would not work to their advantage to stay. But thats them...their show...whatever.

EDIT: Plus, if the state breaks a good deal ABX could base their MRO there. So there are 2 large tenants, Roberts has his corporate jet there. Hey TWA, what do you think? Do you think if ILN became a public airport would some people you know locate their GA aircraft at ILN? And then you have Great Oaks that has a large A&P school there already. Maybe they would start a pilot school there as well.

I do not throw out that ILN could remain an airport at all.
 
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Whichever airline(s) will be doing the job will integrate fully with the way DHL does business in the rest of the world. No C-cans; adopting the same rules, procedures and standards as everyone else. Note, I'm not talking about the actual flying SOPs here, "just" everything else.

Article from International Freighting Weekly:

Posted: 21-11-2008

DHL 'got it wrong' in US
Company regrets not keeping Airborne Express management after integration

By Will Waters



DHL has finally admitted to mistakes that contributed to the company’s US$10bn failure in the US domestic express market.


Following this month’s decision to withdraw early next year ( IFW , 17 November), a spokeswoman told IFW that it had learned major lessons from the experience of integrating US firm Airborne Express, which DHL bought in 2003.


"One big lesson was that the management of Airborne Express should have been kept, " she said.


It was something the company had already learned and applied, she added.


"If you look at the integration of Exel, we kept John Allan as the head of the logistics business and that integration has been very successful."


A former senior Airborne executive told IFW that DHL executives - many of whom had recently joined from TNT - took over the running of Airborne, with "a lot of international freight experience, but their domestic air freight knowledge and experience was limited, at best.


"Would it have made the difference [between the success and failure of DHL’s US operations]?


"Who knows for sure? But one could argue that it wouldn’t have been nearly as bad if they had left the Airborne team intact." He said prior to the acquisition, DHL USA was losing around $200m-$250m per year, while Airborne posted $6m profit.


"When they combined both, instead of heading towards the black they started almost immediately losing a lot more money, and it never stopped getting worse." DHL expects $1.5bn losses for its US express operations in 2008, which it hopes to bring down to $900m in 2009, stabilising at a $400m annual loss by 2010.


Another key lesson was the importance of remaining close to customers, said the DHL spokeswoman, "in order to give them what they want rather than what you think they want."

Guess they really didn't learn any lessons.
 
There are obviously two different sides to the stories - the one we're hearing on the eastern side of the Atlantic, and another one going around on the western side.

To a very large extent, I'm perfectly willing to belive what we've been told might very well have been drivel fed to us by incompetent managers - it would hardly have been the first time. However, since the director of JFK is a personal friend of mine, I've no reason to belive he'd lie to me with regards to the christmas schedule story I related earlier.

However, what's done is done and it's time to look forward. I'm hoping that the future of DHL iin the US will work better than the past, and do wish to extend my very best to all those who'll be tasked with the task of making it work.

I shall not spend any more time pointing fingers and playing the blame-game for things that happened in the past. I will try, to the best of my abilities, to present the picture as it's been given to us over here, and relay what I can to you guys as and when it happens.

PS
Do feel free to do an IP check; I don't suffer from any split personalities on this site, and as thus am only posting under this username.
 
I am not saying your friend lied to you, but he was lied to or misinformed. ABX does not cancel DHL network flights or make them go if DHL did not want them to fly. There are times pointed out to you earlier where our past experience would have us cancel a flight for operational reasons. But those ideas are passed to DHL NCG to make the decision. I would almost give it a 100% factor that whatever we suggested, NCG did the exact opposite.
 
I know some people that would definitely be interested in using the airpark, should it become open to the public.

With Wilmington's current efforts of attracting industrial businesses, the airpark will become a great location to base a corporate jet. If it opens up to the public, they need to either allow private companies to build hangars, or build more themselves.
 
Ive got a friend in upper management at DHL. He keeps telling me that CVG is leading the pack to handle all of the shipments.

Just to confirm that they are looking hard at it. I had recurrent in cvg a couple weeks ago and there was about 20 management guys in DHL shirts eating at the Holiday Inn right next to the sort facilitie. Called my buddy and he said it was the big wigs making "huge deceisions."
 

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