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WSK on Pilot Banter, Training Records, & Crew Rest / Commuting

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This was all over the news this AM. Even Joe Scarborough on MSPMS was swept up in the building "outrage" and proclaiming that he wouldnt alllow his family on a regional carrier until the FAA "speaks to this." Will somebody please remind Joe that his chances of being killed driving home on the Jersey Turnpike were 100 times as great. He missed that part...
I don't blame him... I don't put my family on an RJ or turboprop, either, and don't particularly like getting on one myself. This is why.

Let's take a really close look at the last 4 PCL/Colgan accidents.

3701: Both pilots were GIA, the CA was an idiot, the F/O was low time and just along for the ride. Both dead.

MKE: Both pilots were GIA, completely avoidable accident, complete hull loss, lucky they didn't kill anyone.

TVC: That one was just bad luck, the CA was an exceptionally-bright Check Airman, but the F/O was a new-hire low-time guy (unknown if he was GIA or not) and again, was along for the ride. Something about a 15+ hour duty day comes to mind about this one as well.

BUF - Colgan - The CA was a screwup (5 checkride failures??!!), and the F/O was so completely inexperienced that either she initiated a flaps retraction on her own or listened to the CA if/when he commanded it (an experienced aviator would have said "FU, not putting the flaps up in a stall"), or the gear for that matter. I *KNOW* that's not a training screwup, how many times have we all heard "DO NOT CHANGE CONFIGURATION UNTIL THE AIRCRAFT IS CLEAR OF ALL STALL INDICATIONS AND ACCELERATING"?

So we have GIA graduates and/or gross inexperience in 6 of the 8 pilot positions, a training and hiring culture known to have "issues" (hiring GIA pilots straight out of school with 500 hours is not the smartest move), and fatigue in 3 of the 4 crashes.

And yes, anything less than ATP minimums at a Part 121 carrier is "gross inexperience". You fly for an airline, you should have to hold an ATP, with the associated minimums that are required. The puppy mills need to go away, and I hope this accident brings that fact to light.

Methinks Phil's going to be doing some pretty smooth carpet dancing to keep PCL from getting slammed hard by the feds and Capital Hill after 4 accidents in as many years.
 
The one guaranteed outcome:

The gov't/airlines/lawyers will make whatever changes are necessary to blame the pilots the next time as well!
 
I don't blame him... I don't put my family on an RJ or turboprop, either, and don't particularly like getting on one myself. This is why.

Let's take a really close look at the last 4 PCL/Colgan accidents.

3701: Both pilots were GIA, the CA was an idiot, the F/O was low time and just along for the ride. Both dead.

MKE: Both pilots were GIA, completely avoidable accident, complete hull loss, lucky they didn't kill anyone.

TVC: That one was just bad luck, the CA was an exceptionally-bright Check Airman, but the F/O was a new-hire low-time guy (unknown if he was GIA or not) and again, was along for the ride. Something about a 15+ hour duty day comes to mind about this one as well.

BUF - Colgan - The CA was a screwup (5 checkride failures??!!), and the F/O was so completely inexperienced that either she initiated a flaps retraction on her own or listened to the CA if/when he commanded it (an experienced aviator would have said "FU, not putting the flaps up in a stall"), or the gear for that matter. I *KNOW* that's not a training screwup, how many times have we all heard "DO NOT CHANGE CONFIGURATION UNTIL THE AIRCRAFT IS CLEAR OF ALL STALL INDICATIONS AND ACCELERATING"?

So we have GIA graduates and/or gross inexperience in 6 of the 8 pilot positions, a training and hiring culture known to have "issues" (hiring GIA pilots straight out of school with 500 hours is not the smartest move), and fatigue in 3 of the 4 crashes.

And yes, anything less than ATP minimums at a Part 121 carrier is "gross inexperience". You fly for an airline, you should have to hold an ATP, with the associated minimums that are required. The puppy mills need to go away, and I hope this accident brings that fact to light.

Methinks Phil's going to be doing some pretty smooth carpet dancing to keep PCL from getting slammed hard by the feds and Capital Hill after 4 accidents in as many years.

Abso-friggin-lutely! Don't be so quick to not get on an RJ though. There are plenty of experienced people out there. I would be more discriminating about what regional I get on, but I wouldn't worry about good RJ companies: Comair, ExpressJet, RAH, Skywest, Piedmont, etc. I would stay away from Pinnacle, Gulfstream, Colgan, Great Lakes, and the like.
 
Boy I agree.

One thing that I think is worth mentioning, is the fact that a large number of airlines don't do real training, they do checking. I'm not excusing difficiencies that might have taken place in this event. Howerver, in the name of the mighty bottom dollar, the only real training most of us get, is while we are newhires and during upgrades.

