mrnolmts said:While it is obvious she messed up, it's also very easy for us to be Monday Morning Quarterbacks here.
Oh, no, there is no Monday Morning stuff here. These were mistakes that ANY airline pilot should have acted upon.
I'd be surprised if either one of you can honestly say they've never made a mistake in their flying career.
That many? In one flight? That resulted in serious damage?
How many of you have had firm landings without reporting it? Question is, how hard does it have to be before a report is warranted? I'm not sure I know where the line is, are you? All I know is, I'd report it if I personally felt it was beyond "the norm", but it would still be a subjective assessment. Yours may vary greatly from mine. I am by no means saying she was correct in making the decision to not report it, because obviously she should have.
No way Jose. Don't try to exonorate them here with me. A TEN FOOT by THREE foot area, worn to the pressure vessel?!! How can you say it would be hard to assess, especially since the impact recording was 2.75 Gs!! You'd sure as he11 have the plane inspected if turbulence met that rate.
However, could it be as simple as her train of thought being "It was a hard landing allright, but we inspected the aircraft, and found no visible damage, so I guess it's ok"? Flawed as it turned out to be, I can see a few guys making the very same decision.
Read the full narrative, the FO, not the CA was inspecting, and the CA came out and hastened the inspection, to focus on the wheels.
Obviously, they should have noticed the tailstrike damage on the postflight inspection. However, notice that at least one other crew preflighted and flew the airplane without noticing, so maybe the damage wasn't that obvious?
Again 10' X 3' and worn to the pressure vessel! Looks like poor crewmanship on the part of BOTH crews. I bet the FAA would have seen it, so ALL preflights should be conducted as if the FAA were there.
I don't know.
I can see that.
Also, there were at least one positive here:
I think you mean there WAS at least one positive
She did inform the pilot taking the airplane the following day, who by the way, was a company check airman (!!!),
She was not aware of this, she simply placed a note to him, as many of us do, as a courteousy to the next crew.
and did not take the time to check the airplane out, nor did the crew who wound up actually flying the airplane out.
I am as stupified at this as you are.
I'm just having a hard time dealing with people putting other people down, when they were not there, and were not the ones making the decisions.
I think you need to put your emotions aside here. Airplanes are machines. They do not care who is flying them. Stalling a plane TWICE because you closed the thrust 300 above the ground is something that ANYONE who flies jets should know better than to do. Especially a CA. Sure, she had low time in the plane, which is why she should have listened to her FO, who had way more time in the jet.
But the CRM issues show a clear pairing of Type A (too overbearing) and Type B (too passive) here, which in my opinion had as much to do with the accident as the CAs poor airmanship. The CRM training at Mesa, which is minimal at best, was shortcutted (as shown in the training records) and the overlooking of TWO additional crewmembers who inspected the plane says something about the caliber of Mesa's training.
I say again, let's not get into the emotional "quit picking on them" stuff here. There are many lessons to learn here. They screwed up, big time, and have absolutely no exterior factors to consider. The weather was good, the plane was good, and ROA is really not that hard to fly into. Mesa has issues in crew staffing (both crewmembers came from the FO seat of the 1900), crew training (neither pilot recieved any instruction about swept wing aerodynamics) and supervision (need I bring up CLT?).
I know that any one of us may plant one tomorrow, but really, that is why we look into the screw ups of others. Not because we are so good, but because the person who had the accident just managed to have it before we did.
And let's not foget...the CA lied. She lied about the winds (way way WAY exxagerated), she lied about the inspection, and she lied about when she closed the thrust.
She also didn't know shinola about airport notes. "A go around is not an option"...
Those notes apply to TAKEOFF! It is illegal to operate 121 into an airport that FAR25 approach climb criteria can not be met. Also the wording "is not an option"...sounds like she is putting the discussion out right there (again the Type A persona).
I could go on for hours, but...
:beer:
Leaving the note was the positive, silly!acaTerry said:
Obviously. However, stickshaker is not stall. If the airplane was stalled, I'm thinking the nose would have dropped first. Not saying it's ok to go to stickshaker by any means, just clarifying.
Since I haven't trained at Mesa, I don't know. However, I *do* agree it seems suspect..
No argument there...
Well, we actually have an airport here at QX (Sun Valley) where, if you get beyond a certain point, you are commited to land ("A go around is not an option"). Granted, it applies to single engine ops, but still.. A direct quote from the Q400 Flight Standards Manual:
Obviously, in this particular case, a go-around was not prohibited, so I can't argue your point regarding her making a statement that shouldn't have been made.
