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Wiggins Airways Fatal Crash @ HYA

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Preliminary Is Out

NTSB Identification: NYC08FA218
Nonscheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Accident occurred Wednesday, June 18, 2008 in Hyannis, MA
Aircraft: DeHavilland DHC-6, registration: N656WA
Injuries: 1 Fatal.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
On June 18, 2008, at 1001 eastern daylight time, a DeHavilland DHC-6, N656WA, operated by Wiggins Airways, was substantially damaged when it impacted terrain during takeoff from Barnstable Municipal Airport (HYA), Hyannis, Massachusetts. The certificated airline transport pilot was fatally injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed for the flight, destined for Nantucket Memorial Airport (ACK), Nantucket, Massachusetts. The non-scheduled cargo flight was conducted under 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135.

According to the operator, most of the operation was principally based in Manchester, New Hampshire, while the accident airplane and pilot were based at Hyannis. The accident flight was scheduled to depart Hyannis at 0900. About 0800, the pilot checked in with the operator via telephone in order to provide the flight's fuel and alternate destination information. 0956, the pilot contacted air traffic control and requested clearance to taxi for departure. After taxiing, the flight was cleared to take off from runway 24 at 1000.

A witness located just outside the airport perimeter fence, and near the arrival end of runway 24, observed the airplane as it taxied. According to the witness, he found it strange that the airplane did not stop and "rev up" its engines as he thought airplanes normally did, but instead taxied on the taxiway parallel to the runway and then made a 180-degree turn onto the runway without stopping. The airplane then initiated the takeoff roll, and the witness noted that the engine sound did not seem to increase. The witness also thought that the airplane "must have been empty," since it took off quickly, and was airborne within 100 yards of the start of the takeoff roll. As soon as the airplane became airborne, it began a steep left bank. The witness initially thought the airplane was turning for a normal departure, but because the turn was initiated so low and the bank became so steep, he then thought that the airplane might "catch a wing" on the ground. The airplane disappeared from his view behind trees, and shortly thereafter the witness heard the sounds of impact.


The reported weather conditions at HYA, at 0956, included winds from 260 degrees true at 9 knots, 10 statute miles visibility, clear skies, temperature 21 degrees Celsius (C), dewpoint 7 degrees C, and an altimeter setting of 29.74 inches of mercury.

The pilot held an airline transport pilot certificate with a rating for airplane multiengine land, and a commercial pilot certificate with a rating for airplane single engine land. According to the operator, the pilot had accumulated 3,607 total hours of flight experience, 1,927 total hours of multiengine flight experience, and 99 hours of flight experience in the accident airplane make and model.

The wreckage was examined at the accident scene on June 19, 2008. There was a strong odor of fuel, and all major components of the airplane were accounted for at the scene.

The initial impact point was a ground scar located about 1,100 feet from the threshold, and to the southeast side, of runway 24. The ground scar was 14 feet long, 2 feet wide, and oriented 165 degrees magnetic, which was approximately the same direction as the remainder of the wreckage path. Another ground scar, approximately 5 feet long, and 2 feet wide, was located about 27 feet beyond the initial impact point. Just beyond the second ground scar was a debris field, comprised primarily of components from the forward area of the fuselage, and various items from the cockpit area.

The remainder of the wreckage came to rest 53 feet beyond the initial impact point, with the fuselage oriented 350 degrees magnetic. The nose and cockpit area exhibited significant crush damage, but the remainder of the fuselage aft of the cockpit bulkhead remained largely intact. Both wings were separated from the fuselage at their respective roots, while the empennage was separated just forward of the horizontal stabilizer. Both wings and the empennage remained attached to the fuselage by control cables. The right wing exhibited leading edge crush damage along the outermost one-third of its span, while the left wing exhibited leading edge crush damage along the outermost one-fifth of its span.

Control continuity was established from the ailerons, elevator, elevator trim tab, rudder, and rudder trim tab to the cockpit area. No evidence of corrosion or fatigue failure was observed on any of the primary or secondary control cables. Both wing flaps were found in the fully extended position; however, the drive and actuation mechanisms were separated from each other, and the flaps were free to move.

Examination of the cockpit control column, which had separated from its mount and was found in the debris area, revealed that the upper flight control lock was still attached to the column by its removable pin. The pin attaching the upper control lock to the control column remained tethered to upper flight control lock by a steel cable. However, the pins from the two other flight control lock cables were missing, and the cables exhibited pin retaining end failures consistent with overstress. The instrument panel-mounted attach tab for the upper control lock was fractured, and the portion of the tab that attached to the control lock was not located. The lower flight control lock was found inside an unsecured metal tube that was lying next to the right seat track of the pilot's seat. Both the upper and lower flight control locks were retained for further examination.

Both engines were dislocated from their mounts, but the right engine remained attached to its nacelle by oil lines. Both engines were retained for further examination. One blade from the right propeller was separated at the hub, and was found about 275 feet beyond the main wreckage along the wreckage path. This blade exhibited severe tip curling and burnishing of the blade face. All three blades from the right propeller exhibited s-bending, chordwise scratching, and leading edge gouging. One blade from the left propeller exhibited slight forward bending, while the remaining two were bent at a point about one-fourth of their span.

A Garmin 295 handheld global positioning system receiver was recovered from the wreckage and examined in the Safety Board Vehicle Recorders Laboratory, Washington, DC. Examination of the unit revealed that it was not recording track log information at the time of the accident.
 
http://www.capecodonline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080618/NEWS11/80618015

I got the call about noon that my old boss was the pilot. It was a small company, and we were like a big dysfunctional family there. (Not at Wiggins) His name has not been released yet, but he was a father and gave me a shot at a start-up airline when I desperately needed a job. You never forget those that helped you when you needed it. He went out doing what he loved. RIP

Edit: Name has been released. RIP Mark Conway. Thanks for helping me get where I am today.
I lost a dear friend 4 yrs ago when my old 135 boss wrecked a navijo. 25000 fing hours. I feel your pain my man.
 
Please explain to me what I am hoping I didn't read, and the gust lock was still installed? Not the first time that this has happened and it won't be the last.
 
Unfortunate, but perhaps a runup check (if the witness account is accurate) would have caught this. This type of behavior sadly, is not uncommon. I see guys do this all the time.

Complacency is a killer in aviation. It seems to manifest itself in many preventable accidents.

On another note, I just read some article (Flying mag) about a Citation jet with a 25K ATP at the controls who put it in the ground on takeoff due to the unlatched nose baggage door popping open.
 
Gust lock still installed was the first thing I thought of when I heard the description of the takeoff and crash and saw the picture. I get no points though. I have 2,000 hours in -6s and the control lock still installed was always something I had nightmares about.

Control check control check control check.

We had control locks that had a huge metal flag attached with red warning letters but I have seen some control locks that had nothing and could easily be overlooked. The Twin Otter control lock is a two part thing. One attaches to the dash and the back of the control collumn and the other attaches to the bottom of that top part and sticks into a hole at the base of the control collumn to hold the rudder in place.
 
Checklist discipline or developing a ritual of flows is a must-have in the single-pilot environment. Very, very sorry that this happened to a man with a family and a fellow Cape Codder. My prayers are with the family.

Regards,

ex-Navy Rotorhead
 
Sad that it was so preventable, too bad to lose it all over a control lock.


Not bashing your friend, but why do they always say that these pilots are so experienced? He had 3600 hrs over 24 yrs. Thats only 150 hrs a year. I too have been flying for 24 yrs, and have over 17000 hrs.


My thoughts and prayers to the kids.
 

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