In most cases while going into PCs, we are expected to perform without any fresh training whatsover. Yes, most of us survive these events. Some of us may even like it. But do you really learn anything new? Are you trying to learn, or are you merely trying to survive? I would argue that the latter applies to a big percentage of us.

Accidents have decreased over the years. It's not because we now have super pilots. It's because automation has improved and CRM has become a way of life. I'd argue that this two factors alone are the biggest reasons why our safety record has improved. Most of our training however has not evolved. AQP should be mandatory for every 121 operator. If you can't afford it, tough! If that's the case, you don't deserve to be in business.

But as usual, the FEDs will clamp down on pilots. They may make it more difficult for us to commute. They may make checkrides even harder. But they won't stop companies from over stressing crews. Nor will they make companies properly staff their airlines. In other words, business as usual.


Good point here. I have always thought that the whole recurrent check ride does not achieve much other than proving we can come in and check the boxes. I think this should be a training event. Don't prove you can pull off one V1 cut but do several. Practicing these events would be far better than what we currently do.

Pilots and commuting will be blamed and rules changed. The FAA and airlines will operate as business as usual.
 
Abso-friggin-lutely! Don't be so quick to not get on an RJ though. There are plenty of experienced people out there. I would be more discriminating about what regional I get on, but I wouldn't worry about good RJ companies: Comair, ExpressJet, RAH, Skywest, Piedmont, etc. I would stay away from Pinnacle, Gulfstream, Colgan, Great Lakes, and the like.

Comair took off the wrong runway.

Expressjet has busted P-56 gawd knows how many times, not to mention landing at the wrong airport at least twice that I know of.

RAH had a crew use the wrong minimums to fly an approach to a contaminated runway in CLE.

Even the "good" companies f-up sometime...
 
This is a training issue- said it on the other thread- a video explaining tail ice is not enough. We should be seeing this in the sim- and then practice recovery of ice induced stalls w/o knowing which one it will be, tail or wing. It certainly appears tail ice was in this guy's head during the recovery- hence the flaps, and hence not giving it full power. - and with just a video- i don't blame the guy for screwing it up. With as many ice accidents and mishaps turboprops have had- we got the research done- now it's time to look at training. The idea that turboprop pilots don't practice these is unforgivable.
 
Comair took off the wrong runway.

Expressjet has busted P-56 gawd knows how many times, not to mention landing at the wrong airport at least twice that I know of.

RAH had a crew use the wrong minimums to fly an approach to a contaminated runway in CLE.

Even the "good" companies f-up sometime...

Air Wiskey smacked up AC 470 pretty good. I don't know if it was ever returned to service.
 
Set the speed bug to the proper speed and at all times either be on the bug or accelerating/decelerating to the new selected speed. The Captain had plenty of experience to know this; fly the plane and if you can't remember anything else maintain heading altitude and airspeed. I haven't followed this closely enough to know of they if were using the autopilot or not. If they were using the AP and there are no autothrottles it seems like they simply went to idle and never put the power back in as the plane slowed below the desired speed. It sounds like nobody was really flying the plane.


I think that crew experience and training may be less of an issue here than simply failing to pay attention to what they were doing. Let's not forget that lack of attentiveness and situational awareness has caused highly experienced major airline crews to kill people by: flying into mountains, flying into the ground, running out of fuel, attempting to takeoff with flaps up, aborting TO's above V1, continuing approach/landings/TO's during severe convective weather, accidently crossing active runways while another plane was taking off, attempting TO with substantial surface ice contamination, etc. You can be the best, most experienced pilot in the world with a perfect training record and a spotless career but if you stop paying attention or get distracted at the wrong time you can still have an acccident. The consequences of our mistakes can be very high.
 
One thing that I think is worth mentioning, is the fact that a large number of airlines don't do real training, they do checking...

Absolutely the truth. In six years as a commuter captain, I had twelve checkrides and zero training. I would fly to the sim, do the check (same profile, every time), and fly back to my domicile. This was all done on the same day, so I would only "waste" one duty day checking a box for the FAA. If any actual learning took place, it was unplanned.
 
People actually brief what they're going to do with the stick shaker when entering moderate icing......??? Get real....

The whole, "they reacted like it was a tail stall" shtick is garbage. You could tell the FO saw the low airspeed. The Icing video specifically says tail stalls occur at speeds at the high end of the approach flap speed limitation, as the flap selection is made. Also, the shaker and pusher should not activate during a textbook tail stall. The nose never dropped either... I think it's more likely that the A/P was over trimming with the speed reduction and caused that initial pitch up at the shaker and A/P disconnect. That may have caused some temporary spacial disorientation and eventual F up in the recovery. Putting the flaps up was probably just a mistake induced by shock (nail in the coffin though). Can't explain the raising of the gear.... The captain not bumping the power with the props going max is the real mind blower.

This is an isolated incident. A tragedy at best. It will be used to bash us as a group; even by fellow pilots. It took 26 seconds from time of shaker to impact. However, regulators and management will try to use this as an excuse to control ALL of our time, both at work and home. We must use this as an opportunity to improve the profession, in memory of those lost, regardless of how we see them as aviators.
 
Set the speed bug to the proper speed and at all times either be on the bug or accelerating/decelerating to the new selected speed. The Captain had plenty of experience to know this; fly the plane and if you can't remember anything else maintain heading altitude and airspeed. I haven't followed this closely enough to know of they if were using the autopilot or not. If they were using the AP and there are no autothrottles it seems like they simply went to idle and never put the power back in as the plane slowed below the desired speed. It sounds like nobody was really flying the plane.
Spot on.

Autopilot was on.
No autothrottles.
Airplane was stable on-speed at flaps 5 turning final.
Localizer came alive, Captain commanded gear down and pushed the condition levers full forward, WITHOUT touching the throttles.
The aircraft immediately began slowing dramatically.
The flaps 15 command just happened to coincide with the shaker, and the autopilot disconnected at the shaker onset (normal for every advanced aircraft I've flown, including Bombardier products).
The flaps never actually got to 15, she stopped at 10 as the shaker went off, more than likely wondering if she had just caused the shaker by moving the flaps.
Throttles were still at idle when the pusher actuates and the aircraft rolls slightly left, the Captain overrides the pusher and corrects with right AILERON, probably deploying the right spoiler with it, further slowing the plane, and brings in about 70-75% throttle power, pulling back and overriding the pusher (we'll never know why), but it's too little power too late with the ailerons and spoileron in and the aircraft full stalls and rolls right into a 90 degree turn, right about the time she pulls the flaps up.

Both of them pretty much just stopped monitoring the airspeed during the approach is what it looks like.

I'm not a big fan of partial automation for this reason alone. Give me FULL autopilot WITH autothrottles, or turn ALL of it off. None of this "I have to fly part of the plane but not the other part" nonsense... At AirTran in high winds or tricky approaches, once everything was stable, checklists were done, and I could concentrate, ALL the automation came off in the real world. Still does today. There's no replacement for a good pilot's stick and rudder skills and good judgment.
 
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People actually brief what they're going to do with the stick shaker when entering moderate icing......??? Get real....

The whole, "they reacted like it was a tail stall" shtick is garbage. You could tell the FO saw the low airspeed. The Icing video specifically says tail stalls occur at speeds at the high end of the approach flap speed limitation, as the flap selection is made. Also, the shaker and pusher should not activate during a textbook tail stall. The nose never dropped either... I think it's more likely that the A/P was over trimming with the speed reduction and caused that initial pitch up at the shaker and A/P disconnect. That may have caused some temporary spacial disorientation and eventual F up in the recovery. Putting the flaps up was probably just a mistake induced by shock (nail in the coffin though). Can't explain the raising of the gear.... The captain not bumping the power with the props going max is the real mind blower.

This is an isolated incident. A tragedy at best. It will be used to bash us as a group; even by fellow pilots. It took 26 seconds from time of shaker to impact. However, regulators and management will try to use this as an excuse to control ALL of our time, both at work and home. We must use this as an opportunity to improve the profession, in memory of those lost, regardless of how we see them as aviators.


I think you have a good point and I thought of that as well. The plane was probably in a state of extreme mis-trim when the shaker kicked off the AP. As the power was added rapidly the nose probably came up a lot on it's own before the pusher engaged. The AP had been furiously trimming nose up trying to maintain altitude as all that drag was added with no increase in power.

In my former life at a regional I flew a plane with an AP but no autothrottles and in the sim we practiced a very similiar scenario to this. The instructor would have us configure the plane for landing in level flight at a low power setting with the AP on and allow the AP to trim itself into a shaker/AP disconnect/impending stall and then we would recover. It's a lot harder than doing a regular approach to landing stall where you are hand flying the plane and aware of the control forces and the trim state of the aircraft. When hand flying the stall you don't use nearly as much trim so it's easy to let the nose down by just relaxing back pressure. In an actual situation where you were caught by surprise (even if you shouldn't have been) the plane would be a real handful in that state of trim at a high power setting. It's pretty clear from the testimony that the CA in this case never got to do this exercise in a simulator and may not have been prepared to all of a sudden take control of a severely mis-trimmed plane after and AP disconnect.

It's interesting to note that a very similiar accident happened in the Detroit area with a Brasilia in similiar WX conditions some years back. As I recall they were being vectored to an approach at reduced power settings with the AP on while starting to configure. The plane got slow because they failed to add power and then stalled as they entered a turn. The result was largely the same. As I said, at my airline we were aware of the potential pitfalls of an autoflight system without autothrottles and trained for an AP induced trim stall in the terminal area. If the lessons from this first accident had been incorporated at Colgan in the sim maybe this could have been avoided.
 
zasca-
The tail ice point isn't garbage. the only training you get on tail icing is a video- "the video specifically says...." wtf. I liked your first 'get real' statement- now i got to throw one back at you. I can't believe that your arguing that a video counts for training. Have you ever seen tail icing? Could you tell for sure what was going on after going into a stall right after the addition of flaps? Turboprops have specific issue that aren't the same as jets. This is one of them. As far as putting the flaps back up- some of that might be common sense. If you flip a switch and something happens- what do all of us instinctively do? Flip it back! Especially when there is a video that says tail ice upsets can occur at configuration changes and a remedy is to put them back. I never thought tail stall vs wing stall ice training was adequate when i was flying props.

Nothing replaces talent and mindset in this industry. And nothing ever replaces experience. I was all civilian and though i'm confident in my abilities- pairing inexperience with inexperience is never good- much less to the level it's done these days. Outsourcing isn't good for our industry. It's no knock on the regional pilots- we're some of the best pilots anywhere- but i wouldn't mind seeing the government blame this on outsourcing and putting pressure on the airlines to get flying back under the tent.
 
I was trying to point out that that damn NASA video IS all the training we prop pilots probably get at most airlines and likely the only reference a lot of us have regarding tail ice. I'm not saying it is at all useful or sufficient as a training aid. Every tail stall I've ever heard of involves a severe pitch down upset and uncontrollable altitude loss. Neither of which happened. Just pointing out the obvious. And obviously what's obvious to us now is not always so up there...

I also agree with the point about learning nothing in training. The hostility in the sim and lax ground schools we often deal with are a joke.
 
well said.

an interesting article:
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/gene...overing From Ice-induced Stalls in Turboprops

Recovering From Ice-induced Stalls in Turboprops

-----------------------------------------------------------------
The autopilot point is a good one. It's recommended to hand fly in ice. I knew very few pilots of autopilot airplanes that were truly comfortable hand flying in the soup on approach in the terminal area. It was even recommended by the training dept to not be 'a hero' and handfly. They were seeing too many ASAP altitude deviations. And yet handflying in ice is still recommended for turboprops.

If you're anything but absolutely comfortable hand flying from 10,000' to landing- that's a sign that you need to hand fly MORE, not less.
 
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I was trying to point out that that damn NASA video IS all the training we prop pilots probably get at most airlines and likely the only reference a lot of us have regarding tail ice. I'm not saying it is at all useful or sufficient as a training aid. Every tail stall I've ever heard of involves a severe pitch down upset and uncontrollable altitude loss. Neither of which happened. Just pointing out the obvious. And obviously what's obvious to us now is not always so up there...

I also agree with the point about learning nothing in training. The hostility in the sim and lax ground schools we often deal with are a joke.

My comment is that NASA film is type specific. What it concludes as a proper procedure is really only for the Twin Otter, a short coupled high wing airplane with a high thrust line and immense flaps.

We had tailplane ice incidents in the Convair 340/440's since I began flying them in 1953. It became more serious with the Convair 580 turbo-prop. We thought that was maybe because all the hot exhaust from the turbo-prop engines put the tail in more favorable iceing conditions than the wing. The probable reason though was pilots discontinueing anti-ice heat too soon before landing. The thinner tailplane cooled faster than the wing and started ice accretion again while the wing did not. We did not have de-ice ground equipment everywhere hence the need to cool the wings before landing. That was so falling snow would not melt and refreeze on the wing during the ground stop.

Whatever the reason, the recovery was; reduce flaps and add power and fly out of it.

When that NASA film came out, years later, my thought was somebody is going to get hurt if they apply those procedures to the wrong airplane.

In short, tailplane iceing stall recovery procedores should be tailered to each specific airplane type. No "one size fits all".
 
This crew was distracted!!!

They were surprised by the shaker!!!

They messed up the recovery!!!

Now we are evaluating all the little dirty secrets in their closets.

Every airline has commuters. All pilots fly tired at least some of the time. Most "training" is just a bunch of FAA mandated items that have to be crammed into a 4 hour block in the box. Congress is not surprised by this.....they just get mad when they have to deal with it.
 
Come on folks...commuting has to be done responsibly...
 
Congress should not bes surprised by what we make. Senator John McCain has a son that flies for AMR. He is fully aware of what we make. Nothing will change in regards to our pay.
 

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